IR 05000255/1987032
| ML18052B478 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 01/15/1987 |
| From: | Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18052B477 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-87-32, NUDOCS 8802020233 | |
| Download: ML18052B478 (8) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR* REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-255/87032(DRP)
Docket No. 50-255 Licensee:
Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201
.Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At:
Palisades Site, Covert, MI Inspection Conducted:
December 2 through December 31, 1987 Inspectors:
E. R. Swanson Approved By:
N. R. Williamsen C. D. Anderson Inspection Summary 2A License No. DPR-20 Inspection on December 2 through December 31, 1987 (Report No.50-255/87032(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors and Region III staff of followup of previous inspection findings; operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; outage activities; physical security; radiological protection; Part 21 reports; and reportable event Results: Of the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
8802020233 880115 PDR ADOCK 05000255 G
- DETAILS Persons Contacted Consumers Power Company (CPCo)
+ F. W. Buckman, Senior Vice President, Energy Supply
+* D. P. Hoffman, Plant General Manager
+ W. E. Garrity, Manager of Engineering
+ K. W. Berry, Director, Nuclear Licensing J. G. Lewis, Technical Director W. L. Beckman, Radiological Services Manager
+* R. D. Orosz, Engineering and Maintenance Manager R. M. Rice, Operations Manager
- D. W. Joos, Administrative and Planning Manager
- C. S. Kozup, Licensing Engineer D. J. Malone, Licensing Analyst R. E. Mccaleb, Quality Assurance Director*
R. A. Fenech, Operations Superintendent
- B. N. Young, Safety Engineer T. J. Palmisano, Plant Engineering Supervisor K. E. Osborne, Plant Projects Superintendent
- K. M. Haas, Reactor Engineering Superintendent
+ M. R. Wade, Section Head, Elect/I&C/Configuration Control Nuclear Regulatory Commission
+ K. E. Rogers, Commissioner
+ C. E. Norelius, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, RIII
+ B. L. Burgess, Chief, Projects Section 2A
+ E. R. Swanson, Senior Resident Director
+ N. R. Williams, Resident Inspector
+ Denotes those present at the Quarterly Management Meeting on December 4, 198 *Denotes those present at the Management Interview on December 30, 198 Other members of the Plant staff, and several members of the Contract Security Force, were also contacted briefl.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings:
(Closed) Open Item 255/86035-??(DRP): Correct the P&IDs to show CV-734 and CV-735, Feedwater Regulator Bypass Valves, in their true configuration of "fail as is". This has been done and Drawing M-207, Sheet IA, correctly shows these two valves.
(Closed) Open Item 255/86035-78(DRP): Establish a preventive maintenance (PM) regimen for the positioner seals and 0-rings on the feedwater regulator valves, block valves CV-0742 and CV-074 The inspector reviewed the Preventive and Periodic Activity designated as FWS063 for regulator block valves CV-0742 and CV-0744 and determined that this PM satisfies the above commitmen The PM will be done every six month (Closed) Open Item 255/86035-155(DRP): In Maintenance Procequre SPS-E-4 for 4160/2400 volt switchgear, correct the discrepancies in item 4 of the General Adjustment Data Sheet regarding horizontal alignment and breaker open position value These two values had been specified as 11approximately 0.02 inches 11 and 113 11/16 inches minimum 11, respectivel The licensee has talked to the breaker vendor and revised Procedure SPS-E-4 (Revision 4A) so that the above two values are now no greater than 11.020 inches 11 and 114 +/- 1/8 inches 11, respectivel (Open) Open Item 255/86035-157(DRP): Improve the t~sting of the High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) pumps through a combination of better instrumentation and enhanced procedure The procedures have been improved and a modification was completed involving the permanent installation of precision-type discharge pressure gauges on pre-existing stanchions near the HPSI pump A permanent installation was needed to minimize vibration of the pressure gauge indicato However, the inspector witnessed a test of the HPSI pumps and the oscillations of the pressure gauge dial indicators were between 50 and 75 psi, when the indicator discharge pressure_ was nominally 1250 ps The licensee intends further work to eliminate the vibration problem and this item will remain open pending such resolutio (Open) Unresolved Item 255/87029-02(DRP): The out of calibration fuel oil tank level indication caused the available fuel for the diesel generators to be less than required by Technical Specification This event was reported by LER 255/87040, but the licensee's investigation of the events leading up to the event was not adequate to determine whether the level indication failure was spurious, or characteristic.of prior problem The inspector's review identified seven internal corrective action documents initiated in 1984 possibly ~elating to erroneous tank level indicatio The inspector also noted that no administrative controls exist that require dipsticking of the tank prior to filling; calibration*
of the instrument was, and is still, done on an annual basis, promoting a lack of operator confidence in his control board indications; and no explanation had been provided of the criteria used to eliminate the previous dipstick verification of the level instrumen This item remains open pending further action by the licensee and review by the inspecto No violations or deviations were identifie *
3.
Operational Safety Routine Inspections The inspectors observed control room activities, discussed these activities with plant operators, and reviewed various logs and other operations records throughout the inspectio Control room indicators and alarms, log sheets, turnover sheets, and equipment status boards were routinely checked against operating requirement Pump and valve controls were verified to be proper for applicable plant condition On several occasions, the inspectors observed shift turnover activities and shift briefing meeting Tours were conducted in the turbine, containment, and auxiliary buildings, and the central alarm station to observe work activities and testing in progress and to observe plant equipment condition,
cleanliness, fire safety, health physics and security measures, and adherence to procedural and regulatory requirement A portion of the inspection activities were conducted at times other than the normal work wee An ongoing review of all licensee corrective action program items at the Event Report level was performe Steam Generator Tube Leak Chemistry samples of steam generator (SG) activity taken at 8:20 p.m. on December 3, 1987, indicated an increase in the 118"- SG activity. At 11:25 p.m., a primary to secondary leak rate estimate of 0.02 gpm was obtaine The total unidentified primary coolant system leakrate was 0.19 gp At 12:40 a.m. on December 4, 1987, a plant shutdown was commenced as indications of primary to secondary leakage continued to trend upward, reaching a maximum estimate of 0.072 gpm at 2:30 Palisades Technical Specifications limit steam generator leakage to less than 0.34 gp The plant reached cold shutdown at 9:06 a.m. on December 6, 198 At the time the decision was made to take the unit off the line it was not the obvious correct action since small tube leaks are often undetectable after the steam generator is cooled dow This decision represents a conservative and safety oriented approach to plant operatio During helium leak testing, the leaking tube on the B hot leg was identified both by leaking water and by helium leak detectio The leaking tube was identified to have a circumferential crack indication at the 13th support. A 6% supplemental sample was conducted on the B cold le Preliminarily, Eddy Current Testing (ECT) identified an additional seventeen pluggable indication The scope of ECT was voluntarily expanded to concentrate on 30% of the B steam generator area of concer The licensee also conducted profilometry on 1800 tubes to evaluate the progression of the denting phenomen Although evaluation of the ECT is still in progress and additional testing may be done, the results indicate essentially no wastage or unexpected degradatio * Containment Integrity Violation On December 12, 1987 at 9:50 p.m., it was discovered by testing that at least one of the twd series containment sump isolation valves (CV-1103 and CV-1104) were leaking in excess of the Technical Specification (TS) limit. The licensee made the required four hour nonemergency event report since the condition may have existed when containment integrity was require The TS limit for type B leakage is 0.6 La (65,200 cc/min).
The measured penetration leakage was 75,414 cc/min. The leak test method used was pressure decay between the valve This penetration (#52) had been a historical problem until 1985 when the valves were replaced and an accelerated testing program was implemente The valves have tested acceptably every outage since then including the October 1987 outag Loss Of Shutdown Cooling While in cold shutdown for a Maintenance Outage on December 16, 1987, shutdown cooling was lost for approximately 18 minute At 11:14 a.m. the controller for CV-3025 (shutdown cooling heat exchangers outlet control valve) went to zero and could not be controlled from the control room, thus causing the operator to secure the running Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) pump (shutdown cooling pump) to prevent dead heading. A licensed Auxiliary Operator was sent to the shutdown panel (C-33) in the Auxiliary Building to take control of CV-3025 and CV-3006 (heat exchanger bypass). A LPSI pump was started at 11:32 The primary coolant temperature rose from approximately 87 degrees
. Fahrenheit to 103 degrees during the even Investigation revealed that the input wire to I/I-3025 was not connected to the terminal lug in the C-33 panel. It appears to have been broken away from the lug during a wiring verification process in the C-33 pane The failure could have been attributed to an inadequate termination or the wire being overstressed during previous inspections or maintenanc *
At 1:00 p.m. control of CV-3025 was re-established from the control roo This loss of shutdown cooling is not a 10 CFR 50.72 reportable event at Palisade The wiring verification lead individual is to sensitize the field workers of this incident. Additional hardware changes are planned to prevent recurrence by eliminating the periodic need to move the wirin No violations or deviations were identified.
4 Maintenance The i.nspectors reviewed and/or observed the following selected work activities and verified whether appropriate procedures were in effect controlling removal from and return to service, hold points, verification testing, fire prevention/protection, radiological controls, and cleanliness where applicable: Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) Pump (P-678) Rebuild (ESF-24704362). Rebuild of Containment Sump Isolation Valve CV-1103 (CS-24707499).
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Surveillance The inspectors reviewed surveillance activities to ascertain compliance with scheduling requirements and to verify compliance with requirements relating to procedures, removal from and return to service, personnel qualifications, and documentatio The following test activities were inspected: M0-7Al DW0-1 SH0-1 R0-32-52 Diesel Generator Surveillanc Daily Control Room Surveillanc Operators Shift Surveillanc Local Leak Rate Test of the Containment Sump Isolation Valve A series of repeat tests on the containment sump penetration showed a wide variation in leak rate Maintenance performed on CV-1103 on December 30, 1987 was expected to eliminate a large portion of the measured leakag A nail was found in the line near the valve and was suspected as the cause for the damaged valve seat The retest following this repair was unsuccessful due to the large leak rate through the valve CV-110 The licensee is continuing to pursue both short term and long term (modification) solutions to this proble No violations or deviations were identifie.
Outage Activities Major activities included in the scope of the forced steam generator (SG) outage are as follows: SG eddy current testing, SG secondary side inspections and cleaning, cooling tower work, recorder replacement, non-Q Limitorque maintenance, valve improvement, performance of 22 local leak rate tests, inservice inspections of piping and welds, and overhaul of the fuel transfer system; The o~iginal target date for the plant to.be on line has been shortened to January 30, 1988, due to improvements in the SG schedule which is the critical path for outage completio Emergent issues during the outage have been relatively minor to date, with the exception of the containment sump isolation valves which are -
discussed in Paragraph 5 of this repor No violations or deviations were identifie.
Physical Security The inspectors observed physical security activities at various locations throughout the protected and vital areas including the Central and Secondary Alarm Station Periodic observations of access control activities including proper personnel identification, badging and searches of personnel, packages and vehicles were conducte The inspectors verified appropriate security force staffing and operability of search equipment. *Protected and vital area boundaries were toured to verify maintenance of integrit I 11 umi nat.i on was verified to be adequate to support patrol and Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) monitor observation CCTV monitor clarity and resolution were also observe The inspectors periodically verified that appropriate compensatory measures were taken for degraded or inoperable equipment and breached boundarie No violations or deviations were identifie.
Radiological Protection The inspectors made observations and had discussions concerning radiological safety practices in the radiation controlled areas including: verification of radiation levels and proper posting; accuracy and currentness of area status sheets; adequacy of and compliance with selected Radiation Work Permits and high radiation procedures; and the ALARA (As Low As is Reasonably Achievable) progra Implementation of dosimetry requirements, proper personnel survey (frisking) and contamination control (step-off-pad) practices were observe Health Physics logs and dose records were routinely reviewe During the review of work on the LPSI pump it was identified that a change in the method of removal of a hot spot in the drainline had occurred after the ALARA work plan had been developed and *the workers briefed. The ALARA supervisor was aware of the change in work scope, but the ALARA plan had not been revised and the workers had received no supplemental briefin The establishment of a method for updating the ALARA pl ans and rebri efi ng workers wi 11 be tracked as an Open Item (255/87032-0l(DRP)).
No viol~tions or deviations were identifie.
Part 21 Report A 10 CFR 21 Report was received by the licensee from the General Electric Company concerning three models of HFA type relay To date the licensee is aware that the subject relays have been received and are in stock and in a 11Hold 11 statu Further investigation and review of the GE Service Advice Letter by the licensee is in progres No violations or deviations were identifie I -
1 Licensee Event Reports (Closed) LER 255/87040: The T-10 Diesel Generator fuel oil storage tank was found to contain less than the amount required by the Technical Specifications. This event report was found to have several deficiencies in its content as discussed in Paragraph 2 above {Unresolved Item (UI)
255/87029~02(DRP)). Although a revised report should be submitted, the UI will be used to track resolution of this even No violations or deviations were identifie.
Management Meeting/Commissioner Visit On December 4, 1987, the individuals indicated in Paragraph 1 met to discuss the status of the maintenance program, configuration control program, and the joint Bechtel/CPCo/others ventur Progress in the above areas and the expectation of finalizing the Bechtel contract in January 1988 were discusse *
On the same day (December 4,1987) Commissioner Rogers met with the licensee, interviewed several managers in relation to plant maintenance, and toured the plant with the Plant Manage.
Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspectors, and which involve some action on the pa~t of the NRC or licensee or bot An open item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph.
Unresolved Item Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviation An Unresolved Item is discussed in Paragraph 2 of this repor.
Management Interview A management interview was conducted on December 30, 1987, following the conclusion of the inspectio The scope and findings of the inspection were discusse The inspector also discussed the likely information content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietar