IR 05000327/1980006
| ML19323C776 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 04/02/1980 |
| From: | Cottle W, Dance H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19323C774 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-80-06, 50-327-80-6, NUDOCS 8005190169 | |
| Download: ML19323C776 (10) | |
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UNITED STATES Q
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION m
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o ATLANTA, G EORGIA 30303 Report No. 50-327/80-06 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, TN 37401 Facility: Seq toyah Nuclear Plant Docket No. 50-327 License No. CPPR-72 Inspection at Sequoyah site near Chattanooga, Tennessee Inspector: _
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W. T. Cottle /
Date Signed Approved by: /[,[ [/M w h Y
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H. C. Dance, Section Chief, RONS Branch Date Sigiled SUMMARY Inspection on January 1 through February 29, 1980 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 167 inspector-hours on site in the areas of licensee action on previous inspection findings, readiness of the facility for an operating license, plant tours, followup of previously identified items, followup of plant incidents, and independent inspection effort.
Results Of the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. M. Ballentine, Plant Superintendent C. E. "
all, Assistant Plant Superintendent
- W. F. Popp, Assistant Plant Superintendent O. J. Record, Operations Supervisor W. H. Kinsey, Results Supervisor R. J. Kitts, Health Physics Supervisor J. W. Doty, Maintenance Supervisor (M)
J. M. McGriff, Maintenance Supervisor (I)
i W. A. Watson, Maintenance Supervisor (E)
E. A. Condon, Preoperational Test Supervisor j
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C. R. Brimer, Outage Director D. O. McCloud, Quality Assurance Supervisor R. S. Kaplan, Supervisor, Public Safety Services Other licensee employees contacted included 10 construction craftsmen, 6 technicians, 8 operators, 6 engineers, 18 security force members, 20 cor-
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porate office personnel, and 5 shift engineers.
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Other Organizations t
i P. Bradford, USNRC l
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H. Thompson, USNRC Fifteen inspectors and supervisors, Region II, USNRC
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Eleven engineers and supervisors, NRR, USNRC Twelve contractor personnel (Westinghouse, ESSEX, Nuclear Services Corporation)
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized with the Plant Superin-tendent and members of his staff on January 4, 11, 18, 31 and February 8, 10, 22, and 27, 1980.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Infraction (327/79-70-01) Failure to control temporary alterations.
The inspector reviewed licensee's response to the item of noncompliance dated February 4, 1980.
In addition to the corrective action specified in licensee's response, the inspector noted that the plant Quality Assurance
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Staff had conducted a survey of the temporary alteration program.
The survey included an inspection of approximatelv 150 termination cabinets and wiring panels. The inspector had no further questions in this area.
4.
Unresolved Items 1,
Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Readiness of the Facility for Receipt of an Operating License
The inspector continued to track the status of those items identified as j
having a potential impact on the issuance of an operating license for Unit 1.
Areas addressed included inspector identified items, construction deficiency reports, construction status, preoperational testing status, and operational preparedness.
Throughout the inspection period, the listing of open items was discussed with licensee management representatives on a continuing basis.
Licensee management was encouraged to assure that +5eir requests for license conditions regarding open items were consistent with those recommended by the inspector.
The inspector also discussed the basis utilized for determination of the completion categorization of individual open items with licensee representa-tives.
During this reporting period, the inspector prepared an updated status report on those items identified as potentially affecting the issuance of an operating license. This report was forwarded to Region II management on January 17.
The ins, : tor participated in meetings at the Sequoyah Site on January 14 and 15 to review the status of implementation of the TMI Short Term Lessons Learned requirements. Representatives of licensee's staff and the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation attended the meetings.
The inspector reviewed licensee's letter of completion for the Sequoyah Unit 1 facility dated January 7.
Comments on the requested license conditions were forwarded to Region II management.
The inspector participated in a meeting at the Sequoyah site on January 22 to review the near term operating license requirements from NUREG 0660.
Representatives of licensee's staff, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, and Office of Inspection and Enforcement attended the meeting. Details of the items discussed are contained in IE Inspection Report 50-327/80-07.
The inspector participated in a special management audit conducted January 28-30.
Details of the audit are contained in IE Inspuition Report 50-327/80-03.
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The inspector attended Commission meetings at NRC Headq,tarters in Washington, D. C. on February 12, 15 and 28.
Testimony was given or various topics affecting the issuance of an operating license for the Sequoyah Unit I facility.
The inspector reviewed the draf t Safety Evaluation Report, Supplement 1, and the draft operating license.
Comments were provided to Region II management and the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Plant Tours The inspector toured various areas of Unit I on a routine basis throughout the reporting operiod. The following activities were observed / reviewed:
a.
Housekeeping practices.
b.
Protection of installed instrumentation.
Inplace storage of permanent plant equipment.
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Ability to hear PA system announcements in plant areas.
Fire protection measures for hot work.
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Posting of hold tags, caution tags and alteration tags.
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Measures to exclude foreign materials from entry into clean system.
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Unit operator and shift engineer log books.
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Condition of installed fire protection equipment.
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General si.if t operating practices.
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Access control for the Unit I protected area and fuel storage area.
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Surveillance testing and preoperational testing in progress.
Major maintenance activities in progress.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Followup of Previously Identified Items (Open) Open Item (327/79-41-01) Quality Assurance Program controls for laboratory and bulk chemicals. The inspector reviewed RS SIL C3 " Radio-chemical Lab Cheric,1 Control", Revision 2, which contained adequate provisions for control of laboratory and bulk chemicals. The item will
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remain open pending issuance of Sections III and VI of DPM N79E2; however, the inspector found the present program to be acceptable for fuel loading and initial operation.
(Closed) Open Item (327/79-59-01) Resolution of inspector comments on surveillance test instructions. The inspector reviewed the current revisions to SI-15, SI-31, and SI-33.
The concerns previously identified with these tests had been adequately addressed. The inspector had no further questions in this area.
(Closed) Open Item (327/78-39-14) Housekeeping program for maintenance activities. The inspector reviewed the revision dated February 8,1980, to SQM 46.
The following requirements were incorporated into the housekeeping program by the subject revision:
That procedures consider the need for housekeeping requirements and QC a.
inspection holdpoints for cleanliness, and that these requirements be incorporated into the work instructions for maintenance activities.
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That the plant QA staff review work instructions for the inclusion of appropriate QC holdpoints.
That the plant QA staff perform surveys and/or observations to insure c.
compliance with housekeeping requirements.
These additional requirements appeared to bring licensee's housekeeping program into compliance with their commitment to ANSI N45.2.3-1973.
The inspector emphasized the importance of effective implementation of the housekeeping program in discussions with plant management. The inspector had no further questions in this area.
(Closed) Licensee Identified Item (327/79-46-07) Failure of emergency diesel generator field flashing relay coil. The inspector reviewed work plan 8205 which implemented ECN 2717 on modification of the diesel generator control circuits. The modification replaced the existing latching relay with two electrically shorted. The inspector verified that the field work and post-modification testing were completed, vendor manuals and instructions
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were updated, and verification of system operability was completed. This item, reported as NCR 15P, is closed.
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(Closed) Licensee Identified Items (327/79-29-01 and 327/79-53-01) Residual Heat Removal System piping vibration and pump service factor.
The field work for the installation of flow orifaces to correct these two nonconforming conditions was inspected and reported in IE Report 50-327/79-63. During this reporting period, the inspector completed the review of the retest of the Residual Heal Removal System and the documentation of the acceptance of the remaining test deficiencies noted during the retest. The inspector noted that cavitation still occurred in the vicinity of FCV-74-35 and the downstream piping tee when the B RHR pump was aligned for hot leg recircu-lation. A revision to E0I-1A " Loss of Reactor Coolant" was made to specify
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-5-the A train of ECCS as the preferred alignment for hot leg recirculation.
Discussions with design and preoperational testing personnel revealed that the B train could be used under this mode if the A train were not available.
The inspector had no further questions in this area. These items, reported as CEB 79-4 and NEB 79-3, respectively, are closed for Unit 1.
They will
remain open for Unit 2 pending preoperational testing of the RHR system.
(Closed) Licensee Identified Item (327/80-04-03) Omitted CVCS deadweight pipe supports. These supports have been installed for Unit 1.
The item, reported as CEB 79-38, is closed.
(Closed) Open Item (327/79-66-01) Revision of FSAR Startup Test Sequence Figure. The inspector reviewed licensee's submittal dated January 2, 1980, to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. The submittal proposed a revision to FSAR Figure 14.1-3.
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
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(Closed) Open Item (327/79-25-01) Criteria for reactor coolant system flow
rate. The inspector reviewed licensee's submittal dated December 19, 1979, to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. The submittal corrected the discrepancies previously noted. The inspector had no further questions in this area.
(Closed) Open Item (327/79-42-01) Resolution of inspector comments on shift operating practices. Based upon inspector observations during routine tours of the control room and auxiliary building, these items have been effectively corrected. The inspector had no further questions in this area.
(Closed) Open Item (327/79-56-01) Fuel handling tool storage brackets in the spent fuel pool. The inspector reviewed the weights of tFe fuel handling tools and the possible damage to spent fuel assemblies which could occur if a tool became dislodged and fell on the fuel storage racks.
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
(Closed) Open Item (327/79-30-01) Safety injection accumulator level indi-cation of minimum and maximum water levels allowed by Technical Specifications.
The inspector found that SOI 63.1 had been revised to specify minimum and maximum water level acceptance criteria which were within the range allowed by Technical Specifications.
(Closed) Open Item (327/80-03-03) Unreviewed plant organization. The inspector reviewed a memorandum from the Plant Superintendent dated February 8,1980, which restructured the plant organization back to the
organization described in the FSAR. Some additional personnel assignments
were made to provide support to the Assistant Plant Superintendent, the
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Maintenance Supervisor, and the Results Supervisor, but these assignments did not significantly change the approved organization. The inspector had
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no further changes in this area.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Followup of Plant Incidents During the reporting period, the inspector conducted followup activities on the following plant incidents:
I Oil spill into turbine building sump resulted in an oil release to the a.
yard pond on January 8.
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On January 9, 1980, an internally contaminated shipping cask was inadvertently opened and a contaiminated spacer component removed.
All these operations proceeded without health physics knowledge or
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notification. The cask were received onsite without radioactive
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shipping papers. Health physics became aware of the situation after i
the operations were well underway.
i No significant personnel exposures or contamination problems resulted from this incident. Contamination was spread to the cask transport trailer itself. However, the levels were quite low and did not pose any significant threat to the safety of the workers. The trailer bed was later decontaminated. All other immediate work areas remained clean. All equipment and tools utilized during the job were surveyed
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and found to be free of contamination. One worker had low levels of contamination on his work gloves and coat. These items were confiscated and no further actions were required. No other workers had become
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contaminated during the operations.
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Oil spill into transformer yard from the main bank spare phase trans-c.
former resulted in an oil release to the yard pond on January 21.
Approximately 1200 gallons of light weight mineral insulating oil was spilled from aa oil cooling pump coupling on the transfer.
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On February 2,1980, an inadvertent actuation of a containment spray train resulted in the spraying of approximately 16,000 gallons of 2000 ppm borated water into the Unit I reactor building. The actuation occurred during a periodic test of the B train containment spray pump and appeared to have been caused by a combination of an inadequate test procedure and a relatively inexperienced plant operator performing the test.
The inspector reviewed the circumstances involved in each incident and, where appropriate, reviewed the actions taken by licensee manage--
ment in response to the incident. Licensee's management response
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appeared to be both timely and adequate in each instance reviewed by the f.nspector, including the reporting of each incident to state and NRC sfficials when appropriate.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Followup of Allegation 9.
i The inspector reviewed an allegation of unreported sabotage on the auxiliary feedwater system flow control valves. The inspector discussed the allegation with the responsible Instrument Engineer who, in the presence of the inspector, questioned the Instrument Foreman and Startup Test Engineer who had performed most of the test and calibration activities on the auxiliary feedwater system. None of these individuals were aware of any instance in which the flow control valve controllers were found to have been deliberately plugged.
The inspector then requested that a review of the maintenance work request system documentation be performed to determine if any such condition had been documented. No such documentation was found. Further discussions with the Plant Superintendent, Assistant Plant Superintendent, and Main-tenance Supervisor (I) revealed no knowledge of such an incident having
occurred. The inspector concluded that if the controllers were found to have been plugged, it was most likely identified by an Instrument Mechanic who simply removed the obstructions in order to perform a calibration test or some other activity. There was no evidence of any attempted coverup or failure to report an identified act of sabotage.
The inspector's findings were discussed with Region II management.
It was concluded that further inspection effort in this area was not warranted.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
10.
Independent Inspection Effort The inspector routinely attended the morning scheduling and staff meetings during the reporting period. These meetings provide a daily status report on the construction and testing activities in progress as well as a discussion of significant problems or incidents associated with the construction,-
preoperational testing, and operations effort.
The inspector compared the physical installation of the -ondensate and feedwater systems with the FSAR drawings of these systems. No significant discrepancies were found.
On January 3, 1980, the inspector covered the circumstances involving the civil penalty issued to the Beaver Valley Nuclear Station with the Plant Superintendent and plant supervisors. Particular emphasis was placed on the interpretation of the Technical Specification definition of " operability" involved in this instance.
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The inspector reviewed the instances of excessive noise levels identified on the nuclear instrumentation system source range channels and the radiation monitoring system channels. Corrective ac?. ions taken by the plant appeared to have been appropriate in each instance.
The inspector was approached by a construction craftsman who quesioned the
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use of non-explosive proof lighting fixtures in the vital bsttery rooms.
This question was discussed with Region II construction specialists and the present installation was deemed to be in accordance vith NRC design criteria and practices.
The inspector discussed the use of a vendor mobile solidification unit tc process radioactive waste with the Results Supervisor and Assistant Plant Superintendent.
It was pointed out that a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation would be required and that the vendor's operating procedures would have to be reviewed and approved by the plant staff.
The inspector participated in a review of the adequacy of the waste packaging area building and the condensate demineralizer waste evaporator building foundations on January 24.
Representatives from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations conducted the onsite review.
The inspector witnessed a portion of the tube vibration testing on the component cooling water heat exchangers. The testing revealed excessive vibration with flow rates above 7000 gpm on the component cooling water side of the heat exchangers. Procedure changes were made to limit the flow rates to less than 6000 gpm until modifications to the heat exchangers were maie. The inspector discussed unit operation in this mode with Region II and NRR management representatives as well as licensee design representatives.
The inspector briefed Region II management on the status of NUREG 0660 items at Sequoyah in a meeting in the Region II office on February 7.
The inspector conducted a final closeout inspection of the reactor building recirculation sump with the Assistant Plant Superintendent on February 13.
Following the inspection, the sump screens were installed and the temporary covers removed.
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The inspector conducted a preliminary review of the operating experience of
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vendor personnel selected to augment tb2 operating shifts. The experience level of each individual was discussed vi.th management personnel from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations.
The inspector toured Commissioner Bradford and his technical assistant through the Unit I control room and reactor building on February 21.
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The inspector witnessed a portion of the special ultrasonic testing of the reactor vessel nozzles on February 25.
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The inspector reviewed the instrument power supply system in light of the Crystal River incident. Discussions were held with Region II and Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation representatives.
The inspector provided assistance to and coordinated the inspection activities of visiting NRC personnel during the reporting period.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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