IR 05000255/1987006
| ML18052A992 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 04/24/1987 |
| From: | Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18052A990 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-87-06, 50-255-87-6, NUDOCS 8705060349 | |
| Download: ML18052A992 (9) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I I I Report No. 50-255/87006(DRP)
Docket No. 50-255 Licensee:
Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At:
Palisades Site, Covert, Michigan Inspection Conducted: March 3 through April 6, 1987 Inspectors:
E. R. Swanson Approved By:
C. 0. Anderson
~u~~
B. L. Burgess, Chief Reactor Projects Section 2A Inspection Summary License No. DPR-20 Date fnspection on March 3 through April 6, 1987 (Report No. 50-255/87006(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of followup of previous inspection findings; operational safety; maintenance; surveillance and reportable event The report also documents the March 20,.
1987 Commission meetin Results:
Of the areas inspected one violation was identified. A previously unresolved item is being cited as a failure to take corrective action to prevent recurrence of operators not being aware of Technical Specification requirements when certain combinations of components are removed from servic One unresolved item was identified concerning the classification of the Containment Hydrogen Monitor isolation valves under ASME Section X ~5 PDR ADOCK 050009¥1 G
DETAILS Persons Contacted Consumers Power Company (CPCo)
+W. T. McCormick, Jr., Chairman and CEO
+F. W. Buckman, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
+K. W. Berry, Director, Nuclear Licensing
- +J. F. Firlit, General Manager, Palisades
- R. D. Orosz, Engineering and Maintenance Manager
- R. M. Rice, Plant Operations Manager
- C. S. Kozup, Technical Engineer
- R. P. Margol, Quality Assurance Administration
- T. J. Palmisano, System Engineering Superintendent
- K. A. Toner, Projects Supervisor
- B. V. Van ~agner, Inservice Inspection Supervisor
- R. J. Frigo, Operations Staff Support Supervisor
- G. W. Balcom, Property Protection Supervisor NRC Personnel
+L. W. Zech, Chairman
+K. J. Carr, Commissioner
+T. M. Roberts, Commissioner
+F. M. Bernthal, Commissioner
+J. K. Asselstine, Commissioner
+V. Stello Jr., Executive'Director for Operations
+J. M. Taylor, Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement
+A. B. Davis, Regional Administrator, RIII
+C. E. Norelius, Director, Division of Reactor Projects
+W. G. Guldemond, Chief, Projects Branch 2
- +E. R. Swanson, Senior Resident Inspector
+F. J. Miraglia, Director, PWR-B, NRR
+A. Thadani, Project Di.rector, NRR
+T. V. Wambach, Project Manager, Palisade~
- Denotes those present at the Management Interview on April l, 198 +Denotes those present at the Commission Meeting on March 20, 198 Other members of the Plant Operations, Maintenance, Technical, and Chemistry Health Physics staffs, and several members of the Contract Security Force, were also contacted briefl Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Open Item 255/85009-03:
The ASME Section XI test of the Iodine Removal Checkvalves 3402 ES and 3403.ES was done with too high a pressure.
A revision to test Q0-13 now tests these valves at the appropriate pressur *
(Closed) Open Item 255/85013-06:
"Palisades Nuclear Plant Main Steam Safety Relief Valves - Set Pressure Testing and Repair" Procedure, No. V-16Q, has been revised to prohibit adjustments prior to obtaining the 11 as found" lift pressur (Closed) Unresolved Item 255/85027-03:
With a Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) pump inoperable, the licensee removed a Safety Injection Tank (SIT) from service placing the plant in a condition requiring a plant shutdow As requested by Inspection Report No. 255/85027 transmittal letter dated December 23, 1985, the licensee responded.to the concerns related to this event on January 22, 1986 and April 11, 198 Their responses identified that equipment concerns had been corrected and that the event was reviewed with all Senior Operators emphasizing the need to thoroughly evaluate the effect of equipment operability on Technical Specification requirement The licensee action was not adequate to prevent recurrence as evidenced by the March 10, 1987, situation where both the 1-2 Diesel Generator and the P-52C Component Cooling pump were inoperable at the same time. This repeat event is considered a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI "Corrective Action" (255/87006-0l(DRP)).
(Closed) Open Item 255/85027-04:
The licensee has completed the corrective actions outlined in E-PAL-85-075 concerning an inoperable boric acid flowpath (Reference LER 255/85014).
A memorandum was sent to all Senior Reactor Operators which included the Event Repor A somewhat similar event is described in LER 255/86025 (Reference Inspection Report No. 255/86027(DRP), Paragraph 7). The corrective actions taken following both of these events are considered adequate to prevent recurrenc (Closed) Open Item 255/85027-05:
Pressurizer pressure transmitters were found to be incorrectly calibrated due to the use of incorrect weight values on the dead weight tester (DWT).
The licensee has changed procedures to require addition of a dial indicator to the DWT rig to provide assurance that a scale error would not go unnotice The safety significance of the incorrect setpoint was evaluated by the licensee and determined to be within the accuracy assumed for the pressurizer pressure measuremen (Open) Open Item 255/85030-02:
High Pressure Safety Injection check valves were being tested at differential pressures higher than that observed during the preoperational test. This appears to be contrary to ASME Section XI Article IWV 352 The licensee's evaluation of this item concluded that the test was "adequate for Section XI concerns".
The inspector requested that they review their justification for compliance with code requirement (Closed) Violation 255/85034-01:
Biennial reviews of procedures were overdue and corrective actions were not effective in correcting the proble The licensee implemented a revised system for notifying in advance, the procedure's sponsor, his superintendent, the responsible manager, and then finally the plant manager if a procedure is overdu **
Currently, aside from several which have become overdue since September 1986, only basis documents are overdue for revie The licensee response to this violation dated April 11, 1986 committed to having all procedures reviewed by September 1, 198 There are currently nine procedures overdue since that date and 34 basis documents which have not been reviewed, some dating back seven year Although not required operating procedures, these documents are useful in establishing the bases for the surveillance testing procedure The inspector is concerned that the basis documents are not reviewed along with procedure revision (Open) Open Item 255/85034-02:
In LER 255/85028 the licensee failed to address why the right channel Safety Injection (SI) failed to activate during an SI actuatio The licensee was unable to reproduce the failur This item remains open pending receipt and review of the supplemental LE (Closed) Open Item 255/86014-01:
May 21, 1986, a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) was issued. The Palisades Plant commenced heatup on February 2, 1987, and left cold shutdown on the same dat The licensee conducted over three weeks of planned testing and evaluations to validate the System Functional Evaluation On March 20, 1987, the NRC Region III Administrator received the Commission 1s authorization to continue oversight of the licensee 1 s startu By letter dated March 26, 1987, the licensee attested to the review of the status of commitments made with respect to the outage and requested permission to return the unit to servic Based on the inspection activities documented in Inspection Reports No. 255/86035(DRP) and No. 255/87005(DRP), and review of various licensee submittals, it was determined that the licensee had satisfied the commitments documented in the May 21, 1986 CA Subsequently, a CAL was issued on March 27, 1987 authorizing a controlled startup and return to power under the surveillance of an augmented NRC inspection tea An additional corrnnitment to restrict plant operation to periods when the Service Water Temperatures is less than 53 degrees Fahrenheit was also documented in the latter CA The completion of the commitments contained in the March 27, 1987, CAL will be tracked as an Open Item (255/87006-02(DRP)).
(Closed) Open Item 255/86023-04:
The licensee has completed their modification to install solar shields and cable trays to improve the ampacity of the feeder cables to the 10 and lE buse Corrective actions also included a short term rating calculation_which determined that the cables were not degraded unacceptabl Stronger administrative controls were incorporated into the modifications procedures in the form of the Design Input Checklist. These controls should prevent similar occurrence (Closed) Open Item 255/86031-02:
Request dated March 10, 1987, the from LER 255/86037 to clarify and Effluent TS.
By Technical Specification Change licensee fulfilled their commitment correct portions of the Radiological One violation and no deviations were identifie **
- Operational Safety The inspectors observed control room activities, discussed these activities with plant operators, and reviewed various logs and other operations records throughout the inspection. Control room indicators and alarms, log sheets, turnover sheets, and equipment status boards were routinely checked against operating requirement Pump and valve controls were verified to be proper for applicable plant condition On several occasions, the inspector observed shift turnover activities and shift briefing meeting Tours were conducted in the turbine and auxiliary buildings, and central alarm station to observe work activities and testing in progress and to observe plant equipment condition, cleanliness, fire safety, health physics and security measures, and adherence to procedural a*nd regulatory requirement The inspectors made observations concerning radiological safety practices in the radiation controlled areas including:
verification of proper posting; accuracy and currentness of area status sheets; verification of selected Radiation Work Permit (RWP) compliance; and implementation of proper personnel survey (frisking) and contamination control (step-off-pad) practices. Health Physics logs and dose records were routinely reviewe The inspectors observed physical security activities at various access control points, including proper personnel identification and search, and toured security barriers to verify maintenance of integrity. Periodic observation of access control activities for vehicles and packages and activities in the Central and Secondary Alarm Station were also conducte An ongoing review of all licensee corrective action program items at the Event Report level was performe While in hot shutdown on March 10, 1987, operators were not aware that they were in an action requirement for Technical Specification No. 3.7.2.i. Both the 1-2 Diesel Generator (DG) and the Component Cooling Water Pump P-52C were inoperable for maintenanc This condition was identified by the Operations Superintendent while approximately 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> remained before the plant would have to be in cold shutdow An operability test was performed on the DG and it was declared operable within three hours of the discover The violation cited in Paragraph 2 above will be used to track licensee evaluation/development of an operator aid to prevent further similar situation c.. On March 11, 1987 at 3:00 a.m. a reactor trip with the control rods fully inserted occurred during Reactor Protection System Logic testing (M0-3).
The trip could not be duplicated. Additional review of this event will be done after the licensee submits their Event Repor The inspector attended a Plant Review Committee meeting on March 13, 198 Two of the items discussed during the meeting involved Safety Evaluations of procedure changes relating to the Service Water composite sampler and M0-37 (Fuel Pool Ventilation).
Action on these were deferred due to the evaluations not describing what changes were made and providing only sketchy justifications for making the change These evaluations highlight the need for additional training in performing 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations identified in Inspection Report No. 255/86035 as a violatio At 11:49 a.m. on March 25, 1987 Auxiliary Feedwater actuated on low steam generator level during atmospheric steam dump valve testin Steam generator levels were being maintained low for chemistry cleanup and the 8% level shrink caused by closing the dump valve initiated the low steam generator level pre-trip and the Auxiliary*
Feedwater Actuation Signal (AFAS).
AFAS performed as designe No adverse consequences resulted from the actuatio Following authorization to restart on March 27, 1987, the licensee made a critical approach which was terminated due to failed Nuclear Instrument NI-0 After plant cooldown and investigation it was found that the connector at the detector had a slight oxide corrosion fil Although maintenance was performed on this detector in January 1986, the corrosion appears to be the most likely cause for the channel failur The slight film may have been a result of moisture and lack of us The licensee utilized Raychem heat shrink to protect the remade connector from further moisture problem It was also identified that the detector was mounted at a different height than the other wide range detector, but this variance was an unlikely cause for the detector malfunctionin Varying the height of the detector may affect the magnitude of the detector response, but during operation in 1986, no significant deviation from the other detection readings were note A rebuilt detector was installed at the designed height and source checked to verify proper respons After completion of required surveillance testing and plant heatup the reactor was taken critical on April 2, 198 Power escalation and testing were in progres Additional inspection of these activities can be found in Inspection Report No. 255/87005 (DRP)).
During tours and informal interviews with operations personnel, it was determined that Licensed Auxiliary Operators (LAO) receive only licensed operator training during training shifts. Although these are the more experienced AOs, information on changes to systems and other operating instructions, needed to perform their primary job assignment, are not provided in classroom trainin The licensee is reviewing this issu No violations or deviations were identifie.
Maintenance The inspector reviewed and/or observed the following selected work activities and verified whether appropriate procedures were in effect controlling removal from and return to service, hold points, verification testing, fire prevention/protection, radiological controls, and cleanliness where applicable: CCS 24701388 - Repair of level switch on CCW surge tan DMW 24701559 - Primary Water Pump Seal replacement and alignmen MSS 24701466 - Steam Generator bottom blowdown flow instrument calibratio EPS 24700440 - Repair of oil leaks on Diesel Generator 1-CCS 24701321 - Checking alignment of outboard bearing on component cooling pump P-52C and gasket replacemen Several encouraging signs were observed during this inspection perip Rework of items maintained during the outage has dropped to approximately 2%.
Previously this rate was as high as 30%.
As noted above on the CCW pump, the Maintenance Department is initiating work orders to improve the performance of the equipment before it becomes an operating proble The attitude of ownership and pride being demonstrated is a promising indicator of improvemen No violations or deviations were identifie.
Surveillance The inspectors reviewed surveillance activities to ascertain compliance with scheduling requirements and to verify compliance with requirements relating to procedures, removal from and return to service, personnel qualifications, and documentatio The following test activities were inspected: SFE-61 Acceleration of charging pump SOP-7 Hot testing of Atmospheric Dump Valve SFE-69 Bus 11 and 12 cross tie interloGk SFE-87 Bus D-lla and D-2la shunt trip featur M0-22 HPSI pump test (run to establish new baseline-data for new test configuration). M0-2 Charging Pump Inservice Test Procedur T-241 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (P-88) special tes M0-16 Service Water Pumps Inservice Test Procedur DW0-1 Daily Control Room Surveillanc During review of surveillances addressing The Containment Hydrogen Monitor isolation valves it was found that the valves are opened daily during surveillance DW0-1, Step 5.1.5. The redund~nt supply and return valves for the redundant channels (SV-2412 A&B, SV-2413 A&B, SV-2414 A&B, SV-2415 A&B) are tested only for seat leakage as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix J. The licensee's program for valve testing under ASME Section XI requirements erroneously classifies these valves as passive valves. Since they are routinely opened during plant operation it is possible that the valves could be required to close on a containment isolation signal. This means that the valves should be considered active and therefore require periodic exercising and stroke timing in accordance with ASME Section XI, Article IWV-340 Stroke timing required by Article IWV-3413 was not performed and documented in accordance with the applicable requirement Further review of licensee actions is planne This item is Unresolved (255/87006-03(DRP)).
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Licensee Event Reports Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the inspectors examined the following reportable events to determine whether:
reportability requirements were met; immediate corrective action was accomplished as appropriate; and,
corrective action to prevent recurrence has been accomplished per the Technical Specification (Closed) LER 255/83049:
During the FSAR update process in 1983, the licensee discovered that the current resulting from a short-circuit in the 125V DC System would result in the temperature of some conductors exceeding the FSAR specified valves. Corrective actions included installing fuses, replacing fuses, replacing cables and conducting a technical seminar for engineers which encompassed this even (Closed) LER 255/84016:
In August 1984, Palisades experienced two primary coolant leaks, both in close proximity to a socket weld on a 3/4 inch primary coolant system loop differential pressure sensing line. The first occurrence was thought to be caused by a bad wel Following the second occurrence, the root cause was identified to be fatigue cracking caused by system vibratio Two valves in the line had previously been replaced with. heavier model An independent assessment of the events was conducted by the Nuclear Activities Plant Organization (NAPO) (an independent on site *organization). The NAPO recommendations were incorporated into the corrective action document Corrective actions included replacement of the failed elbow, addition of a piping support, strengthening of administrative controls for specification changes and an inspection program for the subject are,
(Closed) LER 255/84019, Revision 1:
Investigation into the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine overspeed trip determined that the mechanical governor on the turbine driver had become damaged due to lack of continuous lubrication. Preventative maintenance procedures have been approved for periodic maintenance on the governor, linkage and bearing No violations or deviations were identifie.
NRC Commission Meeting A meeting between the NRC Commissioners, NRC Staff and Consumers Power Company was held on March 20, 1987 to discuss the Palisades plant status and obtain a Commission vote on the restart of the plant. After nearly two hours of presentations by the licensee and Staff including discussion on a variety of issues, the Commission voted 5-0 in favor of Regional Administrator authorization of plant startu As noted previously in this report~ the licensee was authorized to start up on March 27, 198.
Open I terns Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspectors, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or bot An open item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or deviation An Unresolved Item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph.
Management Interview A management interview was conducted on April 3, 1987 near the end of the inspectio The scope and findings of the inspection were discusse The inspectors also discussed the likely information content of the.
inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietar