IR 05000266/2011008
| ML11244A041 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 09/01/2011 |
| From: | Michael Kunowski NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B5 |
| To: | Meyer L Point Beach |
| References | |
| IR-11-008 | |
| Download: ML11244A041 (35) | |
Text
September 1, 2011
SUBJECT:
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2, PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000266/2011008; 05000301/2011008
Dear Mr. Meyer:
On July 21, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) team inspection at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant.
The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on July 21 with Mr. T. Vehec and other members of your staff.
The inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to the identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.
On the basis of the samples selected for review, there were no findings identified during this inspection. The team concluded that your staff was effective at identifying problems and incorporating them into the corrective action program. In general, issues were appropriately prioritized, evaluated, and corrected, audits and self-assessments were thorough and probing, and operating experience was appropriately screened and disseminated. Your staff was aware of the importance of having a strong safety-conscious work environment and expressed a willingness to raise safety issues.
However, the inspection did identify weaknesses in the identification of trends and performance deficiencies pertaining to the initiation and quality of operability determinations and reportability evaluations. Additionally, the inspection identified that extensive changes made to plant systems and structures for the power uprate modifications should be considered for their effect on previous issues and corrective actions identified in the corrective action program. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Michael A Kunowski, Chief Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000266/2011008; 05000301/2011008 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION III==
Docket Nos: 50-266; 50-301 License Nos: DPR-24; DPR-27 Report No: 05000266/2011008; 05000301/2011008 Licensee: NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC Facility: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 and Unit 2 Location: Two Rivers, Wisconsin Dates: June 27 - July 21, 2011 Inspectors: J. Jandovitz, Project Engineer, Team Leader M. Thorpe-Kavanaugh, Resident Inspector, Point Beach S. Sheldon, Senior Reactor Inspector M. Munir, Reactor Inspector Approved by: Michael A. Kunowski, Chief Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000266/2011008; 05000301/2011008; NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC; on 06/27/2011 - 07/21/2011; Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 and Unit 2; Problem Identification and Resolution biennial inspection.
This report covers a 2-week, baseline inspection of problem identification and resolution (Inspection Procedures 71152 and 71004). This inspection was conducted by three regional inspectors and the Point Beach resident inspector. Based on the results of this inspection, there were no findings or violations identified during this inspection.
Identification and Resolution of Problems The inspection generally concluded that implementation of the corrective action program (CAP)was adequate to identify, evaluate, and correct issues. A sufficiently low threshold for identifying issues and entering them in the CAP existed. The plants safety culture is generally healthy and workers at the site expressed willingness to raise safety concerns.
Operating experience was entered into the CAP and appropriately evaluated. Self-assessments are being conducted at appropriate frequencies for all departments and resulting deficiencies and enhancements included in the CAP. Quality assurance (Nuclear Oversight (NOS))
oversight of the CAP and work performance was considered good.
The inspection did identify weaknesses in the plant programs for trending long-standing and repetitious issues. Adverse trends in reject rates for Apparent Cause Evaluations and with equipment problems associated with radiation monitors and services water valves were not identified by the respective trend programs.
Additional deficiencies were identified with the conduct and quality of operability determinations and reportability evaluations. Similar issues had been previously identified by NRC resident staff and NOS and represented a weakness of the CAP to improve this area and CAP oversight groups, such as the Issue Screening Team (IST) and the Management Review Committee (MRC), to monitor and enforce adequate standards.
NRC-Identified
and Self-Revealed Findings No findings were identified.
Licensee-Identified Violations
No violations were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
The activities documented in Sections
.1 through .4 constituted one biennial sample of
Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) as defined in Inspection Procedure (IP) 71152.
.1 Assessment of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees CAP implementing procedures and attended selected CAP program meetings to assess the implementation of the CAP by site personnel.
The inspectors reviewed risk and safety-significant issues in the licensees CAP since the last NRC PI&R inspection in April 2009. The items selected ensured an adequate review of issues across the NRC cornerstones. The inspectors used issues identified through NRC generic communications, department self-assessments, licensee audits, operating experience reports, and NRC-documented findings as sources to select issues. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed CAP items generated that had resulted from performance of daily plant activities. The inspectors also reviewed CAP items and a selection of completed investigations from the licensees various investigation methods, including root, apparent, and common cause evaluations.
The inspectors performed a more extensive review of the safety-related component cooling water (CCW) system. This review consisted of a five-year search of related issues identified in the CAP and discussions with appropriate licensee staff to assess the licensees efforts in addressing identified concerns. The inspectors reviewed licensees CAP and work management system procedures that provided guidance for trending.
The inspectors selected the radiation monitoring and the service water systems as vertical slice samples based on input from the resident staff semi-annual trend review.
The inspectors reviewed corrective action documents for the past two years, interviewed the system engineers, and performed a walk-down of these systems.
The inspectors reviewed issues related to the extended power uprate (EPU) project, since this involved large, construction-oriented organizations (such as Bechtel)performing significant modifications to the plant over the last several years. Specifically, Bechtels use of the licensees CAP was reviewed.
The inspectors attended meetings of the Issue Screening Team (IST) and Management Review Committee (MRC) to observe how issues were being screened and evaluated and to obtain insights into the licensees oversight of the CAP program.
The inspectors reviewed the timeliness and effectiveness of corrective actions for selected issue reports, completed investigations, and NRC findings, including non-cited violations (NCVs).
During the reviews, the inspectors evaluated whether the licensees actions were in compliance with the facilitys CAP and with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B requirements.
Specifically, the inspectors evaluated if licensee personnel were identifying plant issues at the proper threshold, entering the issues into the CAP in a timely manner, and assigning the appropriate prioritization for resolution of the issues. The inspectors also assessed whether the licensee staff assigned the appropriate investigation method to ensure the proper determination of root, apparent, and contributing causes.
b. Assessment
- (1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification Issues were generally being identified at a low threshold, evaluated appropriately, and corrected in the CAP. Workers were familiar with the CAP and felt comfortable raising concerns. A large number of CAP items were generated annually; which were reasonably distributed across the various departments. A relatively new computer program was instituted that personnel interviewed described as easier to enter issues and also did automatic generation of a CAP issue when completing a work request.
Although, it was also noted the system no longer had the capability to specifically identify which issues were initiated due to NRC concerns.
In 2009, a NOS (Nuclear Oversightquality assurance) surveillance, PBN 10-003, 2009 4th Quarter Site Quarter Priority DQS Roll-up, (PBNP-QA-10-01), was conducted of the Bechtel CAP and concluded the Bechtel QA [Quality Assurance]
Program for the EPU project during the Unit 2 refueling outage 30 was inadequate and did not prevent significant performance deficiencies from occurring and recurring.
Resulting corrective actions included training, lowering the threshold for Bechtel personnel entering issues into the CAP, encouraging personnel to enter issues into CAP, thorough and timely resolution of CAP issues, and the use of the Point Beach CAP for all issues or events related to equipment problems within the scope of the Bechtel contract. Improvements were noted for Bechtels use of the CAP but the licensee has continued to monitor and ensure the Point Beach CAP standards were met.
Another NOS surveillance, PDN 11-04, was scheduled to assess the effectiveness of the corrective actions.
The inspectors noted that causal evaluations, in particular apparent cause evaluations (ACEs), were of good quality. Although as noted in the following sections, ACEs were found to have a significant reject rate by the corrective action review board (CARB),which was considered a contributing factor in achieving the quality noted.
There were instances found where issues were not put into the CAP because the issue had already been identified and entered. The inspectors noted, however, that the plant conditions had been modified significantly due to the EPU, and that issues previously identified (and prioritized or resolved) may now have different conditions warranting a new entry into the CAP. For instance:
A clogged drain in the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump room resulted in water spilling on the floor and was previously entered into the CAP. As a result of EPU, a new electrical panel was installed above the drain. During a system walkdown with a licensee individual, the drain was found clogged and the inspectors noted the individual had not planned to enter the issue into the CAP since it had been previously entered, even though newly installed equipment may have affected the corrective actions or priority of the initial issue. This issue was captured in the CAP as Action Request (AR) 01670042.
The inspection also revealed a weakness in identifying trends in human performance and equipment issues. Procedure PI-AA-207, Trend Coding and Analysis, was used for human performance trends and defined a potential trend as a change in frequency of occurrence of a given parameter or a change in the level of performance of a particular group, process, program, or procedure. It also defined an adverse trend as a negative change in performance that knowledge, experience, and judgment indicated an adverse impact on safety or reliability, or because a relative large number of performance problems pointed to more significant future problems. The team identified that from January through June 2011, there was a negative trend regarding ACE rejection rate that was not identified by the licensee. This issue was captured in the CAP as AR 01670053.
Additionally, procedure ER-AA-201-2001, System and Program Health Reporting, was used to identify equipment trends and stated that system health reporting is the sum of activities that enables the early identification of system or equipment failures and to determine actions required to ensure reliable equipment performance and the process shall monitor indirect measure and trends of system and component performance of critical equipment." Through the inspectors interviews with staff, it was identified that upon the implementation of the system health reporting system nearly two years ago, certain systems were identified and given a higher priority to establish the direct system reporting system. The inspectors identified the following two examples of equipment trends that were not captured by the licensees trending program.
One of the systems that had direct system monitoring was the service water (SW) system. The inspectors reviewed condition reports for the past 2 years and found 12 condition reports documenting the repetitive position indication and isolation issues for the SW North Header to South Header Crossconnect Valve, SW-2890. The inspectors reviewed the system health reports for SW and found that two trends were identified for pump operating life and increasing vibrations and for increasing numbers of mussels found in the system. However, the inspectors found no trend identified relative to the SW isolation valve issues.
Based on the above described definitions, the inspectors observed that the repetitive issue met the definition of a trend. In response, the licensee initiated AR 1670071.
One system that utilized indirect system monitoring was the radiation monitoring system. The inspectors reviewed condition reports for the past 2 years (60 conditions reports) related to radiation monitoring equipment issues.
The inspectors noted that a number of these conditions reports had been written for the clogging of flow indicators by lake grass and unknown mystery alarms which led to increasing out-of-service times for the equipment. Many of the ARs were closed to action taken without looking into the underlying cause that inspectors concluded represented a trend. In response, the licensee initiated AR 1670071 to evaluate the observation.
- (2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues The inspectors found that issue resolutions established and monitored through the IST and the MRC were correctly assigned significance and priority in accordance with station procedures. However, vulnerabilities were identified in the licensees prioritization of conditions, the licensees evaluation of operability, and the licensees implementation of interim barriers.
Modifications completed for the EPU resulted in many safety systems changing their risk profiles. Most notable, the addition of new auxiliary feedwater pumps (AFW) significantly reduced the risk ranking of the AFW system and components. Conversely, the standby gas turbine electrical, G-05, was now the most risk significant component in the plants probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). Therefore, the inspectors noted that open corrective actions from previous issues with these and other systems and components whose risk changed, should be evaluated for changes to priority and completion dates.
The licensee entered this issue into the CAP as CR01668982 and took action prior to the inspection exit. The licensee determined that the risk rankings for several systems increased (such as CCW, the chemical and volume control, safety injection, residual heat removal, and emergency diesel generator ventilation) and several decreased (125-Volt direct current and AFW). For systems that increased, there were 44 open actions, of which 36 required ranking revisions. For systems that decreased, there were 35 open actions, of which 23 required ranking revisions. All ranking changes were made and the owners of the action items were notified to adjust the current priority and due dates if needed.
The inspectors also identified a number of deficiencies with operability and reportability determinations. Integrated inspection report 2011003 included an NCV for a failure to perform an operability determination in accordance with a procedure when a leak on the secondary side of the steam generator was identified in late 2010. The inspectors found a number of examples where operability determinations did not address the degraded or non-conforming condition described in the AR when concluding operability. Some of these examples included:
- AR 01653799 - Pitting and Corrosion on SW piping between SW-833 and SW-364 - The operability section stated that EH [Electro-Hydraulic] system is not in service but this issue needs resolution prior to relying upon EH system.
The operability section did not address the pitting and corrosion of SW piping.
It was not known why operations addressed the EH system.
- AR 01653323 - HELB Door 193 Held Open - The operability section stated that per the STA [shift technical advisor] walkdown the door is functional as a HELB
[high energy line break] and fire door from both the auxiliary building and the fan room. The operability section did not address the door being held open, which impacted the operability of the door as a HELB and fire barrier.
- AR 01652446 - Unexpected D-08 Battery Charger Ground Fault Alarm -
The operability section stated No Tech Spec, EPlan, reportability, or TRM threshold exceeded. Operability is N/A. The operability section did not address the degraded or non-conforming condition of the ground fault.
- AR 01652104 - D-08 and D-07 Battery Charger Trouble Alarms - The operability section stated, The ground alarms cleared prior to identification of ground location. All battery parameters with the exception of the ground alarms remained normal. The 125VDC system is operable and capable of satisfying its safety function. The non-conforming condition was the existence of the ground and was not addressed in the operability section.
- AR 01653792 - AFW Pump Room Drain Plugged - The operability section stated, No Tech Spec, EPlan, reportability, or TRM threshold exceeded.
Operability is N/A. The operability section did not address the operability of the AFW pumps due to internal flooding from the clogged drain. Also, the source of the water was not addressed.
These issues were entered into the CAP as AR 01666221 and the operability bases were revised for each condition noted by the NRC. With the new information added and all deficient aspects addressed in the operability determination, the inspectors agreed that in all the cases the equipment remained operable.
The conduct of reportability evaluations was also found to be weak. In one case, water seals were missing on the electrical conduit entering the electrical panel for the G-1 and G-02 emergency diesel generators. The basis of the technical assessment for reportability (TAR) contradicted the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The FSAR credited the seals for flood protection, while the engineering walkdown for the TAR concluded the flooding scenario discussed in the FSAR would not occur. Based on the inspectors questions, the TAR was revised to delete the contradiction with the FSAR.
The inspectors also noted that in some instances reportability evaluations were not conducted until the NRC raised questions. One issue involved a non-seismic block wall that could fall on and rupture the nearby condensate storage tanks with a potential to for flooding safety-related components. Another issue described non-seismic water storage tanks in the auxiliary building that could fail during a seismic event causing flooding of the residual heat removal pumps. Several of these reportability evaluations were still being evaluated by the NRC.
The inspectors noted that similar observations had been made by the resident staff.
Inspection Report (IR) 2011003 issued August 5, 2011, discussed an NCV associated with the failure to perform an immediate operability assessment for a Unit 1 secondary side leak in containment. The inspectors also noted that Nuclear Oversight had identified four instances where operability determinations were not prompt or initial determinations did not invoke more timely and rigorous documentation of the conditions and concluded that the quality of some of the operability notes could be improved and that training was being performed to address the issue. These observations were documented in AR 01652090.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees CAP and noted weaknesses in implementation of interim barriers. Procedure PI-AA-204 was reviewed and the inspectors found that it defined an interim corrective action as an action taken to temporarily prevent the effects of a condition or make an event less likely to recur during the period when the condition is being evaluated and until final corrective actions are completed. Also, the inspectors noted that procedure PI-AA-205 further clarified that compensatory/interim actions are classified as interim actions designed to arrest or minimize recurrence until the corrective action to prevent recurrence or corrective action has been implemented.
However, neither of these procedures discussed when and who should evaluate and implement interim or compensatory corrective actions and hence they may not be done.
The most significant example of where better interim actions could have precluded a more significant issue is described below.
The inspectors found an issue concerning inappropriate breaching of HELB doors during plant modifications that was entered into the CAP in February 2010. Several interim corrective actions were established for the Operations department while the causal evaluation was conducted.
In June 2010, the NRC identified that the control room door, a HELB barrier, was blocked open by maintenance, a violation of HELB requirements.
This occurrence resulted in a licensee event report (LER) and several NCVs.
More widespread interim corrective actions could have prevented the control room door issue.
- (3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions The inspectors concluded that the corrective action program was generally effective in addressing identified issues. A licensee emphasis on corrective action due dates has resulted in no overdue CAP actions for over 550 days.
Corrective actions were generally appropriate for the identified issues. One exception is discussed below.
AR 01661717, Incorrect Noun Name on Instrument Face, was initiated on June 17, 2011, by Operations. The AR discusses old AFW pump instrumentation on the C01 main control room board still labeled AFW instead of its new system description as the Standby Steam Generator Pumps.
The AR actions did not try to determine why the labels were not corrected as part of the recent modification or determine the extent of condition. Instead, it assigned actions to fix the labels with a due data in October. As a result of inspectors questions, AR 01668861 was initiated to perform a causal analysis and extent of condition. Through subsequent discussions with the modification engineer, the inspectors determined the labels had not been corrected yet since the modification was partially accepted and modification activities were still in progress to correct the labels. In effect, the issues in the CAP could have been addressed with no actions required by reference to the modification.
The inspectors noted that the licensee has self-identified many instances where corrective actions were closed inappropriately. The inspectors verified that plant staff do get feedback, or feedback was available to them, on how their issues were addressed.
However, the area that most personnel interviewed would like to see more improvement was to have more input for their issues that were dispositioned as closed to actions taken to ensure the issue was properly understood and addressed. For instance:
A licensee individual initiated AR 01654217 when the small article monitor (SAM)was found out-of-service due to high background. Subsequent investigation found that some high activity smears were thrown in the nearby trash, causing the high background. Further, the smears were there because they had been used in the iSOLO instrument, which was considered by the individual inappropriate for this high level of activity. The corrective action desired was to prevent radiation protection (RP) personnel from using the iSOLO for that high contamination level. The AR was closed to action taken which was to remove the swipes from the trash and returning the SAM to service. The AR initiator was not consulted or satisfied with this closure.
The inspectors found that additional actions were completed but not documented in the AR, including discussions with RP personnel on use of the iSOLO and putting new equipment in service to use for the high contamination smears.
The AR initiator would probably have been satisfied closing the AR to these actions.
c. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience (OE)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of the facilitys OE program.
Specifically, the inspectors reviewed OE program implementing procedures, observed meetings for the use of OE information, and reviewed completed evaluations of OE issues and events. The intent was to determine if the licensee was effectively integrating OE experience into the performance of daily activities, whether evaluations of issues were proper and conducted by qualified personnel, whether the licensees program was sufficient to prevent future occurrences of previous industry events, and whether the licensee effectively used the information in developing departmental assessments and facility audits. The inspectors also assessed if corrective actions, as a result of OE experience, were identified and implemented effectively and in a timely manner.
b. Assessment In general, OE was effectively used at the station. The inspectors observed that OE was discussed as part of the daily station and pre-job briefings. Industry OE was effectively disseminated across the various plant departments and no issues were identified during the inspectors review of licensee OE evaluations. However, during the review of corrective actions associated with an NCV, the following instance was found where operating experience was not incorporated into site guidance and, if it had been, the event may have been prevented.
The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions related to NCV 2010005-03, Failure to Submit LER related to breach of HELB Barrier, including the licensees root cause evaluation (RCE) 01616620, 4Q10 Potential NCV on Failure to Submit LER on HELB Issues. The licensees RCE concluded that the root cause was inadequate evaluation of NRC RIS 2001-009, Control of Hazard Barriers. The inspectors noted that even though the initial event occurred in 2001, the licensees evaluation limited the scope of revalidation to 10 regulatory information summaries, all from 2010. The inspectors considered this a missed opportunity to use operating experience from the same timeframe as the initial issue. The licensee acknowledged that a more rigorous review was needed based on this example.
c. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the licensee staffs ability to identify and enter issues into the CAP program, prioritize and evaluate issues, and implement effective corrective actions through efforts from departmental assessments and audits. The inspectors reviewed recent self-assessments of the CAP, all self-assessments from operations and emergency planning, and assessments of Bechtel engineering and maintenance and audits conducted by NOS.
b. Assessment The inspectors concluded that, overall, the licensees use of self-assessments and audits was appropriate for the identification, evaluation, and correction of issues.
The programs for self-assessments and audits were scheduled at an appropriate frequency and included a broad cross-section of performance areas. For the audits and assessments reviewed, observations were documented and ARs written for deficiencies as well as enhancements. NOS assessments and observations were found to be thorough and challenging as evidenced by conclusions and insights related to reviews performed on Bechtel work practices and programs discussed in other sections of this report. Overall, self-assessments were adequately performed.
c. Findings
No findings were identified.
.4 Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment (SCWE)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the licensees SCWE through reviews of safety culture surveys and assessments conducted in 2010 and of the employee concerns program (ECP) implementing procedures, discussions with the corporate ECP manager, and reviews of issue reports. Approximately 19 personnel were interviewed (including Bechtel personnel): 6 supervisors and 13 workers.
The inspectors reviewed a sample of ECP case files involving potential cases of harassment and intimidation for raising safety issues or discrimination concerns.
b. Assessment The inspectors found that personnel interviewed had a reasonable knowledge of the basic definition of a safety-conscious work environment and what it meant to them.
Most have received some training, either in annual site access or initial site access, and were aware of general discussions on the subject by the management. All personnel expressed a strong willingness to raise safety issues, without fear. No one knew of any retaliation against an individual for raising a concern.
The inspectors reviewed the results of licensee quick hit assessment report, PBS_PBNP_10_02, Aggregate Review of 2010 Safety Culture Learnings.
This assessment provided a summary and assessment of the results and corrective actions for all the safety culture surveys conducted in 2010. Surveys included in the assessment were the Fleet Safety Culture Survey conducted in June 2010, the Fleet Engagement Survey conducted in spring 2010, the Fleet NEM survey in July 2010, and the Safety Culture Improvement Team (SCIT) results. The inspectors considered the number of surveys and assessments conducted were higher than normal for a year and would provide the licensee plentiful data to formulate effective corrective actions for weaknesses and enhancements identified for safety culture sustainability and improvements.
Although many surveys were conducted, results evaluated for various levels and groups, and actions developed, most personnel interviewed could not provide any details. on the safety culture assessments in their specific departments or actions to address department weaknesses. Additionally, most individuals were not aware of the purpose, actions or results of the sites SCIT. This team was initiated by the site prior to the last NRC PI&R inspection (March 2009) and evaluated department safety culture through discussions with plant staff on a periodic basis and reports the results to management.
The NRC team noted that additional feedback to plant personnel on safety culture efforts and results, including department results and corrective actions, may enhance the effectiveness of the SCIT.
The inspectors noted that one of the weaknesses identified in the above assessments was communications around decision-making processes and more effectively sharing information with the workforce. During discussions with the plant personnel, there were examples of good communications provided, such as the decision to take the generator off-line in July 2010 to fix a hydrogen leak. Also, more written communications and video messages by the plant manager on plant issues were apparent. However, during the interviews, the inspectors noted that most of the individuals, especially those not associated with operations, were not aware of the existing steam leak on the secondary side of the Unit 1 A steam generator or plant managements basis to conclude it was acceptable to continue to operate the Unit rather that shutdown to fix the leak.
In response to the inspectors observation, a Point Beach Newsflash was issued on July 14, 2010, describing the steam generator leakage and operating basis.
The inspectors reviewed 2011 Daily Quality Summary reports for observations determined by the NOS evaluator to be unsatisfactory. Included in the daily reports were insights of possible reasons the evaluator concluded the activity was unsatisfactory. In five observations from March 7 through April 27, 2011, NOS insights included a production-over-safety theme, including schedule pressure. Some of these issues were put into the CAP and resolved as procedure interpretation differences.
However, the inspectors noted that the licensee had not performed an overall evaluation of these insights, and any other inputs received from the CAP or ECP regarding possible safety culture concerns, to ensure safety culture degradation was not occurring.
The licensee did enter this issue into the CAP as AR 01670098 and will perform a causal evaluation to evaluate all the identified safety culture issues.
The inspectors determined that the ECP process was being effectively implemented.
The program was included in site access training and most personnel remembered the site ECP manager discussing the program at divisional or plant meetings. All personnel stated they would know how to use the system if needed. The inspectors noted through a review of ECP cases that the licensee had appropriately investigated and taken constructive actions to address potential safety culture issues.
The team assessed whether the organizations characteristics and attitudes established, as an overriding priority, that nuclear plant safety issues received the attention warranted by their significance. As a result of the review of the above information, the inspectors concluded the plants safety culture was adequate. This was similar to the conclusions of the 2010 licensee assessments. The inspectors did note that a significant number of issues with safety culture aspects were contained in the CAP, ECP program, self-assessments, observations, and other sources of information. Therefore, organizational decisions and actions at all levels of the organization should emphasize that production, cost, and schedule goals were developed, communicated, and implemented in a manner that reinforced the importance of nuclear safety.
c. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA5 Other
.1 This inspection also counted as a Problem Identification and Resolution sample required
by IR 71004, Extended Power Uprate, for both Unit 1 and Unit 2. Refer to specific sections of the report for additional details.
4OA6 Management Meetings
.1 Exit Meeting Summary
On July 21, 2011, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. T. Vehec and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented.
The inspectors confirmed that they returned any proprietary documents.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
L. Meyer Site Vice-President
J. Costedio Regulatory Affairs Manager
F. Flentje Regulatory Affairs Supervisor
A. Mitchell Performance Improvement Manager
R. Farrell Radiation Protection Manager
R. Harrsch Operations Manager
- J. Voorhess Manager, Nuclear Division, Employee Concerns Program
T. Vehec Plant Manager
S. Pfaff Performance Improvement Supervisor
- R. Flessner Engineering, Performance Improvement
- S. Burnett Operations, Performance Improvement
B. Scherwinski Regulatory Affairs
C. Ford Maintenance Programs Department Supervisor
S. Ruesch Nuclear Oversight Manager
P. Wild Design Engineering Manager
J. Kenny Mechanical Maintenance Manager
B. Wright Online Scheduling Manager
M. Pederson Systems Engineering
F. Domke I&C Systems Supervisor
P. Holzman Heat Exchanger Testing Engineer
S. Clark Systems Engineering Supervisor
L. Hawki Engineering Performance Improvement Manager
J. Schweitzer Operations Support Manager
J. Pierce Chemistry Manager
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- M. Kunowski, Chief, Branch 5, Division of Reactor Projects
- S. Burton, Senior Resident Inspector
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
None Attachment