IR 05000244/1986016
| ML20237H566 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island, Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 11/12/1986 |
| From: | Gallo R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Kober R ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| References | |
| LRP-B-026, LRP-B-26, NUDOCS 8708170271 | |
| Download: ML20237H566 (11) | |
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, ' bie $ NUCLEAR REGULATOR ~COMMISSION #NNNN O :j REGION I a31 PARK AVENUE
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Docket No. 50-244 03 NOV 198g w a 12 e2:10 l Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation 7 l ATTN: Mr. Roger W. Kober '
Vice President Electric and Stev roduction 49 East Avenue
/3d - 2 Roctiester, New York 14649 (dg .d l"[, g <
Gentlemen: /k l Subject: Inspection 50-244/86-16 i
This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted by Messrs. T. Polich and T. K. Kim of this office on September 1,1986 through October 4, '
1986 at the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant of activities authorized by NRC license No. DPR-18 and to the discussions of our findings by Mr. Polich with 1 Messrs. S. M. Spector, T. A. Meyer and other members of your staff !
periodically during the inspectio j i
Areas examined during this inspection are described in the NRC Region I '
Inspection Report which is enclosed with this letter. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and
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representative records, interviews with personnel and observations by the '
inspector ,
Within the scope of this inspection, no violations were observe i No reply to this letter is required. Your cooperation is appreciate
Sincerely, b
Robert M. Gallo, Chie Projects Branch No. 2 Division of Reactor Projects l
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Enclosure:
NRC Region I Inspection Report Number 50-244/06-16
REGION I==
Report No. 50-244/86-16 Docket No. S0-244 Licensee No. DPR-18
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Priority -- Category C'
Licensee: Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation 49 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649 Facility Name: R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Inspection at: Ontario, New York Inspection Conducted: September 1, 1986 through October 4, 1986 Inspectors: T. J. Polich, Senior Resident Inspector, Ginna
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T. K. Kim, Resident Inspector, Ginna d
Approved by: f c/ /O-25-14 1 P.~W. Ese # oth, Chief, Reactor
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Projec M eetion No. 2A, DRp '
Inspection Summary:
Inspection on September 1, 1986 through October 4, 1986 (Report N /86-16)
. Areas Inspected: Routine, onsite, regular, and backshift inspection by the resident inspectors (240 hours0.00278 days <br />0.0667 hours <br />3.968254e-4 weeks <br />9.132e-5 months <br />). Areas inspected included: plant operations; licensee action on previous findings; surveillance testing; maintenance; Licensee Event Reports; Off-site Review Committee Meeting; review of periodic and special reports; and inspection of accessible portions of the facility during plant tour Results: In the eight areas inspected, no violations were observe ,,
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i DETAILS Persons Contacted During this inspection period, the inspectors held discussions with and interviewed operators, technicians, engineering and supervisory and management level personne . - Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (79-10-01) Licensee Follow-up Actions 1 Associated with Containment Tendon Retensioning. During 1979 l containment tendon lift off testing, it was found that the average tendon stress was 59.6% of the ultimate strength versus the 60%
minimum requirement as specified in the Containment Tendon Stress surveillance section of the Plant Technical Specifications. In its October 18, 1979 report to the NRC, the licensee stated that the retensioning procedure was being developed by Gilbert Associates Inc., and a schedule for re-tensioning would follow the procedure development and approva The retensioning procedure was then submitted to NRR for safety evaluatio The licensee carried out the retensioning program in 1980, and tension forces were remeasured in 1981, 1983 and 1985. Extensive communication between the licensee and the NRC occurred during this period, culminating in a August 19, 1985 NRC Safety Evaluation Repor The staff concluded that: (1) all safety concerns have been addressed by the licensee, and (2) the structural adequacy of the containment vessel is assured. This item is close (Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item (82-18-01) Determine Whether Applications for Operator License Renewals Include Completion Status of Requalification Program. During a previous inspection period, the inspector noted that the license renewal application for a non-shif t licensed staff member did not specifically state whether the applicant had satisfactorily completed the requalification program. The applicant had not completed all aspects of the requalification program in that no job cross-training, such as control room watch-standing, had been performed during calendar years 1980 and 198 The station administrative procedure A-102.14 requires job cross-training for at least a total of eight hours every four month In January 1983, NRC implemented standard license renewal application (NRC form 398) which requires specific statement reflecting the applicant's requalification status. The application then must be signed by the responsible licensee officials to confirm such statements. The inspector reviewed copies of recent license renewal applications provided by the licensee and had no further questions. This item is close _ _ . _ . -
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l (Closed) Inspector Follow up Item (84-03-06) Establish Vendor Manual Controls. During a previous inspection period, a problem
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with improper storage and control of some vendor manuals was identifie The licensee has recently implemented a computerized vendor manual control system, incorporating the INPO guidelines. The manuals are now stored in the new technical library in the Steam Generator
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maintenance building, on site. During this inspection period, the inspector toured the vendor manuals libracy and reviewed the new computerized vendor manual control system. This item is close (Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item (85-12-02) Licensee Analysis of Series of Reactor Trips and Subsequent Corrective Actions. During a previous inspection period, the inspector reviewed several reactor trips which occurred between April 5, 1985 and June 6, 1985 as documented in Licensee Event Reports 85-05 through 85-11, and 85-14. The inspector discussed root causes of those reactor trips with the licensee and expressed concern for establishing long term corrective actions and appropriate management controls. The root causes of these mult1ple reactor trips were attributed to: the steam dump control system malfunction; operator inexperience on controlling steam generator water level during start-up, and lack of appropriate level of control in performing concurrent activitie These reactor trips and the root causes are discussed in the NRC Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance Report 50-244/85-9 The inspector reviewed and observed the following corrective actions taken by the licensee:
a (1) The Ginna Station Control Room Simulator was installed in March of 1986 and operators are being trained regularly on the simulator through the Operator Requalification Progra (2) The Steam Dump Control System was re-calibrated prior to the start-up from the 1986 annual refueling outag (3) The shift supervisor and the operations personnel became more aware of their ultimate responsibility and authority in plant status and activity controls through periodic shift supervisor's meetings and shift crew meeting (4) Maintenance Work Requests are routinely reviewed during the l daily Morning Operations Priority Attention Required Meeting j (MOPAR) for safety and possible conflict with operations or -
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The inspector determined that the status and the licensee's progress on these actions appear to be consistent with the licensee's commitments documented in the LERs above. This item is close ] (Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item (86-11-03) Service Water Leak Inside Containment. During a previous inspection period, the licensee experienced a service water leak inside the containment caused by the corrosion induced displacement of a containment fan
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motor cooler drain plug. The drain plugs are made of carbon steel and serve as cathodic protection for the containment air recirculation fan cooler units. As an immediate corrective action, the licensee replaced the drain plug and inspected the remaining three plugs in the coole During this inspection period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's proposed long term corrective actions as documented in the licensee's report to the NRC, dated August 16, 1986. The licensee initiated a Maintenance Work Request (MWR) #86-2901 to replace all fan motor cooler drain plugs during the next refueling outage. The licensee is in the process of ;
incorporating this MWR into their preventive maintenance program '
which includes annual inspection / replacement of the plugs. Also, the Periodic Test (PT)-2.7 on " Service Water System" was reviewed and changes were made to minimize the possibility of a water hammer induced drain plug displacement during the testing of the Service Water System. This item is close (Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item (86-14-01) Inoperable Boric Acid '
Transfer Pump Due to Valve Misalignment. The inspector's review of the Licensee's Event Report (LER)86-006 dated September 16, 1986 on this event is documented in paragraph 6. This item is closed.
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3. Operational Safety Verification General Ouring the inspection period, the inspectors observed and examined activities to verify the operational safety of the licensee's facility. The observations and examinations of those activities were conducted on a daily, weekly or monthly basi On a daily basis, the inspectors observed control room activities to verify compliance with selected Limiting Condition for Operations (LCOs) as prescribed in the facility Technical Specifications (TS). Logs, instrumentation, recorder traces, and other operational records were examined to obtain information on
, plant conditions, and trends were reviewed for compliance with l regulatory requirements. Shift turnovers were observed on a sample
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basis to verify that all pertinent information of plant status was relayed. During each week, the inspectors toured the accessible l areas of the facility to observe the following:
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i General plant and equipment condition Fire hazards and fire fighting equipmen Radiation protection control Conduct of selected activities for compliance with licensee's administrative controls and approved procedure Interiors of electrical and control panel Implementation'of selected portions of the licensee's physical
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Plant housekeeping and cleanlines Essential safety feature equipment alignment and condition ;
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The inspectors talked with operators in the control room, and other '
personnel. The discussions centered on pertinent topics of general plant conditions, procedures, security, training, and other aspects of the involved work activities, Containment Spray System
. During a walkdown of the Containment Spray System the inspector noted three Tygor, tubes were attached to system piping on the spray additive tank. Two of these tubes appeared to be used as level indicators, the third directed gases from the tank vent to ventilation system exhaust duc The licensee's operations manager directed these Tygon tubes to be removed as they are no longer necessary. The inspector verified the removal of the Tygon tubes during a subsequent tour of the Auxiliary Buildin l l Station Vital 125V Battery System The ir.spector identified many loose spacers between cells of the 'A' {
station battery and one missing spacer during a routine tour of the !
battery rooms. The spacers of the 'B' battery are all snug fitted i between the cells. The licensee addressed this concern by having the cognizant corporate engineer examine the battery and determine that the spacing between the cells was adequate to meet the seismic design criteria. An Engineering Change Notice will be issued to correct the spacer gap on the 'A' battery consistant with the snug fit spacers of the 'B' battery, . Residual Heat Removal System The inspectors identified boric acid crystals on weld joints of the
'A' RHR Heat Exchanger drain lines. The licensee removed the boric acid and performed Non-destructive Examination (NDE) in the area of the weld joints. Two leaking welds were identified: one by visual examination and the other by dye penetrant testing. .The drain lines were subsequently flushed to reduce radiation levels and the welds were repaire l l
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I l Two 90* elbows on the 'B' RHR Heat Exchanger drain lines were found 1 i
to have boric acid accumulations on them. This drain line appears I to have three wall anchors missing which leaves much of this drain line unsupported. The licensee is investigating the missing anchors and is planning examination / repair of the elbow ;
! Housekeeping and Equipment Condition
. The inspector has noted hoses and welding leads that were left in the Auxiliary Building subbasement after the completion of wor Also a build up of boric acid crystals on the 'A' and 'B' Safety Injection pumps that has restricted the diameter of the leak off drains and appears to have caused corrosion of the seal water heat exchanger SI line connections. These and other housekeeping items and material conditions were discussed with the maintenance manager and the health physics and chemistry manager when the inspector and the managers toured the Auxiliary Building. All the inspectors concerns were addressed and corrected immediately by the manager or
, a Maintenance Request Form was written to correct the concern at a later dat The inspector will follow the licensee's progress in this area in a future report. (86-16-01) Drawing Control i
During the review of LER 86-06 the inspector noted inconsistent labeling of locked valves on Piping and Instrumentation Drawing (P&ID) 33013-1266 (Chemical and Volume Control System Boric Acid).
Six valves are listed as locked open or closed and two others, 334 and 338, have no indication although they have been designated as locked open since Revision 34 of A52.2, " Control of Locked Valve and Breaker Operation" dated March 20, 1981. The current revision 4 of P&ID 33013-1266 is dated February 21, 1985 and is designated '
"As-built".
The licensee indicated to the inspector that the two additional valves which were locked open as a corrective action in LER 86-06 may not be updated on the P&ID. Such inconsistency in control of P&ID's can be confusing and misleading to the user of a drawin The licensee's Drawing Update Task Force will address this inconsistency issue in their next scheduled meetin The inspector will review the Drawing Update Task Force's resolution >
of this matter in a future inspectio (86-16-02)
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. Reactive Inspection Temporary Inspection Instruction In response to Region I temporary instruction RI-86-02, " Inspection of General Electric Type AK-F-2-25 Breakers", the inspector requested the
~ licensee to identify all GE breakers at Ginna Station used in safety related applications. The licensee has determined that only one GE
, breaker is used in a safety related application at the site and it is type AK-R-4A-5 Temporary instruction RI-86-02 is close . Surveillance Testing The inspector witnessed the performance of surveillance testing of selected components to verify that the test procedure was properly approved and adequately detailed to assure performance of a satisfactory surveillance test; test instrumentation. required by the procedure was calibrated and in use; the test was performed by qualified personnel; and the test results satisfied Technical Specifications and procedural acceptance criteria, or were properly resolve During this inspection period, the inspectors witnessed the performance of a portion of the following tests:
System Operating Procedure (S)-15.1, i' Flux Mapping Normal Procedure", Revision 28, dated March 22, 1986, performed on September 24, 1986, i
Periodic Testing Procedure (PT)-2, " Safety Injection Pumps", !
Revision 41, dated June 27, 1986, performed on September 17, 198 PT-2.7, " Service Water System", Revision 31, dated August 26, 1986, performed on September 30, 198 PT-5.10, " Process Instrumentation Reactor Protection Channel Trip Test", Revision 34, dated August 1, 1986, performed on September 15, 198 PT-6.4, "Excore/Incore Calibration", Revision 14, dated July 24, 1986, performed on October 1, 198 No violations were identifie .- Plant Maintenance During the inspection period, the inspector observed maintenance and problem investigat' ion activities to verify: compliance with ,
regulatory requirements, including those stated in the Technical Specifications; compliance with administrative and maintenance procedures; required QA/QC involvement; proper use of safety tags; I
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proper equipment alignment and use of jumpers; personnel qualifications; and deportability as required by Technical Specification The inspector witnessed a portion of the following maintenance activities:
Preventive Maintenance on 'B' Charging Pump on September 17, 198 Maintenance Procedure (M)-11.4.6, " Charging Pump Stuffing Box
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Maintenance".
Calibration of Control Room Radiation Monitor on September 30, 1986. Calibration Procedure (CP)-233, " Calibration and/or Maintenance of Radiation Area Monitor Channel R-33, R-34 or K-35".
Calibration of Hydrogen Recombiners on October 2, 198 Calibration Procedure (CP)-398A, " Calibration and/or Maintenance of Hydrogen Recombiner Instrumentation".
Emergency Maintenance Procedure (EM)-628, "RHR Heat Exchanger Drain Line Weld Repair" on September 25, 198 No violations were identifie . . Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
The inspector reviewed the following LERs to verify that the details of the event were clearly reported, the description of the cause was accurate, and adequate corrective action was taken. The inspector also determined whether further information was required, and whether generic implications were involved. The inspector further verified that the reporting requirements of Technical Specifications and station administrative and operating procedures had been met; that the event was reviewed by the Plant Opera'.. tons Review Committee and that continued operation of the facility was conducted within the Technical Specification limit : Manual Reactor Trip Due to Large Steam Leak in Turbine Buildin On July 29, 1986, the reactor was manually tripped from 100*4 power I following a break in the drain line from the 2A Main Steam Reheater to the 5B Feedwater Heater. The Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) were manually closed from the control room approximately 15 seconds af ter the reactor trip. The plant wes stabilized in hot shutdown with no compromise to plant safety. The inspector reviewed this event in the {
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previous inspection period as documented in Inspection Report '
50-244/85-11, paragraph .
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Subsequent investigation determined that the exact location of the leak was in a 90* elbow just downstream of the 2A Reheater level control valve. The leak was from an approximately 4 inch diameter hole in this 90* elbow. The elbow was removed and examined for cause of failur The failure mechanism of the elbow was determined as erosion due to impingement of steam from the 2A Reheater level control valve directly on the elbow. The impingement was due primarily to the close proximity of the level control valve to the elbow. In the other drain lines similar to the affected drain line, the level control valves are a larger distance upstream from the elbows, thus precluding any impingement of steam from the level control valve directly on these drain line elbow As an immediate corrective action, the licensee replaced the 90 elbow in the 2A Moisture Separator Reheater Drain line to the 5B High Pressure Feedwater Heater. The non-destructive examination of all similar drain lines revealed no detectable degradatio The inspector verified the corrective actions taken by the licensee and
,had no further question : Automatic Reactor Trip Due to an Intermediate Range Reactor Power Instrumentation Channel Failure. On July 30, 1986 at 1855 hours0.0215 days <br />0.515 hours <br />0.00307 weeks <br />7.058275e-4 months <br /> durin0 a unit start-up with the unit operating at approximately 25%
reactor power, an automatic reactor trip occurred due to an intermediate range reactor power instrumentation channel failure. Following the reactor trip, all systems operated as designed and the reactor was stabilized at hot shutdown condition The cause of the event was two faulty relays in the ' A' train of the intermediate range blocking circuit Subsequent investigation determined that the relay failures were age related. The inspector reviewed this event in the previous inspection period as documented in Inspection Re~ port 244-50/85-11, paragraph As an immediate corrective action, the licensee replaced faulty relays (17 and 18) of the 'A' reactor protection train and tested the~ relays using qualified spare parts and PORC approved procedure The licensee also successfully tested the redundant logic of the 'B' reactor protection trai Increased priority is being given to the Corrective Action Report (CAR)-1579 that had previously identified an age related problem with Westinghouse BFD relay The proposed long term corrective actions by the licensee include replacing all the original BFD relays by the end of 1989 refueling and maintenance outag The inspector had no further question .
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I 86-06: Inoperable Boric Acid Transfer Pump Due to Misalignment. On August 16, 1986 the licensee determined that the 'A' boric acid transfer
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i pump was inoperable dJe to a Closed suction valve. The valve had been isolated on August 15, 1986 after a chemistry sample of the Boric Acid Storage Tank had been drawn. This event was documented in Inspection Report 50-244/86-14, paragraph The inspector reviewed and verified the corrective actions taken to date, including locked valve installation and updating of the
' administrative procedure for locked valve . Offsite Review Committee Meeting On September 18, 1986, the inspector observed meeting No. 152 of the licensee's Nuclear Safety Audit and Review Board (NSARB). The meeting was held at 49 East Avenue, Rochester, New York and chaired by the Executive Vice President, RG& ,The inspector observed the conduct and reviewed the NSARB meeting agenda to ascertain whether the Offsite Review Committee we,s functioning in accordance with Technical Specifications and its Charter. The inspector noted that the committee reviewed the recent reactor trips, as '
documented in LERs86-004 and 86-005, in detail including root causes ;
and corrective actions. The committee also reviewed the activities and progress of the QA/QC subcommitte j The QA/QC subcommittee's function i is to review and approve corporate Quality Assurance policy and to provide oversight of Ginna station and corporate activities to assure that the Quality Assurance objectives are being implemente No deficiencies were note . Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.1 and 6.9.3 were reviewed by the inspector. This review included the following considerations: the reports contained the information required to be reported by.NRC requirements; test results and/or supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; and the validity of the reported information. Within this scope, the following report were reviewed by the inspectors:
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Monthly Operating Report for August, 198 . Exit Interview l At periodic intervals and at the conclusion of the inspection period, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and finding Based on the NRC Region I review of this report and discussion held with licensee representatives, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restriction _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _