IR 05000255/1987018
| ML18052B282 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 08/31/1987 |
| From: | Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18052B281 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-2.D.1, TASK-TM 50-255-87-18, NUDOCS 8709110262 | |
| Download: ML18052B282 (13) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-255/87018(DRP)
Docket No. 50-255 Licensee:
Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At:
Palisades Site, Covert, Michigan Inspection Conducted: July 7 through August 3, 1987 Inspectors:
E. R. Swanson C. D. Anderson T. V. Wambach Approved By: ~ef Reactor Projects Section 2A Inspection Summary License No. DPR-20 Inspection on July 7 through August 3~1987 (Reeort No. 50-255/87018(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors and project manager of followup of previous inspection findings; operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; physical security; radiological protection; reportable events; and 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation Also a management meeting was held to discuss the loss of offsite power event of July 15, 198 Results: Of the areas inspected no violations were identified.
8709110262 870901 PDR ADOCK 05000255 G
- DETAILS Persons Contacted Consumers Power Company (CPCo)
- F. W. Buckman, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- D. P. Hoffman, General Manager
+K. W. Berry, Director, Nuclear Licensing
+J. G. Lewis, Technical Director
- +R. D. Orosz, Engineering and Maintenance Manager
- +R. M. Rice, Operations Manager
- D; W. Joos, Administrative and Planning Manager
- W. L. Beckman, Radiological Services Manager
+D. J. Malone, Licensing Analyst
- +R. E. McCaleb, Quality Assurance Director R. M. Brzezinski, Instrument and Control Superintendent
- R. A. Fenech, Operations Superintendent S. C. Cote, Property Protection Supervisor
+J. S. Erickson; General Engineer, Plant Safety Engineering
+R. J. Alexander, Technical Engineer, Big Rock Point
+W. L. Roberts, Projects Engineer
- C. S. Kozup, Licensing Engineer*
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III
- A. B. Davis, Regional Administrator, Region III
- C. J. Paperiello, Acting Deputy Regional Administrator
- C. E. Norelius, Director, Division of Reactor Projects
- G. Holahan, Assistant Director for Regions Ill and V Reactors, NRR
- M~ J. Virgilio, Director, Directorate III-1, NRR
- +T. V. Wambach, Project Manager, NRR
- M. J. Farber, Technical Assistant, Reactor Projects Branch 2
- R. W. DeFayette, Chief, *Reactor Projects Section 2B
- R. N. Gardner, Chief, Plant Systems Section
- +E. R. Swanson, Senior Resident Inspector, Palisades
- C. D. Anderson, Resident Inspector, Palisades
- J. L. Knox, Electrical Reviewer, NRR
- Z. Falevits, Reactor Inspector
- R. C. Kazmar, Project Inspector
+Denotes those present at the Management Interview on July 9, 198 #Denotes those present in Region III or on teleconference for the Management Meeting on July 21, 198 *Denotes those present at the Management Interview on August 3, 198 Other members of the Plant staff, and several members of the Contract Security Force, were also contacted briefl *
- Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Open Item 255/86035-160(DRP): Operators Shift Surveillance procedure, SH0-1, now requires that battery room or battery cell temperatures be recorded on a shiftly basi Also included are the actions to be taken if room or battery temperature is less than the specified minimu (Open) Violation 255/86030-04(DRP): Component Cooling Water System (CCW)
design erro The licensee appraised the inspector of the progress of *
their evaluation of the design fixes that they are considering to resolve the inadequate capacity of the CCW syste A first proposal to install a third vertical heat exchanger in the room could be completed by November 198 Other options, which may be less complicated and involve a shorter implementation time, are being evaluate These additional engineering evaluations and proposals are expected to be comp.lete by the end of 198 The desired completion date for a modification would be at the end of the 1988 refueling outag (Open) TMI Action Plan Item II.D.l:
Performance testing of relief and safety valve In their June 12, 1987 letter replying to an NRC request dated August 6, 1985, Consumers Power Company committed to installing new block valves in the Palisades Pressurizer PORV inlet lines before the end of the 1988 refueling outag Completion of their installation will be tracked as an Open Item 255/87018-0l(DRP)..
No violations or deviation~ were identifie Operational Safety The inspectors observed contra) room activities, discussed these activities with plant operators, and reviewed various logs and other operations records throughout the inspectio Control room indicators and alarms, log* sheets, turnover sheets, and equipment status boards were routinely checked against operating requirement Pump and valve controls were verified to be proper for applicable plant condition On several occasions, the inspectors observed shift turnover activities and shift briefing meeting Tours were conducted in the turbine and auxiliary buildings, and*
central alarm station to observe work activities and testing in progress and to observe plant equipment condition, cleanliness, fire safety, health physics and security measures, and adherence to procedural and regulatory requirement An ongoing review of all licensee corrective action program items at the Event Report level was performed.
3 * *
On July a, 1987, at 4:00 a.m., maintenance workers removed the relief valve from the in-service Waste Gas Decay Tank resulting in a partial release of the tank contents to the roo When the workers discovered that the tank was continuing to vent, the relief valve was reinstalle Local air sampling determined that the release was primarily Xe-133 which _is a noble gas and would not result in i worker uptak A
violation of the Technical Specifications occurred by not holding the gas for 15 days prior to releas A 10 CFR 50.73 report is expecte The release was monitored by the plant stack monitors and the remaining contents of the tank were sampled to determine the off-site consequence An Unusual Event was not declared under the emergency plan due to the low level of activity release Additional followup of this event will be conducted after receipt of the LE On July 10, 1987, at 1:00 a.m., operators identified the decreasing oil reservoir of the P-50D primary coolant pump (PCP).
At 1:12 a.m.,
a power reduction was begun from about 75% powe At 1:21 a.m.,
reactor power was at 14% and indications of continued oil loss and increasing temperature on the motor prompted the operators to manually trip the reactor and turbin Plant response to the trip was as expected with only two inconsequential secondary plant problems identifie Proper notifications were mad The plant remained in hot shutdown during repair The oil leak was determined to have been caused by a crack in the threaded discharge pipe of the AC Backstop Oil pump and is suspected to have resulted from pump vibration and flange misali9nmen Repairs during the forced outage.included replacement of the PCP Backstop oil piping which had cracked, adjustment to the closing spring pre-load on the 11A 11 main feedwater pump (MFP) trip and throttle valve, rebuilding of the MFP recirculation Valve CV-0711, and capping of the No. 4 governor valve control fluid lines to permit removal and repai This latter action resulted in a power limitation of 94% until the turbine was taken off-line to replace the governor valve, which occurred during the July 14-23, 1987, forced outag On July 12, 1987, at 8:18 p.m., operators made the reactor critica Due to an indication problem with the turbine control panel, the turbine was not started and synchronized until 5:33 a.m. on July 13, 198 At about 10:15 p.m. on July 12, 1987, while starting up a MFP, an overfeeding of the steam generator cooled average reactor coolant temperature below the minimum temperature for criticality for several second This occurred when the MFP was placed on the governor with the feed regulating valves open and in manual contro Operator response was quick to isolate feedwate There were no complications or safety significance to this transien No 10 CFR 50.72 report was required under the licensee's Emergency Pla A 10 CFR 50.73 report is expecte While in hot shutdown on July 12, 1987, at 3:46 a.m., an inadvertent start of the emergency diesel generators occurred as a result of latching the turbine during preparation for a surveillance tes The cause was a mercoid pressure switch bouncing and moment~rily making up the diesel start signal (which is supposed to occur on a turbine trip). Administrative controls had been put in place on July 10, 1987, which wo~ld have prevented the actuation, but the shift on duty had not been made aware of the chang A 10 CFR 50.72 report was made and a 10 CFR 50.73 report is expecte At about 1:22 p.m. on July 14, 1987, Palisades plant startup Transformer 1-2 faulted and caused the switchyard "R" (rear)
bus to isolate. This disabled the capability to supply the plant with offsite power in the event of a reactor trip. At the.time, house and vital loads were being supplied by the main transforme Los~ of the R" bus de-eriergized the plant cooling tower pumps and fans, making a plant trip on loss of condenser vacuum inevitable within a few minutes. Operators manually tripped the plant upon recognition of the bus los At 1:30 p.m., an Emergency Plan "Unusual Event" was declared fo the loss of offsite powe Requisite notifications were made and NRC established continuous open communications with the licensee until offsite power was restored and reactor coolant pumps were restarted for forced circulation cooldow Offsite power was established by back feeding through the main transformer (the method of supplying offsite power during refueling) at 8:48 p.m., at which time the Unusual Event and continuous communications were secure The D.C. Cook resident inspection staff was dispatched to the site to provide immediate event coverage. After initial review of this event by Region III, the Palisades Senior Resident Inspector, an electrical specialist and the cognizant Section Chief were dispatched from Region III to form an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT).
Continuous NRC onsite inspection coverage was established and was
. maintained until the plant was cooled below 325 degrees Fahrenhei The plant r~ached cold shutdown at 11:30 p.m. on July 15, 198 Details of the AIT inspection are documented in Inspection Report No. 255/87019(DRP).
.
- At 3:45 a.m. on July 23, 1987, two primary coolant pumps were started commencing plant heatu Prior to going critical, the licensee experienced noise on startup nuclear instrument NI-01 and an inoperable air start compressor for the 1-2 dies_el generator (DG).
Instrument and Control personnel troubleshot and were unable to determine the source of the NI-01 noise, therefore made no repairs. Maintenance personnel were able to get the 1-2 DG air start compressor running by reconnecting a loose wire
and using the gasoline engine to drive the compresso The normal mode of operation is to use the motor driver in automati The licensee started the DG, left it running unloaded and declared it operable while the failed compressor motor maintenance was complete The reactor was taken critical at 12:12 p.m. on July 25, 198 Following the completion of several checklists and maintenance activities, the control operator prepared to put the generator on-line when the generator field breaker would not clos Upon investigation, the electrical repairman found mechanically worn mechanism linkages and replaced the breake The unit was synchronized to the grid at 2:43 a.m. on July 26, 198 On July 25, 1987, the inspector noted a reactor log book entry dated July 24, 1987, that stated three manual valves, 507ES, 509ES and 3364ES were closed, but not verified after a flush was completed, during which they were manipulate The inspector inquired as to the verification of the valve The control operator (CO) then had an auxiliary operator verify the valve positio ES and 509ES were verified closed, but 3364ES was verified open which is the correct positio The CO had made a log book entry.error when he wrote that all were closed on July 24, 198 These valves are part of the iodine removal system which is not required until power operations (greater than 2% power).
Therefore, the system was not required operable at that tim The Operations Superintendent was alerted to the proble At 7:40 p.m. on July 27, 1987, a power reduction commenced from approximately 96% power to 53% power for repair of a partially blown diaphragm in the controller for the heater drain pumps common discharge header Valve CV-060 The power reduction was made to reduce the chances of having the feedwater pumps trip on low suction pressure during the valve manipulations of CV-0608 and its associated bypass valv Upon repair completion, power escalation began at 11:05 p.m. on the same date and full power was attained at midnight the following nigh No violations or deviations were identifie.
Maintenance The inspectors reviewed and/or observed the following selected work activities and verified whether appropriate procedures were in effect controlling removal from and return to service, hold points, verification testing, fire prevention/protection, radiological controls, and cleanliness where applicable:
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Preventive Maintenance on relief valves on T-68s and T-lOls (WGS 24703006). Repacking of the 118 11 Service Water pump (SWS 24704308).
No violations or deviations were identifie. * Survei 11 ance The inspectors reviewed surveillance activities to ascertain compliance with scheduling requirements and to verify compliance with requirements relating to procedures, removal from and return to service, personnel qualifications, and documentatio The following test activities were inspected: M0-7A-2 CL-36 SOP-7 DW0-1 SH0-1 Monthly Diesel Generator Surveillanc Turbine Trip Tes Atmospheric Dump Valves Tes Daily Control Room Surveillanc Operators Shift Surveillanc No violations or deviations were identifie.
Physical Security The inspectors observed physical security activities at various locations through out the protected and vital areas including the Central and Secondary Alarm Station Periodic observations of access control activities including proper personnel identification, badging and searches of personnel, packages and vehicles were conducte The inspectors verified appropriate security force staffing and operability of search equipmen Protected and vital area boundaries were toured to verify maintenance of integrit Illumination was verified to be adequate to support patrol and Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) monitor observation CCTV monitor clarity and resolution were also observe The inspectors periodically verif1ed that appropriate compensatory measures were taken for degraded or inoperable equipment and breached boundarie No violations or deviations were identifie Radiological Protection The inspectors made observations and had discussions concerning radiological safety practices in the radiation controlled areas including: verification of radiation levels and proper posting; accuracy and currentness of area status sheets; adequacy of and compliance with selected Radiation Work Permits and high radiation procedures; and the ALARA* (As Low As is Reasonably Achievable) progra Implementation of dosimetry requirements, proper personnel survey (frisking) and contamination control (step-off-pad)
practices were observed~. Health Physics logs and dose records were
l routinely reviewe One instance of an inaccurate survey status sheet was* observed by the inspecto The Radiation Protection staff corrected the sheet following notification by the inspecto No violations or deviations were identifie.
Licensee Event Reports Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the inspectors ex~mined the following reportable
- events to determine whether:
reportability requirements were met; immediate corrective action was accomplished as appropriate; and corrective action to prevent recurrence has been accomplished per the Technical Specification (Closed) LER 255/87015(DRP): The Shift Supervisor failed to have a fire watch established in the 1-C switchgear room as a compensatory measure when a maintenance activity required isolation of an associated portion of the fire protection syste As documented in Inspection Report No. 255/87008-03(DRP), the violation of fire protection requirements is being evaluated under Unresolved Item 255/87018-02(DRP).
(Closed) LER 255/87019(DRP): Both diesel generators (DG) automatically started during the latching of the main turbine for electro-hydraulic control system troubleshootin The mercury, within the mercoid autostop oil pressure switches, is susceptible to 11bouncing 11 at the point during -
autostop oil system pressurization when the interface valve seats., This happens at approximately 45 psi, which is also the setpoint for the mercoid pressure switche Actuation of the switches causes the DGs to start. Operators now hold the DG control switches to stop during turbine latchin Engineering is evaluating the actuation logic and the feasibility of utilizing a different style of pressure switch, possibly without mercury. *
No violations or deviations were identifie Safety Evaluations During a site visit from July 7 through July 9, 1987, the NRR Project Manager performed a review of safety evaluations for facility changes at Palisade The sample of evaluations chosen were selected from the Summary in the annual report submitted by Consumers Power Company by letter dated April 30, 198 The inspector reviewed the procedure and forms used by the licensee to perform evaluations required by 10 CFR 50.59(b)(l) to document the bases for the determination that changes to the facility or procedures as described in the SAR, and tests or experiments not described in the SAR do not involve an unreviewed safety questio Eleven of these concluded that no unreviewed safety question was involve One concluded that an unreviewed safety question was involved and one concluded Technical Specifications changes were require These were submitted to NRC for review and approval, which were granted in both case L *-
The procedure for reviewing these changes, Administrative Procedure 3.07
.dated July 23, 1986, and Attachments 1 through 4 were reviewe The results of a previous review of this procedure is detailed in Inspection Report No. 50-255/8603 The relevancy of a finding in the inspection report that the procedure fails to specify minimum qualification requirements for personnel performing safety evaluations was demonstrated by the wide range in quality of the evaluations sample In addition to technical competency, it is the opinion of this inspector that training in the writing of safety evaluations would aid in the communication of technical and safety issues to the evaluation reader, thereby aiding the Plant Review Committee (PRC) members and other readers to more quickly understand and form a judgemen *
The procedure only requires that the reviewer be a PRC member or designated alternate without reference to area of expertis If the appropriate areas of expertise are not covered, a deficient evaluation could go undetected until PRC review, delaying the modification proces Section 5.3.2 states that a change involving an unreviewed safety question may proceed with installation prior to NRC approval; provided it is not declared operabl This could be misleading in that the installation itself, may be the source of the unreviewed safety question (e.g. structural considerations, fire loadings, fire barriers, ventilation distribution and flow patterns, etc.).
The documentation of the safety evaluation according to the procedure is done qn a two page for However, the inspector found that the documentation is usually insufficient if the reader is to understand the issues and the bases for conclusion The safety evaluation is included in the facility change package given to the PRC and the complete package can be the quite voluminous with much of the material not relevant to the PRC revie The inspector found, in some cases, it was time-consuming to search through all the memoranda, forms, and letters to extract relevant informatio In some cases, because of time constraint of the inspection (three days), some information was not foun The inspector believes that the task of the PRC member reviewing the facility change for the purpose of determining its effect on plant safety would be made easier and more efficient if the safety evaluation was more complete by itsel It should include a description of the change, the purpose of the change, the safety functions involv~d before change, the effect of the change on thes.e functions including potential fai'lure modes introduced by the change and finally the responses to the four questions pertaining to 10 CFR 50.5 Some of the safety evaluations did this even though the
- form used at the time of the evaluation would only require the responses to the four questions pertaining to 10 CFR 50.59 and some evaluators chose to do tha A draft of a Safety Review Form was shown to the inspector that appears to take the approach of the expanded, 11stand-alone
type of safety evaluation discussed. abov This would also make it easier for historical purposes (e.g. configuration management control) for future licensee personnel to keep track of why facility changes were made and what effects were not considered at the tim The individual safety evaluations sampled were:
FC-623 Auxiliary Feedwater Nozzle Modification The analysis of this piping modification, removal of the auxiliary feedwater spargers and replacement with an open-ended elbow with nozzle liner, available at the time of the safety evaluation concluded that the design met the requirements of ASME,Section III for a least 18 months or approximately 500 cycle This apparent limitation was not addressed in the safety evaluatio More detailed analyses were performed prior to exceeding the 18 month limitation as part of the corrective action program and the results indicated the piping would meet the requirements for 20 year The licensee stated that the piping !SI has been included in the Periodic Activity Control System with a 15 year interva The PRC did not require this corrective action to be reported back to the Committe It was not apparent to the inspector that consideration of the effects of thermal differential stresses on the tube bundle and support plates was ~ddressed. The only analysis the inspector could find in the facility change package related to the stresses in the nozzle and nozzle line Previously the cold auxiliary feedwater was distributed by the sparger (aux. feedwater sparger to originally the main feedwater sparger) around the periphery of the steam generator~ With thi modification, all the cold water is delivered at one location on one side of the steam ~enerator. The temperature differential on the steam generator internals would be especially aggravated if the water level drops below the'top of the tube bundl Pending further information regarding the impact the auxiliary feedwater on the steam generator, this item will be tracked as an Open Item 255/87018-03(DRP).
FC-576 Install 2 11 Auto Isolation Valve On Penetration No. 33 This safety evaluation consists of five sentences and two checks in 11yes
boxes and six checks in 11 no 11 boxe The reader must do some research to
- find out what system passes through Penetration No. 33, what the previous design looked like and what the proposed design looked lik From reading other documents in the change package it was determined that there were three purposes to be fulfilled by this valve addition: 1) reduce the number of containment isolation valves for this penetration from seven to two making testing and maintenance of valves easier; 2) bring this penetration isolation valves into conformance with the FSAR (5.1.6.2 (a)
of the original FSAR and 5.1.6.8 of the Updated FSAR); and 3) reduce personnel exposure by providing a means of operating the isolation valves remotely rather than manually for SI Tank sampling (A process that requires two operators and a Radiation Safety Technician to enter a hi-rad area at least monthly, potentially much more frequently when the SI check valves leak back to SI tanks).
The safety evaluation presented to the PRC states:
11 Both the temporary modification of the installation of a manual valve and the final installation of a remotely operated
control valve will decrease the probability of occurrence and the consequences of an accident and is essentially upgrading the penetration in case of an acciden The remotely operated valve will be_ operated from the control room or closed by Containment Isolation Signal."
The "tempqrary" manual valve was installed fulfilling purpose (1) abov However, in a memo to file dated August 20, 1986, the remainder of the change was aborted without a safety evaluation or without returning to PRC, leaving unfulfilled purposes (2) and {3) abov When significant changes are made to a PRC approved modification (such as elimination)
that invalidates the safety evaluation, a revised evaluation should be prepared and reviewed and approved by PR Review and approval of a revised evaluation will be tracked as Open Item 255/87018-04(DRP).
FC-445-2 Install Motor Operators On MSIV Bypass Valves This evaluation did not address any potential adverse effects of this chang With control switches in the control room, the probability of operator error is increased and with electrical operation, the potential for spurious operation from hot shorts, such as from a fire, is introduce Pending revision of the evaluatton this will remained an Open Item 255/87018-05(DRP).
FC-676 Supports For Nozzle Of HC-23-3" Adjacent To SIRW Tank The Facility Change Form for this change states that leakage is occurring at the recirculation discharge line, however, it is not known if the leakage is from the pipe or the SIRW Tan Discussions with licensee staff indicate that observations have determined that the leakage is not from the pipe but at an unknown point above and is running down the tank and pipe~ The leak rate is about one drop per minute of water with high boron content, therefore, indicating the source as the SIRW Tan It has*
been.determined that the minimum wa11* thickness of the pipe is 0.076" in a one inch arc of the circumference approximately two inches in heigh The original wall thickness of this three inch pipe was approximately 0.275.
This facility change provides supports, both vertical and horizontal, at this degraded portion of the pipe "to ensure no structural forces are on the pipe.
The safety evaluation states that the only stresses left on the pipe will be due to pressure. This will allow the wall thickness of the pipe to be 0.033 11 and meet design analysi On this basis, the evaluator determined that no unreviewed safety question was involve *
The inspector finds no discussion of the effects of stresses that would
. be produced at this area of supports in the case of a seismic even In addition, it is not clear if this is the only part of the pipe suffering degradation or just the point of minimum wall thickness. It appears that a more detailed piping analysis is required than that used as a basis for
this modification, that its results probably would have indicated a loss in safety margin, and, therefore, it would have required NRC review and approva Pending review of a revised evaluation this will be considered an Open Item 255/87018-06(DRP).
FC-564 Addition of Alternate Safe Shutdown Panel C-150A This evaluation did not identify that all instruments for this panel connected to RPS or ESF circuits were from the same channel and therefore separation or isolation was no problem. The statement that Technical Specifications are not affected because these instruments and controls are not in the Technical Specifications ignores the consideration of whether they should b When a facility change involves the addition of equipment, this question should be addressed; Pending revision of the evaluation this will be considered an Open Item 255/87018-07(DRP).
The fo 11 owing eva 1 uat ions were reviewed and found to be acceptab 1 e:
FC-638 Adding CCW Pumps To Normal Shutdown Sequencer FC-639 Installation Of Isolation Switches For Alternate Shutdown Panel T-195 PCS Mass Flow Determination FC-570 Addition Of Service Water Pump Motors' Spray Deflectors-FC-510-5 Redesign Containment Purge FC-657 Isolation Of CCW From Containment FC-419 Nitrogen Overpressure Addition To Hydrazine Tank 1 Management Meeting A management meeting was held between Consumers Power Company, represented by Dr. F. W. Buckman and Mr. D. P. Hoffman, and the NRC represented by Mr. A. 8. Davis, Mr. G. Holahan, and staff as identified in Paragraph 1 on July 21, 198 The licensee presented the sequence of events of the July 15, 1987, loss of offsite power even The licensee stated that of the approximately seven hours it took to restore offsite power, two to three hours were discretionary. Since the diesel generators were supplying reliable AC power, the licensee took the time to review the event and equipment to ensure no additional damage prior to backfeeding through the main transforme The root cause of the 1-2 startup transformer failure was attributed to likely contaminants in the fire protection deluge system which allowed a path for flashover ar A description of damages and*corrective actions taken was presente The licensee is evaluating modification options such as bringing in another independent line or adding one or two transformers in the switchyard to provide alternate sources of power to the vital buse When a modification determination is made, the licensee will meet with the NRC to discuss the choic.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or deviation An Unresolved Item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 1 Open Items
.. ~,
Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, :Which wi 11 be reviewed further by the inspectors, and which involve some ai::t ion on the part of the NRC or licensee or bot Open item disclosed du~ing *
the inspection are discussed in Paragraph **
1 Management Interview
. Management interviews were conducted on July 9, 1987, and on August ~ 1987, at the end of the inspectio The scope and findings of the inspectff.Pn were discusse The inspector also discussed the likely information content of the inspecti~n report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietar