IR 05000327/1980004
| ML19305D886 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 02/27/1980 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Gouge M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19305D885 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-80-04, 50-327-80-4, 50-328-80-03, 50-328-80-3, NUDOCS 8004160072 | |
| Download: ML19305D886 (5) | |
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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o 101 MARIETTA ST N.W.. SUITE 3100
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o ATLANTA. G EORGIA 30303
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Report Nos. 50-327/80-04 and 50-328/80-03 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, TN 37401 Facility Name: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328
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License Nos. CPPR-72 and CPPR-73 Inspection at Sequoyah site near Chattanooga, Tennessee k' 5
C Inspector:
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M. J. Gouge /
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Date Signed Approved by:
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S~. Cantrell, Sectio'yCM'ef, RC&ES Branch Da,(e Sigtied SUMMARY Inspection on February 5-7, 1980 Areas Inspected This routine unannounced inspection involved 23 inspector-hours on site in the areas of followup on an allegation, 50.55(e) items, followup on IE Bulletins and Circulars, and observation of safety-related activities.
Results Of the four areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- G. G. Stack, Project Manager
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B. Northern, Jr., Construction Engineer
- D. W. Mack, Assistant Construction Engineer
- R. W. Olson, Assistant Construction Engineer
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H. J. Fischer, Supervisor, Mechanical Engineering Unit G. B. Lubinski, Supervisor, Electrical Engineering Unit R. C. Miles, Supervisor, QCRU J. M. Munns, Supervisor, Construction QA Unit
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D. J. Record, Assistant Operations Superintendent
- D. O. McCloud, Supervisor, Nuclear Station QA Unit V. F. Powell, Mechanical Engineering Unit
- E. C. Pendergrass, Engineer, QCRU J. A. Thompson, Supervisor, Hanger Inspection Unit
D. L. Wall, Licensing Engineer, ENDES Other licensee employees contacted included various construction craftsmen, technicians and office personnel.
I Other Organizations kestinghouse Electric Corporation
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R. Mattason, Site Manager
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NRC Resident Inspector W. T. Cottle, SRI S. D. Butler, RI
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- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 7, 1980 with those persons indicated in Paragraph I above.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
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Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Licensee Identified Items (Units 1 and 2)
TVA has reported a number of items to Region II as reportable in compliance with 10 CFR 50.55(e). The Region II inspector reviewed the items listed below and the supporting documentation, and discussed the items with responsible licensee staff during this inspection.
a.
(Closed) Item 50-328/79-07-01:
Upper Head Injection (UHI) Rate (NCR MEB 78-4).
This NCR was closed for Unit 1 in inspection report 50-327/79-20. The inspector reviewed closed ECN 2110, the licensee's final report dated December 28, 1978 and work package F271M087-001.
Modifications to the Unit 2 UHI accumulator tanks level instrume,nta-
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tion to correct the problem identified by NCR MEB 78-4 have been completed.
b.
(Closed, Item 50-328/79-16-05: Error in Design of Small Line Pipe Supports (PCR SWP 79-S-1).
This NCR his been incorporated into NCR CEB 79-19.
The inspector reviewed portions of open ECN 2548, and the TVA final report dated March 7,1979 and discussed this item with the Supervisor, langer Inspection Unit. Design effort on ECN 2548 is nearing completion and work will be accomplished under various system work packages. This ECN affects the majority of hangers supporting piping that penetrates the containment vessel but will not impact Unit 2 to the extent Unit I was affected due to the earlier stage of con-struction of Unit 2.
c.
(Closed) Item 50-328/79-21-01:
Incorrect Weight of Velan Valves (NCR MEB 79-20).
The licensee's final report dated July 5, 1979 stated that the corrective action for this item would be specified in the response to IE Bulletin 79-04.
Region II has reviewed the response dated November 9, 1979 for IE Bulletin 79-04 and has closed the subject bulletin in inspection report 50-327/79-72 and 50-328/79-35.
The licensee's analysis and corrective action for this item is
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adequate.
d.
(Closed) Item 50-327/79-36-12: Pressurizer Relief Piping Supports (NCR SWP 79-S-8).
This item was discussed in inspection reports 50/327/79-72 and 50-327/79-53. TVA has furnished NRR data on weld heat input, results of stress corrosion testing, environment of the pressurizer relief piping interior, NDE records and stress data due to the weld bead draw repairs to the deformed piping. NRR (Mechanical Engineer Branch) has reviewed the submitted data and documented this review on internal memorandum R. M. Gustafson to S. S. Pawlicki dated January 25, 1980.
The memorandum concludes "it is recommended that NRC accept the repaired pressurizer relief line".
NRR has previously granted a waiver for ASME Section XI hydrostatic testing of the repaired Class 1 piping.
TVA has redesigned the support 1-RCH-93
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-3-s which caused the original deformation of this piping during hot func-tional testing. TVA corrective actions are discussed in the final report dated June 22, 1979.
e.
(Open) Item 50-327/80-04-01 and 50-328/80-03-01:
Bettis Valve Actuators (NCR 19P). TVA informed Region II of this item on December 18, 1979 and submitted a final report dated January 17, 1980. At the time of this inspection a work plan had not been issued to coordinate correc-tive action for this item.
f.
(Open) Item 50-327/80-04-02 and 50-328/80-03-02:
Radiation Monitor Spurious Signals (NCR 20P). TVA informed Region II of this item on January 4, 1980 and submitted an interim report dated January 30, 1980.
This item remains open pending receipt and review of a TVA final report on this matter.
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(0 pen) Item 50-327/80-04-03 and 50-328/80-03-03:
Omitted Supports in CVCS (NCR CEB 79-38). TVA informed Region II of this item on January 3, 1980 and submitted a final report dated January 31, 1980. Work on this item for Unit I had not commenced at the time of this inspection.
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(Closed) Item 50-327/10-04-04 and 50-328/80-03-04:
Copes-Vulcan Valve Weights - UHI (NCR NEB 80-01).
TVA informed Region II on
this item on January 11, 1980. The inspector reviewed the TVA final
report dated February 11, 1980, Licensing Engineering Change Notice
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5176 and Unit 2 ECN 2548 which document the design reanalysis to reflect the revised valve weights. Analysis has shown that no piping /
hanger modifications are required for the revised valve weights.
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(0 pen) Item 50-327/80-04-05:
Piping Seismic Analysis (NCR CEB 80-02).
TVA informed Region II of this item on January 4,1980.
A final report is due February 4, 1980.
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(Closed) Item 50-32P/80-03-05:
Inappropriate Documentation for Engineered Supports (NCR SN-M-79-15). TVA informed Region II of this item on January 3, 1980 and submitted a final report dated February 1, 1980.
Corrective actions described in the final report were reviewed by the Unit 2 principal inspector and are adequate.
6.
IE Bulletin and Circulars (Units 1 and 2)
The principal inspector (Unit 2) reviewed the file of IE Circulars a.
maintained in the project managers office. All 1979 (79-01 through 79-25) Circulars had been received and reviewed by (as a minimum) the project manager and construction engineer.
Circulars that described I
problems that could potentially affect Sequoyah design and construction were forwarded to the site from the design / construction corporate office with a memorandum directing determination of applicability and corrective action if required.
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b.
(Closed) The following bulletins require no action for Sequoyah Unit 2 and were forwarded for information only:
IEB 79-13 IEB 79-18 IEB 79-26 IEB 79-16 IEB 79-19 IEB 80-01 IEB 79-17 IEB 79-21 IEB 80-02 c.
(Closed) IEB 79-23: Potential Failure of Emergency Diesel Generator Field Exciter Transformer (Units 1 and 2).
Region II has reviewed the TVA response letter dated October 29, 1979.
This letter states that the diesel generators at Sequoyah do not have a grounded neutral on the excitation power transformer that would allow circulating currents.
The letter further stated that a common connection did exist between a low-KVA rated potential transformer and the diesel generators but that excessive circulating currents are limited by fuses on the potential transformer grounded neutral. The full load operational tests described in the subject bulletin have been completed satisfactory, d.
(Closed) IEB 79-24: Frozen Lines (Units 1 and 2).
Region II has reviewed the TVA response letter dated October 30, 1979. The actions required by the bulletin have been completed. The design review of freeze protection heat tracing identified the following lines lacking heat tracing:
(1) sensing lines off the feedwater flow elements (2) full flow test line from the containment spray pumps where it joins the refueling water stroage tank Installation of heat tracing for items (1) and (2) was in progress for Unit I at the time of the inspection. This work is conducted under work plans 8232 and 8233 and will be completed before operation at 1%
power.
e.
(Closed) IEB 79-25: Failures of Westinghouse BFD Relays in Safety
Related Systems (Units 1 and 2).
The TVA response letter dated January 4,1980 stated that none of the subject BFD/NBFD relays were
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in use or planned for use in safety-related system at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.
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7.
Followup on Allegation (Unit 1)
On January 10, 1980 an allegation was made to Region II concerning shipment of two nonconforming ASME Class 2 valves from Watts Bar to Sequoyah. A total of six, two inch, motor operated ASME Class 2 valves were originally received at Watts Bar site without proper seismic documentation. This was documented on Over, Short, or Defective (OSD) Report 87872-A dated March 25, 1976, and Watts Bar Nonconformance Report (NCR) 232, R2 dated May 19, 1976.
The OSD report and NCR are still open.
In August 1977, the NCR tags were j
removed from two of the four valves (serials 2TM78FM 740 and 2TM78FN 731)
and these two valves were sent to Sequoyah for installation in the Safety
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-5-Injection System (SIS). The specific concern of the alleger was that the nonconforming status of the two valves was lost during the transfer to Sequoyah.
Investigation revealed that the above Watts Bar OSD report and NCR were referenced on the shipping ticket (No. G 93292) that accompanied the valves to Sequoyah. Discussions with Sequoyah Site personnel and inspections of site QA records indicate that Sequoyah management was aware of the noncon-forming status of these two valves upon arrival on site. This is documented by Sequoyah OSD Report A104642 dated September 30, 1977 and NCR's 480 and 481 dated September 28, 1977. These NCR's were resolved on October 17, 1977 when seismic documentation (approved stress reports) was received from Westinghouse. The receipt of proper documentation is documented on the NCR's and Westinghouse QR 24061 I (Valve serial 740) and QR 25650-1 (valve serial 731). The nonconforming status of these valves was properly identi-fied, controlled and resolved by Sequoyah site personnel. The allegation could not be substantiated.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Observation of Safety-Related Activities (Units 1 and 2)
The project inspector conducted a general walk through inspection of Units 1 and 2 Containment Buildings and the Auxiliary Building. Areas inspected included general housekeeping practices, storage of QA materials, rigging practices, measures to control cleanliness of piping, and installation of various supports for safety-related piping and valves.
During the inspection the area around the top of the Unit 1 pressurizer was examined for housekeeping and installation of relief valve and piping supports.
It was noted that the vent valve off the 6" pressurizer spray line (1-68-594) was opened and the downstream blank flange was disconnected.
This resulted in exposing the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) to atmosphere. There was no construction activity or testing in the area and no apparent need for the open valve and disconnected flange.
The area was clean and the pipe size was small (3/4"); it is doubtful that any foreign matter entered the RCPB. The specific concern was control of valve position and blank flanges and the restoration of the RCPB following repairs, testing, or temporary alterations. Discussions with the shift engineer on duty indicated that the valve was open and blank flange disconnected for insertion of tygon tubing to monitor reactor vessel water level during preoperational maintenance.
Inspection of control room records revealed that the valve 1-68-594 out-of-normal position was recorded. The licensee stated that a valve lineup on all safety-related systems would be performed prior to Unit I fuel loading. The operations Senior Resident Inspector had previously indicated concern with control of blank flanges and the licensee was in the process of revising the valve lineup procedures to include a check of blank flanges. These steps should insure integrity of the RCPB prior to fuel loading. The valve lineup to be performed prior to fuel loading will include blank flanges used in lieu of second isolation valves.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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