IR 05000255/1987020
| ML18052B247 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 08/19/1987 |
| From: | Patterson J, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18052B246 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-87-20, NUDOCS 8708240250 | |
| Download: ML18052B247 (4) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Rep~rt No. 50-255/8jo20(DRSS)
I Docket No. 50-255
. Licensee:
Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At:
Palisades Site, Covert, Michigan Inspection Conducted:
August 6-7, 1987 Inspector:
J. ~ahlr~
Approved.By: w.~.,~
Emergency Preparedness Section
'Inspection Summary License No. DPR-20 Date Date Inspection on August 6-7, 1987 (Report No. 50-87020(DRSS)}
.
Areas Inspected:
Announced inspection of observations and evaluations -Of the following areas of the Emergency Preparedness Program; a repeat medical*
drill (1987 Exercise Weakness) involving activities at the site plus the hospital, shift augmented drills, and a review of activations of the site emergency plan since the prior inspectio The inspection was conducted by one NRC inspecto Results:
No violations, deficiencies or deviations were identified as a result of this inspection.
870824
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PDR Agggg S70Bl9 G-n 05000255 f>DR-
DETAILS Persons Contacted *J. Lewis, Technical Directo~
~R.. Rice, Operations Manager
- C. Axtell, Health Physics Superintendent
- R. French, Operations Superintendent
- *C. Kozup, Licensing Representative
- T. Neal, Staff Health Physicist *
- J. Brunet, Senior Emergency Planner, Palisades K. Penrod, Emergency Planner, Corporate W. Mosher, Medical Administrator, Corporate
- Denotes those attending the exit interview on August 7, 198 Licensee Action on Previously Identified items (Closed) Open Item No. 50-255/87010-01):
Some incongruity exited in the Si-te Emergency Plan (SEP) between Sections 5.. 7.4, 5. 75 and 5. 76 and Sect ion 8.1. 2.. This re 1 ated to annua 1 Emergency Ope rat ions Center (EOC) communication tests. These communication tests with the various EOCs are tested annually by calling the County Sheriff 1s Department The Sheriff 1s alone have the authority to activate these phones for testing or in a real emergency.. Section 5 and Section 8 of the SEP were modified to better address these communication tests, and were effective as of August 3~ 1987 as part of Revision 6 to the SE In addition an emergency implementing Procedure No. EI-15.2, Attachment 1 and 2, was revised to specify how these EOC communication checks* will be mad This item is close (Closed) Open Item No. 50-255/87012-02:
This involved the evaluation of another medical drill with a contaminated injured employee which included emergency treatment of the victim at the Mercy Memorial Medical Center in St. Joseph, Michiga This drill was scheduled as a result of an unsatisfactory medical drill performed as part of the annual emergency exercise conducted on May 19, 198 The initial medical drill was designated as* an Exercise Weaknes Initial response and communications with the Shift Supervisor (SS) in the Control Room were timel The ambulance was requested w'ithout undue dela The victim was monitored and given temporary.aid by the Rad Techs (RTs) before the ambulance crew arrive The two ambulance attendants
- followed radiation control procedures as directed by one of the RT The victim was strapped to a hard-board, and from that to a mobile cart and then out to the ambulance through the Auxiliary Buildin This was the most advantageous way to exit the area, and was suggested by the RTs
- and Security personne The time from when the ambulance attendants arrived at the victim 1s location until the ambulance left the site was 48 minute This time would have been decreased by approximately 20-25 minutes if real radiation contamination was not enco~ntered in the hallways leading away from the victi The surveying and use of protective shoe
- covers, delayed the exit of the victim on the car *
For this drill, the ambulance attendants with the victim in the ambulance, did not leave the site until the NRC inspector and other evaluators had exited the protected are This permitted the evaluators to be present for the initial handling and care of the injured contaminated victim at the hospital. bne RT did radiation monitoring of the victim and equipment used in the emergency receiving roo The other RT cont~olled access and set up a step-off ~ad for those who had to enter the roo Herculite carpeting was previously laid down in the hallways leading to the emergency room from the rear of the ambulanc Medical personnel-at the hospital performed in a professional manner throughout the dril Protective clothing and dosimetry were worn by all involve The repeat medical drill was well coordinated, demonstrated good training by the RTs, and was conducted in an efficient, professional manne This item is close One improvement item from the same inspection of April 20~24, 1987 (Report No. 50-255/8710) has been addressed satisfactorily by the license Summary page cover sheets to the SEP and the EIPs have all been revised to specify that periodic reviews of both documents will be made, rather than biennial reviews as previously liste This was confirmed by the inspector's revie.
Emergency Plan Activations The inspector review two Licensee Event Reports, one occurring on June 20, 1987 and the other on July 14, 198 The latter event was the result of a loss of offsite power due to a fault in a startup transforme This event was properly classified as a Notification of an Unusual Event (NUE)
and notifications were made to offsite governmental agencies and to the NRC within the required time The event on June 20, 1987 occurred when the Primary Coolant System
- (CPCS) temperature dropped below 525°F for approximately 30 seconds following a rapid power decrease necessitated by a leak on the turbine electro hydraulic control syste Altho_ugh this incident was classifiable as an NUE under the EAL, "Critical Operation atPCS temperature <525°F (except for physics tests),
11 Page 25 of 33 of Attachment 1 to EI-1, Revision 12, the licerisee fail~d to recognize it as classifiable for several day ~u~ther review of the licensee'~ documentation confirmed that the failure to classify was recognized on June 22, 1987, and the NRC was notified per 10 CFR 50.72 at 155 The State of Michigan was informed of the incident also on June 22, 1987 at 153 Considerations which may have contributed to the missed cla~sification related to a memo sent to all licensed operators on March 20, 1987 by the Operations Superintenden This memo discussed the declaration of an NUE for a shutdown required by Technical Specifications (TS) as indicated in the EALs under the Miscellaneous Category, Page 15 of 33 of Procedure No. EI-An example was having the reactor Gritical and the PCS temperatyre dropping below 525°F for a minut Under this condition TS 3.0.3 applie TS 3.,
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indicates that if the condition cannot be corrected in one hour, plant shutdown must be initiate From this interpretation, the memo concluded that an NUE would not have to be declared; The Senior Emergency Pl an.ni ng Coordinator 1 s report stated that when this memo was written the Operations Superintendent was not aware that EI-1 included an EAL under the category "Primary Coolant System-Temperature or Pressure" which states that "critical operation at PCS temperature
<525°F (except for physics tests) is an Unusual Event.
Shortly after the memo was.distributed to the licensed operators, this EAL was brought to the attention of the Operations Superintendent who requested that the Plant EP Coordinator revise EI-1 to clarify the inconsistency between the two EAL 1 Although this revision was not complete at the time of the incident, the operators on shift were aware that the revision was in progres This revision was reviewed and approved by the Plant Review Committee on June 23, 1987 and was effective in the implemen.ting procedures on June 24, 198 The EAL now states "critical operation at PCS temperature
<525°F (except for physics tests) AND initiation of plant shutdown due to Technical Speti fi cat i ons 11 *
. If this would have been in pl ace on Juhe 20, 1987 this incident would not have been a classifiable NU After review of this event, the inspector concluded that this event of June 20, 1987 should have been* declared an NUE based on PCS - Temperature or Pressure, Critical operation at PCS temperature <525°F (except for physics tests), Page 25 of 33, Procedure EI-1, Revision 12, or Page 25 of 33, Section 4, Revision 7 of the SE This is a violation for failure
. to classify an event and make subsequent notifications in a timely manne However, since the licensee identified the event, reported it, took corrective actions which included measures to prevent recurrence within a reasonable time, it was not the result of inadequate corrective actions from the previous violation, and would have been a Severity Level IV, per 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, then no violation will be assesse.
Exit Interview The inspector held an exit interview on August 7, 1987 with those licensee represehtatives denoted in Section 1 of this repor The in~pector determined from the licensee that none of the information discussed was proprietary in natur The inspector stated that the medica 1 dri 11 observed was successful and included the corrective actions needed to address the weaknesses identified in the original medical drill conducted on May i9, 198 The main item of concerned was an.event which occurred on June 20, 1987 and should have be~n declared as a Notification of Unusual Even The inspector concluded that further evaluation of this event and counsel with.NRC management was needed to determine if a violation should be imposed on the licensee~
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