IR 05000289/1986020
| ML20214T869 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 12/01/1986 |
| From: | Amato C, Conklin C, Hawxhurst J, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214T840 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-289-86-20, 50-320-86-14, NUDOCS 8612090038 | |
| Download: ML20214T869 (5) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
59-289/86-20 and 50-320/86-14 Docket No.
50-289 and 50-320 License No.
DPR-50 and DPR-73 Licensee: GPU Nuclear Corporation P.O. Box 480 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Facility Name: Three Mile Island Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Middletown, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted:
November 4-6, 1986 Inspectors:
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J ulawxhurstY Team Leader, EPS, EP&RPB, DRSS da'te '
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C. Conklin, EP Specialist, EPS, EP&RPB, DRSS date
///o26 /7C C. Mato, EP Specialist, EPS, EP&RPB, DRSS
' dat'e D. Johnson, Resident Inspector, TMI-1 F. Young, Resident Inspector, TMI-1 J. Rogers, Resident Inspector, TMI-1 G. Stoetzel, Battelle PNL M.
e n, nalysts Approved by:
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fro T. M azqfu), Chief, Emergency Preparedness date
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Section,TP&RPB, DRSS Inspection Summary:
Inspection on November 4-6,1986, (Report Nos.
50-289/86-20 and 50-320/86-14)
Areas Inspected:
Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's annual emergency exercise performed on November 5, 1986.
The inspection was performed by a team of seven NRC Region I and contractor personnel, l
Results: No violations were identified. Emergency response actions were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
861209003s 861201 PDR ADOCK 05000289~
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted The following licensee representatives attended the exit meeting held on November 6, 1986.
H. Hukill, Vice President and Director of TMI-1 G. Giangi, Corporate Emergency Preparedness Manager G. Simonetti, Emergency Preparedness Manager, TMI R. Long, Vice President and Director, Nuclear Assurance J. Kuehn, Manager, Radiological Controls, TMI-1 J. Colitz, Director, Plant Engineering, TMI-1 S. Levin, Director, Site Operations, TMI-2 R. Toole, Director, Operations and Maintenance, TMI-I The team observed and interviewed several licensee emergency response personnel, controllers and observers as they performed their assigned functions during the exercise.
2.
Emergency Exercise The Three Mile Island Units 1 and 2 partial-scale exercise (limited off-site participation) was conducted on November 5, 1986 from 6:00 PM until 11:30 PM.
2.1 Pre-exercise Activities Prior to the emergency exercise, NRC Region I representatives held meetings and had telephone discussions with licensee representatives to discuss objectives, scope and content of the exercise scenario.
As a result, changes were made in order to clarify certain object-ives, certain portions of the scenario were revised to ensure that the scenario provided the opportunity for the licensee to demonstrate those areas previously identified by NRC as in need of corrective action.
NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on November 4, 1986, and participated in the discussion of emergency response actions expected during the various phases of the scenario. The licensee stated that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent scen-ario deviation or disruption of normal plant operations.
The exercise scenario included the following events:
Injured / contaminated individual;
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Complete loss of all overhead annunciators;
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A primary to secondary leak;
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Release of activity to the atmosphere (primary to secondary
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leak, with a release path through the condenser offgas);
Declaration of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency and
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General Emergency Classification;
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Calculation of off-site dose consequences; and Recommendation of protective actions to state officials.
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2.2 Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, seven NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of emergency response facilities, and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency resporse facilities. The following activities were observed:
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Detection, classification and assessment of scenario events; Direction and coordination of the emergency response;
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Notification of licensee personnel and off-site agencies of
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pertinent plant status information; Communications /information flow, and recordkeeping;
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Assessment and projection of off-site radiological dose and
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consideration of protective actions;
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Provisions for in plant radiation protection;
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Performance of off-site and in plant radiological surveys; Maintenance of site security and access control;
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Performance of technical support, repair and corrective actions; and
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Assembly and accountability of personnel.
3.
Exercise Observations The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of the emergency response facilities, and use of the facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedures. The team also noted the following actions of the licensee's emergency response organization that were well implemented during the exercise:
Technical Support Center (TSC) personnel acted independently in
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providing recommendations for corrective actions;
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Operations Support Center (OSC) team briefings and debriefings were thorough and complete; Positive command and control of all emergency response facilities
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was demonstrated by the respective facility managers;
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Communication between individual groups within the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and between the EOF and TSC were excellent; Emergency response facility managers conducted frequent briefings of
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their staff concerning plant conditions; and
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Recovery discussions were appropriate for the situation.
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3.1 Open Items The NRC team identified the following findings which were indicative of a weakness and need to be evaluated by the licensee for corrective action:
(OPEN) 50-289/86-20-01 and 50-320/86-14-01:
The Emergency
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Director (ED) initially did not effectively utilize TSC person-nel.
For example, the TSC was not requested to verify the leak-rate, source term calculations, or trend key plant systems.
(OPEN) 50-289/86-20-02 and 50-320/86-14-02:
Followup notifica-
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tions to off-site agencies was slow.
For example, a significant increase in steam generator leak-rate was not transmitted until after a second request by the ED was made.
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(OPEN) 50-289/86-20-03 and 50-320/86-14-03:
Continuous
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accountability was not maintained in the OSC and the design made command and control difficult.
(OPEN) 50-289-20-04 and 50-320/86-14-04: Call-out and mobili-
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zation of emergency response personnel off hours was not demon-strated during this exercise due to a large portion of the staff being on-site in support of the outage (Objective C.2).
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-(0 PEN) 50-289-20-05 and -50 320/86-14-05: Additional training
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is needed for proper call-in procedures by emergency response personnel. Several personnel who called in gave garbled messages and/or did not indicate appropriate arrival times (ie.,
a half hour arrival time with no clock reference time). Also, the reliability of the code-a phone during off-hours should be re-evaluated.
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(OPEN) 50-289-20-06 and 50-320/86-14-06: There are discrepan-cies between the PTFC organization table and the PTFC duty roster dated August 15, 1986.
In addition, nine out of ten responding PTFC staff mambers are apparently not formally trained / qualified.
4.
Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items The following open items were identified during the previous exercise (Inspections Report 50-289/85-23). Based upon discussions with licensee representatives, examination of procedures and records, and observations made by the NRC team during the exercise the following Open Items were not repeated and are closed:
(CLOSED) 50-289/85-23-02: TSC status boards are not designed to
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permanently provide for key plant and system parameters.
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(CLOSED) 50-289/85-23-03:
Delays were observed in the TSC using the
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Parsippany Technical Functions Center (PTFC) in providing engineering advice on purge flow, boron concentration, charcoal efficiency, and ductwork. pressure limitations.
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50-289/85-23-06: The health physics portion of the exercise
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did not allow adequate challenges for testing emergency response actions of personnel in the area of radiological controls.
(CLOSED) 50-289/85-23-07:
Information transmitted to the Emergency
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Support Director caused. confusion in the EOF regarding the status of the injured person.
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(CLOSED) 50-289/85-23-09:
De-escalation from the general emergency classification did not appear to be of any benefit either to off-site authorities, NRC representatives, or on-site and off-site augmenta-tion (licensee) personnel. Also, during initial recovery efforts, de-escalation does not identify appropriate actions each of these entities should take, or provide specific instructions to affected populations.
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(CLOSED) 50-289/85-23-10: The recovery phase did not utilize proce-dure 1004.24 and entail in-depth discussions of short term vs. long term objectives with key EOF Coordinators.
(CLOSED) 50-289/85-23-11:
The plant paging system for providing
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routine information and emergency announcements is not audible in the auxiliary building.-
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5.
Licensee Critique The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique on November 6, 1986, during which the key licensee controllers discussed observations of the exercise. The critique adequately highlighted areas for improvement (which the licensee indicated would be evaluated and appropriate actions taken).
6.
Exit Meeting and NRC Critique
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Following the licensee's self-critique, the NRC team met with the licensee representatives listed in Section 1 of this report.
The team leader summ-arized the observations made during the exercise.
The licensee was informed that most previously identified items were adequately addressed and no violations were observed.
Although there were areas identified for corrective action, the NRC team determined that with-in the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner which would adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated that appropri-ate action would be taken regarding the identified open items.
At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the licensee.
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