IR 05000266/2020002
| ML20220A308 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 08/06/2020 |
| From: | Nestor Feliz-Adorno Reactor Projects Region 3 Branch 4 |
| To: | Strope M Point Beach |
| References | |
| IR 2020002 | |
| Download: ML20220A308 (20) | |
Text
August 6, 2020
SUBJECT:
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000266/2020002 AND 05000301/2020002
Dear Mr. Strope:
On June 30, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Point Beach Nuclear Plant. On July 8, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Point Beach Nuclear Plant.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Point Beach Nuclear Plant. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Néstor J. Féliz Adorno, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 05000266 and 05000301 License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000266 and 05000301
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000266/2020002 and 05000301/2020002
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-002-0035
Licensee:
NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC
Facility:
Point Beach Nuclear Plant
Location:
Two Rivers, WI
Inspection Dates:
April 01, 2020 to June 30, 2020
Inspectors:
K. Barclay, Resident Inspector
T. Hartman, Senior Resident Inspector
B. Jose, Senior Reactor Inspector
Approved By:
Néstor J. Féliz Adorno, Chief
Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Point Beach Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Establish Instructions that Were Appropriate for Isolating Portions of the Residual Heat Removal System Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000301/2020002-01 Open/Closed
[H.5] - Work Management 71111.20 A finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation of Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, Drawings," was self-revealed for the licensee's failure to establish instructions for activities affecting quality that were appropriate for the circumstances. Specifically, the licensee's instructions for isolating a portion of the residual heat removal (RHR) system while the reactor coolant system (RCS)was in solid plant conditions resulted in an overpressure of the RCS.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000301/2015002-01 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Trip Time Delay Relay Installed Past Evaluated Service Life 71111.04 Closed URI 05000266,05000301/20 16002-03 Suitability of Reactor Protection System and Engineered Safeguards System Components Particularly Electrolytic Capacitors 71111.12 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power and remained at or near full power throughout the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period shutdown for refueling outage U2R37. On April 4, 2020, Unit 2 was restarted. On April 5, 2020, the unit was synchronized to the grid, and on April 9, 2020, it achieved full power. The unit remained at or near full power throughout the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week and during that time conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of high summer temperatures and increased electrical system demand.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Emergency diesel generator (EDG) G-04 while EDG G-03 was out-of-service on April 27, 2020
- (2) EDG G-03 while EDG G-04 was out-of-service on June 2, 2020 (3)1P-53 motor-driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) train after testing on May 28, 2020 (4)2P-53 MDAFW train after maintenance on June 16, 2020
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the Unit 2 RHR system on May 7, 2020.
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Fire Zone 151 on May 1, 2020
- (2) Fire Zones 156/156A on May 1, 2020
- (3) Fire Zone 166 on May 21, 2020
- (4) Fire Zones 306/307 on May 21, 2020
- (5) Fire Zones 225/226 on June 15, 2020
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during reactor and plant startup on April 4, 2020.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated simulator training on June 2, 2020.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Unit 2 RHR train A heat exchanger flow control valve failure on March 30, 2020.
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
(1)elevated risk due to G-05 gas turbine generator maintenance on May 13, 2020 (2)elevated risk due to EDG G-04 maintenance on June 4, 2020
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
(1)intake louver for EDG G-01 failed to open (2)two cells of D-06 battery did not meet voltage requirements during charge (3)instrument equipment room door found bowed (4)containment pressure transmitters exceed qualified service life (5)reactor coolant loop flow trip relay found de-energized
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
- (1) TS 82, "Emergency Diesel Generator G-02 Monthly," after alternate output breaker replacement on May 12, 2020
- (2) IT 08A, "Cold Start of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump and Valve Test (Partial),"
after maintenance on valve operator 1AF-4002-O on May 20, 2020 (3)0-SOP-VNBI-003, "White/Yellow Battery and Inverter Room Ventilation Normal Operation," after fan maintenance on May 28, 2020
- (4) Work order testing of 1P-2A charging pump after suction pressure switch replacement on May 28, 2020
- (5) RMP 9043-47A, "Emergency Diesel Generator G-04 Post-Maintenance Run and Testing," on June 10, 2020
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated refueling outage U2R37 activities from April 1 to April 9, 2020.
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
(1)0-PT-FP-002, "Diesel Engine-Driven Fire Pump Functional Test," on May 1, 2020 (2)2ICP 02.003A, "Reactor Protection System Logic Train A 31 Day Surveillance Test,"
on May 21, 2020
- (3) OI 135E, "LHSI Core Deluge Venting Train A Inside Containment Unit 1," on May 22, 2020
Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) ORT 27, "Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Return Unit 2," on March 18,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04)===
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2019 - March 31, 2020)
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential adverse trends in maintenance rule failure evaluations that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Followup (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated a plant transient during solid plant conditions and the licensees response on April 2,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Unresolved Item (Closed)
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Trip Time Delay Relay Installed Past Evaluated Service Life URI 05000301/2015002-01 71111.04
Description:
In the 2015 second quarter integrated inspection report (05000266/2015002; 05000301/2015002), the inspectors identified an Unresolved Item (URI) due to Unit 2 Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) Pump Time Delay Relay 2-62/04044 potentially being installed past its recommended 17-year service life. The licensee captured this issue in Action Request (AR) 02056034. The licensees corrective actions included completing a condition evaluation justifying the continued operation of the relay until the next Unit 2 outage, performing an extent of condition review under AR 02214823, and replacing the relay in late 2015 as part of refueling outage U2R34.
Recently, the inspectors reviewing the issue noted the licensees condition evaluation was partially based on data from calibration and testing activities performed every refueling outage and data from surveillance tests performed each quarter. These activities showed satisfactory relay performance and provided a basis to support continued operation of the relay until it was replaced in 2015. The inspectors noted the relay was installed for 17 years, 8 months prior to its replacement. The inspectors also noted the licensee had completed a modification to the plant in 2011, which resulted in this specific TDAFW pump time delay relay no longer performing a safety function. As a result, the inspectors determined the licensees failure to replace this specific TDAFW relay within their established 17-year frequency was minor and did not constitute a failure to meet NRC requirements.
The licensee also performed an extent of condition review under AR 02214823 and found 52 additional time delay relays installed in engineered safety feature systems, AFW system, Essential Bus A05 and the main steam actuation system which needed further review. Most of these relays were being replaced every 12, 15, or 17 years in accordance with the licensees preventive maintenance strategy and based upon the importance of the relay. In 2017, the licensee implemented Preventive Maintenance Change Requests to conservatively replace all Agastat time delay relays every fifth refueling outage (every 7.5 years).
Based on the review of the items mentioned above, the inspectors did not identify any violations of NRC requirements. This URI is closed.
Corrective Action Reference(s): AR 02056034, AR 02214823 Unresolved Item (Closed)
Suitability of Reactor Protection System and Engineered Safeguards System Components Particularly Electrolytic Capacitors URI 05000266,05000301/2016002-03 71111.12
Description:
In the 2016 second quarter integrated inspection report (05000266/2016002; 05000301/2016002), the inspectors identified an Unresolved Item (URI) associated with components in both units reactor protection system (RPS) and engineered safeguards (ESF)system which contained components known to degrade with age. In some cases, these components may have been installed as original plant equipment. The licensee captured this issue in Action Request (AR) 02138501. The licensees corrective actions included completing a prompt operability determination and performing an extent of condition review under AR 02144821.
Recently, the inspectors reviewing this issue noted that the prompt operability evaluation performed by the licensee was supported by surveillance test data and independent testing performed by the licensees test laboratory in Juno Beach, Florida. The surveillance data and test results showed no degradation of the electrolytic capacitors or other components despite their age. The licensee had been refurbishing the components, including electrolytic capacitors of the associated control modules, on a fifteen-year frequency based on Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) recommendations. When some of the control module components became obsolete, the licensee initiated efforts to replace the RPS control modules. The Unit 2 RPS control modules were replaced in March 2017 under Engineering Change (EC) 286911. The Unit 1 modules were replaced in October 2017 under EC 286909.
The remaining control modules are scheduled to be replaced during future refueling outages under ECs 288281, 288282 and 291338.
Based on the review of the items mentioned above, the inspectors did not identify any violations of NRC requirements. This URI is closed.
Corrective Action Reference(s): AR 02138501, AR 02144821
Failure to Establish Instructions that Were Appropriate for Isolating Portions of the Residual Heat Removal System Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity
Green NCV 05000301/2020002-01 Open/Closed
[H.5] - Work Management 71111.20 A finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation of Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, Drawings," was self-revealed for the licensee's failure to establish instructions for activities affecting quality that were appropriate for the circumstances. Specifically, the licensee's instructions for isolating a portion of the RHR system while the RCS was in solid plant conditions resulted in an overpressure of the RCS.
Description:
On April 2, 2020, the licensee was performing startup activities after a refueling outage on Unit 2. At the time, the reactor was in Mode 4 with the RCS solid (i.e., a bubble was not present in the pressurizer). The licensee had the charging system (injection) and the letdown system (removal) matched maintaining RCS pressure steady. The letdown system removed water inventory from the RCS through two paths, one direct and one indirect. The direct path, which was the most significant letdown contributor, was the traditional flow path coming from the RCS through the letdown orifices. The smaller indirect path was from the RHR system through a connection downstream of the letdown orifice. While in this condition, the licensee authorized instruction 2RH-RH-716D Repair, "Replace the Stem Bushing on 2RH-716D," to isolate a portion of the RHR system to facilitate planned maintenance.
The isolation was briefed with the operators performing the activity and then the control room was informed that the RHR system would be isolated. The control room was not informed about the specific equipment that would be manipulated to isolate the system. Also, no one questioned how the isolation would affect the system or plant configuration. The operators isolated the system in accordance with the instructions contained in 2RH-RH-716D Repair.
This activity caused the indirect letdown flow path to isolate without a reduction in charging flow that was equivalent to the indirect letdown flow. As a result, RCS pressure increased until a power-operated relief valve (PORV) lifted. Control room operators recognized the pressure transient and reduced charging flow until RCS pressure stabilized. A subsequent review discovered that instruction 2RH-RH-716D Repair was written assuming the plant had a bubble in the pressurizer and that this assumption was not identified as a prerequisite.
Corrective Actions: The licensee took immediate corrective action to lower charging flow to match letdown and stabilize pressure. Additionally, the licensee added caution notes in the equipment database to all the valves that could potentially affect the letdown path to notify future tagout users of the potential operational effects of manipulating these valves.
Corrective Action References: AR 2350894, AR 2362562, RWA 2341341-16
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to establish instructions for activities affecting quality that were appropriate for the circumstances was contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, Drawings,"
and was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the licensee altered the configuration of the RHR system in a manner that adversely affected the RCS barrier by lifting a PORV. The PORV lift breached the RCS barrier by opening a drain path to a tank in containment.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix G, Shutdown Safety SDP. The inspectors screened the finding against the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone screening questions in Attachment 1, Exhibit 4, and answered "NO" to all ten screening questions. Therefore, the finding screened to very low safety significance (Green).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.5 - Work Management: The organization implements a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. The work process includes the identification and management of risk commensurate to the work and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities. Specifically, the licensee did not implement a process of controlling and executing the work activity to ensure the associated instructions were appropriate for the plant conditions. In addition, the work process did not include coordination with the control room regarding the equipment that would be manipulated.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, Drawings,"
states, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. The licensee established instruction 2RH-RH-716D Repair, "Replace the Stem Bushing on 2RH-716D,"
dated April 1, 2020, to isolate a portion of the RHR system to perform planned maintenance.
Contrary to the above, on April 2, 2020, an activity affecting quality was not accomplished in accordance with documented instructions of a type appropriate to the circumstances.
Specifically, the isolation instructions contained in 2RH-RH-716D Repair were not appropriate when there was not a bubble present in the pressurizer. However, on April 2, 2020, the licensee implemented 2RH-RH-716D Repair when a bubble was not present in the pressurizer resulting in the lifting of a PORV to prevent a low temperature overpressure condition on the RCS.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Observation: Maintenance Rule Functional Failure Assessment Issues 71152 Inspectors performed a semiannual review to identify trends that might indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. For their review, the inspectors focused on issues, particularly those entered in to the licensee Corrective Action Program (CAP), associated with not evaluating or tracking Maintenance Rule Functional Failures (MRFF)s.
From December 2019 to May 2020, inspectors identified multiple issues related to the evaluation or tracking of MRFFs. Most notably:
- Action Request 2334093 documented the failure of a radiation monitor to actuate and re-align the control room ventilation system. The licensee evaluated the condition through the MRFF process and concluded that a MRFF had occurred. During a maintenance rule inspection, the resident inspectors found that the MRFF was not counted towards the total number of MRFF for the system. The licensee reviewed the inspectors concerns and concluded that the MRFF was coded incorrectly in the software. The licensee documented the incorrect coding in AR 2350077 and updated the maintenance rule tracking software with the correct information. The updated total MRFF for the system increased from five to six, which reached the licensees administrative warning level of six. The performance criteria of eight was not exceeded.
- Action Requests 2350536 and 2350547 documented the failure of an RHR valve to reposition when given a signal from the control room. The resident inspector noted that the licensee did not evaluate the failure through the MRFF process. In response to the inspectors concerns, the licensee initiated AR 2359464 and performed a MRFF assessment. The MRFF assessment determined a functional failure did exist.
The inspectors noted that the cases above involved the incorrect tracking and evaluation of equipment failures against their respective maintenance rule performance criteria. In each case, the failure did not require the component or system to be moved from 50.65(a)(2)status to 50.65(a)(1) and therefore, these issues were considered minor.
The inspectors did not identify any findings or violations during their review.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On July 8, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. M. Strope, Site Director and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Miscellaneous
PBNP-MISO-
NUC-001
Nuclear Plant Operating Agreement for Point Beach Nuclear
Plant
Procedures
NP 2.1.5
Electrical Communications, Switchyard Access and Work
Planning
Corrective Action
Documents
OE15886 - Safety-Related Agastat Relays Were Found In
Service
04/24/2003
Replacement Of U2 Relays 262-A, 262-B, 2-62/4044 &
2-62/4044
06/27/2013
U-1 & U-2 AFW Time Delay Relays Replacement Schedule
09/05/2014
2015 CDBI FSA: Agastat Relay Aging Management
01/14/2015
NRC Identified Relay Beyond Recommended Replacement
Date
06/23/2015
CDBI 2017, PMs not Scheduled in Accordance with
Manufacturer's Recommendations
07/12/2017
Drawings
110E029 Sh. 1
P&ID Auxiliary Coolant System
110E035 Sh. 1
P&ID Safety Injection System
M-209 Sh. 12
P&ID Emergency Diesel Air Starting System
M-217 Sh. 1
P&ID Auxiliary Feedwater System
104
M-217 Sh. 2
P&ID Auxiliary Feedwater System
M-217 Sh. 3
P&ID Auxiliary Feedwater System
M-219 Sh. 1
P&ID Fuel Oil System
M-219 Sh. 3
P&ID Fuel Oil System Diesel Generator Building
Engineering
Evaluations
2002-0035
Replacement Schedule of the ESF Electronic Time Delay
Relays (ETDR)
10/03/2003
Miscellaneous
CL 11A G-03
G-03 Diesel Generator Checklist
CL 11A G-04
G-04 Diesel Generator Checklist
CL 13E Part 2
Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Lineup Motor Driven
PMCR 2171365
Replace All Units 1 and 2 Trains A & B Agastat Time Delay
Relays in ESF Systems Every 5th Refueling Outage
2/08/2017
PMCR 2215026
Replace Auxiliary Feed Water Pump Low Suction Pressure
Agastat Time Delay Relays Every 5th Refueling Outage
08/09/2017
PMCR 2221527
Replace Agastat ETR Series Time Delay Relays 162-A,
09/20/2017
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
2-B, 262-A and 262-B Every 5th Refueling Outage
PMCR 2221547
Replace Agastat ETR Time Delay Relays in Safety-Related
Buses 1A05 and 2A05 Every 5th Refueling Outage
09/21/2017
Procedures
CL 13E Part 2
Operations Checklist Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Lineup
Motor Driven
Drawings
FPE-015
Electrical Layout Fire Detection System Aux Bldg. Area 5
FPE-017
Electrical Layout Fire Detection System Aux Bldg. Area 4
Fire Plans
Pre-Fire Plan Control Building ELEV 8 FT, 26 FT, 44 FT and
FT
PFP-0-PAB-26
Pre-Fire Plan Unit 1 & 2 Auxiliary Building 26 Ft
PFP-0-PAB-8
Pre-Fire Plan: Primary Auxiliary Building Elevations 8' and
Below
Miscellaneous
Fire Round Performance Sheets-PAB
05/06/2020
FPTE 2016-010
Detailed Fire Model Report - Fire Compartment 151 Safety
Injection Pump Room, EL 8'-0"
FPTE 2016-011
PBNP Detailed Fire Modeling Report - Fire Compartment
156 MCC Room - 1B32, EL 8'-0"
Procedures
OM 3.27
Control of Fire Protection and NFPA 805 Equipment
71111.11Q Miscellaneous
PBN LOC 20B
2S
Simulator Exercise Guide One Column
Procedures
Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Unit 2
Reactor Startup
Corrective Action
Documents
Reactor Protection System DANA Amplifier Electrolytic
Capacitors
06/16/2016
U2 Failure of TE-406BD OP/OT DT Turbine Runback
(White)
10/07/2016
2RH-624 Opened with No Flow Response
03/30/2020
1RH-624 Visual Inspection of Set Screws
04/02/2020
M&TE OOT MCVT-001 (No Impact To Plant)
05/13/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
MRFF Needed For AR 2350547
06/10/2020
NRC ID: CRs 02350536 and 02350547 Required
Rescreening
06/10/2020
Engineering
Unit 1 Thot/Tcold R/E Conversion Replacement
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Changes
Unit 2 Thot/Tcold R/E Conversion Replacement
Unit 1 Delta Flux and Delta T SP2 Module Replacement
Unit 2 Delta Flux and Delta T SP2 Module Replacement
Foxboro to Curis-Wright Implementation
Corrective Action
Documents
NSCA Engineer To Evaluate G-05 Comp Actions For 2020
Outage
05/11/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Door 157 Not Closing Completely Due to Building D/P
2/26/2020
W-86 Maintenance Not Included in PRA Look Ahead
06/10/2020
Miscellaneous
Operations Daily Work List
05/13/2020;
06/15/2020;
06/24/2020
PBN Unit 1 and 2 Current Risk Summary Report
05/13/2020;
06/04/2020;
06/15/2020;
06/24/2020
Point Beach Station Unit 1/2 Daily Status Report
05/13/2020;
06/04/2020;
06/15/2020;
06/24/2020
Procedures
NP 10.3.7
On-Line Safety Assessment
Corrective Action
Documents
G01 Louver Failed to Properly Operate during TS 81
05/17/2020
EQ Qual Life of 1/2PT-947/948 CTMT Low & Intmd PR
Xmtrs
06/04/2020
D-06 Battery Post Equalize: Two Cells Outside Average
Range
06/12/2020
Found 2RC-1B De-Energized on Relay Status Checks 2ICP
2.3B
06/25/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Door 486 Appears Bowed (NRC Identified)
06/15/2020
Miscellaneous
0019-300-0020
Summary Report - Analysis of Internal Heat Rise Effects On
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Qualified Life of N-E10 Series, DTN2070 and DTN2010
Pressure Transmitters
DG-G11
Environmental Qualification Service Condition
EQCK-FOXB-001
Checklist for Environmental Qualification of Foxboro N-E10
Series (N-E11, N-E13) Pressure Transmitter
Corrective Action
Documents
Mode Panel Switches on New NUSI TMD Modules Faulty
2/27/2020
2TI-407A Blue Channel Setpoint 1 Failure
04/07/2020
Replace Setpoint 1 Yellow Channel (2TM-404B)
04/13/2020
Drawings
CD-6 JOB 10668
Wiring Diagram - Interconnect Reactor Protection System
Rack 1-B1 (1C116) Top Unit 1
CD-8 JOB 10668
Wiring Diagram - Interconnect Reactor Control System Rack
1-Y1 (1C118) Top Unit 1
Foxboro 10665
BD-5
Block Diagram Instrument Protection System Delta T Ave -
Loop B2
Engineering
Changes
Foxboro To NUS Project - Time Domain Modules (Lead/Lag)
11/25/2018
Miscellaneous
SCR 2019-0024
RPS/ESFAS Module Replacement EOP STPT Changes
03/06/2019
Work Orders
WO 40595771 01
04/01/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
HU Performance Event
04/27/2020
Drawings
499B466 Sh.
316B
Elementary Wiring Diagram Charging Pumps 1P-2A
Engineering
Changes
Install Low Pressure Trip on U1 Charging Pumps
Miscellaneous
WP 2020-019
Manually place G-05 Gas Turbine on Turning Gear
04/24/2020
Procedures
OM 3.22
Operations Work Plans Development
Work Orders
WO 40651647 01
A52-DHVR1200-54; Breaker Maintenance Per RMP 9366
2/17/2020
A52-DHVR1200-25 Breaker Maintenance Per RMP 9366
05/12/2020
W-086 Lubricate Fan Bearings
05/28/2020
TS-82 Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test
05/14/2020
1P-010A Sample and Change Oil as Required
06/24/2020
1AF-04002-O/Replace Air Supply Hose
05/26/2020
18M Mechanical Maintenance
06/11/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
WO 40714864 01
1PS-01366A Leaking on Cubicle Floor
05/28/2020
1A52-66; MOC Switch Needs Adjustment
06/15/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
RWA 2341341-16 Add Caution/Note to Select Equipment IDs
05/07/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Items Became Loose In a FME Posted Areas During
Walkdown In Containment
03/14/2020
Items Identified During RP and NRC Walkdown
03/14/2020
Drawings
110E029 Sheet 1
P&ID Auxiliary Coolant System Unit 2
110E035 Sheet 1
Safety Injection System Unit 2
499B466 Sheet
757B
Elementary Wiring Diagram Reactor Coolant System
Remote Operated Valve 2RC431C
499B466 Sheet
757D
Elementary Wiring Diagram Remote Operated Valves
541F445 Sheet 1
541F445 Sheet 2
541F445 Sheet 3
685J175 Sheet 2
Chemical & Volume Control System Unit 2
685J175 Sheet 3
Chemical & Volume Control System Unit 2
BD-13
Block Diagram - Instrument Reactor Control System
Pressurizer Pressure Control Unit 2
Miscellaneous
PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection
Checklist
03/14/2020-
04/03/2020
2R37 Shutdown Safety Assessment Daily Snapshot
03/27/2020
Tagout: 2 RH RH-716D Repair
PBF-5101
Fuel/Insert/Component Movement Authorization: U2R37
Core Offload
03/22/2020
PBF-5101
Fuel/Insert/Component Movement Authorization: U2R37
Core Reload
03/26/2020
TLB-3
Tank Level Book: Pressurizer Relief Tank, T-2
Procedures
2-SOP-RH-002
Residual Heat Removal System Operation
2RMP 9096-1
Reactor Vessel Head Removal and Installation Using Biach
Tensioning System
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
NP 8.4.7
Control of Safe Load Path and Rigging
Placing Residual Heat Removal System In Operation
SLP 2
Safe Load Path and Rigging Manual: Items Lifted By
Containment Polar Crane Unit 2
Work Orders
2ICP 4.4-6 LTOP Transmitters Outage Cal
03/23/2020
2ICP 2.16-2 - OP Mitigation Sys LTOP Req'd < 392 Deg F
03/28/2020
Calculations
2010-0010
Acceptance Criteria for GAMP Sentinel Points
Corrective Action
Documents
Eight PM Credit Dates Not Correct
05/12/2020
Engineering
Changes
FP-3715, P-35B Diesel Fire Pump Discharge Relief Setpoint
Procedures
0-PT-FP-002 Diesel Engine - Driven Fire Pump Functional
Test
05/01/2020
Work Orders
ORT 27, RCP Seal Return
03/18/2020
OPS Perform OI-135E For Unit 1 SI Train A (IN CTMT)
05/22/2020
2ICP 2.3A - RP logic Test - Train A
05/21/2020
71151
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Wrong Unit 1 RCS Leakrate Submitted for Aug 2019
05/01/2020
Miscellaneous
Performance Indicators; Units 1 and 2; Reactor Coolant
System Leakage
04/01/2019-
03/31/2020
Performance Indicators; Units 1 and 2; Safety System
Functional Failures
04/01/2019-
03/31/2020
LI-AA-100-10003
NRC Performance Indicator
Procedures
NP 5.2.16
NRC Performance Indicators
Corrective Action
Documents
NRC Identified: MR Evaluation Documentation Discrepancy
03/26/2020
NRC ID: CRs 02350536 and 02350547 Required
Rescreening
06/10/2020