IR 05000289/1992020
| ML20126L818 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 12/23/1992 |
| From: | Rogge J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20126L738 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-289-92-20, 50-320-92-14, NUDOCS 9301080125 | |
| Download: ML20126L818 (15) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No Docket No License No DPR-50 DPR-73 Licensee: GPU Nuclear Corporation P.O. Box 480 Middletown, PA 17057 Facility: Three Mile Island Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: Middletown, Pennsylvania inspection Period: October 27,1992 - December 7,1992 Inspectors: Francis 1. Young, Senior Resident Inspector David P. Beaulieu, Resident Inspector Harold I. aregg, Senior Reactor Engineer Approved by: 8 f+4 /4/h / b
[)6hn F. Rogge, Citji/ Dat6
" Reactor Projects Section No. 4B honection Summary The NRC Staff conducted safety . inspections of Unit I power operations and Unit 2 cleanup activities. The inspectors reviewed plant operations, maintenance, radiological controls, security, and engineering and technical support activities as they related to plant safet Results: An overview of inspection results are in the executive summar PDR ADOCK 05000289 G PDR
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TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . .
.................................... ii-1.0 SUMMARY OF FACILITY ACTIVITIES . . . . . ................... -1- Licensee Activities .................................. I NRC Staff Activities ................................. I 2.0 PLA NT OPER ATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Operational Safety Veri 6 cation . . . . . . . ................... 1 Station Blackout Diesel Inoperable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3.0 EVAPORATION OF TMI UNIT 2 ACCIDENT GENERATED WATER ..... 3 4.0 RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS . . . . . . . . . . ...................:3-5.0 MAINTENANCE AND SURVEILLANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .-.. . . 3 Maintenance Observations - . , . . . . . . . . . . . ................ 3 Fuel Bottles Located Next to Borated Water Storage Tank . . . . . . . . . 4 Missed Core Flood Tank Sampling Surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Preventive Maintenance Frequency Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Reactor Building Radiation Monitor Surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6.0 SECURITY .................................,....,....81 7.0 S AFETY ASSESSMENT /QU ALITY VERIFICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-8.0 ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... 9 Design Modification for Spent Fuel Pool Partial Re-Racking _ . . . . . . . . .
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. (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-289/91-20-01: _ DH-V-22B,- CF-V-4B, and '
C F-V-5 B Seat Leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' 10 Repair Of Valve HD-V-18C Body Wall Leak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . 10 9.0 NRC MANAGEMENT MEETINGS AND OTHER ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . 11 Routine Meetings .. ................. .... .......11
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EXECU_TIVE SUMM ARY Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station i
Report Nos. 50-289/92-20 & 50-320/92-14_
Plant Ooerations The licensee conducted overall plant operations in a safe and conservative manner. The station blackout diesel was inoperable for approximately one month due to a mispositioned cooling water valve. Although the diesel is not safety related equipment, this incident reflects a weakness in maintaining control of the status of important plant component The Unit 2 accident generated water evaporator continues to operate and approximately 1,299,000 gallons of AGW have been vaporized to the atmosphere at the close of the a
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inspection perio Badiological Controls During the routine auxiliary building tours, the inspector paid particular attention to ensure -
radiological surveys were current and that the proper warning signs were posted. The inspector noted no discrepancies and concluded that overall radiological controls were good.-
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Maintenance and Surveillance
The inspector found two unsupported 30 gallon bottles of liquid petroleum gas improperly stored within 15 feet of the borated water storage tank. The licensee changed the-maintenance procedure which controls hot work permits to require cognizant personnel to -
review the potential effect of this fire / missile hazard on safety related equipmen A review of past Plant Review Group meeting minutes determined that the licensee missed a core flood tank boron sampling surveillance and did not report this to the NRC as require The Plant Review Group's understanding and application of the Licensee Event Report-regulations were found to be incorrect. This failure to report is cited as a violation, The inspector noted that the licensee has been changing the preveiitive maintenance (PM)
frequencies to correspond with system maintenance outages without fully evaluating an documenting a technical basis why the change is acceptabl The reactor building atmospheric monitor was rendered inoperable due the failure to properly return the monitor to service during the surveillance procedure restoration. The licensee's corrective actions were comprehensive and the incident was reported as required. This .
incident is characterized as a non-cited violatio Safety Assessment and Ouality Verification The inspector attended General Office Review 130ard meetings and found that the board's review of safety issues was comprehensive and demonstrated the proper safety perspective, ii
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Engineering and Technical Sunnort The inspector found that the modification packages for the spent fuel pool lre-rack
.--modification were comprehensive and management involvement in the re-rack activities wa eviden The inspector closed an open item concerning whether the leak rates through Dli-V-22B,'
CF-V-4B, and CF-V-5Bi as evidenced by core flood tank level decrease, were within the- .
technical specification required band. Subsequent surveillance testing was satisfactor Repair of the heater drain pump discharge check valve through-wallleak was well engineered
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and performe i Security During the perio:1 the secondary alarm station was unavailable, the inspector verified that the -
licensee implemented appropriate' compensatory measure .
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DETAILS SUMMAltY OF FACILITY ACTIVITIES ljeensee Actisities Unit I remained at 100% power throughout the inspection period except for a three day period beginning November 20,1992, when power was reduced to 50% to remove clam shells from the main condense The Accident Generated Water (AGW) evaporator resumed vaporizing water to the atmosphere on November 25,1992. The evaporator had been operating in a decoupled mode since June 11, 1992, where the condensate produced in the first part of the AGW system was sent to a storage tank rather than be vaporized to the atmosphere. At the close of the ~
inspection period approximately 1,299,000 gallons had been vaporized to the atmosphere overall to dat .2 NRC Staff Activities This inspection assessed the adequacy of licensee activities for reactor safety, safeguards. and radiation protection. The inspectors made this assessment by reviewing information on a sampling basis. The inspectors obtained information through actual observation of licensee activities, interviews with licensee personnel, and documentation review The inspectors observed licensee activities during both normal and backshift hours: 46 hours5.324074e-4 days <br />0.0128 hours <br />7.60582e-5 weeks <br />1.7503e-5 months <br /> of direct inspection were conducted on backshift and 15.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> were conducted on deep backshift. The times of backshift hours were adjusted weekly to assure randomnes .0 PLANT OPEllATIONS (71707) Operational Safety Verification _
The inspectors observed overall plant operation and verified that the licensee operated the plant safely and in accordance with procedures and regulatory requirements. The inspectors conducted regular tours of the following plant areas:
--Control Room --Auxiliary Building
--Switch Gear Areas --Turbine Building
--Access Control Points --Intake Structure
--Protected Area Fence Line --Intermediate Building
--Fuel Handling Building --Diesel Generator Building The inspectors observed plant conditions through control room tours to verify proper alignment of engineered safety features; to verify that operator response to alarm conditions was in accordance with plant operating procedures; to verify compliance with Technical Specifications, including implementation of appropriate action statements for equipment out of service; and to review logs and records to determine if entries were accurate and identified equipment status or deficiencies. These records included operating logs, turnover sheets, and system safety tag . .
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~ The inspector conducted detailed walkdowns of accessible areas to inspect major components
! and systems for leakage, proper alignment, proper lubrication, proper cooling water supply, '
and any general condition that might prevent fulfillment of their safety function. -The: '.
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inspector observed plant housekeeping controls including control and storage of Hammable .
material and other potential safety hazard On November 23,1992, the inspector noted four Dre extinguishers in the station blackout -
diesel building that did not receive the required monthly inspection. The licensee indicated :
that the problem had also been noted during a Fire Protection Engineer's tour.i The licensee
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stated that the cause of the missed inspections was the poor transfer of the responsibility for the extinguishers from Unit 2 to Unit 1. The safety significance of this incident is considered to be mino ,
The inspecto- found that shift turnovers were comprehensive and accurate, and adequately, reflected plant activities and status. Control room operators effectively monitored plant operating conditions and made necessary adjustments. Housekeeping was good. The inspector concluded that the licensee conducted overall plant operations in a safe and --
conservative manne .2 Stntion Hinchout Diesel Inoperable
. On November 15, 1992, the licensee found FS-V-652, the station blackout (SBO) diesel-cooling water outlet valve, closed rendering the diesel inoperable. The SBO diesel air,-
lubricating oil, and jacket water heat exchangers use the fire service system for heat remova Even though FS-V-632 maintained the fire service system designator (FS) the licensecL downgraded the quality classification of the valve to regulatory required and the valve is' S considered an SBO diesel valve. The valve _was found closed by an observant auxiliary -
operator. Operating Procedure 1107-9, "SBO Diesel Generator " requires the valve to be - : ,
open. The licensee performed a valve lineup of all SBO diesel valm. and did not find any .
other valve out of positio '
The licensee was unable to determine when the valve was closed but-suspects it was closed on or about November 7,1992, when Gre service system valves were manipulated to locate a; small fire service system leak. Operations personnel involved in the troubleshoo ing do not ; j recall shutting FS V 652. There were several log entries to document the manipulation o >
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fire service system valves but FS-V-652 was not mentioned. The diesel was last operated -
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during its quarterly surveillance on September 12,1992. The SBO diesel cooling water
. system was Bushed on October 6,1992, indicating the valve was open on this date.
O Administrative Procedure (AP) 1029, " Conduct of Operations," states that operation of equipment or systems shall only be accomplished with the knowledge and consent of the Shift Supervisor or Shift Foreman. AP 1012, " Shift Relief and Log Entries," states that the Shift Foreman log is to be a detailed narrative of major plant status changes, problems, or
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abnormalities. The change in position of FS-V-652 and SBO diesel inoperability was not logge The inspector concluded that although the diesel is not considered safety related equipment, this incident reflects a weakness in maintaining control of the status of important plant component .0 EVAPORATION OF TMl UNIT 2 ACCIDENT GENEllATED WATElt (71707)
The inspectors observed overall evaporator operation and verified that the evaporator was operated in accordance with licensee procedures and regulatory requirements. The Accident ~
Generated Water (AGW) evaporator resumed vaporizing water to the atmosphere on November 25,1992. The evaporator had been operating in a decoupled mode since June 11, 1992, where the condensate produced in the first part of the AGW system was sent to a storage tank rather than be vaporized to the atmosphere. The licensee operated in the decoupled mode due to slightly higher radioactivity of the AGW, necessitating processing the water twice. At the close of the inspection period approximately 1,299,000 gallons had been vaporized overall to dat The inspectors identified no conditions that were adverse to safety or contrary to regulatory requirement .0 ItADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS (71707)
During entry in'o and exit from radiologically controlled areas, the inspectors verified that proper warning signs were posted, personnel entering were wearing proper dosimetry, personnel and material leaving were properly monitored for radioactive contamination, and -
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monitoring instruments were functional and in calibration. The inspectors also reviewed extended Radiation Work Permits (RWPs) and survey status boards to verify that they were current and accurate. The inspectors observed activities in radiologically controlled areas and verified that personnel were complying with the requirements of applicable RWi's and that workers were aware of the radiological conditions in the are During routine auxiliary building tours, the inspector paid particular attention to ensure radiological surveys were current and that the proper warning signs were posted. The inspector noted no discrepancies and concluded that overall radiological controls were goo .0 MAINTENANCE AND SURVEILLANCE (62703,61726,71707) Mnintenance Observations The inspector reviewed selected maintenance activities to assure that: the activity did not violate Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation and that redundant components were operable; required approvals and releases had been obtained prior to
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commencing work; procedures used for the task were adequate and work was within the skills of the trade; maintenance technicians were properly qualified; radiological and fire preventive controls were adequate; and, equipment was properly tested and returned to servic Maintenance activities reviewed included:
- Job Order No. 056439, " Brass Chips Found on NR-P-1B Packing Leakoff Indicating Bearing Wear," was inspected on November 11,199 * Corrective Maintenance Procedure 1410-Y-26, " Control of Hot Work," was inspected on November 26,199 * Job Order No. 055173, " Calibration of GE Type 180 Panel Meters," wns -
inspected on November 7,199 * Job Order No. 063016, "HD-V-18C Valve Repair," was inspected on October 6, 199 For nuclear river water pump maintenance (Job Order No, 056439), the inspector found that individuals performing the maintenance were knowledgeable, maintenance procedure quality was good, and proper QA documentation existed for replacement parts. _ The inspector concluded that overall performance of this maintenance activity was excellent. A detailed evaluation the HD-V-18C repair can oc found section 8.3. The inspector had several concerns with the control of liquid petroleum gas and the changing of PM frequencies which are discussed in sections 5.2 and .2 Fuel llottles Located Next to lloraud Water Storage Tank ,
On November 23,1992, the inspector noted two unsupported 30-gallon bottles of liquid petroleum gas stored within 15 feet of the borated water storage tank (BWST). The bottles were being used by the electrical maintenance personnel to supply fuel to a portable heate The inspector was concerned because the bottles were a missile hazard since they were unsupported and also a fire hazard. The inspector raised his concerns to the licensee's fire protection engineer, who had the bottles tied to a cement block 30 feet away from the BWST. Discussions with the licensee indicated that no evaluation of the location of the bottles had been performe To prevent recurrence of a similar incident the licensee changed Corrective Maintenance Procedure 1410-Y-26, " Control of Hot Work," to provide a permit system for the use of liquid or gas fueled portable heaters. The permit will allow cognizant personnel to review the ha72rds associated with the type and volume of fuel and the potential affect of the fuel on safety related equipmen .
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and found they were adequate to prevent recurrence of a similar inciden .3 Missed Core Flood Tank Sampling Surveillance The inspector reviewed past Plant lleview Group (PRG) meeting minutes and noted that Meetmg Number 92-002 described a missed core Dood tank sampling surveillanc Technical Specification 4.1.2 requires that equipment sampling and testing be performed as detailed in Tables 4.1-2 and 4.1-3. Technical Specification Table 4.13, item 3, requires a monthly determination of boron concentration in the core flomi tanks. Technical Specification 3.3.1.2.b requires a minimum concentration of 2270 ppm boron. A sample was taken on November 13, 1991. The next sample was scheduled for December 14, 1991, with a late date of December 21,1991. On December 23,1991, the licensee determined that the sample was missed and sampled the core Dood tanks that day. The boron concentration in both tanks was above the technical specification limit (2319 ppm for the 'A' tank and 2375 ppm for the 'IP tank). There was no Shift Foreman log entry to document the missed surveillance as required by Administrative Plocedure 1012 " Shift Relief and Log Entries."
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The licensee determined that the cause of the missed surveillance was the mis 0 ling of the surveillance scheduling sheet. These scheduling sheets are stored in a binder chronologically by due date. The corrective action is to use the computer data base to independently identify and track the status of current and completed surveillances, in addition, the core flood tank sampling surveillance was added to the daily chemistry schedule as a Exed weekly tas ,
The PRG cvaluated whether the technical specification violation was ecportable. The PRG determined that since the sample results determined the boron concewation to be within the hmits of the limiting condition for operation, no operation or condition prohibited by
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technical specifications occurred and this event is not reportable under 10 GR 50.72 cr 50.73. The licensee based this cotielusion on the draft wording of 10 CFR 50.73 prm.ased rule changes published in the Federal Register (Volume 47, Number 88) on May 6,1982, and subsequent comments by the public. In the discussion of section 50.73(a)(4),
proposed rule states in part that " The licensee must report events where an Action _.4ement contained in a 1.imiting Condition for Operation is not met. For an Action Statement that gises the licensee alternatives, the Action Statement is met if either alternative is me I ailure to comply with a Surveillance Requirement need not be reported as an LER, but shouhl be tabulated in the Monthly Operating Report." The licensee interpreted this proposed rule change to indicate that as long as the equipment / component was shown to have remained operable, and that only the surveillance interval was missed, an LER was not required. The licensee interpreted this retion to support their conclusion that a missing surveillance interval was not a condition prohibited by tecimical specifications and this event was not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 or 50.73, i
On December 1,1992, the inspector with the aid of the NRR Project Manager referred this specific situation to the NRC Technical Staff for their understanding of the intent of the data
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that is collected by the 1.litt rule. The NI(C Technical Staff considered missing a surveillance interval information that the N1(C Staff desired to gather using the 1.111( rule (10 Ul:lt 50.73). This position was clanfied in Generic 1 etter (GL) 87 09 dated June 4,1987, addressing 1.imiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance llequirements for Standard Technical Specifications. In the Generic Letter, the NI(C stated that the failure to perform a surveillance within the allowable surveillance interval defined by Specification 4. constitutes a reportable event under 10 CFl( 50.73(a)(2)(i)(II) because it is a cond. tion piohibited by the plant's Technical Specification. Section 4.0.3 of the Standard Technical Specilications addresses me operability of equipment associated with the failure to perform a Suncillance itequirement within the allowable surveillance interval. This requirement for TMi thiit 1 is addressed m the plant's Technical Specifications, Section 4 introductory ~
par.y'raph. The equipment testing and system sampling frequencies specified in the surveillance section of the Technical Specifications are used to maintain the equipment and systems in a safe operational status, lisceeding the surveillance time interval was considered by the inspector a condition prohibited by TMI Technical Specification 4.1.2 that established mininuun f requencies and was reportable per 10 CI:lt 50.73(a)(2)(i)(ll). Itased on this information, the inspector disagreed with the PI(G's reportability evaluation. The inspector discussed the reportability issue with the licensee and they still maintained that the incident was not reportabl The inspector concluded that the failure to sample the core Good tank at the required monthly hequency is a violation of Technical Specification 4.1.2. The response to the missed surveillance was appropriate and the results were acceptable, llowever, the inspector also concluded that the failure to report the missed core Good tank sampling surveillance is a violation of 10 CFit 50.73(a)(2)(i)(H.) (50-289/92-20 01)
'Ihe above-noted violation is of minor safety signincance; however, the use of enforcement
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discretion is not possible since the licensee has not acknowledged the violatio ,4 Presentise Maintenance Frequency Changes on November 6.1992. the inspector noted that the calibration stickers on six ammeters on the IS and IP 480 volt class 111 switchgear had a calibration due date of June 15, 199 Although the licensee no longer uses calibration stickers, the inspector questioned if the licensee had missed the calibration. The inspector reviewed the licensee's computer based machinery history and found that the preventive maintenance (PM) activity to calibrate the ammeters had been scheduled for April 7,1992, but was canceled. The basis given in the database for the cancellation was to reschedule the calibration to coincide with the switchgear cleaning and inspection which is scheduled for July 1994. The licensee stated that consolidating PM tasks into system outages enhances plant safety by minimizing system unavailabilitie The inspector questioned the licensee concerning the adequacy of this basis because it esplains why the licensee wants the frequency changed but does not provide a technical basis
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why the change was acceptable. The licensee and inspector .evie ved the vendor technical manual and found no recommended calibrat.5n frequency. The licensee abo indicated that the ammeters do not have a history of faihire or being out of calibration. liased on this review, the inspector determined that the ammeter PM change was acceptabl Further inspector review found that the licensee has no formal method or criteria for evaluating and documenting changes to PM frequencies. PMs which are rescheduled to co!ncide with a system outages are generally reviewed by the maintenance foremen, the lead gtoup supervisor, and the nunager of plant material. There is no administrative requirement to irrform this review end there is ao gnidance as to the extcat of this revbw. The licensee does not believe that a formal method is necessar The inspector concluded that the lack of a program to formally evaluate and documen!
technical bases for PM frequency changes is a weakness that warrants further licensee review. Consolidating system unavailabilities can enhance plant safety only if the reduced Ph' frequencies do not result in increased component failures or reduced component relh.bilit ~ Iteactor fluihling Itudiation Mmiltor Surveillance On October 19, 1992, the licensee performed the quarterly calibration of the iodine channel on 1(M- A2, the reactor building atmospheric monitor, per Surveillance Procedure (SP) 1302-3.1, "Itadiation Monitoring System Calibration." l(M A2 is a particulate-iodine-gas type sampling unit located in the intermediate buildini,, with sample air drawn from the reactor building and retmned to the reactor building. Due to an improper valve lineup subsequent to completion of the surveillance, the radiation monitor was rendered inoperable for greater than the technical specification allotted tim .
SP 1302-3.1 purges itM-A2 to reduce background radiation readings by closing CM V-4, the sample pump suction valve from the reactor building, and opening V-9, the sample pump suction / purge valve from the intermediate building. After a two-minute purge, the sample pump discharge valve was closed and the sample pump was secured. SP 1302-3.1 then required V-9 to be closed but this was not accomplished. Tha technician completed the calibration and considered itM-A2 properly returned to service. Since V-9 remained open, the reactor building air was diluted by the intermediate building air resulting in low itM A2 channel indications. The particulate channel indication was approximately one-Ofth of the recorded indication before itM A2 was removed from service and the gas channel levels were reduced by approximately one-half. The low RM A2 channel indications wete noted and V-9 was shut approximately 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after itM-A2 was removed from servic Technical Specification 3.1.6.8 requires a reactor building sample be taken every eight hours
- when ItM-A2 is inoperable. Since the licensee was unaware that V-9 was open, this sample l was not taken. The licensee reported this technical specification non-compliance as required by 50.73 (A)(2)(i)(b).
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The licensee conducted a formal iluman Performance linhancement System (IIPliS)
investigadon into this incident and found several root causes. The stcp that clows V-9 is not contained in the iodine channel calibration section but ir a referenced step contained in the p.uticulate channti calibration section of the nocedure. The steps in the particulate section of the procedure were not initialed when completed and the pages containing these steps were
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not included in the completed work package. The supervisor did not note the missing pages when reviewing the work package. The llPliS report also noted that the procedure does not etntain an mdependent verification of system lineup following surveillance completion and the procedure does not compare before and after radiation levels. The report indicated that pnor to this incident, the technician had successfully completed the surveillance eight time The inspector reviewed 1.icensee livent lleport (1.1111) 924K13 00 associated with this E incident. The licensee's corrective actions include: counseling the !&C technician on the
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importance of completing all procedure steps, and reviewing all radiation monitoring system procedures to add an independent verification of proper valve realignment as appropriat The inspector evaluated the safety significance of this incident. Technical Specifications limit to eight hours the tinn itM-A2 can be inoperable without taking a reactor building sample bnause of the ability of the detector to detect a small reactor coolant system leak in a short period of time (a leak of less than I gpm will be detected within one hour). The three alternate means of detecting coolant leakage, the mass balance technique, the reactor building sump level increase, and reactor building cooling coil condensate flow measurements, were all available during the time itM-A2 was inoperable The licensee still had the ability to detect changes in reactor building activity after 1(M-A2 was believed to have been returned to service but the indication would be further from the alarm setpoint. Since the time period itM- A2 was inoperable was very short and the other means of detecting reactor coolant system leakage were available, the safety significance of this incident was minimal, ;
The inspector concluded that the failure to shut V-9 in accordance with SP 1302-3.1 is a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1. The licensee's corrective actions are adequate to prevent recurrence of this incident. I or this reason, this viola'. ion was not cited pursuant to NI<C linforcement Policy,10 CPit Part 2, Appendix C (1992),Section V. ,0 SECUltlTY (71707)
The inspectors verified the implementation of the Physical Security Plan by verifying:
Protected Area and Vital Area barriers were well maintained and not compromised; isolation zones were clear; personnel and vehicles entering and packages being delivered to the Protected Area were properly searched and access control was in accordance with approved
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licensee procedures; persons granted access to the site were badged to indicate whether they have unescorted access or escorted authorization; security access controls to Vital Areas were
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being maintained and that persons in Vital Areas were properly authorized; security posts I were adequately staffed and equipped; and adequate illumination was maintaine _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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9 During evening backshift ia.pections the inspectors toured the protected area to verify that i temporary lighting was suf0cient and functioning properly. During the period of time the secondary alarm station was unavailable, the inspector verified that the licensee implemented appropriate compensatory measures. The inspectors concluded that the Security Plan was properly implemente .0 SAFETY ASSEG1ENT/ QUAI,lTY VERIFICATION (40500)
On November 16 and 17,1992, the inspeuor attendcd General Office Review Board meetings and found that the board's review of safety issues was comprehensive and demonstrated the proper safety perspectiv .0 ENGINEEltlNG AND TECilNICAl, SUPPORT (37700,40500)
8,1 Design Modification for Spen: Fuel Pool Panhti lle-Rncking
'i'he inspector reviewed the licensee's ir xlineation design description MDD-254A-Division 1, safety evaluation Sli 412076-001, Installation Speci0 cation T1 lS-412076 001, and the contractor (lloltec International) installation and test procedures series HPP-90310 for the installation of the new high density poisoned fuel racks in the 'A' fuel storage pool. The inspector also reviewed the NRC Safety Evaluation related to Amendment No.164 for the technical specification changes for the new fuel storage rack installatio The modification included the removal of eight old storage reck.s that were fastened to the pool walls and base, and their replacement with six new free standing, poisoned, high density storage racks designed to seismic category I requirements. The old ' A' pool racks contained 253 spent fuel storage locations whereas the new racks contain 846 storage locations of which 100 are presently in use. The north end of the pool, presently free of racks, can provide 648 storage locations with the installation of six more racks. The spent fuel storage capability would be extended to full plar.t life with the 1494 storage locations provided when all new fuel racks are installe The i..spector observed the removal of the old racks and installation of the new racks in progress. The inspector verified that 25% of the new rack storage locations were tested for alignment by a drag test of a dummy fuel assembly. The 150-pound maximum drag limit for insertion and removal was met in all tests. The inspector also veri 0ed the satisfactory performance of the test which determines the effectiveness of the boral poisoned cells and establishes a baseline for future coupon surveillance The inspector reviewed Field Questionnaire No. C 092196, pertaining to a slight misalignment of the neo C 1 rack. Discussions with the lead nuclear engineer indicated that fuel movement for the new racks in the north-south direction was to be accomplished by only bridge movement and in the east-west direction only by trolley movement. Currently, movement of fuel from the C-1 to E racks requires both bridge and trolley movement. A
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meeting between the licensee and contractor has been scheduled to resolve this issue. The inspector does not consider this issue to be a safety concer The inspector determined that fuel storage pool 'A' contains two horal coupon trees that have actual rack material coupons. Testing of the coupons is to be done on a systematic basi s for the life of the plan The inspector found that the madineation packages and contractor installation procedures were comprehensive and fully descriptive of the installation. The inspector concluded the partial re-racking modification of the ' A' spent fuel pool was a coordinated team effort of corporate and site engineering and there was managem:nt involvemen _ (Closed) Unresolved llem 50 289/91 20-01: Dil Y-2211, CF-V-411, and CF-V-Sil Seat leakage This issue concerned whether the leak rates through Dil-V-2211, CF-V-411, and CF.V-Sil, as evidenced by changes in core flood tank level, were within the technical specification required band. This issue was made unresolved pending completion of leak rate testin The licensee performed leak testing of valves Dil-V-2211, CF V-411, and CF-V-511 in accordance with Surveillance Procedure 1300-3T, " Pressure isolation Test of CF-V-4A/B, 5 Alli, and Dil-V 22 Alli," during the last refueling outage. The inspector verified that leakage was within the procedure acceptance limits, in addition, CF-V-4B was opened on November 4,1991, due to a bonnet leak. The valve internals were inspected and the valve was manually exercised. Both the internals inspection and the exercising results were satisfactor _
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The inspector had no further concerns related to leakage through these check valves. This item is close Itepair Of Valse llD-V-lHC lludy Wall leak The inspector reviewed the licensee's activities associated with the repair of a through wall leak on llD-V-18C, the 'C' hea'er drain pump discharge check valve. The inspector evaluated the repair of this valve due to the personnel safety implications. The leak was identified on September 28,1992. Ill.'-V-18C is an original equipment 8" Crane Company, 400 Class, cast steel, vertically mounted, swing check valve which was purchased to ANSI 1116.55 and 1116.3434 requirements. Based on visual and nondestructive examination (NDE),
-- l the licensee determined that the leak was caused by a pre-existing defect in the casting that opened as a result of thermal cycling. The casting also appeared to have some original i
foundry repair welding in another h> cation near the lea l The inspector reviewed engineering evaluation request (EER) 92-0417 and observed the pre-weld body wall excavation, in process welding, and NDE. The initial excavation
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approximately 1" in diameter and 5/8" deep and was intended to remove porosity at the leak location. The secondary excavation was 3/8" deep by 1 1/2 " long to remove a 3/8" below surface linear indication that started in the initial excavation and progressed in the horizontal direction. The inspector vetiGed that the grinding removed porosity and linear indications to within the ANSI B16.34-1977, Annex C, examination and acceptance provision Wet magnetic particle examination was effectively used to identify the porosity and linear indications for their removal during the excavating process. Subsequent to the start of welding, the licensee used dry magnetic particle testing to examine the root pass, two adjacent passes, and every three weld passes thereafter. The final cap passes were also examined. The inspector observed the magnetic particle testing and verified each of the weld _
examinations was acceptable and that a 300*F preheat and minimum temperature was maintained during welding as specined in 111111 42-0417. Testing at system pressure following welding provided additional veri 0 cation that the repair was effectiv The inspector noted that the engineer who prepared the EER, the welding supervisor, and the QA NDli technician monitored each step of the valve repair. The inspector concluded that the licensee's repair of valve HD V-18C was well engineered and performe .0 NI(C MANAGESIENT MEETINGS AND OTilEli ACTIVITIES (30702) (outine Meetings At periodic intervals during this inspection, meetings were held with senior plant management to discuss licensee activities and areas of concern to the inspectors. At the conclusion of the reporting period, the resident inspector staff conducted an exit meeting with licensee management summarizing inspection activities and findings for this reporting perio No proprietary information was identified as being included in the report. There are no issues in this report related to Unit 2 Post-Defueling-Monitored-Storag ' I