IR 05000320/1986013

Safety Insp Rept 50-320/86-13 on 861016-1208.No Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Routine Plant Operations,Ler Followup & Defueling Operations.Continuing Housekeeping & Industrial Safety Problems in Reactor Bldg Noted

ML20207H026
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	12/19/1986
From:	Bell J, Dan Collins, Cowgill C, Moslak T, Myers L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207G977	List: IR 05000320/1986013 ML20207G972
References
50-320-86-13, NUDOCS 8701070444
Download: ML20207H026 (14)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Report N /86-13 Docket No. ,50-320 License No. DPR-73 Priority --

Category C Licensee: GPU Nuclear Corporation P.O. Box 480 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Facility Name: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Inspection At: Middletown, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted: October 16, 1986 - December 8,1986 Inspectors: f S M E' k /N f 4 [f T. W slak sident ins ector (TMI-2) date signed

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[ O (@~ /2//7/gg i , Senior Radiation Specialist date Yigned llins, 40 -

Radiation Specialist

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't'/Myerst Radiation Specialist da'te signed Approved By: N 'u~t-.

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l>IM\fL C. Cokgill,(Qief, THI-2 Project Section date signed Inspection Summary:

Areas Inspected: Routine safety inspection by site inspectors of plant operations (long term shutdown), including routine plant operations, licensee action on previous inspection findings, licensee event report followup, defueling operations, and health physics and environnental revie Results: No violations were identified; however, the inspector noted continuing housekeeping and industrial safety problems in the reactor building (paragraph 5.c.).

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DETAILS 1.0 Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (320/84-?1-02): Control of the procedure issue, cancellation, and replacement process Radiological Controls issued a aracedure without cancelling the procedure that it replaced. Control of t1e procedure issue and cancellation process for procedure replacement has been revised in procedure 9200-ADM-1218.01, "TMI-2 Radiological Controls Department Procedure System". The person approving the procedure is now responsible for ensuring that the superseded procedure is cancelle The inspector had no further questions regarding this ite (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (320/86-01-01): Licensee commitment to update previous Semi-Annual Radiological Effluent Reports (SRER) to include specific releases figures for Sr-9 The SRERs for the years 1984 and 1985 were updated to include specific release figures for strontium-90 in liquid effluents. The licensee's practice of estimating the strontium-90 activity by assuming that the gross beta activity is attributable to strontium-90 is conservative and leads to a conservative dose assessmen The inspector had no further questions regarding this ite (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (320/86-05-03): Inadequacies in the recall system for radiological field instrument Since April 1986, the responsibility and action necessary to placement and removal of portable instruments have been limited to, and directly done by, either Radiological Instrument Technicians or Radiological Controls Technicians, thereby minimizing the likelihood of a third party failing to take the required action. No further incidents were identifie The inspector had no further questions regarding this ite (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (320/86-06-03): Inspection and Maintenance of Jib Crane Through discussions with the cognizant er,gineer and review of the revised procedure ft the inspection of jib cranes (4000-IMP-3890.05), the inspector determined that corrective measures have been implemented to assure a more detailed inspection of monorail hoists prior to their operatio Such measures included the incorporation of drawings into the inspection procedure, and specific checks of trolley and bridge carrier fastener The inspector had no further questions regarding this ite _

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l (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (320/86-06-06): Method of reaching staff with procedure changes is slow, t

The inspector determined that increased supervisory attention has been directed to this problem and that this action has resulted in acceptable notification of technician The inspector had no further questions regarding this ite (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (320/86-06-07): Airborne contamination of the Auxiliary Building by a release of nitrogen from relief valves in the contaminated nitrogen syste The nitrogen system was contaminated during the 1979 acciden Consequently, the Auxiliary Building has experienced several airborne contamination incidents when the nitrogen system was used to provide overgas to the reactor bleed tanks. As a result of pressurizing the nitrogen manifold, two relief valves located on the 281' elevation of the Auxiliary Building became overpressurized and relieved into locally vented exhaust stacks, releasing radioactive materials to the area. In addition, the valves leaked around their stems. The contaminated section of the manifold, of which the relief valves are a part, has been cut out and removed to preclude any further releases of airborne contaminatio The inspector had no further questions regarding this ite (Closed) Violation (320/86-08-01): Implementation of an In-Service Inspection Progra Through discussions with the cognizant engineer and review of selected records the inspector determined that the licensee has implemented an In-Service Inspection (ISI) Program. THI-2 administrative procedure 4210-ADM-3274.01 "In-Service Inspection System," effective September 3, 1986, was reviewed by the inspector and determined to adequately establish the scope, boundaries, and retest requirements for systems subject to ISI requirement The inspector had no further questions regarding this ite (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (320/86-08-02): QA monitoring of Core Boring /Defueling Operation ThroughdiscussionswithQualityAssurance(QA) management,theinspector determined that QA monitoring personnel have been given a flexibility in adjusting their coverage schedule to adapt to changes in defueling activitie The inspector had no further questions regarding this ite .0 Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup The following LER was reviewed. The inspector verified that reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified, corrective actions

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. 4 appeared appropriate, generic applicability had been considered, and the LER forms were complet /86-10 Performance of a Reactor Building Double Door Entry with the Required * Air Particulate Monitor Inoperable 3.0 Defueling Operations Defueling efforts during this reporting period were directed at preparation for and completion of fragmentizing core material Preparations involved removal of end fittings from the debris bed and placing them in dedicated storage drum End fittings were removed because they cause a rapid degradation of drill bit cutting rate Subsequent to end fitting removal, a video inspection was performed of the core debris bed to verify the absence of end fittings and the drilling rig was reinstalled on the shielded work platfor Fragmentation was to be accomplished using the drilling rig previously used for the Core Stratification Sampling (Core Bore) Program. The purpose of breaking up core materials was to facilitate pick and place defueling techniques (i.e. using the spade bucket and clamshell tools).

Beginning on October 20, 1986, an initial test pattern of nineteen (19)

penetrations was drilled and approximately 200 pounds of material was removed and placed in a canister. The test pattern was made to confim the effectiveness of the operation. Approximately 400 additional penetrations were made during the period, ending on November 14, 198 The drill rig was removed and pick and place operations resumed on November 21, 1986. Attempts to defuel using conventional tools were unsuccessful in that the tools could not penetrate the fragmented debri The cause of this failure is being evaluated by the licensee. As part of the evaluation, vessel water is being processed to improve visibility; six (6) sections of drill string, broken during the drilling operation, will be removed from the vessel; and the debris bed will be inspected and probed to detemine its consistency and overall condition. From this evaluation, the licensee will determine what defueling strategy to pursue. The inspector will continue to closely follow licensee defueling activitie .0 Routine Plant Operations Inspections of the facility were conducted to assess compliance with the requirements of the Technical Specifications and Recovery Operations Plan in the following areas: licensee review of selected plant parameters for abnormal trends; plant status from a maintenance / modification viewpoint, including plant cleanliness; control of switching and tagging; fire protection; licensee control of routine and special evolutions, including control room personnel awareness of these evolutions; control of documents, including log keeping practices; radiological controls; and security plan implementatio Inspections of the control room were performed during regular and backshift hours. The Shift Foreman's Log and selected portions of the Control Room Operator's Log were reviewed for the period October 16 through December 8, 1986. Other logs reviewed during the inspection

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. 5 period included the Submerged Demineralizer System Operations Log, Radiological Controls Foreman's Log, and Auxiliary Operator's Daily Log Sheet Operability of components in systems required to be available for response to emergencies was reviewed to verify that they could perform their intended functions. The inspector attended selected licensee planning meetings. Shift staffing for licensed operators, non-licensed personnel, and fire brigade members was determined to be adequat No violations were identifie .0 Health Physics and Environmental Review Plant Tours The NRC site Radiation Soecialists performed plant inspection tours which included all radiological control points and selected radiologically controlled areas. Among the areas inspected were:

the Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Buildings; EPICOR-II; Radiochemistry Laboratories; radioactive waste storage facilities; Respirator Cleaning and Laundry Facility; and, the Radiological Controls Instrument Facilit Among the items inspected were:

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Access control to radiologically controlled areas

-- Adherence to Radiation Work Permit (RWP) requirements

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Proper use and storage of routinely used respirators and associated equipment

-- Maintenance and storage of emergency respiratory equipment

-- Adherence to radiation protection procedures

-- Use of survey meters and other radiological instrument The inspectors reviewed the application of radiological controls during normal hours, on backshifts, and on weekends. Log books maintained by Radiological Controls Field Operations and Radiological Engineering to record activities in the reactor building and the balance of the plant were reviewed. All of the log backs contained appropriate entrie No vio.ations were identifie Radioactive Material Shipments The NRC site Radiation Specialists inspected radioactive materials shipments on October 16, 20, 24, and 30; November 4, 6, 13, 18, 20, and 22; and December 4 and 5,198 . .- .

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. 6 The inspector's review determined that the licensee had:

-- Complied with approved packaging and shipping procedures

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Properly prepared shipping papers, including certification that the radioactive materials are properly classified, described, packaged and marked for transport

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Placarded vehicles and applied warning labels-to all packages

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Controlled radioactive contamination and dose rates below regulatory limit ; The inspector's review consisted of (1) examinations of shipping i papers, procedures, packages and vehicles, and (2) performance of

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radiation and contamination survey No violations were identified.

, Reactor Building Work

, Reactor Building Entries i The inspector monitored the licensee's conduct of reactor building

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(RB) work during the inspection period. The following were reviewed i

on a sampling basis during the inspection period:

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The RB entry was planned and coordinated so as to ensure that ALARA review, personnel training, and equipment testing had been conducted.

-- Radiological precautions were planned and implemented, including: use of an RWP, locked high radiation area access authorization, specific work instructions, alarming self-reading dosimeters, and breathing zone air sampler Individuals making entries into the RB had been properly informed, trained, and understood emergency procedure Unique tasks were performed using specifically developed procedures, and mock-up training had been conducted where warranted.

I Entries 1068 through 1118 were conducted during the reporting period. Observed operations and facilities were found to be

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consistent with applicable Safety Evaluation Reports and -

. implementing procedure Reactor building radiological and industrial safety conditions were examined by radiation specialists during entries 1069, 1081, 1094, 1101, and 1107 on October 17, October 31, November 13, November 20, and November 26, 1986. Activities specific to preparations for core boring, removal of core boring equipment, defueling, data acquisition, preparations for reactor building basement sludge

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o 7 transfer, and decontamination were ongoing during one or more of these entries. The conduct of pre-job briefings; and observations of technicians performing radiological surveys and radiological measurement and monitoring instrument surveillance, changeout and maintcnance were also observe Pre-job briefings were appropriate to the work to be performed and Radiological Controls' coverage of work activities was adequate, i

Appropriate radiation monitoring and measuring equipment was present l 'and in use on the work platform and in other work areas in the building. No work activities were determined to be inconsistent with applicable procedures and, with few exceptions, areas were orderly, and posting and labeling were appropriat It was noted that postings are now provided to identify relatively low dose rate L

areas as " waiting areas" so as to further limit the radiation l exposure of workers. Also, the inspector determined that the

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transit dose for workers moving from the personnel access airlock to the work platform has been further reduced to less than 5 mrem.

l The inspector expressed concern to the licensee with respect to

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industrial safety and housekeeping problems in the reactor building, i The lack of markings on some access rou',e trip hazards and the cluttering of some access routes and woik areas was noted by the l

inspector on several occasions during the inspection perio Although the licensee has clways expressed a willingness to correct specific problems brought to its attention, the sace, or similar, l

problems recur, indicating that a more aggressive program of licensee surveillance and prevention is needed. The inspector will observe these conditions during subsequent reactor building entrie .0 Internal Exposure Control Administrative Controls and Procedures The corporate policy is to limit internal exposures to less than one-tenth (1/10) of the quarterly NRC regulatory limit of 520 MPC-hr. Internal exposure is controlled by the use of engineering

controls, personnel access controls, control of removable surface

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contamination, and, where other controls are not practical, the use

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of respiratory protection equipment. The inspector's review of the licensee's policy statements, administrative controls and administrative procedures implementing its internal exposure control program, including the Corporate Radiation Protection Plan and the l

Respiratory Protection Policy, found them to be consistent with

! Regulatory Guides, NUREG 0041 (" Manual of Respiratory Protection l Against Airborne Radioactive Materials"), industry standards, and l regulatory requirements.

l Control of Airborne Radioactivity l The observed use of ventilation restrictions, and enclosures and

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containments to contain and control airborne radioactivity was adequate. When work caused unplanned airborne radioactivity, the work was stopped until the event was studied and corrective actions l

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. 8 taken, including the use of containments to provide local ventilation. For example, work in the highly contaminated 3eal Injection Valve Room (SIVR) in the Auxiliary Building utilized two adjoining containments provided with HEPA filtered local ventilation to control the airborne radioactivit In addition, special restrictions on Auxiliary Building ventilation, such as the prohibition of the opening of large doors, are in place during work in the SIV The licensee was also observed to effectively monitor and control the generation of airborne radioactivity. As a result of an increasing level of airborne contamination on the defueling platform (located on top of the open reactor vessel) the licensee studied the trend and concluded that the source of the contamination was highly contaminated defueling tools removed from the reactor vessel (RV).

The licensee's corrective actions consisted of scrubbing, brushing, wiping and bagging defueling tools as they were removed from the RV to storage. Airborne radioactivity has been controlled on the defueling platform so that a major portion of defueling work could be done without respiratory protective equipment. Also, in plant areas outside the reactor building, contaminated areas totalling 14,009 fta have been reduced to 500 DPM/100cm2 or less, exceeding the calendar year's goal of 10,000 fta. Contaminated equipment, tools and supplies were observed to be properly bagged and isolate The licensee's trcining programs emphasize the control and containment of contamination and are backed by an active visual aid prograni throughout the plan Control of Personnel Exposure to Airborne Radioactivity The inspector determined that the licensee effectively controls personnel exposures to airborne radioactivity by means of a network of interrelated requirements, actions and equipment. These include radiation worker training to equip the worker to carry out his or her job safely and in accordance with radiological safety requirements, specific job instructions and briefings concerning airborne radioactivity conditions, Radiological Engineering evaluations of proposed work, engineered controls, airborne radioactivity surveys, respiratory protection equipment, the preparation of radiation work permits, including specific job-related requirements for coping with airborne radioactivity, and work site coverage of work activities by Radiological Control Personnel exposure to airborne radioactivity is effectively controlled with the aid of the radiation exposure monitoring system (REMS). At such time as an individual requests access to a radiation work permit requiring the use of respiratory protective equipment, the computerized system provides the access control radiological control technician with a summary of the individual's qualifications, including respirator qualification physical exam date, equipment qualifications, fit test data, and MPC-hr assignment. Any out-of-date information is highlighted on the terminal screen. If the individual's MPC-hr assignment equals or exceeds 2 MPC-hr per day or 10 MPC-hr in the previous six days, this

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> 9 information is highlighted in a note area on the scree The individual is then scheduled for whole body counting and, if necessary, access restrictions are imposed. The inspector reviewed MPC hr assignments and whole body counts of selected individual The computerized record system results in these records being easily retrievable for review. The exposure assignments and whole body counts were timely and consistent with the results of personnel exposure assessments, e.g. analysis of breathing zone airborne radioactivity sample Respiratory Protection Equipment, Procedures, Training and Records The inspector determined that the licensee had inplemented the requirements of 10 CFR 20.103(c) for respiratory protective equipment and that the licensee's written procedures for the cleaning, maintenance, and control of respiratory protective equipment were appropriate; In addition to providing basic operating instructions, the effectiveness of the procedures was enhanced by the inclusion of criteria to aid those involved in the cleaning, maintenance, and control of respiratory protective equipment in making judgements concerning the equipmen The licensee has recently modified its respiratory protection equipment selection and use procedures to allow use of a more flexible silicone rubber facemask with powered air purifying respirators (PAPR). This action is timely, closely following OSHA /NIOSH approval of this equipment, and adds to the flexibility of the program in that hard-to-fit personnel will now be able to use the PAP Supplies of respiratory protective equipment in storage for emergency use were adequate. Respiratory equipment issued and used in the plant was properly controlled for return to the maintenance facilit Equipment is water washed, air dried, tested and

' inspected according to written, approved procedures. The inspector identitied no discrepancies with respect to equipment inspections or the condition of the equipmen Records identifying equipment used by a particular individual are maintained within the Radiological Controls Radiation Work Permit system. Records of repair and inspection are arranged by individual facepiece identification numbers, thereby providing for efficient retrieval of information on each piece of equipmen The failure of a piece of respiratory equipment is investigated to determine the cause and the results of the investigation recorded in order to track failure similarities and trends. As a result of effective licensee monitoring of equipment failures, it was recently determined that a large portion of powered air purifier battery failures could be attributed to 4-year-old rechargeable batterie Subsequent removal of all 4-year-old batteries from service reduced the number of failures. Appropriate dose assessments were made following failures. However, since an unpowered PAPR has a protection factor of 50, little exposure to airborne radioactive materials occurre . .

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5 10 The inspector examined selected training records of three system operators and seven respirator maintenance technicians and found the training and the records acceptabl e. Evaluation and Control of Internal Dose The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for evaluating airborne radioactive gas and particulate (ARGP) hazards, including the maintenance, repair and calibration of ARGP sampling equipment; the sampling of ARGPs; the assay of samples; the calculation of ARGP concentrations and maximum permissible concentration (MPC)

fractions; and the calculation and assignment of MPC-hours to individuals exposed to ARGP Technicians were observed performing their jobs within the program; records, including technician qualification sheets, calculation sheets, instrument status logs, and ARGP sample counting and assay results were reviewed; and the results of bioassays (e.g. urinalysis and whole body counts) were compared to exposures of workers to ARGPs (i.e. MPC-hours) as determined from analyses of ARGP samples taken at workers' breathing zone The licensee's operating procedures were reviewed for consistency and effectiveness with respect to the licensee's radiation protection plan, generally accepted good practices (e.g. American National Standards Institute standards) and regulatory requirement The licensee's methods, equipment, and personnel were adequate in meeting the demands of a working environment where ARGPs are a continuing problem and the concentration of ARGPs is highly variable. Equipment was functional, technicidh: were adequately trained and alert to the potential impact of changing variables encountered in the progra Records were legible, complete and easily retrievable. The practices employed in maintaining, repairing and calibrating equipment and in using the equipment were consistent with generally accepted good practice, the licensee's procedures and regulatory requirement In those cases where the radioactivity of an airborne radioactive particulate (ARP)sampleexceedsthecapacityofRadiological Controls' counting equipment, survey meter readings are utilized to provide a quick, approximate estimate of personnel exposure to ARP A review of licensee records showed that this method provides an acceptable estimate of exposure pending receipt of the results of more sophisticated analysis methods such as those employed by Chemistr Although ARP samples individually show alpha particle-emitting ARP concentrations to be very low, the licensee is taking a very conservative approach to assuring that this is, in fact, the cas As a backup to its routine area and personal breathing zone ARP sampling, the licensee composites several area monitor and breathing zone samples so as to provide a larger sarple for analysis. The results of these analyses have shown that airborne alpha-emitting

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> 11 material concentrations are far below regulatory limits, thus confirming the results of the individual measurement The performance of technicians in obtaining, analyzing and reporting analysis results was acceptable. However, one of the primary procedures related to the assay of ARP samples (9200-ADM-4212.02)

was weak in some respects. The procedure requires the daily calculation of " minimum detectable count rate" (MDCR) and " minimum detectable concentration" (MDC) values for counting systems, but gives no guidance as to how one is to determine what value of the MDCR or MDC is acceptable. Although MDCs for samples that were actually assayed were acceptable (i.e. much less than the applicable airborne concentration limit (MPC) of 10 CFR Part 20), licensee records showed that, in some cases, the calculated MDC exceeded the applicable NPC. Also, the procedure does not cover the partitioning of available counting time between background and sample ( filter paper) counts. Such partitioning, in accordance with generally accepted criteria, could improve the accuracy of ARP determination It is staced in the procedure that ARP samples "may be removed to a low background area and counted with a field survey instrument for insnediate gross activity indications." However, no guidance is provided as to when such a count should or shall be done or what action is to be taken on the basis of such a count. In addition, although it is indicated that an ion chamber instrument may be used for this purpose, no guidance is given in the procedure as to how one is to convert meter readings (mR/hr) to ARP concentration Also, the term "MPC" is apparently used to mean different things at different points in the procedure, i.e. in some cases it apparently refers to the air concentration values in Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 20, but in other cases the term apparently is understood to refer to the air concentration value of 10 CFR Part 20 modified by the application to it of a respirator " protection factor."

Further, the procedure directs that "no further analysis is required" in those cases where the half-life of the alpha-emitting radioactivity on an ARP sample is determined to be less than two hour In addition, in those cases where a second count of an ARP sample is made for strontium / yttrium-90, the results of the second count, made 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or more after the first count, is used as a basis for assigning MPC-hours when the magnitude of the second count indicates a lower MPC-hour figure than the first count. The licensee did not provide a basis for these practices. This procedure is currently undergoing revision following a licensee internal audit. The effectiveness of the revised procedure and the basis for these practices will be determined in a future inspectio (320/86-13-01)

f. Whole Body Counting The ifcensee currently uses a standup, fixed detector unit and a moving bed, fixed detector scanning unit f or Whole Body Countin Both whole body counters at TMI are used in support of both Units 1

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and The inspector noted that the units were properly calibrated using traceable standards. Appropriate isotopes for TMI-1, TMI-2 .

and fission products are included in the library of identifiable peaks. The system indicates unidentified peak areas when appropriate. The system presents nanocurie quantities, flags those which exceed the control limits for the isotopc, and prints-and records data for each scan. Appropriate quality control charts are maintained and used with each syste The inspector did not identify any violation g. Audits and Other Internal Licensee Reports The inspector reviewed licensee Quality Assurance audit reports S-TMI-85-18 and S-TMI-86-12 and Quality Assurance Modifications Operations Monitoring Report LLE-1846-86 covering several aspects of the licensee's Radiological Controls program, including the control of internal exposur .

Quality Assurance audit report S-TMI-86-12, conducted June 24 - July 28, 1986, examined the Radiological Controls program for adequacy ,

and procedure compliance in the areas of training, dosimetry, bioassay, and respiratory protection. The audtt did not identify any deficiencies, but did identify two weaknesse . One weakness was a procedural requirement which called for whole bedy counting (WBC)

for _anl respirator failure. The same procedure required a'WBC for any Fndividual exceeding 2 maximum permissible concentration-hours (2 MPC-hrs) of airborne radioactive material exposure per day. No exemption from the WBC requirement was provided regardless of how small an exposure was associated with the respirator failur Radiological Controls recognized that such a requirement could result in an undue expenditure of resources. Consequently, the procedure is being modified. The second weakness was associated with the non-radiological respiratory protection progra '

The QA audit of July 1986 also identified several Bioassay Investigative Reports (a document summarizing a Radiological Engineering investigation of a bioassay result exceeding the ,

bioassay action level) which had not been completed and forwarded to Radiological Health. This deficiency was promptly correcte The inspector noted that bioassey investigations are not logged or tracked so that the status of the investigations, which may involve one or more analyses, may be readily followed. A tracking system :

could have helped prevent the deficiency noted in the QA audi The inspector also reviewed Incident / Event Reports, Radiological Awareness Reports, and Bioassay Investigative Reports to identify any trends or problem areas with respect to internal exposure control. No such trends or problem areas were identifie ._ _

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7.0 Inspector Follow Items, Inspector follow items are inspector concerns or perceived weaknesses in the licensee's conduct of operation (hardware or programmatic) that could lead to violations if left uncorrecte Inspector follow items are addressed in paragraphs 1.0 and .0 Exit Interview The inspectors met periodically with licensee representatives to discuss inspection findings. On December 11, 1986, the site inspectors summarized the inspection findings to the following personnel:

U. Behling, Manager, Radiation Health J. Byrne, Manager, TMI-2 Licensing C. Dell, Licensing Technical Analyst A. Miller, Manager, Plant Operations -

M. Slobodien, Manager, Radiological Controls J. Tarpinian, Radiological Engineering Manager At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the TMICPD staff except fcr procedure reviews pursuant to Technical Specification 6. ,.

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WORK ORDER #

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REFRODUCTION WORK ORDER CRIGINATOR NAME N A#^ BRANCE EXTENSI N 20 SHORT DESCRIPTION (Include Docket No. , Insp. No. or key reference number.)

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/ INSTRUCTIONS XEROKING Cys of original /M Cys 766/766- A Forma, lO Cys of entire package w/o bec' /$ Cys NRC:I Form // Cys of entire package with bcr.' Special Instructions:

/ Cys of entire package with bec's and concurrences (aultiple docket numbers-add one copy for each additional docket number).

/ Cys of report onl Cys of Licensee's letter dtd .

/ Cy of Enf. Ltr with BCC's (w/o enc 1. for

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s Cys of Inspector's Evaluation Memo and/or Region I Forma 1 and , DISTRIBtrfl0N RIDS DMB(Original Con:urrence Copy) I b Code Other i Region I Docket Room with -

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concurrences (multiple dockets-one copy each docket file). I Resident Inspector k State Copy h CC's RETURN COMPLETED WORK TO: Originator Docket Room Date and Time In: Id oh Date and Time Out:

! Date Dispatched: /9 99 /84

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REGI N I FORM 45 June 1984 (Rev. )

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