IR 05000320/1986001

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Insp Rept 50-320/86-01 on 860101-31.No Violation Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Lers,Defueling Operations,Diesel Generator Protective Relaying Preventative Maint & Health Physics & Environ Reviews
ML20137X906
Person / Time
Site: Three Mile Island Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 02/28/1986
From: Bell J, Dan Collins, Cook R, Cowgill C, Moslak T, Myers L
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20137X876 List:
References
50-320-86-01, 50-320-86-1, NUDOCS 8603120035
Download: ML20137X906 (13)


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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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Report No.. 50-320/86-01 Docket No. 50-320 License No. DPR-73 Priority -- Category C Licensee: GPU Nuclear Corporation P.O. Box 480 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Facility Name: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Inspection At: Middletown, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted: January 1,1986 - January 31, 1986 Inspectors: ).

R. CCok, Senior Resident Inspector (TMI-2)

27 9(o d6te signed

/ cm 7_/L 7k date signed

'T.70slak,Resigdt Inspector (TMI-2)

&11,L 5M O.eRs - 6,hu J nio Ra at'on Specialist ddte tiig1ed s t 8)

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Mid'7f b D. Collins, Ratti tion Specialist date sicjned M S hcp _ 2/o//A a . yers, Radiation Specialist date sigr.ed, Approved By: z111 % bb date sigred C.CowgiQChief,TMI-2ProjectSection Inspection Surrnary:

Areas Inspected: Routine safety inspection by site inspectors of plant operations (long term shutdown) including review of Licensee Event Reports (LER); licensee action on previously identified inspection findings; defueling operations; diesel generator protective relaying preventative maintenance; health physics and environmental reviews; radiological shipments; records associated with the radiological controls program; placement and calibration of radiation detectors strategically located in the reactoc building; radiological instrumentation calibration facilities and radiological effluent release reporting. The inspection involved 370 inspection hour Results: No violations were identifie e60228 PDR ADOCM 05000320 Q PDR

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DETAILS 1.0 Ongoing Recovery Operations Routine Plant Operations Inspections of the facility were conducted to assess compliance with the requirements of the Proposed Technical Specifications and Recovery Operations Plan in the following areas: licensee review of selected plant parameters for abnormal trends; plant status from a maintenance / modification viewpoint, including plant cleanliness, control of switching and tagging, and fire protection; licensee control of routine and special evolutions, including control room personnel awareness of these evolutions; control of documents, including log keeping practices; radiological controls, and security plan implementatio ~

Random inspections of the control room during regular and backshif t hours were routinely conducted. The Shif t Foreman's Log and selected portions of the Control Room Operator's Log were reviewed for'the period January 1 through January 31, 1986. Other logs reviewed during the inspection period included the Submerged Demineralizer System (SDS) Operations Log, Radiological Controls Foreman's Log, and Auxiliary Operator's Daily Log Sheet Operability of components in systems required to be available for response to emergencies was reviewed to verify that they could perform their intended functions. The inspectors attended selected licensee planning meetings. Shift staffing for licensed operators, non-licensed personnel, and fire brigade members was observe No violations were identifie .0 Licensee Event Report (LER) Review The inspector reviewed the LER listed below to verify that the details of the event were clearly reported, including the accuracy of the description of the cause and the adequacy of corrective actio The inspector determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether the event should be classified as an Abnormal Occurrence, whether generic implications were indicated, and whether the event warranted onsite follow-u LER 86-01 dated January 16, 1986, addressed exceeding the 7-day timeclock for inoperability of the IB Emergency Diesel Generator due to defective component At 2050 hours0.0237 days <br />0.569 hours <br />0.00339 weeks <br />7.80025e-4 months <br /> on December 13, 1985, the annual preventive maintenance for Emergency Diesel Generator DF-X-1B commenced. On December 20, 1985, while performing the required demonstration of engine operability, it was determined that there was no remote speed control. Troubleshooting eventually identified the governor as being defective. A replacement governor was obtained and installe Retesting indicated that the remote speed control problem was

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corrected, but there was no shutdown capability. Further troubleshooting discovered a defective solenoid in the replacenent governor. A new solenoid was obtained and installed. Engine 2.

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operability was successfully demonstrated and the engine was returned to service at 1709 hours0.0198 days <br />0.475 hours <br />0.00283 weeks <br />6.502745e-4 months <br /> on December 21, 1985. Thus, Emergency Diesel Generator DF-X-1B was out-of-service for more than seven (7) days, exceeding the timeclock of the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.8. The event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(i)(2)(i)(B). The root cause of this event is not known at this time. The governor and solenoid will be returned to the manufacturer for analysis. A supplemental report will be

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submitted to report the results of the analysis. The inspector will review the supplemental report 'when it is issue .0 Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (320/85-10-01): Review technician training regarding respiratory protection equipment component compatibilit Guidance on component compatibility is given in Radiological Controls

Procedure 9000-ADM-4020.02, Revision 0-00, " Description and Selection of
Respiratory Protection Equipment." The inspector determined that

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Radiological Controls technicians had been instructed and tested concerning facepiece interchangeability and various combinations of equipment. Through discussions with technicians and Group Radiological

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Controls Supervisors, the inspector determined that technicians and supervisors were knowledgeable of requirements and equipment. The inspector had no further questions.

, (Closed) Violation (320/85-16-04): Failure to inspect respiratory protective equipment within the required perio As noted in Inspection Report 85-21, the licensee has issued updated i

procedure guidance in 9000-ADM-4020.06, Revision 1, dated November 8, 1985 and 4232-ADM-4020.01, Revision 0, dated November 21, 1985. Routine resident reviews have identified no similar problems. The inspector had no further questions on this ite (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (320/85-20-02): Provide documented

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results of GPUN assessment of impact of inaccurate Sr-90 analysi NRC Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 85-16 required that the licensee respond by November 22, 1985. The licensee assessment included analyses

of radioactive shipments, Safety Evaluation Reports, Technical Evaluation

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' Reports and Recovery System Descriptions, the Effluent Monitoring Program, and personnel airborne exposure. The results indicate the previously identified waste classification error and one additional barrel shipped in 1984 (Drum 83-D-II-128) to be affected. The licensee notified the burial site operator and the State of Washington. The review indicated that no other regulatory limits had been exceede The inspector verified calculations establishing that effluents and personnel airborne exposures did not exceed regulatory limit The inspector had no further questions on this ite c

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!' (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (320/85-20-03): Provide independent assessment of Chemistry QA/QC program and procedures by November 22,

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198 The licensee response dated November 22, 1985 stated that a contracted report from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory concerning the Chemistry QA/QC program found that the program was acceptable. The inspector

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reviewed the report and found it to be as stated in the licensee's letter. The licensee has begun to implement the recommendations of the report. The inspector had no further questions on this ite (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (320/85-20-04): Implement a formalized QA/QC program for laboratory analyse t

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As stated in the licensee's letter dated November 22, 1985, the Chemistry

Department has implemented the following procedures

4212-CHM-3011.85, Rev. O, December 23, 1985, Radiochemistry Round Robin i

4212-CHM-3011.86, Rev. O, December 23, 1985, Radiochemistry Intra-Laboratory Analysis 4212-CHM-3011.87, Rev. O, December 19, 1985, Radiochemistry Interlaboratory Cross Check Verificatio The inspector reviewed these procedures and noted that evaluations are required when discrepancies occur. The department continues to use t 4212-CHM-3011-82, Rev. 2-01, Quality Control Program for Radiochemistry I Instrumentation, which has been effectively extended by the above three ,

procedures. The chemistry department has performed an initial internal audit of the radiochemistry area and is compiling a summary report for THI-1, TMI-2 and Oyster Creek. The report will be reviewed by NRC when completed. The inspector had no further questions regarding this matte (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (320/85-20-05): Document and verify results for computer programs used in laboratory analyses.

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The licensee has reviewed computer software and has determined which equations were used, has verified that the equations are correct and has ,

compared the computer output to hand calculations. TMI-2 Radiological Engineering perfonred an independent verification. These comparisons found no discrepancie The licensee has developed Procedure 4212-CLM-3011.21, Rev. 0, January 30, 1986, Control of Laboratory Computer Programs, which specifies a methodology for documenting computer programs, requires verification of calculations, defines a frequency of software review, specifies a

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methodology for making modifications, requires a program security statement and~ requires a sample run. The inspector had no further .

questions on this ite ,

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(Closed) Violation (320/85-15-01): Misclassification of three barrels as Class A waste. The licensee has revised Procedures 1501-ADM-4450.01

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dated October 9, 1985 and 4214-ADM-4450.01 dated November 20, 1985 which implement the changes as stated in the licensee's letter to NRC Region I

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dated October 10, 1985. The procedure changes were as discussed in

Region I Inspection Report 320/85-21. The inspector determined the l

procedures to be adequate to prevent recurrence. This item is close ,

(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (50-320/84-04-04): The licensee's i implementation of the As-Low-As-Is-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA) concept was assessed in Inspection Report 50-320/84-0 One identified weakness concerned training of licensee and contractor personnel at the planning.and direction level whose duties may have a significant effect on ALARA implementation. The licensee established two training courses in response to this identified weakness: one for l . management and one for engineers. As noted in Inspection Report i 50-320/85-19, the inspector attended part of the engineers' training course during the previous inspection period. During this (50-320/86-01)

e inspection period, the inspector attended the course for managers. The instructor was well prepared and the material presented was appropriate; however, the inspector observed that the course effectiveness could be improved by providing:

l More time for the instructor to cover the course material. Muen of

the material covered in the text was not covered in the course. It appears that two hours may not be sufficient to allow instruction in all of the major aspects of ALARA implementation covered in tne

. tex . An overall, integrated description of ALARA implementation it TMI-2

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(the "ALARA program") to the students in the classroom. The text i

mentions "ALARA organization," "ALARA committee," and "ALARA

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coordinators." However, the existence of these or similar functional elements at TMI-2 was not specifically described in the course in the context of an ALARA program at THI- . Specific, integrated instruction in ALARA implementation within the context of the TMI-2 recovery effort. Although brief mention was i made of applicable ALARA implementation procedures, specific instruction (e.g. a working example) in the application of the procedures was not provided.

i 4.0 Defueling Operations During the reporting period the licensee continued defueling operation One of the defueling operations consisted of cutting a fuel element which

. was withdrawn nearly intact' (P-4) into nominal four foot sections and

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placing the pieces into a fuel caniste The element was cut using the hydraulic shears. Straggling fuel pins, which interfered with placing the pieces into the canister, were trimmed using either the hydraulic shears and/or the impact chisel. Spiders, end fittings and fuel pins were loaded into the canisters using pick and place techniques with the three prong hydraulic gripper. The licensee also used side loading debris buckets which were filled with fuel pins using the pick and place technique and by use of the hydraulically operated spade bucke _ _ - - - -

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Ultimately, the hydraulically operated spade bucket was used to deposit debris directly into the fuel caniste Lack of visibility has plagued the defueling process. On one occasion, the lack of visibility was caused by TV cameras which had deteriorated to the point of non-use. The cameras were replaced when the Comand Center no longer had enough visibility to install covers, dewater and transfer fuel canisters. Reactor Vessel lighting seems to need continual attention and light replacemen During replacement of vessel lights on Janua ry 28, 1986, one of the electricians became overcome. The licensee instituted a rescue which was well coordinated f rom the Command Cente The cause of the fainting was attributed to dehydration of the worke Visibility is also being hampered by the reactor coolant defueling water cleanup system not being able to operate effectively for extended periods. The amount of water that can be processed for a given filter has degraded to about 45,000 gallons or about 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> of operation before a high filter differential pressure is create The previous filter life was expended af ter 250,000 and 125,000 gallon throughput showing a continual decrease in filter life with respect to absolute time. The cause of the filter plugging is attributed to an algae growth which has made the reactor coolant system (RCS) water murky and which readily fouls the 0.Su filters. The licensee is evaluating means of removing the algae from the RC The licensee has attempted to chemically treat one of the filter cans, F-402, by an acid cleaning technique in an attempt to destroy the alga The licensee has also contracted biologists and taken samples of the algae to determine a viable solutio The licensee is also investigating the use of a different filtering system which would utilize a coarser filter to remove the algae and fines rather than expending the 0.5u filter On January 12, 1986, the licensee transferred three loaded fuel canisters from the reactor building into the fuel handling buildin These were the first loaded canisters to be transferre The canisters were sealed, dewatered and individually transferred from the reactor vessel by a shielded canister handling bridge to the fuel transfer cana The canisters were then transported to the fuel handling building via a modified fuel transport system and placed in underwater fuel canister storage racks located in the "A" fuel pool. Since this initial transfer of fuel canisters to the fuel handlir.g building, five additional fuel canisters and one filter canister have been transferred and stored in the spent fuel poo Jnit 1 operators for manipulation of the fuel handling tools Training was witnesse of ld at the defueling test assembly (DTA). Unit 1 personnel are supplementing the Unit 2 personnel during defueling operations. A demonstration of a newly developed reciprocating saw and clamping

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ass [mblieswasalsowitnessedattheDT The reciprocating saw appeared to facilitate cutting of fuel eierent . _ . - - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ .- - _ . _ _ _ --. - . _ - . .. - ,

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i The licensee appears to be conducting their defueling operations per the i provisions of the applicable Safety Evaluation Report and procedures approved by the NRC staff. No violations were identifie .0 Diesel Generator Protective Relaying Preventative Maintenance i

The inspector observed maintenance and testing performed on the i

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protective relaying systems of the emergency diesel generators. The electrical relays are calibrated and tested at 18-month intervals to demonstrate operability in accordance with Technical Specification 3.8.1.1. The inspector verified that the diesel generators were taken

! out-of-service and returned-to-service in accordance with approved switching and tagging orders, operability testing was performed on the

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redundant diesel, within the required frequency. The station storage batteries were available as required, and control room operators were

knowledgeable regarding the testing. The inspector witnessed the following activities: racking in 4160 volt breakers; ,

installation / removal of electrical jumpers; hot bus transfers; and functional trip testing of the diesel generators by operation of the differential, neutral overcurrent, and reverse power relays.

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The inspector verified that independent position verification on i electrical jumpers was performed, that test acceptance criteria were met and that electrical safety equipment was used, i The inspector reviewed the following controlled procedures
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-- Diesel Generator Protective Relaying, 4220-SUR-3864.01

' -- Switching and Tagging Safety, 4000-ADM-3020.04

-- Configuration Control of Electrical Jumpers, Lif ted Leads, and

> Sliding Terminal Links, 4000-ADM-3020.08 i

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-- Emergency Diesels and Auxiliaries, 4210-0PS-3860.01

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-- Class IE Electrical System, 4210-0PS-3750.01 i

Testing was performed by technicians from the licensee's Lebanon Relay Group located in Reading, Pennsylvania. The inspector determined that

' the technicians used the proper administrative controls in processing Temporary Change Notices (TCN Nos. 4220-3864-86-025 and -029) to clarify and correct portions of the surveillance procedure.

! Exceptions and deficiencies that were identified during performance testing were resolved through the issuance of Unit Work Instructions fnr corrective maintenance and retestin No violations were identifie !

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6.0 Health Physics and Environmental Review Plant Tours The NRC site radiation specialists performed plant inspection tours which included all radiological control points and selected radiologically controlled area Backshift tours were conducted on January 11 and 12, 198 Among the items inspected were:

-- Access control to radiologically controlled areas

-- Adherence to Radiation Work Permit (RWP) requirements

-- Proper use and storage of respiratory protection equipment

-- Maintenance and inspection of radiological instruments

-- Adherence to radiation protection procedures

-- Use of survey meters and radiological instruments

-- Cleanliness and housekeeping

-- Fire protectio The inspector reviewed the application of radiological controls within the plant, the laundry / respirator facility, and the Interim Solid Waste Staging Facility. The inspector reviewed the Radiological Controls Field Operations logbook for the period January 1 through January 31, 1986. Notations in the logbooks were appropriate to the conditions. Departmental management initials indicate frequent management revie No violations were identified, Radiological Shipments The inspector (s) examined selected shipments of waste and radioactive naterials from the site on January 3,10, and 13,1986 for some of the following:

-- External vehicle contamination

-- External package contamination

-- Radiation levels at vehicle surfaces, two meters and inside cab

-- Radiation levels at package surfaces

-- Verification that recipients possess the appropriate license

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-- The licensee had applied labels to all packages and had  :

placarded vehicles

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-- The licensee had prepared shipping papers, certifying that the materials were properly classified, described, packaged and j marked for transport f -- The licensee had controlled the radioactive contamination and dose rates below the regulatory limit '

No violations were identifie l

' Measurement Verification i

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Measurements were independently made by the inspector using NRC radiological equipment. These measurements were made in verifying the quality of licensee performance in radioactive material

. shipping, radiation and contamination surveys, and onsite

] environmental air and water analyse No violations were identified, Reactor Building Entries

. The inspector monitored reactor building (RB) entries during the

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inspection period. The inspection activities includeo review of i selected documents and direct observations of RB entries. The following items were verified on a sampling basi .

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-- The RB entry was properly planned and coordinated to assure that task implementation included adequate ALARA review, personnel training, and equipment testing

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Radiological precautions were planned and implemented,

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including the use of an RWP, specific work instructions, alarming self-reading dosimeters, breathing zone air samplers, and specific work instructions.

-- Special procedures were developed for unique tasks and were properly implemented.

' Entries 782 through 811 were conducted during this period.

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No violations were identifie Records Review The inspector reviewed selected radiological records during the period to assure the accuracy and completeness of the licensee i documentation of occupational exposure. The records reviewed were

. selected from the following:

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.-- Radiation Work Permits (RWPs)

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-- Dosimetry Investigative Reports l -- Incident Evaluation Reports

{ -- Radiological Awareness Reports i

-- Dosimetry Exceptions Reports I No violations were identifie l l Additional Reviews .

! The inspector reviewed various licensee records and periodic reports l concerning the radiological controls program, including current data and trends in such areas as manrem per RWP hour, decontamination

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status, skin contaminations, environmental monitoring, radiological

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events, whole body counting, training, dosimetry, shipments,

progress toward achievement of goals and objectives, storage tank l radioactivity content, airborne radioactivity, and manrem by work category; effluent releases, including sump releases and sources of sump contamination; and the cumulative dose (manrem) to all plant '

personne No violations were identifie i l NRC Reactor Building Entry

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On January 12, 1986, the inspector entered the Reactor Building to

confirm the placement and calibration of the radiation detectors e

positioned to monitor the first fuel canister transfer to the Spent

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Fuel Pool A. The purpose of the radiation monitors was to determine the effectiveness of the Reactor Bulloing Handling Bridge Fuel Canister Shield (RBHBFCS) and to determine the radiation levels on the defueling platform during canister movement. The three

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canisters transferred were two fuel canisters and one knockout l

canister. The detectors were to be located at the following points:

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one on. the defueling platform floor eighteen inches from the

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vertical surface of the RBHBFCS, one at the same distance from the

, RBHBFCS at about waist height, and one near the stairs at the defueling platform floo In addition, the general housekeeping conditions and the industrial safety aspects of the reactor building q were to be observe Observations

.The radiation detectors were recently calibrated. They were positioned as stated above, except that one detector was located at t 30 inches from the RBHBFCS vice 18 inches. Associated cables and i connectors' appeared to be in good condition. There were two area monitors on the platform with alarm set points of 30 mR/hr and ,

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300 mR/hr, respectively. The two criticality detectors were located on the lip and on opposite sides of the refueling canal just south of the rotating defueling platfor The audio / visual alarm indicators were located adjacent to the detectors. The alarms for the criticality monitors were set at I rem /h Radiation levels observed on and near the defueling platform were similar to those previously observed and reporte A high volume air sampler was brought in and located on the west side of the defueling platform. Examination of the sampler by the Rad Engineer identified that a filter had not been placed in the filter housing. A filter was promptly placed in the filter housing and the sampler checked for operatio The housekeeping on the platform was goo The defueling floor was reasonably free of trip hazards except for necessary cables. The inspector noted one problem with fire equipment. The Defueling Operator did not know the location of the defueling platform fire extinguisher. The fire extinguisher was located at the platform on the stair landing. The licensee immediately instructed the affected operator on the location of the extinguishe Further, the. licensee stated that as part of training, operators would be instructed on the location of the fire extinguisher. The inspector had no further questions regarding this matter, h. Facilities The licensee's Radiological Instrumentation Group (RIG) has moved from the Unit I shop to the southeast corner area of Warehouse 3, adjacent to the Unit 2 Administration Building. The radiological instrumentation calibration sources were also moved from the Unit 1 sho Following the move of the RIG to Warehouse 3, Radiological Controls Field Operations performed radiation surveys of the calibration area and established controls in accordance with Radiological Controls Procedure 9200-ADM-4110.01, " Establishing and Posting Areas," Re O, dated May 14, 1984, including an approved December 9,1985 Tempcrary Change Notice (TCN). The TCN (now incorporated into Re of the procedure) includes specific requirements for establishing posting boundaries at the Radiological Instrumentation Shop. Duplicate surveys of the area are maintained at the sho The inspector determined that the Radiological Controls Instrumentation Technicians had received additional training and were performing adequately in the new shop are . Observation of Licensee Qualification Board On January 31, 1986, the inspector observed the licensee conduct a qualification board for a prospective Group Radiological Controls Supervisor. The Radiation Protection Manager and two other department senior supervisors comprised the board. The ooard

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members asked questions in areas of administration, Radiological Controls operations and casualty control. The board emphasized the supervisory role of the individual in each situation. The inspector

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observed that the questions were appropriate and that the individual

was well prepared. No unacceptable conditions were identifie l Radiological Effluent Release Reporting In response to NRC concerns identified in Inspection Report 320/84-09 regarding Strontium-90 (Sr-90).in sumps released to the

environment, the licensee initiated a program of sump sample

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analyses for Sr-90 by off-site contractors. At the inspection exit

meeting on February 10, 1986, the licensee committed to updating previous Radiological Effluent Release Reports, with respect to Strontium-90 releases, based on the results of these sample analyses. This will be reviewed in a later inspection.

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7.0 Unresolved Items Unresolved items are findings about which more information is needed to ascertain whether they are violations, deviations, or acceptabl Unresolved items are addressed in paragraph .0 Inspector Follow Items

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Inspector follow items are inspector concerns or perceived weaknesses in the licensee's conduct of operation (hardware or programatic) that could

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lead to violations if lef t uncorrecte Inspector follow items are addressed in paragraphs 3 and .0 Exit Interview The inspectors met periodically with licensee representatives to discuss i inspection findings. On February 10, 1986, the inspector summarized the inspection findings to the following personnel at the exit meeting:

J. Byrne, Manager, TMI-2 Licensing W. Craft, III, Manager, Radiological Controls Field Operations C. Dell, Licensing, Technical Analyst J. Hildebrand, THI-2 Radiological Controls Director A. Miller, Manager, Plant Operations W. Potts, Acting Director, Licensing and Nuclear Services M. Slobodien, Manager, Radiological Engineering At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the TMICPD staff except for procedure reviews pursuant to Technical Specification 6. i

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. 50320-851271 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMri!SSION

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Report N /86-01 Docket N License No. DPR-73 Priority -- Category C Licensee: GPU Nuclear Corporation P.O. Box 480 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Facility Name: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Inspection At: Middletown, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted: January 1,1986 - January 31, 1986 Inspectors: ).

R. C60k, Seniot Yesident Inspector (TMI-2)

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~T.'Moslak, Resid t Inspector (TMI-2)

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Ra iat'on Specialist dite siigned

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O D. Collins, R M ation Specialist

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2fL3 s yers, Radiation Specialist

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date s1gned Approved By: u dfl,% bb date signed C. CowgiQ Chief. THI-2 Project Section Inspection Summary:

Artes Inspected: Routine safety inspection by site inspectors of plant operations (long tenn shutdown) including review of Licensee Event Reports (LER); licensee action on previously identified inspection findings; defueling operations; diesel generator protective relaying preventative maintenance; health physics and environmental reviews; radiological shipments; records associated with the radiological controls program; placement and calibration of radiation detectors strategically located in the reactor building; radiological instrumentation calibration facilities and radiological effluent release reporting. The inspection involved 370 inspection hour Results: No violations were identifie _ . - _ _ _ _ - _ . -_

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