IR 05000327/1980038
| ML20002C488 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 11/26/1980 |
| From: | Butler S, Dance H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20002C477 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-80-38, NUDOCS 8101100364 | |
| Download: ML20002C488 (8) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIE 310N 4, k -)./' ^i REGION 11 g *e hhj'[
t01 MARf ETT A ST., N.W., SutTE 3100
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"f ATLANTA, GEC'GIA 30303
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Report No. 50-327/80-38 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 500A Chestnut Street Chatt.anooga, TN 37041 Facility: Sequoyah, Unit 1 Docket No. 50-327 License No.
DPR-77 Inspection at Sequoyah site near Chattanooga, Tennessee
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Inspector: h 4L
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~Date Signed
Approved by:
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H. C. Dance, Section Chief, RONS Branch Date Signed SUMMARY Inspection on September 1-30, 1980 Areas Inspected This routine announced inspection involved 84 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings, Operational Safety Verification, Verification of License Conditions, Licensee Event Report Review, Independent Inspection Effort and Followup on Plant Incidents.
Results Of the 6 areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in 5 areas; 1 item of noncompliance was found in 1 area (Deficiency - Improperly Maintaining and Making Changes to a Procedure Required by Technical Specifica-tions - paragraph 5).
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I DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
J. M. Ballentine, Plant Superintendent C
E. Cantrell, Assistant Plant Superintendent
', F. Popp, Assistant Plant Superintendent
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J, M. Bynum, Assistant to Plant Superintendent J. W. Doty, Maintenance Supervisor (M)
J. M. McGriff, Maintenance Supervisor (I)
W. A. Watson, Maintenance Supervisor (E)
D. J. Record, Operations Supervisor W. H. Kinsey, Results Supervisor R. J. Kitts, Health Physics Supervisor C. R. Brimer, Outage Director R. S. Kaplan, Supervisor, Public Safety Services W. M. Halley, Preoperational Test Supervisor D. O. McCloud, Quality Assurance Supervisor W. T. Cottle, Compliance Supervisor Other Organizations Six representatives from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Six inspect. ors from the Office of Inspection and Enforcement i
j Other licensee employees contacted included 2 technicians, 4 operators, 4 shift engineers, 4 security force members, 7 engineers, 1 maintenance person, 2 contractor personnel, and 2 corporate office personnel.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized with the Plant Super-intendent and members of his staff on September 15 and 30, 1980. The item of noncompliance discussed in paragraph 5 was reviewed with the Plant Superintendent who acknowledged his understanding of the item.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Deficiency 327/80-25-02 Failure to properly implement temporary alteration procedure for a critical system. The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the item of noncompliance dated September 15, 1980 and their corrective action.
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
(Closed) Infraction 327/80-25-01 Failure to positively control access to vital areas. The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the item of noncompliance dated September 15, 1980 and Public Safety Services Memorandum Instruction number 2, Revision 2, dated June 20, 1980 which contains more explicit instructions for establishing and maintaining compen-
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-2-satory measures to control access into vital areas. The inspector had no further questions in this area.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Operational Safety Verification The inspector toured various areas of Unit 1 on a routine basis throughout the reporting period. The following activities were reviewed / verified:
a.
Adherence to limiting conditions for operation which were directly observable from the control room panels.
b.
Control board instrumentation and recorder traces.
c.
Proper control room and shif t manning.
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The use of approved operating procedures.
e.
Unit operator and shif t engineer logs.
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General shif t operating practices.
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Housekeeping practices.
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Fire protection measures for hot work.
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Posting of hold tags, caution tags and temporary alternation tags.
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Measures to exclude foreign materials from entry into clean systems.
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Personnel, package, and vehicle access control for the Unit 1 pro-tected area.
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General shift security practices on post manning, vital area access control and security force response to alarms.
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Surveillance testing and startup testing in progress.
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Maintenance activities in progress.
During a routine tour of the auxiliary 'auilding on September 6, 1980, the inspector noted from the rad-waste operator's logs that the licensee had been experiencing dif ficulty with the operation of radiation monitor RM-122.
RM-122 monitors the liquid waste effluent line which discharges liquid
waste to the river via the cooling tower blowdown path. The monitor is designed to alarm and isolate this discharge path when activity exceeds its setpoint. Several tanks can be discharged through this path and if a tank with a lower activity level is discharged preceded by a tank with a higher
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-3-activity level the monitor sensitivity may be reduced because of the residual activity lef t in the detector by the preceding tank. The discharge path isolation valve will not open because by procedure, the setpoint of the monitor is based upon the activity of the tank being discharged, as modified by dilution, since discharge is via the cooling tower blowdown path.
To alleviate this problem, the licensee was flushing the detector with demineralized water to the floor drain collecting tank. A maintenance request form was used until a detailed procedure could be prepared which describes flushing the detector with installed piping from the tanks to be discharged to the plant drainage collecting system prior to adjusting the setpoint of the monitor.
The inspector did not take exception to this, since the flush method used could be considered to be within the skill normally possessed by qualified maintenance personnel.
In addition, the licensen is considering design changes which would enable flushing the monitor through permanently installed piping rather than with the use of temporary hoses.
This item will continue to be followed as open item 327/80-38-01 until it is resolved.
On September 11, 1980 the inspector witnessed the licensee's inspection of a liner of solidified waste in response to a problem experienced with incomplete solidification of liquid rad-waste using the
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urea-formaldehyde method.
Other persons present were from the licensee's Nuclear Safety Review Staff, Low Level Rad-Waste Management and the Office of Power Quality Assurance organization. The liner inspected was one that had been solidified on August 8, 1980 at Sequoyah but had not been shipped off-site. When the liner cover was removed about 2 inches of free-aater was observed on the solidified mass. The water was siphoned off and a core drilled to the bottom of the liner. The mass appeared uniformly solid all the way to the bottom of the liner with no large pockets of liquid. The solid mass appeared to completely surrounded by water in the liner because the void left by the core drill continued to refill as the remaining water was siphoned from the liner.
A total of approximately 60 gallons of free water was removed from the liner.
The nspector's observations were
relayed to a rad-waste specialist in Region II.
On September 12, 1980 during a routine tour of the Auxiliary Building, the inspector found a copy of System Operating Instruction SOI-3.2, Auxiliary Feedwater System, stored for use in the Turbine driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump room. The procedure was not being stored in a location designated for controlled procedures as described in Administrative Instruction AI-4, Plant Instructions - Document Control, and in addition, several changes related to manual operation of the pump turbine had been added to the procedure without proper authorization as required by Technical Specifi-cation 6.8.2 or 6.8.3.
The Plant Superintendent and Operations Supervisor were notified and took prompt action to remove the procedure. Failure to properly maintain a controlled document and properly execute changes to that document constitute an apparent item of noncompliance (327/80-38-02)
with Technical Specification 6.8.1, 6.8.2 and 6.8.3.
The actions taken by the licensee to correct the apparent item of noncompliance were reviewed by the inspector and found to be satisfactory.
In addition to promptly removing the procedure and reinstructing personnel in weekly training
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-4-sessions in the proper method for maintaining controlled procedures and making changes to them, the licensee has issued written instructions for the senior reactor operator in charge of instructions and procedures to make a daily tour of the plant operating stations to verify proper procedure control. The improper changes to the procedure were reviewed by the inspector and concluded that no adverse impact to the equipment would have resulted from the changes. The inspector had no further questions in this area. This item is closed.
j No other items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Verification of License Conditions
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Operating License DPR-77 issued September 17, 1980 contained several require-ments that had to be satisfied prior to exceeding 5% power. The inspector reviewed the following license items:
a.
2.c.(10) Water Chemistry Control Program - The inspector reviewed Technical Instructions TI-23 and 37, Section Instruction Letter SIL-C10 and Surveillance Instruction SI-154A and found that the pro-visions described in Section 2.C.(10) had been properly incorporated into the licensee's secondary water chemistry control program.
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2.c. (13) Loss of Non-Class IE Instrumentation and Control Room System The inspector reviewed Abnormal Operating Bus During Operation
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Instructions A01-21.1, 21.2, 21.3, 21.4, 25.1, 25.2, 25.3 and 25.4 which cover loss of 125VDC and 120 VAC vital boards.
In addition drawings for the 120VAC, and 125VDC vital power distribution systems and the 120VAC preferred power distribution were reviewed. The inspectors findings were discussed with the licensee and members of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations and Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region II who had performed similar reviews in this area.
Based on the inspectors findings the licensee has satisfactorily revised its emergency procedures to ensure the capability for a safe shutdown of the plant following an inadvertent loss of a single instrument and control power bus.
The inspector reviewed the c.
2.c.(22)A. Safety Engineering Group
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requirements of Technial Specification Section 6.2.3 which define the Independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG) for Sequoyah. In addition, memoranda from the licensee to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Reg-ulation dated August 11, 1980 and from the Plant Superintendent to the plant Compliance Staff Supervisor dated September 25, 1980 were reviewed. These memoranda identify the Plant Compliance staff as.the organization responsible to perform the function of the ISEG and define its authority and responsibility. The members of the ISEG that were interviewed by the inspector were knowledgeable of their function and channels of reporting. The inspector considers the existing ISEG to be satisfactory.
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2.c.(22)E. Auxiliary Feedwater - At the end of the reporting period the licencee assured the inspector that the auxiliary feedwater endurance tests described in the Sequoyah Safety Evaluation Report would be completed prior to exceeding 5% power and a written report submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission within 30 days of test completion.
This will be verified and documented in a subsequent inspection report.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Review During the reporting period the inspector and a Region II based inspector conducted a thorough review of all the licensee's Licensee Event Reports received by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to date.
Details of this inspection including an apparent item of noncompliance are documented in IE report 327/80-39.
No other items of noncompliance or deviations we:a identified.
8.
Independent Inspection Effort The inspecter routinely attended the morning scheduling and staff meetings during the reporting period. These meetings provide a daily status report on the operational and testing activities in progress as well as a discus-sion of significant problems or incidents associated with the start-up testing and operations effort.
During the reporting period the inspector made preparations for testifying at meetings of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in regard to Sequoyah's full power operating license. Items included were the licensee's Special Test Program, the proposed Distributive Ignition System for hydrogen mitigation in containment, enforcement history, reportable occurrences and readiness for full power operations. The inspector attended meetings of the ACRS and the NRC Commissioners on September 4 and 5,1980.
On August 29,1980 the licensee reported to the NRC that they had found a pinhole leak on the C-ll control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) seal weld. The leak had been found during a routine inspection of the reactor head area while the plant was in cold shutdown.
The licensee was not sure of the cause of the leak but suggested that it might have always been present and was only identified at this time due to a building of boric acid crystals around the leak. In order to repair the defect a small vent / purge hole was drilled in the seal canopy to aid in the welding process.
The original defect was repaired but when the vent / purge hole was being re-welded it i
caused a small crack to appear at the base of the seal canopy adjacent to the repair. The new defect was ground out and repaired af ter the entire t
CRDM was vented to ensure that the problem would not repeat.
A dye penetrant test of the entire seal weld indicated the defects had been successfully repaired. The inspector discussed the repair with licensee
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-6-and contractor personnel and consulted a metallurgist and non-destructive testing specialist in Region II to ensure the repair and subsequent retest of the repair was consistent with all requirements. The inspector had no further questions on this matter.
No items of noncompliance cr deviations were identified.
9.
Followup of Plant Incidents On September 8, 1980 a construction electrician inadvertently allowed a metal cable pulling device to short bus bars in the 480 VAC Turbine
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Building Common Board.
Loads supplied from the board were lost until alternate power supplies could be lined up.
The inspector verified that a
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small fire was promply extinguished and that no safety related equipment was involved. The switchboard was subsequently repaired and power lineups returned to normal.
On September 26, 1980 the NRC was notified by the licensee that they had momentarily lost containment integrity during plant heatup. The problem occurred when an operator was xiting the containment through the 734'
elevation personnel air lock. The inner door was being closed too rapidly, bounced off its seal and the latch continued shut without engaging the door. The interlock was made up and allowed the outer door to be opened, thus violating containment integrity. The operator immediately realized the problem and reestablished containment integrity. There was a similar occurrence at the 690' elevation personnel air lock on July 11, 1980. The licensee's previous corrective action consisted of reinstructing personnel on the proper operation of the air lock doors and initiation of a design change to the door closing mechanism. The design change was cancelled when discussion with the air lock's designer / constructor revealed that adjustments.
the door operating linkage would prevent the door malfunction. At the totime of the second occurrence, the procedure for adjusting the door linkage
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had not been inco rporated into the maintenance instruction for the air i
lock. Subsequent to the second occurrence, the licensee again cautioned personnel on the need for proper door operation and in addition established a trained individual on each shift to be responsible for air lock door operation until permanent corrective action can be implemented. Permanent j
l corrective action will consist of either implementing a linkage adjustment
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procedure with a periodic surveillance to verify proper adjustment or a
l design change to the door latching mechanism if it is deemed necessary.
l The inspector will continue to follow the licensee's permanent corrective action to its completion as open item 327/80-38-03.
l On September 28, 1980 a pipe-fitter fell from a ladder in containment and broke his ankle. There was no open wound or contamination involvei. The
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worker was transported off-site for medical treatment.
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I The inspector reviewed the circumstances involved in each incident and,
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where appropriate, the action taken by licensee management in response to the incident.
Licensee's management response appeared adequate in each cas a m
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