IR 05000269/1993018
| ML20046B730 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 06/13/1993 |
| From: | Barr K, Wright F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16148A815 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-93-18, 50-270-93-18, 50-287-93-18, NUDOCS 9308060122 | |
| Download: ML20046B730 (26) | |
Text
_
.~.
-
,
%
UNITED STATES
'
/
o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON g
y REGloN il n.j'
101 MARIETT A ST REET, N.W.
$
.
g
'C AT1.ANTA, GEORGI A 30323 s,...../
.
JUL 16 B33 t
P Report Nos.: 50-269/93-18, 50-270/93-18, and 50-287/93-18 f
Licensee: Duke Power Company
}
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242
[
Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, License Nos.:
and 50-287 and DPR-55
!
Facility Name: Oconee Nuclear Station Inspection ConducteJq June 14-17, 1993
Inspectpr:
i4A d /7f3 i
-
F. Nl Wright,-Team Leader DatfSighed Team Members:
G. Bryan j
-
F. McManu
K. Poer ti r i
Approved by:
J 7I3./97-3
!
,-
K. P. Bar' (Chieff '
(
)DateSigned l
r Emergency Preparedness Section v
Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards j
l i
SUMMARY
Scope:
j This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of the annual emergency preparedness exercise.
Emergency organization activation and response were selectively observed in the licensee's Emergency Response Facilities, including the Simulator Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operational Support Center, and Emergency Operations Facility. The inspection i
also included a review of the exercise scenario and observation of the
!
licensee's critique. This announced exercise was conducted on June 15, 1993,-
between the hours of 7:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m., with offsite participation limited to receiving notification messages and activation of the Alert and Notification System for Oconee.
Results:
'
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified. One
)
exercise weakness was identified concerning failure of Emergency Operation l
'
Facility personnel to discuss suspect offsite dose information with the Emergency Director prior to its transmittal to offsite agencies. Also, the 9308060122 930716 PDR ADOCK 05000269 G
., -
-
-
-
-
_-
..
.
.
.
..
.
!
,
,
licensee's method for. establishing the time of actual emergency classification declaration was confusing and could lead to exceeding the required time for State and local notifications. Overall, the licensee demonstrated capability to implement the Emergency Plan in the event of a radiological emergency.
P
.i
,
i
!
,
,
)
!
.
]
.
_
.
.
..
-
-
-
.
.
.
.
.
,
.
-
.
REPORT DETAILS
.
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees S. Adams, News / Press Controller i
- H. Barron, Station Manager
- R. Bond, Work Control t
- P. Brandt, Emergency Preparedness Specialist
- E. Brown, Radiation Protection
- R. Brown, Emergency Preparedness Specialist
- S. Coy, Radiation Protection
- D. Davidson, Institute Nuclear Power Operations Coordinator
.
- J. Davis, Safety Assurance Manager
!
- T. Grant, Emergency Preparedness
- M. Green, Corporate Communications
- J. Hampton, Site Vice President
- M. Hipps, Mechanical Services Manager
- C. Jennings, Emergency Preparedness Manager i
T. Kuhr, Lead Emergency Operation Facility Controller E. Lampre, Technical Support Center Dose Assessor
- D. Manley, Chemistry Department
- M. Patrick, Regulatory Compliance
- S. Perry, Regulatory Compliance
- G. Rothenberger, Operations Superintendent T. Stevens Shift Supervisor
C. Wray, Dose Projection Controller
- C. Yongue, Radiation Protection Manager Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.
i Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. Harmon, Senior Resident Inspector
- K. Poertner, Resident Inspector
- Atteni. J Exit Meeting Abbreviations used throughout this report are defined in the last j
paragraph.
]
2.
Exercise Scenario (82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine whether provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee's Emergency Plan and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I.
.
,
.
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the exercise and was discussed
!
with licensee representatives. The final exercise scenario was detailed and adequate to exercise the participants.
.
The inspector discussed the licensee's scenario review and validation process and determined that the scenario was developed and reviewed by a
scenario development team having knowledge of engineering, health i
physics, emergency preparedness, training,-and plant operations. One
'
problem was identified with scenario data provided to the players. The scenario provided a radiation level for a main steam line monitor that was too high for the desired radiological release activity in'the
scenario. The "high radiation levels" on the main steam line radiation r
monitor resulted in a higher than expected whole body dose rate _at the
'
site boundary. 'The correct dose rate on the main steam line monitor, to obtain the desired scenario dose rates, should have been 0.5 mrad /hr.
However, a main steam line monitor reading of 64.0 mrad /hr was provided to the players during the exercise. The inspector determined, from interviews with scenario developers, that a calculation error had been
'
made in developing the scenario data.
The inspector also determined
that there were no additional or separate data reviews other than those
>
made by individual scenario developers. The licensee identified the
'
scenario data problem during the critique process as an item requiring corrective actions. The licensee did not propose any specific alternative approach to validating scenario data prior to the exit
meeting.
The attachement to this report exhibits the licensee's exercise
,
'
objectives, narrative summary, and timeline.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
The area of assignment of responsibility was observed to determine whether primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee i
had been specifically established and that adequate staff was available
'
to respond to an emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specified criteria in NUREG-0654,
'
Section II.A.
i
During pre-exercise reviews of the licensee's Emergency Plan and
,
implementing procedures; the inspector concluded that the onsite and
)
offsite emergency organizations were adequately described and the responsibilities for key organization positions were clearly defined in approved plans and implementing procedures.
'
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
Implementation of the licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to determine whether the responsibilities for emergency
'l
.
-
.
,,
__
._
_
._
.
.
-
.
!
>
,
response were unambiguously defined, that adequate staffing was provided
to insure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at j
all times, and that the interfaces were specified as required by l
10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific
criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.B.
l
The inspector concluded that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined; the responsibility and authority for directing i
actions necessary to respond to the emergency were clear, that staff
'
were available to fill key functional positions within the organization,
,
and that onsite and offsite interactions and responsibilities were clearly defined.
j The licensee adequately demonstrated the ability to alert, notify, and mobilize licensee response personnel. Augmentation of the initial
onsite emergency response organizations was accomplished through
'
activations of the ERFs. The inspector observed the activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency, organizations in the SCR, TSC, OSC, and the EOF. The inspector determined that the licensee was able to staff and activate the facilities in a timely manner. The required staffing and assignment of responsibility was effective and consistent with the licensee's approved procedures.
Because of the scenario scope and conditions, long-term or continuous staffing of the emergency i
response organization was not required.
An exercise weakness was identified when EOF. personnel failed to notify the Emergency Director that suspect information would be provided to the i
State and offsite agencies in an Emergency Notification message. The j
licensee transmitted Emergency Notification message number 4 to the State and local emergency response agencies at 11:05 a.m.
The Emergency
{
Notification Data Sheet, that accompanied the notification message,
'
projected offsite whole body dose rates that were approximately
-
2.23 E+2 mrem /hr at the site boundary. The inspector noted the dose rate was much higher than those provided in the licensee's scenario and that the Radiological Assessment Team was highly suspect of the projected offsite dose rates in that message. According to the
-
Radiological Assessment Manager the doses appeared high for the reported
plant conditions.
Subsequent calculations confirmed the Radiological Assessment Teams suspicion that the projected offsite doses, reported in i
the 11:05 a.m. message, were several orders of magnitude high.
In Emergency Notification message number 5, issued at 11:30 a.m., the whole body dose rates at the site boundary were estimated to be only 7.33 E-4 mrem /hr.
The inspector noted that the Radiological Assessment Team had failed to discuss or report the suspect offsite dose rates with the Emergency Director prior to the transmittal of Emergency Notification message number 4 and that the significant changes in offsite dose projections were not brought to the attention of the Emergency Director
'
during the exercise. The inspector stated that failure of the Radiological Assessment Team to report highly suspect offsite dose information with the Emergency Director was an exercise weakness.
..
.
-
. -
-
.-
i
.
'
i
l f
Exercise Weakness 50-269, 270, 287/93-18-01: Failure of the E0F staff to notify the Emergency Director of suspect information (offsite dose i
rates), prior to its transmission to offsite agencies.
l l
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
l The area of Emergency Response Support and Resources was observed to
,
determine whether arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made, that arrangements to accommodate l
State and local staff at the licensee's onsite Emergenev Operations
.
Facility have been made, and that other organizatior che ble of s
augmenting the planned response have been identifie quired by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragrapn IV.A and
.j specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.C.
!
State and Local Agency participation in the exercise was limited to receiving Emergency Notification messages from the licensee and
activation of the Alert and Notification System for Oconee. The
!
licensee simulated other communications to those agencies.
j
>
No violations or deviations were identified.
.
6.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
The emergency classification system was observed to determine that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by l
the nuclear facility licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4),
j 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.D.
j
Licensee Exercise Objective B.1 was " Demonstrate the ability to declare emergency classification in accordance with procedures." The inspector
,
reviewed licensee procedure RP/0/B/1000/01, " Classification of
'
Emergency," revision dated April 28, 1993, which provided for off-normal
events to be classified into one of the four emergency classification
,
categories.
Enclosure 4.1, " Emergency Action Levels for Emergency
!
Classes," of the procedure listed various events and the corresponding i
emergency classifications per existing conditions. The Shift Supervisor
!
in the control room and the Emergency Coordinator in the TSC effectively
evaluated existing conditions and declared appropriate emergency j
classifications in accordance with emergency procedures. All
'
classifications were made in a timely manner and exercise objectives
'
were met. The following classifications were made during the exercise:
'
The conditions for declaring an Alert Emergency were met when
staff was aware of a primary leak greater than 50 gpm at 9:16 a.m.
l The Emergency Coordinator in the TSC declared the Alert 7 minutes
!
later at 9:23 a.m.
}
!
l,
'!
!
--
..
.
..
.
-
.
,
k
The conditions for declaring a Site Area Emergency were met when
-
.
Main Steam Relief Valves opened at 10:24 a.m. with primary to secondary leak greater than 50 gpm. The Emergency Coordinator in
,
the TSC immediately declared a SAE at 10:24 a.m.
-
There was a concern related to the time that an Emergency Classification is declared by licensee procedures.
Licensee procedures required the time the Emergency Notification message was approved to be the time the
emergency classification was declared. This issue is discussed in i
'
Paragraph 7 of the report.
I No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
The Notification Methods and Procedures area was observed to assure that procedures were established for notification of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel by the licensee, and that the
,
content of initial and follow-up messages to response organizations was
'
established.
This area was further observed to assure that means to provide early notification to the population within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), Paragraph IV.D
-;
of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in
~
Section II.E of NUREG-0654.
The inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were used to provide.information concerning the simulated emergency
'
conditions to Federal, State, and local response organi. '. ions and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization. The inspector observed notifications to the State of South Carolina and to local offsite agencies were promptly transmitted following their completion and approval. Notifications to offsite agencies were initiated within 4 minutes and 13 minutes of the declarations for the Alert and Site Area Emergency classifications.
The contents of the
Emergency Notifications made during the exercise were adequate, with
,
minor problems experienced. The licensee had several exercise objectives related to notification of offsite authorities which the licensee adequately demonstrated.
The inspectors identified a problem with the licensee's Emerge,cy Notification procedures which could result in delays in implementing the
~
Emergincy Plan and inaccurate documentation of Emergency Preparedness response.
10 CFR 50 Appendix E, " Emergency Planning and Preparedness For Production and Utilization Facilities,"Section IV, " Content of Emergency Plans," D, " Notification Procures," Paragraph 3, states, in part, "A licensee shall have the capability to notify responsible State and local government agencies within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency." The inspector determined that the licensee had developed a scheme to ensure the requirement to notify offstte agencies within 15 minutes was never exceeded.
i
!
.
.
.
- -
-
-
-
-
.
-
.
_ -.
.
-
h f
'
'
.
-
i
!
!
!
The Emergency Notification form, in part, contained the following
!
information:
Item 3.
TRANSMITTAL TIME /DATE: (time) (date)
Item 6.
A. Emergency Declared At: (time) (date)
Item 16.
APPROVED BY: (name) (title) TIME /DATE: (time) (date)
f The licensee's procedures required the notification message approval I
time be documented as the emergency classification and declaration time.
For example:
j RP/0/B/1000/15, "Offsite Communications," revision dated
-
,
December 17, 1992, stated in Paragraph 6 of Enclosure 4.5, l
" Guidelines For Completing Emergency Notification Form,"
"The
'
time the emergency declared is the time the Emergency Coordinator l
or E0F Director signed the approval on line 16."
RP/0/B/1000/19, " Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator l
-
Procedure," revision dated February 11, 1993, stated in step 3.2 l
of Enclosure 4.3, " Emergency Classification Tracking Sheet,"
,
" Declare an Alert. Notify Offsite Communicator to complete a
-
message form in accordance with RP/0/B/1000/15, get it approved, t
and send it to the offsite agencies.
(The Alert is officially declared at this time.
The times on the Emergency Notification Form, lines 6 and 16, and the time on this step must all be the same)." The procedure duplicates the process for Site Area
'
Emergency in step 4.2 and a General Emergency in step 5.2.
The licensee had similar procedure requirements in RP/0/B/1000/20,
-
" Emergency Operations Facility Director Procedure", revision dated
December 21, 1992.
The following information was recorded on Emergency Notification messages:
Emergency Notification Message number 1, ALERT Item 3.
TRANSMITTAL TIME /DATE: (9:27 a.m.) (6/15/93)
,
Item 6.
A. Emergency Declared At: (9:23 a.m.) (6/15/93)
Item 16.
APPROVED BY: (Emergency Coordinator 9:26 a.m.)
(no title given) TIME /DATE: (9:23 a.m.)
(6/15/93)
Emergency Notification Message number 3, SAE Item 3.
TRANSMITTAL TIME /DATE: (10:37 a.m.) (6/15/93)
Item 6.
A. Emergency Declared At: (10:24 a.m.) (6/15/93)
,
Item 16.
APPROVED BY: (Emergency Coordinator) (Station Manager) TIME /DATE: (10:24 a.m.) (6/15/93)
)
.-
.
..
--
.
.
.. _.
.-.
.-
-
.
...
.
.
-
.
- - - -
. - -.
. -
!
,
i
!
The inspector made.the following observations concerning Emergency
Notification messages 1 and 3:
.
!
The Emergency Coordinator in the TSC declared an Alert at
!
-
9:23 a.m. and so indicated in block 3 of Emergency Notification message number 1.
The Emergency Coordinator approved the message
and signed it at 9:26 a.m. and recorded two times, 9:26 a.m. and
!
9:23 a.m., in item 16 of the form. Message transmittal began at 9:27 a.m.
-
A Site Area Emergency was declared at 10:24 a.m. and so indicated
!
-
in block 3 of Emergency Notification message number 3.
The
Emergency Coordinator approved the message and signed it at
!
10:33 a.m.
However, the Emergency Coordinator recorded the j
approval time as 10:24 a.m. which was 9 minutes prior to it's e
actual review and approval. Message transmittal began at i
10:37 a.m., which was about 13 minutes following the SAE
declaration time.
l The inspector discussed the inappropriateness of the procedures and
their use during the exercise with representatives of the site's l
Emergency Preparedness staff. The inspector pointed out that the
!
Emergency Notification message approval was not limited to a review of
,
the emergency declaration and its causes. The inspector reported that
'
'
the approval time should indicate the actual time the Emergency Coordinator reviewed and agreed that all of the information; including l
the description of plant conditions, release information, estimates of-
'
offsite dose and recommended protective actions; were accurate and appropriate.
In this exercise, the licensee's actual approach did not significantly affect the ability to make a timely classification after
conditions were met, or to make timely emergency notification following
an emergency classification.
However, the 2 times of Emergency l
Notification message approval was confusing on message number 1 and l
'
inaccurate for message number 3.
The licensee did not plan to modify I
the procedures.
l No violations or deviations were identified.
'
t 8.
Emergency Communications (82301)
i
,
The Emergency Communications area was observed to determine whether
[
provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response
organizations and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6),
!
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-
0654,Section II.F.
The inspector observed that adequate communications existed among the
'
licensee's emergency organizations.
Emergency communications with
offsite agencies were adequate with minor problems experienced with
i communication equipment.
Licensee personnel identified the need for i
l
!
'
4_,
.
additional radios in the OSC for maintenance and operation activities.
Exercise participants did a good job of transmitting drill messages and properly identifying them as drill-related.
l
!
No violations or deviations were identified.
,
9.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
The Emergency Facilities and Equipment area was observed to determine
whether adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an
emergency response were provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
Licensee procedure RP/0/B/1000/03, " Alert", revision dated February 11, t
1993, required the Emergency Coordinator to activate the emergency i
facilities upon declaration of an Alert emergency classification. An
Alert classification was made at 9:23 a.m. and an announcement was made
over the PA system to activated the TSC, OSC and EOF at 9:28 a.m.
The
~
inspector observed the activation, staffing and operation of key ERFs, including the SCR, TSC, OSC, and EOF.
-
a.
Simulator Control Room The operations-personnel properly analyzed plant conditions and developed appropriate strategies to combat the equipment failures.
'
Operations personnel kept management well informed of changing i
plant conditions, and management responses were timely and i
appropriate to the circumstances.
,
No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Technical Support Cer.. -
-!
i
'
The TSC was activated and staffed promptly upon request of the Emergency Coordinator in the SCR. The Emergency Organization's response to staff the TSC was adequate, with most of the TSC staff in the facility by 9:45 a.m.
The minimum TSC staffing, which included Dose Assessor, Reactor Engineer, and Offsite Communicator, was in the TSC by 9:39 a.m.
The TSC was staffed and i
operational at 9:55 a.m.
j j
The licensee's TSC facilities and equipment were adequate to deal with the conditions described by the Scenario. The licensee's staff identified request for better data screens and the need to review the adequacy of the field monitoring team radio location.
No violations or deviations were identified.
.
.
_
.
.
_
~
,
i
..
.
.
.
l
c.
Operational Support Center The inspector observed the initial activation and personnel
'
response in the staffing of the OSC. The OSC was activated, staffed, and functional in a timely manner.
The OSC was declared
operational at 9:45 a.m.
,
i The licensee's OSC which is located in an adjacent to the Unit 3 Control Room, was small and the layout of the area had limitations.
However, the OSC staff was able to work around the facility's limitations and meet OSC exercise objectives. Command
,
and control were adequate; however, high noise levels and general J
confusion were observed during portions of the exercise. Adequate communications between the OSC, TSC, and emergency repair teams
.
was demonstrated and communication equipment functioned properly.
!
A designated area to conduct taam briefings was not available and resulted'in some confusion during team briefings.
Players in the
OSC identified additional equipment needs and facility concerns that were documented in the licensee's critique process.
,
t i
Licensee Exercise Objective B.23 was " Demonstrate proper plant personnel response to a simula'"d fire emergency and timely backup assistance from the offsite fin support agency." The scenario
called for an explosion near a Unit 1 Startup Transformer and a
report of potential fire to be made to the control room staff. A report of fire and request for fire brigade deployment was % de at
about 10:18 a.m.
A PA announcement for the fire brigade response j
was made at 10:20 a.m.
At about 10:27 a.m. 4 maintenance i
personnel arrived at the fire scene. One or more of these persons was qualified to and did assume " acting command " of the fire brigade. Several other fire brigade personnel arrived at the
,
scene until the fire was reported out at 10:45 a.m.
There were
!
some problems with the timely deployment of the Fire Brigade Team.
Licensed operators did not join the fire brigade until 10:38 a.m.
"
It appeared that there was some' problem in dispatching available
!
fire brigade personnel out of the OSC. The licensee identified the issue as one requiring review and corrective action.
The
'
inspector stated that a review of the licensee's corrective actions would be made in a future inspection as an IFI.
t IFI 50-269, 270, and 287/93-02:
Review the licensee's evaluation i
of fire response capabilities during emergency plan implementation-and any corrective actions to improve responsiveness in a future
,
inspection.
l No violations or deviations were identified.
,
s
i
_. -
.
.
d.
Emergency Operations Facility The licensee's goal was to activate the E0F within 75 minutes of declaration of any Emergency Classification greater than a Notification of an Unusual Event. The E0F was promptly staffed and activated with qualified personnel at 10:45 a.m.
The Emergency Director provided timely and accurate status updates to the EOF staff. The EOF did not make any emergency tassifications or protective action recommendations during the xercise.
The E0F and supporting equipment were very good and utilized accordingly. However, the licensee did experience some equipment
.
problems during the exercise. A fax machine utilized in making offsite notifications and a large screen monitor utilized to display plant conditions failed to work during the exercise. The licensee identified the equipment problems in the critique process for corrective action.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Accident Assessment (82301)
The Accident Assessment area was observed to determine whether adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR 50. Appendix E, Parao-aph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
Exercise Objective A.e. was " Demonstrate the ability to assess the incident and determine / implement mitigating strategies." The accident assessment personnel in the TSC and E0F facilities analyzed plant conditions and developed appropriate strategies for combating equipment failures. The licensee's staff successfully met the exercise objective.
The dose assessment staff experienced some difficulties during the first couple of hours into the scenario but later recovered. There was a scenario data problem and bad meteorological information that caused high radiation levels offsite (several orders of magnitude) for the existing plant conditions. The dose assessment staff reported suspect data to the offsite agencies without discussing them with the Emergency Director prior to their transcission to offsite agencies _(Paragraph 4 of the report).
Shortly thereafter the dose assessment team was able' to determine the correct meteorological conditions and make dose calculations based on RCS activity as opposed to those made with the defective Main Steam Line radiation monitor data. The offsite i
.
-...-
. -
.'
,
I
'
monitoring teams were appropriately dispatched and monitored as required i
by procedures.
The teams verified that offsite radiological doses were not significant, j
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Protective Responses (82301)
The Protective Responses area was observed to determine that guidelines
for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.J.
"
Exercise Objective E.c. was " Demonstrate the ability to provide timely and appropriate protective actions recommendations in accordance with
,
station procedures." The inspector verified that the licensee had emergency procedures for formulating PARS for offsite populations within the 10 mile emergency planning zone. The licensee did not issue any l
offsite protective action recommendations during the exercise as
~
scenario conditions did not provide conditions that would require their issuance. However, the licensee demonstrated ability to identify
,
affected sectors and discussed possible shelter / evacuation strategies
!
should offsite doses increase significantly.
Protective actions were initiated for onsite personnel following the i
Alert declaration by conducting a personnel accountability of those
!
personnel inside the protected area.
The site accountability process was achieved and reported within 30 minutes.
However, there were 11 i
persons missing at that time. At 10:10 a.m. that number had been reduced to 5 and at 10:50 a.m. there were two persons missing. At 11:15, an evacuation of non-essential personnel was simulated. The inspector reported that the licensee's decision to delay site t
J evacuation of non-essential personnel following the declaration of a SAE did not appear appropriate or ALARA. Personnel were not required to evacuate assembly areas in which personnel could be exposed to radiation and radioactive material from the releases prior to that time. A release path through the Main Steam Relief Valves existed from about 10:24 a.m. to 10:46 aan. Another release path from a main steam line break in the licensee's Turbine Building began at 10:45 a.m.
While i
there was no evidence of radiation exposure or radioactive contamination to personnel in or near the release paths, it appeared that it would have been prudent to move personnel from assembly points adjacent to plume pathways at the time the MSRV release began.
It was not until the contamination levels began to increase in the Turbine Building that the evacuation of non-essential personnel was ordered.
The issue was identified as an Exercise Weakness at the exit Meeting, Upon further review of the plant conditions, a decision was made to characterize the issue as an area requiring closer evaluation in a future inspection and was identified as an IFI.
i
.
.
..
.
_ _ _
i
.
I'
IFI 50-269, 270, and 287/93-03: Review the licensee's evacuation criteria and procedures for non-essential personnel onsite during a radiological release in a future inspection.
No violations or deviations were identified.
,
12.
Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to
,
l determine whether shortcomings in the performance of the exercise were
'
l brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective
,
action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
I Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The licensee conducted facility critiques with exercise players immediately following the exercise termination.
Licensee controllers and observers conducted additional critiques prior to the formal l
critique to management on June 17, 1993.
Issues identified during the i
exercise were discussed by licensee representatives during the critique.
l The licensee's critique addressed b9th substantive deficiencies and improvement areas. The conduct of the critique was consistent with the regulatory requirements and guidelines cited above.
Licensee action on identified findings will be reviewed during subsequent NRC inspections.
No violations or deviations were identified.
i 13.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
(Closed)
Exercise Weakness 50-269,270,287/92-16-01: The licensee's Joint Information Center failed to quantify or put into perspective for the general public the radiological release to the environment.
The licensee's corrective action resulted in the development of a Pre-News Conference Briefing checklist that was part.of the News Group Plan.
The checklist was utilized during the exercise to prepare the Public Information Officer for a news interview. During the 1993 exercise the licensee demonstrated the use of the checklist and conducted a news interview that accurately characterized the release in terms easily understood by the press and public. The inspector reported that the item would be closed.
14.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on June. 17, 1993, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed bel ow. Propriety information was not reviewed during the inspection.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Licensee management was informed that a previous open item (listed in Paragraph 13) was reviewed and considered closed.
l
!
l i
.
.
.
-
-
-
..
-
..
-
.
.
>
.
[
'
Item Number Description and Reference 50-269, 270, 287/93-18-01 Exercise Weakness - A exercise weakness l
was identified when a Manager in the EOF Emergency Response Organization failed to notify the Emergency Director that suspect
information would be provided to the State
!
and offsite agencies in an Emergency Notification message (Paragraph 4).
50-269, 270, and 287/93-02 IFI - Review the licensee's evaluation of i
fire response capabilities during
,
emergency plan implementation and any corrective actions to improve responsiveness in a future inspection (Paragraph 9).
50-269, 270, and 287/93-03 IFI - Review the licensee's evacuation criteria and procedures for non-essential personnel onsite during a radiological
'
release in a future inspection-
'
(Paragraph 11).
15.
Index of Abbreviations Used in this Report ALARA As low As Reasonably Achievable CFR Code of Federal Regulations EAL Emergency Action level EOF Emergency Operations Facility ERF Emergency Response Facility ERO Emergency Response Organization GPM Gallons Per Minute
IFI Inspector Follow-up Item MSRV Main Steam Relief Valve
MRAD Milli-Radiation Absorbed Dose MREM Milli-Roentgen Equivalent Man NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
,
OSC Operations Support Center l'
SAE Site Area Emergency SCR Simulator Control Room TSC Technical Support Center
!
Attachments:
Exercise Objectives, Narrative Summary, and Time Line
!
i
_
.
.
.
Sheet 1 of 6
,
1993 OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE ANNUAL EXERCISE OBJECTIVES
.
V& m y[l@b iQy %4hi$$tkl & & & ffQ QQQQf Ql@Q
_ g f.,
_9 ;
.:
a
,
A.
EMNr.tNCY ltt$MEESE OMWWIIZATI(NI a.
Demonstrate ability to mobilize staf f (ISC 05C.f 0F.JIC) and I
activate facilltles as required by figure B-8 in DNS Emergency Plan after declaring an Alert or higher emergency classification.
~
b.
Demonstrate the ability to fully staff facilities and X
maintain staffing around the clock.
f O
c.
Demonstrate precise and clear transfer of responsibility X
from the Shift Supervisor la the. Control Room to the
$
Emergency Coordinator in the ISC.
tn i
d.
Demonstrate precise and clear transfer of responsibility X
- free the Emergency Coordinator in the ISC to the (OF m
Director in the EOF.
Q
$
e.
Demonstrate the ability to assess the incident and X
,
determine / implement altigation strategies.
g b
'
8.
EMiti.tNCY CtASSIFICAil011 m
a.
Demonstrate the ability to properly classify emergency X
S situations in accordance with plant procedures, g
b.
Demonstrate the ability to notify counties and state within X
$
15 minutes af ter declaring an emergency or af ter changing classification.
,
c.
Demonstrate proper use of message format and authentication X
l methodology for messages transeltted to state and counties.
i
- -
.
-.
.
-
.
.
-
-
.. - -
-. -.
.
... -...
.,
..,
-
.. -.
.
..
- -
.
.-
.-_
- _
_.
.--
.
.
.
Sheet 2 of 6 1993 OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE ANNUAL EXERCISE OBJECTIVES i
hikbl$f hlh.il$flb5khi\\Y.
hlhhk hhh gs hh hg5%
,ak h?liQ
g:g gy __.
}
.
bSG 5['
'
$
- h !'
>
C.
(IBOT 5tlCATIGt5
,
a.
Test onsite and offsite communications equipment
-
Selective Signaling
-
Duke Offsite Radio Systes X
(FMisand15C/ EOF)
-
Duke Onsite Radio System-X
,
-
SC State Dectslon Line
-
FIS 2000 System:
'
EMS I
-
AT&T I
-
ONS Switchboard X
-
Intercoe Systees I
b.
Demonstrate the ability to cosaunicate with all appropriate I
locations, organtrations, and field personnel.
c.
Demonstrate the ability to notify the NRC not later than 1 X
hour after declaring one of the energency classes.
d.
Demonstrate the ability to provide current plant data to X
appropriate locations, organlaations, and fleid personnel, e.
Test adequacy and operability of emergency X
equipment / supplies.
.. ~. -_ _ - _ _,_.-._.,-_.,..-...---_... - -
..-..- --
. - -
. - -
=
. - - -
- -
. -.
- - -.
-.. -
- -
-
_..
_
_.
.
.
.
Sheet 3 of 6 1993 OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE ANNUAL EXERCISC OI!JECTIVES
.
i m m g M, of(ft$.M@(V?jMS @(Qigsgj[f giW g sk@ gj%gsg 7;g3 g :.
sg.
- nWl:
'
M L
D.
ACCESS M W QN m WL a.
Demonstrate the ability to account for onsite personnel X
within 30 minutes.
b.
Demonstrate the ability to locate unaccounted personnel X
determined by site assembly.
,
c.
Demonstrate the ability to effect an orderly evacuation of non-essential personnel.
d.
Demonstrate the ability to provide controlled access to the X
plant and EOF.
L.
IUG10 LOGICAL MEllI0 RING a.
Onsite
-
Demonstrate appropriate equipoent and procedures for X
determining ambient radiation levels.
-
Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for X
measurement of airborne radiolodine concentrations.
'
Demonstrate the ability to provide offsite dose I
-
projection in accordance with site procedures.
-
Desonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and X
control emergency worker esposure.
-
Demonstrate the ability to make the decision (based on predetermined criterie) whether to issue KI to emergency workers and then to issue same.
l
,
m
-.
.-
-m m
.___.+,-_-e-m
- -~-em*-
- ------
1--,
,
eeez,
__
w-e r
,a==
w
+e
.
=
m-
,
m
,--_
-
-
-
.
.
~
.
.
Sheet 4 of 6 1993 OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE ANNUAL EXERCISE OBJECTIVES
-
"N 4.k!-~~.'^
'
- -; :f
- }
, b
'
.
l-.
k
> '
. _.;
y
^
-
.
b.
Dffsite:
-
Demonstrate the ability to mobilize teams in the 10 X
elle EPZ to locate and track the plane for neble gases and radiolodine concentrations in a timely
manner.
-
Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for collection, transport. and analysis of samples of
'soll, vegetation, snow, water, and ellk as determined by specific scenario requirements.
to transult fleid I
-
Demonstrate the abl11ty/IDF.
measurement data to 15C
~
c.
Dose Calculations and Protective Action Recommendations
.
-
Deennstrate the ability to project dosage to the pubile via ingestion pathway exposures.
-
Demonstrate the ablitty to project damage to the pubile based on plant and fleid data for pubile via ingestion pathway exposure.
-
Demonstrate the abl11ty to provide timely and I
appropriate protective action recommendations in accordance with site procedures.
,
F.
OFF3ITE AGENCY AS$15TAIICE a.
Demonstrate the ability to identify need for, request, and obtain federal assistance.
b.
Demonstrate the adequacy of response to a medical injury involving (contamination with transport to an offsite medical feel 11ty conteelnation and/or radiation consequences).
c.
Demonstrate the adequacy of response to a fire outside the protected area utilizing volunteer fire department support.
d.
Demonstrate county and state participation in exercises / drills, full Partial
.
-
-
-
- _ _ _ _ _ - _. _ - _ _ - - _. - - - _ - _ _ _ - -..., - -.
-
-...
. -.. - -.
. - -. - ---.
... ~
-
.
.
.
,
.
Sheet 5 of 6 1993 OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE ANNUAL EXERCISE OBJECTIVES ni W inM"m g'@@a#N@g/@$d@
s(JiMf M trd $ hid/gggs5{d y#Mjggghst hivgggggi.
s
, ISS5 4'
,
G.
JOIIti INRIIsmilGI CtWifE i-a.
Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in a clear, I
accurate, and timely eenner.
b.
Demonstrate the ability to provide advance coordination of X
information released.
c.
. Demonstrate the ability to estabitsh and operate rumor I
control in a coordinated fashion.
H.
RECOVERY Ale REENTRY a.
Demonstrate the ability to determine and toplement appropriate seasures for controlled recovery and reentry.
b.
Demonstrate the ability to take post-accident ilquid samples
.
under accident conditions.
c.
Demonstrate the ability to take post-accident gaseous saeples under accident conditions.
d.
Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for deconteelnation of workers, equipeent, etc.
e.
Demonstrate the ability to estleate total population
esposure, i
f.
Demonstrate the capability to respond to slaulated Appendix R Scenarios to test a portion of the planned response Turbine / Auxillary Building Fire
--
,
!
li
-
Turbine Building Fire
-
Fire in West' Penetration Room or SSF cable trench
-
Reactor Building Fire l
-
Fire at CT-4 Transformer l
-
titillration of Alternate TSC and Osc
t l
!
l - -
-.
-. -. -
. -.. - -
-
- - -
-. -. -- -- - - -...
..... - - - -
-.-
.
Sheet 6 of 6 1993 OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE ANNUAL EXERCISE OBJECTIVES
.
uix;4:v%h~gyyggggy g M;w >. dW13nMWF4 Ep%#@inph.,4$3g g 6:n.)jg y '
fg g ;
4g..
I.
[IlltCISE/ Drill MUMGEMNT Semi-annually an ERF activation drill will be scheduled to a.
begin after normal working hours (between 1800-0600 hours or on weekends / holidays). This drill is unannounced.
b.
The Annual Excrcise will be scheduled during different I
.
seasons of the year,
"
Once every 6 years, an Exercise will be scheduled to begin c.
during the time of 1800 hours0.0208 days <br />0.5 hours <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.849e-4 months <br /> through 0400 hours0.00463 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.613757e-4 weeks <br />1.522e-4 months <br />.
d.
Ort 11s/ exercises will be under the control of a X
Drill /Ezercise Director. Controllers / Evaluators will be utilfred to keep the scenario on track and to allow for
" free play".
,
Critiques allt be held after all drills / exercises to I
e.
determine any corrective actions that say need to be made, f.
Drill scenarlos should include response to cheelcal, hasardous wastes spent fuel shlpeents, and secortly incidents,asweIlasradiologicalandreactorincidents.
g.
Demonstrate participation in in Ingestion Pathway Exercises
-
Full
-
Partial i
.
Narrative Stmmary L
.
I OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE 1993 EMERGENCY RESPONSE AN/lUAL EXERCISE
'
INITIAL CD/IDITIONS/ SEQUENCE OF EVENTS AECLCXCiZia2":EL"2 L; aim &EllitC2**MTm"""""" "" ***W"EBM%M i
INITIAL CONDITIONS
,
!
Unit 1 75% Full Power: Power Escalation Testing is in progress. Unit is in startup after
!
refueling outage.
,
RCS sample results on 6/14/ 93 identified DEI = 0.2 yCi/ ml RCS sample results @ 0300 on 6/15/93 indicated DEI = 0.9 Ci/ml
!
RCS sample results @ 0700 on 6/15/ 93 indicated DEI = 1.5 pCi/ ml
-
Evening shift initiated AP/1/ A/1700/ 21. High Activity in RC System
^
Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump (TDEFWP) is tagged out for bearing replacement.
,
Keowee underground power path is inoperabis to repair large oil leak on CT-4.
I I&E investigating reason for VJ inverter swapping to AC line.
Generator Ground Fault Statalarm is lit.
i i
Unit 2 Shutdown to change out the 2B1 RCP Seal Package LPl Suction Temp = 100* F; 2LT-5 = 75 inches
.
Unit 2 MFBs powered from backcharged Main Transformer CT-2 and CT-5 are available as backup sources of power Unit 3 100% Power: no major problems
l
!
I
.
l
.
'
a _
_ _ _
.
m
.
--
J OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE 1993 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ANNUAL EXERCISE INITIAL CONDITIONS / SEQUENCE OF EVENTS aan.e %:LL a % intl?2B E L A " " "
"T T** ~ ' """*"" ****M2 l
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 0700 Chemistry sample confirms DEI concentration for unit 1 is 1.5 Ci/ ml.
I 0845 Radwaste begins transfer of Spent Resin Liner to shipping cask in RWF Truck Bay.
Dose Rate on liner is 12 Rem / hr.
l
0850 While moving liner the overhead crane fails; liner is suspended in Truck Bay. Crane will not move. Radwaste reports problem to MM/l&E.
i 0900 Tube leak develops in 1 A S/ G - 75 gpm. RIA-16 and 40 show sudden activity increases / spikes. Operators begin leak rate calculation - 75 gpm.
j Operations initiates OP/0/ Al1106/31, Control of Secondary Contamination.
j Conditions exist for an Alert classification.
'
0905 Control Room operators (Simulator) began to shutdown unit, per EOP, at approximately 3% FP/ min.
0915 Shift Supervisor declares an Alert based on RCS LEAKAGE GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 50 gpm - Primary or Primary / Secondary Leak 2 F1 gpm AND Subcooling > 07 AND Leak CANNOT be isolated.
NOTE: No Protective Action Recommendations required at this classification.
0915 - 0920 Site Assembly is initiated; emergency response organization activation initiated.
0920 While reporting for Site Assemoly, two welders working on an NSM package for unit 2 are injured whenever the scaffolding they're standing on collapses. Both are unconscious as a result of the fall and are unable to report for Site Assembly.
0930 Oconee County, Pickens County, and SC State notified of emergency classification.
0945 NRC notified of event classification (ENS)
, - -
.
-
,
OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE 1993 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ANNUAL EXERCISE INITIAL CONDITIONS / SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
=.
x _ a.
'
,
.
,., s..
~~u
,
.
~= -
a 0945 TSC/ OSC staffed and operational: unrt 1 is now shutdown - RCS < 532* F.
0945 - 0950 Site Assemoty completed; two personnel (welders) are unaccounted for - efforts to
'
locate them are inrtiated.
NOTE: Site Assembly should be completed within 30 minutes of initiation.
1000 EOF staffed; notifies TSC that they're ready for turnover.
.
1010 Explosion is heard near CT-1, Unit 1 Stanup Transformer. 6900V power is lost, RCP's are wrthout power. Operators manually restore power to Main Feeder Bus (MFB) from CT-5 using AP/1/ A/1700/11, Loss of Power. Unit 1 unisolates 1A Steam Generator and uses Natural Circulation to cooldown or initiates Forced HPl Cooling.
Fire Brigade should be activated to invesugate reported fire in the vicinity of CT-1.
+
Efforts to power unit 1's main feeder bus from CT-2 are started.
1010- 1015 Secenty locates missing personnel in TB Basement; MERT activated to respond to medical injuries.
1015 - 1030 Tumover completed between TSC and EOF after second mecsage provided to Oconee County, Pickens County, and SC State. EOF declared operational, i
1045 Steam drain line break occurs - 3 inches upstream of 1SD-33. Steam is visible in Turbine Building. Control Room Operators try to close 1MS-17 (Turbine Bypass isolation Valve) from the control room without success. OSC dispatches NLOs to attempt to manually close 1MS 17. NLOs are unsuccessful. OSC dispatches a t
team to stick the breaker for 1MS-17. This action is also unsuccessful. A direct opening to the environment now exists since these valves are off of A main steam line.
1100 EOF Director should escalate to Site Area Emergency due to STEAM LINE
BREAK WITH P/S LEAK GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 50 GPM - Failure on
Secondary Side of one SG results in a direct opening to the environment AND Tube leak a 50 gpm exists in the same Steam Generator.
NOTE: No Protective Action Recommendations required at this time.
-
-
,
__
i
.
,
+
.
OCONEE-NUCLEAR SITE 1993 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ANNUAL EXERCISE INITIAL CONDITIONS / SEQUENCE OF EVENTS gwnmm m e w =
-
-a:n nn ~+-
-mmmmmmmm 1100 EOF notifies Oconee County, Pickens County, and SC State of upgrade in classification.
!
TSC informs NRC of classification change.
TSC begins discussion of Site Evacuation.
!
1115 Counties activate Sirens and EBS Message (actual activation will occur).
t i
1130 Field Monitoring teams began to pick up indications of activity at the Protected Area Fence. Activity at fence is 0.08 mrem / hr.
l Site Evacuation (simulated) initiated.
'
!
1130 - 1145 Follow-up message for Site Area Emergency provided to state and counties.
- 1200 Unidentified helicopter is observed flying over site. Helicopter is flying over transmission lines around site. Secunty officer reports this observation to the Secunty Liaison in the OSC.
i l
1230 Loud noise is heard from helicopter; helicopter begins rapid descent towards Keowee Hydro Station. Helicopter is seen crashing into Lake near the intake Structure.
1200 - 1300 News reporter arrives at the EOF requesting additional information; interview / breifing is conducted with a Duke Power Company Public Spokesperson 1300 - 1400 Efforts to restore power from CT-2 continue.
Exercise will be terminated once objectives have been tested and efforts to
_
reestablish power are clearly underway and/ or power has been restored and RCPs restarted to continue cooldown.
'
!
,
i
~
!
,
.
.
.
.
..
-
.
,
a
!
OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE 1993 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ANNUAL EXERCISE TIME LINE
'
0345-0700 0845 0850 09000J05 0915 0920 0945 0950 Chemistry sample Radwaste begins Overhead crane Tube leak develops in Alert declamd; no Scattolding collapses TSC/OSC operational; Site confirms DEI Spent Resin Liner moving liner 1 A SIG = 75 gom.
PARS required. Site in Turbine Budding; unit is shutdown.
Assembly concentraton transfer to truck bay; fails; liner Conditions exrSt for Assembly and Emergency 2 welders injured and comolete; for Unit 1 Dose Rate = 12 R/hr.
Suspended in an Alat classification; Response Organization unable to report for search in d truck bay.
ControlRoom begins unit activation initiated.
Site Assembly.
progress. @
shutdown.
[
N 1000 1010 1C 15 1CnD 1045 111X)
1185-130 1200 EOF staffed and Explosen occurs @
Security finds Turnover completed Unisolable steam line Site Area Emergency Countes activate Helicopter ready for turnover CT-1; 6900v power missing between TSC & EOF; break occurs; conditions declared.
sirens and EBS observed from TSC.
is lost. Fire Brigade persor'nel; MERT EOF declared exist for a Site hea message.
flying activated.
activated.
operational.
Emergency classification.
over site.
1730 1300-1400 Heltopter crashes Exercise is completed.
l into LAe.
l
-
. -
-.
-
-
-
-
-
- - -
- -
-
-
-
-
-
.
.
.
-.
.
-
-
. - -