IR 05000327/1980003
| ML19309C943 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 02/19/1980 |
| From: | Cottle W, Dance H, Kellogg P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19309C938 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-80-03, 50-327-80-3, NUDOCS 8004090413 | |
| Download: ML19309C943 (10) | |
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101 MARIETTA sT., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, G EORGI A 30303 Report No. 50-327/80-3 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 Facility Name.
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Docket No. 50-327 License No. CPPR-72 Inspection at Sequoyah site near Chattanooga, Tennessee and Corporate Offices, Chattanooga, Tennessee 3 Inspectors:
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H, Kister, L. Crocker, C. Stahle, J. Snell Approved by:
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II. C. Dance, Section Chief, RONS Branch Da'te Slgned SUmiARY Inspection on January 28-30, 1980 Areas Inspected This special, announced inspection involved 90 inspector-hours in the areas of shif t technical advisor, augmentation of plant staff for startup test program, independent safety review function, onsite and offsite management capability and technical capability, and the onsite operation support center and technical support center.
Results Of the five areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees J. Ballentine, Superintendent Sequoyah
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Calhoun, Director, Nuclear Power C. Cantrell, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance
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Coffey, Assistant Reactor Nuclear Power
- A. Crevasse, Quality Assurance Manager
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Dewcase, Assistant Director Nuclear Power J. Dotie, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
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R. Ecker, Assistant Outage Coordinator
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- H. Green, Assistant Manager Power Operations W. Kinsey, Results Supervisor R. Kitts, Health Physics Supervisor
- T. Knight, Chief, Reactor Engineering Branch
- D. Lambert, Manager Power Regulation Staff J. McGriff, Instrument and Control Maintenance Supervisor
- L. Mills, Manager, Nuclear Regulations and Safety D. Ormsby, Regulatory Staff
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Parker, Assistant to Director Nuclear Power W. Popp, Assistant Superintendent-Operations D. Record, Operations Supervisor
- F. Szczepanski, Nuclear Safety Review Board
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- E. Thomas, Manager Power Operations
- P. Wallace, Nuclear Operations Coordinator W. Watson, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included operators and technical support personnel.
- Att ended exit interview.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 30, 1980, with the persons indicated in Paragraph I above.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
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4.
Unresolved Items
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Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
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5.
Shift Technical Advisor The objective of this portion of the inspection was to determine whether the licensee was prepared to implement the shift technical advisor (STA)
staffing requirement / commitment by time of issuance of an operating license for Unit 1.
a.
Documents Reviewed The following reference and licensee documents were reviewed and discussed:
(1) NUREG-0578, "THI-2 lessons learned Task Force Status Report and Short Term Recommendations" dated July 1979.
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(2) Clarifying documents for NUREG-0578 dated October 30 and November 9, 1979.
(3) American National Standards (ANS) draft revision 3.1 of December 6, 1979 entitled " Standard for Qualification and Training of Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants."
(4) Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SNP) Administrative Instruction AI-27,
" Shift Technical Advisor" dated November 27, 1979.
j (5) SNP Standard Practice SQA 106, " Shift Technical Advisor Qualifica-tion and Training" dated November 27, 1979.
(6) Division of Power Division Procedures Manual (DPM) No. N79A15,
" Shift Technical Advisor" dated January 7, 1980.
(7) SNP Results Section Instruction Letter No. A.24, " Training of Results Section Personnel Other Than Instrumentation," dated i
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November 20, 1978.
i (8) TVA responses to VUREG-0578 dated September 7 and October 31, 1979.
(9) Records of education, training and work experience for eight (8)
engineers of the SNP Results Section staff who had been designated as potential STA's.
b.
Findings (1) No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in this area.
(2)
In certain cases, the STA may also be the lead test engineer for a startup test.
It was observed that adequate augumentation and assistaaee must be maintained on shift in the event of such a dual rol.
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(3) One of the engineers designated as STA has been employed for less than one year and this represents the total work experience.
Licensee personnel were informed that such use of an engineer with less than one year experience appeared to be contradictary to Section 4.4.8 of ANS 3.1 draft dated Decembec 6, 1979. There are an adequate number of STA's who have been on site for greater than one year to provide for shif t coverage.
(4) Discussions with STA candidates revealed that their functions and responsibilities had not been fully defined for them.
Management stated that training and indoctrination would be completed prior to receipt of an operating licensee and the functions would be defined in procedures.
(5)
Interim training, or training for initial assignment as ST4, had not been completed for two (2) of the eight (8) engineers. This is to be completed prior to fuel loading.
(6) The role of the STA in evaluation and dissemination of operating experience from other plants and mechanisms for accomplishing this function had not been defined. This is to be completed prior to fuel loading.
These items are designated as an open
item 50-327/80-3-01 and will be followed up at a subsequent
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inspection.
6.
Augmentation of Plant Staff for Startup Test Program The purpose of this portion of the inspection was to determine the degree of augmentation and assistance to be given the plant staff for the startup
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test program, including special testing.
a.
Documents Reviewed The following reference and licensee documents were reviewed and discussed:
(1) SNP FSAR Section 14.2, including Figures 14.2-1 and 14.2.1 and Tahic 14.2-2.
(2) SNP Standard Practice SQA 44, " Plant Startup Test Program, dated February 27, 1979.
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(3) SNp Standard Practice'SQA 109, "Special Low-Power Test Program,"
dated January 2, 1980.
(4) TVA Operational QA Manual, Part II, Section 4.2, " Plant Startup Test Program," dated December 7, 1979.
(5) Letter No. SAD-ND-564 from M.'A. Slano of Westinghouse to i
D. R. Patterson of TVA regarding Westinghouse Startup Support dated January 30, 1980.
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Findings (1) No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
l (2) Four TVA engineers, including the STA and a Westinghouse engineer will be assigned to shif t coverage during the normal startup tests.
Review of personnel data for the plant engineering staff a
revealed that several of the individuals have had startup program experience at one or more PWR's.
(3)
In addition to the four engineers in (1) above, assistance will be provided for the special startup tests as follows:
(a) One member of the Special Test Group.
(b) An of fsite observer f rom the Plant Engineering Branch '<ni the day shift.
(c) Another Westinghouse nuclear or systems engineer.
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(4) Station Quality Assurance (SQA) 44 and SQA 109 did not define the role of Westinghouse in assisting the conduct of tests and/or
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reviewing test results. Station management stated that these procedures would be revised prior to fuel load (open item 50-327/80-3-02).
7.
Onsite Organization and Technical Capability The objective of this part of the inspection was to review management and technical capability of the Sequoyah nuclear plant staff.
In performing this task a review was conducted of the plant staff organizational arrange-
ment, responsibility, authority, and qualifications of plant staff principal personnel, shif t crew composition and interfacing of principal personnel
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with offsite groups supporting the operation of the Sequoyah nuclear plant.
a.
Documents Reviewed L
The following reference and licensee documents were reviewed and discussed.
P (1) Sequoyah Nuclear Plant FSAR Section 13 and 14.
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(3) Draft ANS 3.2, dated December 6, 1979.
i (4) Site Radiological Emergency Plan
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(5) Qualifications of principle plant personnel.
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Findings j
(1) No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in this area.
(2) The Sequoyah Nuclear Plant organizational arrangement currently functioning at the plant site is not in accordance with that described in the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant FSAR Section 13.1; and has not been reviewed and evaluated by the NRC.
This is identi-fled as an open item pending reorganization back to the organiza-
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tion described in the FSAR or submittal of a FSAR revision to reflect the new organization as it exists (50-327/80-3-03).
(3) Personnel assigned to principal positions associated with the important operational aspects of the facility (Shif t Engineers, Operations Supervision) generally lack operational experience with pressurized water reactors. This is identified as an open item 50-327/80-3-04. Subsequent to the inspection, TVA informed the inspector that qualified individuals with PWR experience would be assigned to each operating shift.
(4) The Site Radiological Emergency Plan does not establish specific lines of authority and establishment of responsibility for these persons reporting to the site to provide technical support in the event of an emergency. This item is identified as an open item pending incorporation of these lines of authority into the site Radiological Emergency Plan (50-327/80-3-05).
8.
Independent Safety Review Function The objective of the portion of the inspection was to determine that the licensee has established or plans to establish an onsite safety engineering group to perform independent reviews of plant operational activities and engineering evaluation of the operating history of the plant and plant of similar design.
a.
Documents Reviewed (1) Sequoyah Nuclear Plant FSAR Chapter 13.1, Organizational Structure
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Chapter 13.4, Review and Audit
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Appendix 13.4b, Charter Nuclear Safety Review Board
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Chapter 14.1, Test Program
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Chapter 14.2, Augmentation of Plant Staff for Special Tests
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and Operation (2) TVA Operational Quality Assurance Manual Part 2, Section 4.2, Plant Startup Test Program
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Part 2, Section 4.6, Special Tests, Experiments or Activities
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Part 2, Section 1.4, Evaluation of Changes in Reator Core
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Operation and Core Operating Transients
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-6-(3) Response to Letter from Division of Operating Reactors dated September 13, 1979.
(4) Response to Letter from Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation dated October 30, 1979.
b.
Findings The following findings include information about the licensee current program for independent reviews and evaluations.
(1) No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
(2) The licensee's Plant Operating Review Committee (PORC) and the Plant Quality Assurance Staff provide onsite reviews of plant operations. The review responsibilities of the PORC are contained in the proposed plant Technical Specifications.
(3)
Independent review of operational activities is provided by the licensee's offsite Nuclear Safety Review Board (NSRB).
The NSRB reports to the office of the Manager of Power.
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(4) Other offsite groups that provide independent review of plant activities are:
Reactor Engineering Branch - performs operational safety analyses; and evaluation of the adequacy of design and operation of safety-related systems. The Nuclear Safety Staf f within this branch perform independent reviews of plant procedures, reportable occurrences, and evaluates safety questions on plant modifica-tions. Procedures for the Nuclear Safety Staf f are currently being developed.
Nuclear Experience Review Panel (NERP) - performs reviews of industry operational information to detect potential problems.
Procedure DPM N72A39 describes the membership and responsi-bilities of this review group.
Nuclear Safety Review Staf f (NSRS) - acts independently of the TVA organizations concerned with the design, construction, opera-tion, and support of the plant. This group provides advise to the Board of Directors on nuclear safety through the Office of the General Manager.
Procedures that delineate the function of this group are currently being prepared.
(5) The inspector noted that the establishment of an onsite Independent Safety Engineering Group had not been addressed by the licensee.
This group would be independent of the plant staff and would perform independent reviews of plant operational activities and would report to management independent of the power production
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L-7-staff. During discussions on this subject, licensee representa-tives stated that they believe that their current review organi-zations meet the criteria of an Independent Review Function. The licensee's management currently feels that the establishment of an on-site group on a permanent basis is not only a duplication of their established safety engineering groups but would dilute the expertise available in the central office.
The inspection team found that the licensee's established mechanisms for identifying and reporting safety significant problems to higher management appeared to be adequate to fulfill the functions identified to be performed by the Safety Engineering Group.
However, TVA has not established this on-site group. This item remains open pending further review (50-327/80-3-06).
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9.
Onsite Technical Support Central (TSC) and Onsite Operational Support Center (OSC)
The objective of this portion of the inspection was to determine that the licensee has established an onsite technical support center and an onsite operational support center to provide technical and operational support in response to accident situations.
a.
Documents Reviewed (1) Response to Letter from Division of Operating Reactors dated September 13, 1979.
(2) Response to Letter f rom Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation dated October 30, 1979.
(3) Sequoyah Procedure SQA 105 dated November 27, 1979.
b.
Findings The following findings include the inspectors verification of actions taken by the licensee with regard to committments made in the above documents:
(1) No items of noncompliance or deviation were identified.
(2) The licensee has established a TSC and has provided a complete description.
Procedures SQA 105 and AI-2 provide the staffing requirements for the TSC and OSC.
(3) The following comments were made regarding implementation of the actions identified in the referenced documents:
No portable radiation monitors are provided in the TSC.
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TSC procedures do not address how documents such as primary system isometrica, electrical schematics, and photographs of components installed without layout specifications (e.g.,
field-run piping and instrument tubing) will be accessible to the TSC under emergency conditions.
Dose reduction measures and breathing apparatus have not
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been addressed in the TSC description submittals.
The above items are identified as an open item pending further review (50-327/80-3-07).
(4) The SNP Emergency Plan is being revised to incorporate the role of the TSC and also the staffing requirement of the TSC.
10.
Offsite Organization and Resource
The inspection team reviewed licensee's of f-site organizations, both the management and technical support staffs, to access their capability to support the safety operation of Sequoyah Unit I facility during normal operation and under emergeny conditions. Specific areas considered in the conduct of the review included:
The competence of management and technical stafis.
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The size of the management and technical staffs.
The degree of involvement of the off-site organizations in normal and c.
abnormal plant operations, d.
The areas of expertise available to support the plant staff.
Organizational arrangements for both normal and accident situations.
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The training provided to management and technical personal.
Provisions for implementation of preestablished plans for supporting g.
the plant staff in abnormal operations.
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provisions for the identification and independent technical review of safety significant items and unresolved safety issues.
The review was performed by a combination of interviews with licensee management and technical support personnel (including a number of working 1cvel engineers); detailed reviews of selected managment controls proce-dures, position descriptions, and personnel resumes; formal presentations by licensee's management representatives on the organizational structure; authorities, and responsibilities of the various groups; and informal question and answer discussions with respresentatives of the various groups.
The review was concentrated on licensee's Division of Nuclear Power organiza-tions but included representatives from licensee's Of fice of Power and Office of Engineering, Design and Construction.
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The inspection team concluded that licensee's off-site organization and resources are adequate to support to safe operation of the Sequoyah Unit I facility.
However, the following concern was identified and will require further inspection effort and clarification of the regulatory requirements
in order to resolve. There is currently no formal training program for management and technical personnel on the plant specific details of the Sequoyah facility. This items will remain open pending subsequent inspec-tion by the NRC (50-327/80-3-08).
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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