IR 05000327/1980036
| ML19341C951 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1980 |
| From: | Butler S, Cottle W, Dance H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19341C939 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-80-36, NUDOCS 8103040593 | |
| Download: ML19341C951 (8) | |
Text
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C0!iill':S 2.7:0 l2.'.:0.TO.'l Report No. 50-327/80-36 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 Facility Name: Sequoyah Unit 1 License No. DPR-77 Inspection at Sequoyah site near Chattanooga, Tennessee Inspectors:
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Date Signed Approved by:
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Ddte gigned 9 14 B. C. Danc'e, Section Chief, RONS Branch SL?fMARY Inspection on August 1-31, 1980
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Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 108 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of operational safety verification, verification of license conditions, IE Bulletin review, independent inspection effort and followup on plant incidents.
Results Of the five areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in two areas; three items of noncompliance were found in three areas (Infraction -
failure to control designated vehicles; (see paragraph 5); infraction - f ailure to follow procedure (see paragraph 8); infraction - failure to comply with Technical Specifications (see paragral,h 7).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees J. M. Ballentine, Plant Superintendent i
C. E. Cantrell, Assistant Plant Superintendent W. F. Popp, Assistant Plant Superintendent J. W. Doty, Maintenance Supervisor ei)
J. M. McGriff, Maintenance Supervisor (I)
W. A. Watson, Maintenance Supervisor (E)
D. J. Record, Operations Supervisor W. H. Kinsey, Results Supervisor R. J. Kitts, Health Physics Supervisor C. R. Brimer, Outage Director R. S. Kaplan, Supervisor, Public Safety Services
.W. M. Halley, Preoperational Test Supervisor D. O. McCloud, Quality Assurance Supervisor J. R. Bynum, Assistant to Plant Superintendent Other licensee employees contacted included three technicians, eight operators, nine shift engineers, five security force members, twelve engineers, two maintenance personnel, two contractor personnel, and four corporate office personnel.
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Other Organizations L. Barry, USNRC J. LeDoux, USNRC q
Eleven inspectors from USNRC Region II office 2.
Exit Interviews
The inspection scope and findings were summarized with the Plant Superinten-dent and members of his staff on August 7, 11, and 22, 1980. The apparent items of noncompliance were discussed with the Plant Superintendent or his designated representatives immediately following the identification of each, item. The findings were acknowledged.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
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4.
Unresolved Items l
Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
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2-5.
Operational Safety Verification The inspector toured various areas of Unit 1 on a routine basis throughout the reporting period. The f.ollowing activities were reviewed / verified:
a.
Adherence to limiting conditions for operation which were directly observable from the control room panels.
b.
Control board instrumentation and recorder traces.
c.
Proper control room and shif t manning.
d.
The use of approved operating procedures.
e.
Unit operator and shif t engineer logs.
f.
General shift operating practices.
g.
Housekeeping practices, h.
Fire protection measures for hot work.
i.
Posting of hold tags, caution tags and temporary alteration tags.
j.
Measures to exclude foreign materials from entry into clean systems.
k.
Personnel, package, and vehicle access control for the Unit 1 protected area.
1.
General shift security practices on post manning, vital area access control and security force response to alarms.
m.
Surveillance testing and preoperational testing in progress.
n.
Maintenance activities in progress.
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The inspectors reviewed a new technique for placing the Upper Head Injection (UHI) accumulators in service.
In addition, the inspectots reviewed a generic Westinghouse evaluation on the impact of continued operation of the
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unit with the UHI diaphram ruptured. The review was performed because of
indications of a pinhole leak in the UHI diaphram.
The inspectors witnessed portions of the Auxiliary Feedwater System endurance and control testing performed during this reporting period. The inspectors followed licensee's efforts in reducing the ambient temperature in the i
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CONTAnis 2.70 Ei.iU.liniD3
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Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump room.
Actions taken included installing additional insulation on steam admission and steam trap process lines, and correction of a ventilation damper which had separated from the actuator arm. These actions resulted in reducing the ambient room temperature by approximately 12 degrees ~ fahrenheit.
The inspectors verified, by a physi.al survey and by discussions with plant
. personnel, that there are no load centers inside the reactor building which would require entry in order to restore power to valves which are locked in position in accordance with Technical Specification requirements.
An inspector reviewed a proposed plant staff reorganization.
Licensee
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management was reminded that a Technical Specification change would have to be approved prior to implementation of the new organization.
On August 15, during a routine tour of the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building the inspector noted that the Floor Drain Tank was overflowing on Elevation 653.
This was reported to the shift engineer and action was initiated to correct the overflow. There was no radiological contamination problem associated with this event.
During this reporting y criod, a distributed hydrogen ignition system was installed in the Unit 1 Reactor Building. The system has not been reviewed and approved by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) but the preliminary installation was concurred in by NRR. The inspector cautioned licensee' management that provisions must be made to prevent unauthorized
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energization of the system pending final approval by NRR. This will be verified in a subsequent inspection (327/80-36-02).
No other items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Verification of License Conditions During this reporting period, t'ae inspectors performed the following activities in support of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation's licensing efforts:
a.
Obtained a commitment from licensee representatives to make main control board labeling changes identified during the NRR inspection of emergency operating instructions.
These changes involved seven component labels on the main control board and will be verified during the next inspection period (327/80-36-03).
b.
Performed a verification of items identified during the NRR/ vendor inspection of human performance factors of control room layout.
During this verification, the inspectors noted that the background noise in the control room was in excess of the 65 dbA acceptance l
criteria. The licensee has taken additional measures to reduce the
background noise level to 62-64 dbA. This will be verified during the next inspection period (327/80-36-04).
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All on site documentation concerning the pressurizer relief line mockups and associated testin; was collected and reviewed.
d.
Witnessed portions of the Auxiliary Feedwater System endurance testing.The licensee did experience a problem with an overheated component in the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump governor controller during the endurance testing.
This failure will be documented in licensee's report to NRR.
e.
Evaluated the manpower requirements to reroute Emergency Raw Cooling Water electrical conduits to obtain adequate train separation for fire protection measures.
f.
Reviewed draft of Supplement 2 to the Safety Evaluation Report and the draft of the full power operating license. Comments were provided to the Region II office for transmittal to NRR.
In addition, the Resident Inspector participated in at inspection of emergency planning activities on August 20 and 21 with int,ectors from the Region II office.
Details of this inspection are in IE Report 50-327/80-34. The Senior Resident Inspector attended the Commission Hearing for a full power operating license in Washington, D. C. on August 21.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified with the exception of an apparent item of noncompliance identified in IE Report 50-327/80-34.
7.
IE Bulletins The Resident Inspector reviewed licensee's testing program initiated in response to IEB 80-06 " Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Reset Controls."
In reviewing the test data for TVA-56, the inspector noted an entry in the official test log, dated 7/27/80, that reid "had problem with FCV-61-192 going closed.
It took approximately 20 s econds for the valve to cycle closed." FCV-61-192 is a containment isola?. ion valve and in accordance with Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 has a maximum isolation time of less than or equal to 10 seconds. This fact was not identified by the test engineer and since the plant was in Mode 3 at the time, resulted in operation of the plant in violation of Technical Specification 3.6.3.1.
This is an apparent item of noncompliance (327/80-36-05).
Licensee management agreed that a further review of TVA-56 test data would
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be performed to insure than any other discrepancies between the test data and the Technical Specification requirements are identified.
This review should be documented in licensee's response to the item of noncompliance.
No other items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Folloup on Plant Incidents The Resident Inspector reviewed the details concering two bomb threats received at the facility on August 1.
Licensee's actions taken in response to the threats, including immediate notification of the NRC, appeared to have been adequate.
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The Senior Resident Inspector reviewed the circumstances concerning a reactor trip which occurred on August 12.
The reactor trip was initiated by a low low water level in #2 steam generator. The water level was being decraased in #2 steam generator in order to perform optimization testing on an auxiliary feedwater flow control valve controller loop at the time of the reactor trip. The reactor operator apparently overfed #2 steam generator and the resulting " shrink" caused the water level to decrease to the trip setpoint.
Plant response and operator actions taken subsequent to the reactor trip appeared to be adequate.
During the plant restart fo} lowing the reactor trip on August 12, an uncontrolled rod withdrawal event occurred.
b'ith the reactor plant at 3%
Rated Thermal Power (RTP), the reactor operator withdrew control banks C and D one step.
k' hen the rod control In-Hold-Out switch was released, the rods continued to step in the out direction.
Placing the In-Hold-Out switch to the "In" position and returning it to the " Hold" position did not halt the rod motion.
k' hen control banks C and D had stepped out 5 steps and reactor power had increased to approximately 3.3% RTP, the reactor operator initiated a manual reactor trip. All control rods inserted on the reactor trip. Plant response and operator actions taken subsequent to the reactor trip appeared to be adequate.
The inspectors followed licensee's investigation of the rod control system malfunction and concur with the following general findings which were made:
The cause of the malfunction was a failure of a relay contact set in a.
the out motion relty. The contact set failed to the closed position.
This produced a continuous OUT directional common signal to control circuitry (pulse thaper signal) internal to the rod control logic cabinet.
The remaining two contact sets in the out motion relay functioned normally.
b.
The malfunction was of an intermittent nature.
The contact set did not fail to a hard closed condition and apparently opened when power was removed from the contact set. During subsequent trouble shooting, with the reactor trip breakers open, the malfunction recurred and was permitted to continue for several hours. This lead to a hard failure of the suspected contact set to the closed position.
The cause of the contact set failurc may have been related to an event c.
which occurred a week prior to this malfunction. During installation and checkout of a metal impact monitoring system inhibiting modification to the rod control system, high current was drawn through an adjacent contact set in this relay.
The licensee is working with the relay vendor (C. P. Clare Company) to determine the failure mode of the contact set.
d.
Both rod motion relays (In and Out) were replaced and rod control system verifications were performed.
In addition to the above findings, the inspectors noted that the reactor operators and senior reactor operators involved in the event took prompt corrective action to terminate the event and place the plant in a safe condition.
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On August 8, the inspectors were informed that a radioactive waste shipment from Sequoyah had been found to contain excessive free water when inspected
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at the Barnwell, South Carolina disposal site. The inspector collected all available information on the specific shipment and briefed Region II manage-ment. This activity was transferred to the Region II office for followup inspection.
J On August 9, 1980, during the performance of preoperational test TVA-13B, the diesel generator 86 LOR relay coils were burned out during the process of securing the diesel generators.
In this cc dition, the non-essential trips for the diesel generators would not have 17en disabled upon receipt of an automatic start signal.
The licensee took prompt action in declaring the diesel generators inoperable and in replacing the relay coils. All applicable Technical Specification requirements concerning the diesel generators were complied with. It was
noted by the inspectors that even though the diesel generators were dec'.ared inoperable, they would have performed their design function except that the non-essential trips would not have been disabled in an emergency situation.
The System Operating Instructions for securing the diesel generators, (SOI 82.1, 82.2, 82.3, 82.4) contained adequate guidance to have prevented this occurrence had they been followed. Failure to follow the applicable System
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Operating Instructions for securing the diesel geaerators is an apparent
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item of noncompliance (327/80-36-06).
No other items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
9.
Independent Inspection Effort
The inspectors routinely attended the morning scheduling and staff meetings during the reporting period. These meetings provide a daily status report on the construct
.n and testing activities in progress as well as a discussion of significant problems or incidents associated with the construction, testing and operations effort.
The inspectors coordinated f.he site visits and assisted in the inspection efforts of those NRC personnel listed in section 1 of this report.
The inspectors reviewed AOI-8, Tornado Watch." It was noted during the review that this procedure called for both control room emergency pressurization fans to be secured. The inspectors pointed out that this would be in violation of the Technical Specification requirements governing the control room ventilation systems. The licensee agreed in this evaluation and a chaage to AOI-8 is in progress.
This will be verified during the next inspection period (327/80-36-07).
The Resident Inspector began a review of the completed data sheets for SU-1.0, Baseline Data. The licensee had not yet assimilated the complete data package. This review will be continued in the next inspection period.
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The Senior Resident Inspector followed up _ on selected hanger discrepancies identified during thin reporting period as a result of licensee's efforts i
to complete IEB 79-14 requirements.
In each instance, licensee's actions appeared to be both timely and in accordance with applicable Technical Specification requirements.
In response to a request from Region II manag pent, the inspectors reviewed the status of the Westinghouse evaluation concerning the potential failure l
of the holddown springs on the 17 x 17 fuel assemblies. It appears that the Westinghouse recommendation for Sequoyah will be to replace the holddown
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springs on Unit I at the first refueling and to replace the holddown springs
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on Unit 2 prior to initial fuel loading. This information was transmitted to the Region II Office for evaluation.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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