IR 05000327/1980044
| ML19345H573 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 02/06/1981 |
| From: | Dance H, Heatherly T, Mcdonald J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19345H556 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-80-44, 50-328-80-23, NUDOCS 8105210283 | |
| Download: ML19345H573 (6) | |
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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HEGION 11
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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
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ATLANTA. GEORGIA 30303
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Report Nos. 50-327/80-44 and 50-328/80-23 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Autharity 500A Chestnut Street Chattanooga, TN 37401 Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328 License Nos. DPR-77 and CPPP-73 Inspection at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Inspectors: [
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J. A.
Donald
Date Signed
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Approved by:
H.' C. Dance, Section Chief, RONS Branch Date ' Signed SUMMARY Inspection on November 12-14, 1980 Ar%s Inspected This special, announced inspection involved 72 inspector-hours on site in the areas of construction testing quality assurance, preoperational testing quality assurance, and licensee action on previous inspection items.
RESULTS l
Of the three areas inspected, four violations were found in two areas (failure to control testing-paragraph 5.a; failure to have adequate / failure
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to follow procedures-paragraph 5.b; failure to control testing-paragraph 5.c; failure to follow procedures-paragraph 5.d.)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. H. Ballentine, Plant Superintendent R. Adams, Coordination Unit Engineer
- W. E. Andrews, Nuclear Power - Chief, Quality Assurance Staff
- G. Beasley,. Manager, OEDC - QA
- E. A. Condon, Preoperational Test Section Supervisor
- W. T. Cottle, Compliance Supervisor
- A. W. Crevasse, Manager, Power QA
- R. W. Diebler, Manager, Construction QA
- J. C. Killian, Assistant Manager, Construction
- D. W. Mack, Assistant Construction Engineer
- J. M. Munns, Construction Site Engineer - QA
- T. B. Northen Jr., Construction Engineer
- R. C. Parker, Assistant to Director of Nuclear Power C. Rice, Coordination Unit Engineer Other Organizations R. Mathison - Westinghouse Project Supervisor NRC Resident Inspector
- S. D. Butler
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 14, 1980 with those persons indicated in Paragraph I above.
The licensee acknowledged the findings and commented that the concerns raised in the paragraph 6.e unresolved item should be covered by construction testing.
Commitments for resolution of the findings will be made around December 1, 1980.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (328/80-21):
Inadequate hydrostatic testing of Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal piping.
Additional information supplied by the licensee revealed that the systen was hydrostatically tested to a pressure that was lower than the design acceptance criteria.
This item is now considered a violation as discussed in Paragraph 5.a.
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4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information -is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations.
New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraphs 5.e, 6.b, 6.c, 6.d. 6.e, and 6.f.
5.
Ccnstruction Testing Ouality Assurance The inspectors reviewed quality assurance procedures and documentation that deal t with hydrostatic testing, system flushing and setting limitorque valve operators. The following findings were not acceptable:
a.
Site Instruction II-41, Hydrostatic Test of Piping Systems, used as a generic instruction for safety related systems requires that the systems be pressurized to 1.25 times design pressure for testing.
Engineering Design (ENDES) Drawing 47W810-74-1 states that design pressure between the RHR pump suction and discharge values is 600 psi.
A review of hydrostatic test cards indicated that the two hydrostatic tests done on these sections was per-fonned at 400 psi, 350 psi, less than required (328/80-23-01).
b.
A review of 50P 103 revealed that it prescribed no changes to torque switch settings whereas the pertinent specification, Construction Specification G-50 require these switches to be set at a minimum position during initial construction.
An interview with an electrical engineer and his supervisor revealed that the engineer had not been strictly complying with S0P 103 in that he had made adjustments to some torque switches on some safety-related valves if he felt they were set too high.
The records reviewed did not indicate what had been done (see paragraph 5.d).
Manufacturer recommendations were not known at the site and it did not appear that any attempt had been made to identify them. These
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examples of failure tc have appropriate site procedures and i
failure to follow the site procedure constitute a violation (327/80-44-01,328/80-23-02).
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c.
The inspector reviewed the cleaning and flushing operations which l
had been conducted on the Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal System.
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was noted that the instrumentation portion of this system was not addressed in the detailed Chemical Cleaning procedure.
The Instrumentation Supervisor stated that no program had been estab-lished for this purpose.
This failure to identify and conduct required testing constitutes an item of noncompliance (327/80-44-02,328/80-23-03).
l The Instrument Unit Supervisor stated that some unspecified quantity of demineralized water had been forced through these sensing lines and into the process system as part of hydrostatic l
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testing preparation.
The results were not monitored, nor were these evolutions coordinated with flushing of the process pipes, d.
Construction audit' report SN-G-80-07 identified that the checkout of motor operated valve circuits was being completed under S0P 103 which had not been reviewed and approved by the Quality Assurance Unit Supervisor.
Also the data were not being kept as QA records as there was no requirement to record torque switch settings and they were not recorded for one of two valves selected.
The Ouality Assurance Unit accepted corrective action which did not include the required quality assurance procedural review or upgrade the recordkeeping controls to satisfy the licensees commitment.
The failure to follow QASP 7.1 requirements for accepting only appropriate corrective action constitutes a
violation (327/80-44-03, 328/80-23-04).
e.
No hydrostatic test cards were located that indicated that the Residual Heat Removal system piping had been hydrostatically tested between the containment sump and the pump suction valves.
Until the licensee determined whether or not hydrostat:c tests demonstrated that design criterial were met, this item is unresolved (327/80-44-04, 328/80-23-05).
f.
The Residual Heat Removal Pump Technical Manual drawing of the mechanical seal was revised to show that spare parts were changed to upgrade the seal.
The narrative section of the manual referenced the outdated drawing.
Until the licensee appropriately revises the vendor manual, this item is open (327/80-44-05, 328/80-23-06).
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Numerous site instructions have been issued duplicating portions of vendor manuals.
Administrative Instruction 23, Vendor Manual Control, does not contain steps to insure that revisions involving software changes or operational changes are implemented into applicable procedures.
Until the licensee implements appropriate
controls to insure vendor manuals and their changes are tran-scribed to applicable instructions, this item is open (327/80-44-06,328/80-23-07).
6.
Preoperational Testing Quality Assurance The inspector reviewed two surveys of the preoperational test program which were performed by the on-site QA Surveillance section to verify management control of the disposition of deficiencies.
Findings were acceptable.
The inspector also reviewed the Upper Head Injection System (UHI) test which was one of four preoperationsl tests recently audited by the Office of Power Quality Assurance Staff.
The completed test package had been assembled and signed by the Test Director though not yet submitted for further review and approval. The following findings were not acceptable:
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a.
The first low pressure blowdown was perfomed August 10, 1980 using a procedure which was intended to be modified in scope from the FSAR commitments to those new commitments contained in letters to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
The procedure deviated from both sets of commitments. This error was eventually recognized and corrected by the licensee prior to the performance of the third low pressure blowdown on September 20, 1980, hence it is not considered a Deviation, b.
The combined results of the first and third low pressure blowdowns do not yet appear to support acceptance since the data was inconsistent.
Only the third test met the acceptance criteria and no activities have been identified as a cause for the change in perfomance.
Until the licensee detemines the adequacy of this data and performs further testing as necessary tnis item is unresolved (328/80-23-08).
c.
Step 5.5.38 of W6.2 provided for readjusting hydraulic isolation valve travel which was not acceptable during the conduct of a low pressure blowdown.
The readjusting was allowed to be done under
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no-flow conditions with no retest under flow conditions.
Until the licensee reviews the propriety of this technique and conducts retesting as necessary this item is unresolved (328/80-23-09).
d.
The precise closure times for UHI hydrau'ic isolation valves FCV-87-21 through - 24 was 3.5t0.05 seconds. This was ascertained by instrumentation connected to the stem-mounted closed limit switch. This switch was assumed to operate at a valve position of 100% closed.
The actual setting and the direct effect it has on the measurement of stroke time has not been ascertained.
Until
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the licensee reviews the accuracy of stroke time determination and makes any appropriate test revisions, this item is unresolved (327/80-44-07,328/80-23-10).
e.
The following tests of the proper functioning of circuits and switches were apparently not addressed in W6.2:
(1) Testing of the motor heaters for FCV-87-17 and the gags for FCV-87-21 through - 24.
(2) Testing of the red motor running light f..
FCV-87-17 and the gags for FCV-87-21 through 24.
(3) Testing of the spring return feature of the FCV-87-17 hand switch.
(4) Testing of the functioning of interlocks and with valves in a midposition.
Until the licensee detemines whether these features are appro-priately tested under either the construction or preoperational
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testing program this item is unresolved (327/80-44-08, 328/80-23-11),
f.
Section 8.4.3.1 of General Construction Specification G-39, Cleaning During Fabrication of Fluid Handling Components, was changed by Revision 2 to allow for particulate sampling using a cartridge filter not in line with the flush path.
No specifi-cations were given to er.sure that on site sample apparatuses draw-representative samples from the process pipe.
Until the licensee prescribes appropriate specifications for a cartridge fil ter sample apparatus and evaluates the effectiveness of those used at Sequoyah Ui.its 1 and 2, this item is unresolved (327/80-44-09,
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32o/80-23-12).
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