IR 05000320/1986004
| ML20203F374 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/15/1986 |
| From: | Bell J, Dan Collins, Cook R, Cowgill C, Moslak T, Myers L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203F346 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-320-86-04, 50-320-86-4, NUDOCS 8604250136 | |
| Download: ML20203F374 (10) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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Report No. 50-320/86-04 Docket No. 50-320 Category C-License No. DPR-73 Priority
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Licensee:
GPU Nuclear Corporation P.O. Box 480 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Facility Name: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Inspection At: Middletown, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted: March 1, 1986 - March 31, 1986 Inspectors:
[ [ v,, d 4 //f 86 R., ook/l 5enior Resident Inspector (TMI-2)
d' ate signed af Y/.S 0h u-t
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T.' oslak, Residen Itfspector (TMI-2)
da'te sifgned
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J. Be
, Senior Radiation Specialist date figned aA9. W 4k D. Collins ( Radiation Specialist date signed b'
G-L. My s, Radiation Specialist Fate signed
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Approved By:
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C. CgWgill, Chief, T^ - Project Section date signed Inspection Summary:
Areas Inspected:
Routine safety inspection of plant operations (long term shutdown) including review of Licensee Event Report (LER) reviews; licensee action on previously identified inspection findings; defueling operations; reactor building entry by NRC inspectors; probing of the steam generators; retest of the diesel generator protective relay system; high river water level; radiation worker training; health physics and environmental reviews; radiological shipments; independent radiation measurements; licensee reactor building entries; and records associated with the radiological control program.
Results: No violations were identified.
8604250136 860418 PDR ADOCK 05000320'
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DETAILS 1.0 Ongoing Recovery Operations Routine Plant Operations Inspections of the facility were conducted to assess compliance with the requirements of the Technical Specifications and Recovery Operations Plan in the following areas:
licensee review of selected plant parameters for abnormal trends; plant status from a maintenance / modification viewpoint, including plant cleanliness, control of switching and tagging, and fire-protection; licensee control of routine and special evclutions, including
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control room personnel awareness of these evolutions; cantrol of documents, including log keeping practices; radiological controls, and security plan implementation.
Random inspections of the control room during regular and backshift hours were routinely conducted. The Shift Foreman's Log and selected portions of the Control Room Operator's Log were reviewed for the period March 1 through March 31, 1986. Other logs reviewed during the inspection period included the Submerged Demineralizer System (SDS) Operations Log,
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Radiological Controls Foreman's Log, and Auxiliary Operator's Daily Log
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Sheets.
Operability of components in systems required to be available for
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response to emergencies was reviewed to verify that they could perform their intended functions. The inspectors attended selected licensee planning meetings. Shift suffing for licensed operators, non-licensed personnel, and fire brigade members was cbserved.
No violations were identified.
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2.0 Licensee Event Report (LER) Review The inspector reviewed the LER listed below to verify that the details of the event were clearly reported, including the accuracy of the description of the cause and the adequacy of corrective action.
The
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inspector determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether the event should be classified as an Abnormal Occurrence, whether generic implications were indicated, and whether the event warranted onsite follow-up.
LER 86-03 dated March 7, 1986, addressed failure to perform a
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monthly' surveillance test on the Fuel Handling Building exhaust monitcrs for three consecutive months.
On February 6,1986, the licensee identified that the monthly l
channel functional tests for Fuel Handling Building exhaust monitors
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HP-R-221A and HP-R-2218 had not been performed for the months of
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November 1985, December 1985, and January 1986. This resulted when
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the Safety Review Group (SRG) Results Engineer inadvertently cancelled the wrong surveillance procedure (4303-M11 vice 4301-M11).
4301-M11 (Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water (DHCCJ) Valve Line-lip
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Verification) was to be cancelled because the Technical Specifications had been changed deleting operability requirements for the DHCCW System.
As corrective action, per the LER, the licensee tested the monitors and determined them to be fully operational. The SRG Results Engineer responsible for the error was also counseled on more effective methods for verifying surveillance schedules and checks would be made to determine if other changes to the surveillance schedule were correct.
During the in-office review of the LER, the inspector had concerns regarding the long term corrective action in that no mention was made of the implementation of organizational checks and balances to prevent a similar recurrence. Through meetings with icensee representatives, the inspector determined that the cc crective actions were more extensive than those stated in the LER.
The inspector determined that the Operations Department was subsequently assigned (Memorandum No. 4420-86-0041) to independently verify the modification / deletion of any future surveillance requirements generated by the Licensing and Nuclear Safety Department.
Also,,the Quality Assurance and Licensing Departments were tasked with verifying the correctness of surveillance matrices, schedules, and supporting documentation.
To date, no similar occurrences have been identified. The inspector determined these actions were appropriate and will review the formalized results of the verification program in a future NRC inspection.
(50-320/86-04-01)
Based on the facts that the exhaust monitors had been tested and determined to be operable following identification of the scheduling error, that the downstream monitor (HP-R-219) was operable and tested as required, and that no abnormal operational conditions occurred in the Fuel Handling Building, the inspector concluded that the event had no effect on the health and safety of plant personnel or the public.
The inspector determined that the event met the criteria of 10 CFR 2 Appendix C for licensee identified and corrected item in that, it was identified by the licensee, is a Severity Level IV Violation, was reported as required, it was corrected and long term measures were implemented to prevent a recurrence, and it was not a recurring problem. Therefore, a notice of violation will not be issued. The
. inspector had no further questions regarding this matter.
3.0 Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) 50-320/85-21-07: Did not carry out provisions of Radiological l
I There was a failure to implement a provision of Radiological Review No.
50024, for " Installation of DWCS Piping and Penetration Mods in AFHB," on l
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l a Radiation Work Permit (RWP). The provision stated that an addendum
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than 25 mR/hr.. The general radiation level documented on-the RWP was 35'
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To ' revent a recurrence, the licensee has instituted a frequent periodic p
review of ALARA reviews (Radiological l Reviews) by cognizant Radiological Engineers to at,sure that the ALARA reviews used by Radiological Field
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- Operations Group contain the latest revisions..' Management meetings and
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staff conferences emphasized the need of careful review of ALARA reviews.
in the preparation of RWPs.
In addition, Cycle 2 of Cyclic Training stressed the importance of incorporating provisions of the ALARA review L
into the RWP.
- The-inspector had no further questions.
(Closed) 50-320/85-21-08: There was lack of prompt and thorough follow-up of the worker's nasal contamination.
- The need for a' timely. follow-up of nasal contamination by whole body counting and bioassays were discussed in the January 1986 staff meeting and in the same cyclic training of supervisors and technicians. The inspector interviewed supervisors to determine what was meant by prompt
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follow-up bioassays and was satisfied that prompt follow-up of nasal
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contamination would occur in spite of lack of procedural guidance, s
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(0 pen)50-320/85-21-09: Knowledge and training of Radiological Control Field Operations personnel concerning follow-up of a contamination event.
The second cycle of Cyclic Training of Radiological Control Field Operations supervisors and technicians studied the annulus event of June
- 1985. Follow-up measurements and evaluations were a significant part of-the training. The training included documentation, documentation
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methods, reporting of the event to management, prompt whole body
- counting, investigations-to determine the cause of the event and actions
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- to preclude the-recurrence of the event. This training cycle will be completed.on May 1, 1986. This item will remain open until the results
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of the training are reviewed.-
l (0 pen) Violation 50-320/85-21-06:
Unplanned intake of radioactive materials and the assignment of 40 MPC-hr to a worker.
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The inspector reviewed corrective actions to prevent a recurrence of the event. The main contributing cause of the event was a breakdown in
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comunications between Radiological Controls Technicians and workers.
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Cycle 2 of Cyclic Training for Radiological Control supervisors and
technicians are studying the event in the annulus with.special emphasis
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This cyclic training will be completed May 1, 1986. The inspector will review the results of cyclic training when completed.
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4.0 Defueling Operations The licensee continued defueling operations during the reporting period.
By the end of the period, a total of 34 defueling canisters had been transferred from the reactor vessel to the spent fuel pool storage racks.
The total weight of the fuel debris and structural material transferred out of the reactor vessel is about 39,000 pounds. The bulk of the material placed in the fuel canisters has been done using the-hydraulically operated spade bucket discharging directly into the canister. This method has proven quite effective in the defueling operation and has contributed to reducing the exposure from greater than 3 rem per 1,000 pounds of debris removed to about 1.5 rem per 1,000 pounds of debris removed.
The licensee is continuing to be aware of the exposure per pound of material removed and is continually monitoring and improving techniques to reduce the exposure whenever possible.
Visibility in the reactor vessel continues to be poor because of the biological growths. The licensee is continuing to evaluate various means of destroying and removing the biological residue. Approximately 20 biocides have been considered but only methanol and hydrogen peroxide are feasible for use in the reactor coolant system because of their non-toxic form. Other biocides such as sodium cyanide and sodium azide are toxic to personnel.
The licensee has investigated the use of elevated hydrostatic pressure to destroy the biological growths. When complications from other treatments are considered, pressurizing the organisms is more appealing than some of the other proposed courses of action. The licensee is pursuing the design of systems and upgrading of filter systems to accomodate cleaning of the reactor coolant.
5.0 Reactor Building Entry by NRC Inspectors The Senior Resident Inspector and a Radiation Specialist entered the Reactor b ilding (RB) on March 26, 1986 to assess radiological and housekeepins.onditions in the RB. The inspectors determined that the small trash coaoactor had been removed from the RB, and transferred to the Model Room u the Fuel Handling Building. This compactor is used especially to compact defueling platform waste, which is segregated.
The inspectors found that there had been an effort to reduce the amount of flammable material in the RB. The abnormal waste generated on the defueling platform is being transferred out of the RB. The licensee's waste management and radiological controls staffs determined that it would be more exposure efficient to move the small compactor because of the exposure involved in transporting waste.
The inspectors noted that the defueling system hydraulics were not leaking to the extent that an oil film was being left on the defueling platform. Minor leakage is dealt with effectively.
The fluid containment at the pump unit on the 347' elevation appears adequate.
The inspectors observed that the conditions inside the "A" 0-ring had been improved, but that the amount of trash on the top of the D-ring had
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increased. The inspectors determined that conditions of the RB had not deteriorated. The inspectors observed that the available instrumentation had been calibrated and source checked adequately.
No violations were identified.
6.0 Probing of the "A" Steam Generator During the reporting period the Resident Inspector witnessed the examination of portions of the "A" once through steam generator (OTSG)
lower head and part of the associated cold leg piping. The examinations were performed using fiber optics viewing which was monitored from the Command Center using closed circuit T.V.
A sludge material was noted in the cold leg piping which was described as being " yellowish-orange, more yellow than orange." Samples of the material were removed from the cold leg piping but the small size of the sample yielded inconclusive results when analyzed.
Pieces of material ranging in size from 1 to 2 inches in diameter were found in the upper head of both "A" and "B" steam generators. The steam generator upper heads were clear of fines and grit appearing material characteristic of that found in the lower reactor vessel head.
No violations were identified.
7.0 Retest of Diesel Generator Protective Relay System On March 20, 1986, the inspector witnessed a retest of a portion of the protective relay system for the "B" Emergency Diesel Generator (DF-X-18).
The retest was performed to resolve a deficiency identified during the performance of a surveillance test (4220-SUR-3864.01) in January 1986.
The deficiency was the failure of the light for the " field overload" alarm on the local annunciator panel to respond to an alarm condition.
(The light on the annunciator panel in the control room did respond to an alarm condition.) To correct this condition, troubleshooting and repairs were completed (UWI 4220-3611-86-F834) by the licensee's electrical maintenance department. The failure is attributed to a faulty coil.
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l The retest was performed (UWI 4220-3864-86-029) successfully with automatic shutdown of the diesel and appropriate alarm on the local
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l No violations were identified.
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8.0 High River Water Level On March 15, 1986, the River Forecast Center notified the Unit 2 Control Roca of a Susquehanna River flowrate of about 350,000 cfs.
(A projected river flow of 1,000,000 cfs requires that an Unusual Event be declared.)
Following this notification, the licensee implemented the preparation phases of the Emergency and Abnormal Procedure (4210-EAP-1300.01) for flood actions. Such actions included patrols of the shore line every two hours, inspection of the dikes for signs of deterioration and checking the weir gate at the southeast drainage culvert for freedom of operation.
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The river crested at a flow of about 400,000 cfs and began receding on March 16, 1986, negating the need for further flood control measures.
On March 17, 1986, as a result of high concentration of river silt, the sole Screen Wash Pump (SW-P-1B) failed to operate, thereby jeopardizing the operability of the Nuclear River Water System (NRWS). The licensee's inanediate action was to run charged fire hoses to the traveling screens of the NRWS and initiate washdowns of the screens at least every four hours and as needed based on screen differential pressure.
The disabled-pump was removed and disassembled to determine the cause of failure (mud -
' clog in the pump intake).
On March 19, 1986, the licensee made measurements of the silt depth at the Intake Structure and compared this data with routine monthly surveillance data (4210-SUR-3168.01). Maintenance personnel determined the silt to be excessive. The silt would be removed prior to replacing the pump.
Preparations are being made to pump the silt to a silt retention-dike and install a rebuilt pump.
The inspector followed licensee actions in the above matters and determined these actions were appropriate and in accordance with approved UWIs and procedures.
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No violations were identified.
9.0-' Radiation Worker Training During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's radiation worker refresher training courses for unescorted access to TMI radiologically controlled areas. The inspector attended courses designated as GET 202, " Radiation Worker Refresher Training (Category II)"; and GET 203, " Respiratory Protection Refresher Training."
No violations were identified.
10.0 Health Physics and Environmental Review a.
Plant Tours The NRC site Radiation Specialists per'ormed nlant inspection tours which included all radiological contrcl points ed selected radiologically controlled areas.
Among the areas inected were:
Unit 2 Reactor Building including the defueling platform; the Auxiliary and Fuel llandling Buildings; EPICOR-II; Radiochemistry
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l Laboratories; South East Acres radioactive waste storage facility; Solid Waste Storage Facility; Interim Waste Storage Facility; Respirator Cleaning and Laundry Facility; and, the Radiological Controls Instrument Facility.
Among the items inspected were:
Compliance with 10 CFR Part 20, Part 50, and Part 71
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Access control to radiologically controlled areas
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Adherence to Radiation Work Permit (RWP) requirements
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Proper use and storage of routinely used respirators and
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associated equipment V intenance and storage of emergency respiratory equipment
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Adherence to radiation protection procedures
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Use of survey meters and other radiological instruments
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Cleanliness and housekeeping; and
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Fire protection.
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The inspectors reviewed the application of radiological controls during normal hours on backshifts and on weekends.
Backshift inspections were performed on March 11, 23, 25, and 26, 1986.
Log books maintained by Radiological Controls Field Operations to record the happenings in the Reactor Building and the balance of plant were reviewed.
Both notebooks contained appropriate entries and showed evidence of frequent management review.
No violations were identified, b.
Radiological Shipments The inspectors examined a shipment from the site on March 17, 1986 for the following:
External vehicle contamination
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External package contamination
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External radiation levels at vehicle surfaces, two meters away
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and inside the tractor cab Radiation levels at package surfaces
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Verification that the recipient holds an appropriate license
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The proper preparation of shipping documents certifying the
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materials had been properly classified, described, packaged and marked; and Appropriate package markings, placards placed on vehicles.
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The licensee made one waste shipment, two sample shipments and five contaminated laundry shipments during March 1986.
No violations were identifie r b
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Measurement Verifications Measurements were made by the inspector using NRC-calibrated radiological equipment. These measurements were made in verifying the quality of licensee performance in radioactive material shipping, radiation and contamination. Additionally, the inspectors
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No violations were identified.
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Reactor Building Work The inspectors monitored the licensee's conduct of reactor building (RB) work during the inspection period. The R8 remains a locked high radiation area, requiring an RWP for entry.
The entry into the RB also requires the use of specific work instructions.
The
.following were reviewed by sample during the month:
The RB entry was planned and coordinated so as to ensure that
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ALARA review, personnel training, and equipment testing had been conducted.
Radiological precautions were planned and implemented;
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including: use of an RWP; locked high radiation access authorization; specific work instructions; alarming self-reading dosimeters; breathing zone air samplers.
Individuals making entries into the RB had been properly
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informed, trained and understood emergency procedures.
Unique tasks were performed using specifically developed
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procedures, and mock-up training had been conducted where warranted.
Entries 840 through 870 were conducted during March 1986. The Reactor Building entries have'been conducted around the clock for the most part. Defueling activities (e.g. pick and place, canister transfer to the Fuel Handling Building) have been routinely performed by 4 - 5 person teams working four-hour shifts. Defueling work has been routinely conducted during daylight and evening shifts starting at 7:00 AM and being completed between 10 PM and midnight.
The balance of the 24-hour day is used to perform work which cannot be done while fuel movements are being performed, such as opening both equipment hatch doors to permit staging large pieces of equipment, material or parts into the building.
No violations were identified.
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Records Review Additionally, the inspector reviewed selected radiological records during the period to assure the accuracy and completeness of the licensee's documentation of occupational exposure.
The records reviewed were selected from the following:
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Radiation Work Permits (RWPs)
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Dosimetry Investigative Reports
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Incident' Evaluation Reports
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Radiological Awareness Reports
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Dosimetry Exceptions Reports
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No violations were identified.
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f.
Additional Reviews The inspector reviewed various licensee records and periodic reports concerning the radiological controls program, including current data and trends in such areas as manrem per RWP hour, decontamination status, skin contaminations, environmental monitoring, radiological events, whole body counting, training, dosimetry, shipments, progress toward achievement of goals and objectives, storage tank radioactivity content, airborne radioactivity, and manrem by work category; effluent releases, including sump releases and sources of sump contamination; and the cumulative dose (manrem) to all plant
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No violations were identified.
11.0-Inspector Follow Items
Inspector follow items are inspector concerns or perceived weaknesses in the licensee's conduct of operation (hardware or programmatic) that could i
lead to violations if left uncorrected.
Inspector follow items are
. addressed in paragraphs 2.0 and 3.0.
12.0 Exit Interview The inspectors met periodically with licensee representatives to discuss inspection findings. On April 2,1986, the inspector summarized the inspection findings to the following personnel at the exit meeting:
J. Byrne, Manager, TMI-2 Licensing l
C. Dell, Licensing, Technical Analyst J. Hildebrand, THI-2 Radiological Controls Director S. Levin, Director, Site Operations l
R. Rogan, Director, THI-2 Licensing and Nuclear Safety At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the i
.. licensee by the TMICPD staff except for procedure reviews pursuant to Technical Specification 6.8.2.
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