IR 05000255/1987024
| ML18052B364 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 10/21/1987 |
| From: | Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18052B363 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-87-24, GL-87-12, IEIN-87-023, IEIN-87-23, NUDOCS 8711030087 | |
| Download: ML18052B364 (9) | |
Text
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-255/87024(DRP)
Docket No. 50-255 Licensee:
Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Ml 49201 Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating *Plant Inspection At:
Palisades Site, Covert, Michigan Inspection Conducted:
September 11 through October 5, 1987 Inspectors:
E. R. Swanson C. D. Anderson Approved By: ~
'-
8. L. Burg~hief Reactor Projects Section 2A Inspection Summary Ins ection on Se tember 11 throu h October 5, 1987 (Re ort No. 50-255 87024(DRP)
License No. DPR-20 Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of followup of previous inspection findings; operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; physical security; radiological protection; reportable events; Generic Letters and Information Notice Results:
Of the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identified.
8711030087 871022
~DR ADOCK 05000255 PDR
- DETAILS Persons Contacted Consumers Power Company (CPCo)
F. W. Buckman, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- J. G. Lewis, Technical Director R. D. Orosz, Engineering and Maintenance Manager R. M. Rice, Operations Manager D. W. Joos, Administrative and Planning Manager
- C. S. Kozup, Licensing Engineer
- D. J. Malone, Licensing Analyst
- R. E. McCaleb, Quality Assurance Director R. A. Fenech, Operations Superintendent
- R. A. Vincent, Director, Plant Safety Engineering
- T. J. Palmisano, Plant Engineering Supervisor
- K. E. Osborne, Plant Projects Superintendent
- R. B. Kasper, Electrical Maintenance Superintendent
- Denotes those present at the Management Interview on October 5, 198 Other members of the Plant staff, and several members of the Contract Security Force, were also contacted briefl.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (Open) Unresolved Item (255/87022-04(DRP)):
The reactor vessel overpressure protection system was found not to meet the design requirement It was recommended that the licensee provide a valid analysis and justification for-continued operation in the low temperature conditio At the close of the inspection, the analysis had not been completed ~nd the plant was operating in an unanalyzed condition (90 degrees F and atmospheric pressure) in reliance upon administrative controls and the existing Low Temperature/Overpressure protection Syste No violations or deviations were identifie * Operational Safety The inspectors observed control room activities, discussed these activities with plant operators, and reviewed various logs and other operations records throughout the inspectio Control room indicators and alarms, log sheets, turnover sheets, and equipment status boards were routinely checked against operating requirement Pump and valve controls were verified to be proper for applicable plaht condition On several occasions, the inspectors observed*
shift turnover activities and shift briefing meetings.
L Tours were conducted in the turbine and auxiliary buildings, and central alarm station to observe work activities and testing in progress and to observe plant equipment condition, cleanliness, fire safety, health physics and security measures, and adherence to procedural and regulatory requirement A portion of the inspection activities were conducted at times other than the normal work wee An ongoing review of all licensee corrective action program items at the Event Report level was performe In response to a recent drop in Primary Coolant Pump (PCP) motor oil level, the licensee reduced power and took the turbine off line at 1:20 a.m. on September 22, 198 After adding oil to the PCP (P-50D) upper oil reservoir, it was discovered that the suction pipe to* one of the two backstop oil pumps had cracke In order to make repairs the PCP had to be stopped and the reactor was shutdown at 3:45 a.m. which also further reduced radiation levels for the repair wor Replacement of the piping was completed and the reactor was taken criticai at 1:49 p.m. on,September 23, 198 The turbine was synchronized to the grid at 5:57 p.m., and after a chemistry hold at 35% power, escalation to the 94% (turbine governor valve) limit continue All remaining backstop oil piping is scheduled for replacement during the upcoming maintenance outage~ It is noted that the previous leak on this system (July 10, 1987) was on the other pump 1s discharge, and inspection of the other piping showed no problems at that tim On October 1, 1987 at 7:26 a.m., the plant was shut down from 86%
power after determination that a steam leak on an unsolvable moisture separator reheater excess steam vent line was worsenin The leak on the pipe had previously been temporarily repaired and a further attempt to ~epair the line was unsuccessfu As a result of the forced shutdown, the licensee commenced the planned 45 day outage a day earl *
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Maintenance The inspectors reviewed and/or observed the following selected work activities and verified whether appropriate procedures were in effect controlling removal from and return to service, hold points, verification testing, fire prevention/protection, radiological controls, and cleanliness where applicable: Diesel Generator 1-1 manual valve repair (EPS-24705621, EPS-24704716). Diesel Generator meter replacement (FC-627-1, EPS-24705286).
3 Fire System Jockey Pump repair (P-13) (FPS-247d5493). volt breaker preventive maintenance (SPS-24703474).
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Surveillance The inspectors reviewed surveillance activities to ascertain compliance with scheduling requirements and to verify compliance with requirements relating to procedures, removal from and return to service, personnel qualifications, and documentatio The following test activities were inspected: RI-99 M0-18 M0-27 Q0-8C DW0-1 SH0-1 Startup Channel Calibration:
A maintenance work request was written for repair of an out-of-tolerance power suppl In Service Test of Component Cooling Water Pump Functional check of PCS Overpressure Protection Syste Engineered Safeguard System Check. Valve Operability:
A maintenance work request was written to resolve the low flow condition exhibited through valves CK-3131ES and CK-3252E Daily Control Room Surveillanc Operators Shift Surveillanc No violations or deviations were identifie.
Physical Security The inspectors observed physical security activities at various locations through out the protected and vital areas including the Central and Secondary Alarm Station Periodic observations of access control activities in~luding proper personnel identification, badging and searches of personnel, packages and vehicles were conducte The inspectors verified appropriate security force staffing and operability of search equipmen Protected and vital area boundaries were toured to verify maintenance of integrit Illumination was verified to be adequate to support patrol and Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) monitor observation CCTV monitor clarity and resolution were also observed.
. The inspectors periodically verified that appropriate compensatory measures were taken for degraded or inoperable equipment and breached boundarie No ~iolations or deviations were identifie.
Radiological Protection The inspectors made observations and had discussions concerning radiological safety practices in the radiation controlled areas including:
verification of radiation levels and proper posting; accuracy and currentness of area status sheets; adequacy of and compliance with selected Radiation Work Permits and high radiation procedures; and the ALARA (As Low AS is Reasonably Achievable) progra Implementation of dosimetry requirements, proper personnel survey (frisking) and contamination control (step-off-pad) practices were observe Health Physics logs and dose.records were routinely reviewe No violations or deviations were identifie.
Licensee Event Reports Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the inspectors examined the following rep9rtable events to determine whether:
reportability requirements were met; immediate corrective action was accomplished as appropriate; and corrective action to prevent recurrence has been accomplishe (Closed) LER 255/84015 Revision 2:
The reactor trip report which encompassed failure of the fast transfer feature to maintain power to Bus lC was update Included was a new root cause and the corrective measures taken to prevent recurrenc (Closed) LER 255/87007:
The FSAR stated that hydrazine addition to containment spray water would occur at one minute after the initiating event, which is contrary to the as-built configuration of the system which include a one minute time delay to verify injection nee The licensee has recalculated the off-site dose consequences of the maximum*
hypothetical accident using the additional injection time and Palisades specific meteorology as opposed to Regulatory Guide 1.4 and D. C. Cook data which had been used befor The reanalyzes yielded an expected thyroid dose of approxi.mately 100 rem which is significantly less than the previous FSAR value of 280 re The discrepancy occurred during the development of the updated FSAR and will be corrected during the next FSAR updat (Closed) LER 255/87011:
The failure of an Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC)
system pump resulted in a manual reactor tri The event is described in Inspection Report 255/87005(DRP), Paragraph 2. The root cause of the pump impeller failure was determined to be inadequate metallurgical properties of the impeller materia The companion pump impeller and those in spares were dye penetrant examined and found not to exhibit the same cracking indication Discharge tubing was similarly examine A flush of the EHC system was performed to remove any debris that may have been introduced to the system by the failure or subsequent maintenanc The LER was noted as incomplete, in that Section 13 was not coded for the equipment failure **
(Closed) LER 255/87020:
An inadvertent release of a Waste Gas Decay Tank (WGDT) occurred o~ July 8, 1987, at about 3:00 Although the release was monitored and constituted only 2.9% of the allowable dose rate, a violation of the Technical Specification 3.24.6.1 occurred, which requires that a WGDT be held for 15 days prior to releas Several violations of plant procedures and policies occurred, which contributed to the event (also described in Inspection Report 255/87018(DRP),
Paragraph 3.b.).
The personnel error in removing the wrong relief valve was facilitated by confusing labeling and a maintenance order problem description which included all three relief valves when only one was released for work:
The Radiation Work Permit (RWP) procedure was not followed, in that the workers did not notify Radiation Protection prior to breaching the contaminated syste Also contrary to plant administrative controls, the Shift Supervisor was not notified of the inadvertent release until 7:30 Since no alarms were received in the control room, the inspector verified that the release was below the alarm setpoint for the stack gas monitor, and that no other monitors should have detected the releas *
Corrective actions taken include review of work authorization documents to ensure only one component is identified for work when several may be addressed under a single activit All maintenance personnel have had the reporting requirements reemphasized and Mechanical Maintenance personnel have also been retrained in RWP requirement Relableling of the tanks and relief valves was also accomplishe Since the event was identified by the licensee, would be a Severity Level IV or V, was reported, corrective action was taken to prevent recurrence, and was not expected to be prevented by previous corrective action; this event will not result in a violation being issued as allowed by 10 CFR 2, Appendix (Closed) LER 255/87023 Revision 1:
Untimely corrective action results in inadvertent diesel generators startin As previously described in Inspection Report 255/87018(DRP), Paragraph 3.e, the event is similar to that discussed in LER 255/87019 which outlines corrective action to deal with the hardware issues involve The immediate corrective actions to prevent recurrence (procedural changes and notification) were not completed in a short time span, although they could easily have bee In light of this event and other situations, the plant Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) Chairman agreed to improve the CARB controls to ensure timely completion of reasonable, short-term corrective actions and actions to prevent recurrence, while allowing longer time frames for the detailed evaluation or engineered solution This action took the form of a memorandum to CARB members, issued on October 7, 1987, which addressed the above concer *
(Closed) LER 255/87025:
On August 17, 1987, the reactor was manually tripped after operators were alerted to an Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) system lea At the time of the event, the plant had been operating at 68% of rated power and shortly before 4:04 a.m., the turbine generator governor valves began to close due to a rapid EHC system pressure los A manual trip was initiated in response to an increase in Primary Coolant system pressur The standby EHC pump started as per system design when EHC fluid pressure droppe Had the EHC supply failure not been identified, an automatic trip due to high pressurizer pressure and a subsequent automatic turbine trip would have resulte Since this is an analyzed event, no safety hazard would have resulte Investigation by the licensee determined that a flexible fluid supply hose to. the #4 governor valve (CV-0576) had ruptured which has been attributed to both vibration and the improper installation and application of the flexible hos Flexible hose had been recently installed on all governor EHC lines as a corrective measure to eliminate cracking from vibration that had been previously experienced with hard pipin Details are documented in Inspection.Report 87015(DRP). The flexible hosing was removed from all four turbine generator governor valves and dye penetrant examinations were performed on the flared ends of the rigiq stainless steel tubing removed prior to flexible hose installatio No positive indications of cracking were reveale Rigid tubing was then reinstalled and the flexible hose restraints removed.*
The licensee has performed vibration monitoring of the EHC tubing during various stages of turbine starting and power escalatio No high frequency vibration was observed on the governor valves until the #4 valve began to ope Isolation of the #4 valve caused the vibration to ceas The source of the vibration is currently unknown and the #4 governor valve has remained isolated, except for inservice data collection and troubleshooting and has limited power to.94%.
The licensee 1s work scope list for the 1987 maintenance outage scheduled to commence October 2, 1987, includes a project to upgrade the turbine EHC fluid syste The flared fittings are scheduled to be replaced with welded fittings and the associated tubing will be replac~d as requested on all main and governor valve In addition, Westinghouse has been contracted to assist with diagnostic evaluation as to the cause of the vibratio (Closed) LER 255/87027: *Main generator voltage regulator failure resulted in a reactor trip on August 23, 198 Details of the event are documented in Inspection Report 255/87022(DRP), Paragraph The root cause was identified as a discontinuous bias supply potentiometer in the Trinitrate power amplifie No other failed components were identified and the licensee considered the potentiometer failure to be a random failur Corrective actions taken and plans to further evaluate the voltage regulator components are considered adequat The licensee analysis of the event, which considered the less than optimum performance of a feedwater regulation valve, was appropriate an well don No additional violations or deviations were identifie.
Generic Letter Followup (Closed) Generic Letter 87-12:
Loss of Residual Heat Removal (SOC) while the Reactor Coolant System (PCS) is partially filled. *This review also completes the review of Information Notice 87-02 The licensee 1s response, solicited pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) was submitted on September 18, 198 The inspector verified that the commitments made in their letter were either complete or scheduled to be completed with compensatory measures in place for the October-November, 1987 maintenance outag A reactor water level alarm is to be installed, but due to the existing transmitter accuracy this modification is scheduled for the refueling outage in late 198 Although admittedly not anticipating a loss of SOC, the licensee plans to install a temporary low suction alarm for the pump This alarm was made operable on October 5, 198 In addition, operators have been directed by Standing Order #60 to check the control room level instrument once an hour and the level gauge in containment once per shift while on shutdown coolin SOC flow instruments will be checked hourl A commitment made to complete an analysis of core heatup rates and the time to core uncovery was completed, the results of which were 20 minutes until boiling and 1.6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> untii core uncover A commitment to remind maintenance personnel to keep the control room informed of their activities in the plant, was met by a paragraph in the September 25, 1987 Palisades Weekly Bulletin. It was noted that this did not exactly provide the verbal instruction alluded to in their response to Item 6, but was considered by the licensee to be equally effectiv The licensee committed to making available for this outage a temporary backup method for operation of CV-3006, CV-3025, and CV-305 The inspector verified that operators had been briefed on the alternate means for operating these valve A permanent modification is scheduled for the 1988 refueling outag Since containment isolation may not be readily achievable, operating procedure SOP-1 was revised to require operability of the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) ventilation exhaust system when the PCS is drained below 624 and a half feet and the equipment hatch is ope Provisi6ns have also been made to expedite the replacement of the equipment hatch on the containment so that it can be isolated in less than an hour in the event of boiling in the cor SOP-17 has also been revised to instruct operators to shift the SFP exhaust through the charcoal filters if SOC is los Lastly, it is noted that the licensee described no plans for formalizing the equipment operability requirements by submitting a request for change to the Technical Specifications (TS).
Palisades is likely the only plant in the United States which does not have TS requirements governing the operability of SO No violations or deviations were identifie.
Information Notices (Closed) IN 87-023:
Loss of Decay Heat Removal During Low Reactor Coolant level Operatio The inspector verified receipt, appropriate review, proper distribution, and scheduling of corrective action Nb violations or deviations were identifie.
Management Interview A management interview was conducted on October 5, 1987, following the conclusion of the inspectio The scope and finding~ of the inspection were discusse The inspector also discussed the likely information content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietar