IR 05000255/1987014
| ML18052B149 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 06/11/1987 |
| From: | Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18052B147 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-87-14, NUDOCS 8706230342 | |
| Download: ML18052B149 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-255/87014(DRP)
Docket No. 50-255 License No. DPR-20 Licensee:
Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generat.ing Plant Inspection At:
Palisades Site, Covert, MI Inspection Conducted:
May 5 through June 1, 1987 Inspectors:
E. R. Swanson Approved C. D. Anderson
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By:
B. L. Bu~
Reactor Projects Section 2A Inspection Summary f?/n/oz Dat'e Inspection on May 5 through June l, 1987 (Report No. 50-255/87014(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of followup of previous inspection findings; operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; engineered safety feature walkdown and reportable events; Results: Of the areas inspected one violation was identifie A previously unresolved item is being cited as a failure to test eight containment isolation valves per ASME Code,Section X One unresolved item was identified concerning the miswiring of two temperature instruments leading to the remote shutdown pane PDR ADOCK 05000255 Q
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Consumers Power Company (CPCo)
- D. P. Hoffman, General Manager
- J. G. Lewis, Technical Director
- R. D. Orosz, Engineering and Maintenance Manager
- R. M. Rice, Operations Manger D. W. Joos, Administrative and Planning Manager
- W. L. Beckman, Radiological Services Manager C. S. Kozup, Technical Engineer
~ D. J. Malone, Licensing Analyst
- R. E. McCaleb, Quality Assurance Director R. M. Brzezinski, Instrument and*Control Superintendent K. M. Haas, Reactor Engineering Superintendent R. A. Fenech, Operations Superintendent S. C. Cote, Property Protection Supervisor
- T. A. Buczwinski, Plant Projects Engineer
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- Denotes those present at the Management Interview on June 3, 198 Other members of the Plant Operations, Maintenance, Technical, and Chemistry Health Physics staffs, and several members of the Contract Security Force, were also contacted briefl Followup on Previous Inspection Findings:
(Closed) Unreso 1 ved Item 255/86034-01:
Whi 1 e per*formi ng drawing reviews an engineer identified that the design of the four containment
- penetrations related to the post accident Containment Hydrogen Monitoring System (CHMS) did not incorporate independent containment isolation signals to the series isolation valve A single failure of an isolation signal would result in a monitor (with two containment penetrations) not being isolate During a design basis loss-of-coolant-accident where an earthquake had ruptured the monitor lines, excessive releases to the atmosphere could resul The NRC has concluded that postulation of these *
concurrent events is beyond the design basis requirements of the Palisades plant and therefore escalated enforcement action was not warrante Correct.ive actions taken included revision of the design and implementation of the design change (FC-732), review of other modifications done by the same architect/engineer (A/E), and completion of the review of the circuitry for containment isolation valve The root cause appears to be related to both an inadequate understan_di ng of the design requirements for the system by the A/E and inadequate design review The three year implementation time also complicated the modi-fication process and central accountabilit In the past, Consumers Power Company (CPC) has reviewed designs by external organizations by audit onl Currently no external design organizations are being utilized; however, revised controls have been implemented to assure that
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adequate independent design reviews are conducted in the futur Project Management and Control Procedure 13-4, 11Design Control With Outside Lea Design Organization 11, was issued May 28, 198 As discussed in Reports 255/86034(DRP) and 255/87004(0RP), the event was reported under both 10 CFR 50. 72 and 10 CFR 50. 7 As a 11 owed by the enforcement po 1 icy (10 CFR 2, Appendix C) a notice of violation will not be issued for this violation which meets the five specified criteria:
The design error was discovered by a licensee initiative to review containment isolation logic, is of low severity (level IV), was reported properly, was corrected with measures taken to prevent recurrence, and was not expected to be prevented
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Licensee actions which identified and corrected the error, and those t~ken to pr~vent recurrence demonstrat~d a conscientious and rigorous
~pP.roach to: safety and complianc ~~los~d) Unresolved Item 255/87006-03:
The inspector identified that
~ight solenoid operated containment isolation valves associated with the Containment Hydrogen Monitor System were not tested under the requirements of ASME Code,Section XI, Article IWV-3400 which include stroke timing and position switch verificatio The Section XI Engineer was apparently not aware that an Operations Department daily surveillance opens the valves therefore requiring that the valves be capable of 11active 11 closure during an acciden This issue was identified to the licensee in February 1987 but corrective action has not yet been taken to correct the proble Therefore a violation is set forth in the Appendix (Violation 255/87014-0l(DRP)).
(Closed) Open Item 255/87008-03: The licensee has revised Health Physics Procedure 6.51 to specify the preplanned alternate monitoring methods to implement ~echnical Specification Table 3.24-2, Action 3 I No* new vidlations or deviations were identifie Operational Safety The inspectors observed control room activities, discussed these activities with plant operators, and reviewed various logs and other operations records throughout the inspectio Control room indicators and alarms, log sheets, turnover sheets, and equipment status boards were routinely checked against operating requirement Pump and valve controls were verified to be proper for applicable plant condition On several occasions, the inspector observed shift turnover activities and shift briefing meeting Tours were conducted in the turbine and auxiliary buildings, and central alarm station to observe work activities and testing in progress a~d to observe plant equipment condition, cleanliness, fire safety, health physics and security measures, and adherence to procedural and regulatory requirement The inspectors made observations concerning radiological safety practices in the radiation controlled areas including:
verification
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of proper posting; accuracy and currentness of area status sheets; verification of selected Radiation Work Permit (RWP) compliance; and implementation of proper personnel survey (frisking) and contamination control (step-off-pad) practice Health Physics logs and dose records were routinely reviewe The inspectors observed physical security activities at various access control points, including proper personnel identification and search, and toured security barriers to verify maintenance of integrit Periodic observation of access control activities for vehicles and packages and activities in the Central and Secondary Alarm Station were also conducte An ongoing review of all licensee corrective action program items at the Event Report level was performe On the evening of May 15, 1987, while reducing power to perform turbine valve testing, a pressurizer spray valve stuck in an intermediate position causing pressure to reduce and stabilize at approximately 55 pounds below norma Actions by both the operators and maintenance personnel were successful in partially reseating the valve which was accessible at powe As a result of the valve failure, on May 16, 1987, the plant was shutdown reaching the hot shutdown mode at 5:18 This action by the licensee was conservative since it was possible that stroking the valve at power could jeopardize pressure control if it stuck in a farther open positio *
While shutdown, the spray va 1 ve was found to be binding due to a cocked packing follower and scored ste The follower was aligned, the stem smoothed out, and the valve stroked satisfactoril Since the valves do not normally full stroke at power, the licensee plans to stroke the spray valves periodically to prevent recurrence. The licensee also repaired a small steam leak on the 118 11 Main Feed pump, repacked the 11 8 11 Cooling Tower pump, repacked the 11 A11 Charging pump, added oil to the 118 11 Primary Coolant pump motor, and completed other repairs during the plant shutdow The plant remained i-n hot shutdown for a secondary chemistry hold until 5:43 a.m. on May 20, 198 The reactor startup was witnessed by the inspector and was uneventfu The generator was tied to the grid at 3:06 p.m. on May 20, 198 On May 22, 1987_, at 12:07 a.m., the reactor and turbine were manually tripped from 35% power as a result of a valving erro While lining up the moisture separator reheaters~ an Auxiliary Operator (AO) mistakenly isolated the operating main feed pump turbine from the condenser resulting in the rupture disk rupturing which caused actuation of area fire sprinkler At this time, the control room operators (COs) had indication of low vacuum on the feed pump and a fire header system deman An AO called the control room to report the steam lea The Shift Supervisor (SS) went to evaluate conditions while the COs started reducing powe Upon
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arrival at the scene, at approximately three minutes into the event, the SS directed the plant be trippe The plant response to the trip was normal with all systems functioning as expecte The valving error was determined to be a result of poor communication between the two AOs performing the valve line u The operators were disciplined and will be required to review the event and lessons learned with the other AO Repairs were made to the rupture disk and the sprinkler heads were replace The plant was taken critical at 5:47 p.m. and was paralleled to the grid at 9:29 p.m. on May 22, 198 Additional review of this event and the licensee 1 s corrective actions will be documented under review of the LE While operating, at:~OO% reactpr power at 11:39 a.m. on May 28, 1987, the P-558 Coola~t Cp~rging pump breaker failed to clos Within an hour, electr~ci~ns had diagnosed the trip signal as not valid and replaced the breaker*with a ready spar : : '
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While evaluating the failed breaker, the electrical repairman noticed that the tripper paddle was misaligned causing a standing trip signa The hinge pin for the breaker had worked itself out because the retaining cotter pins had not been installe The breaker, a 480 volt
!TE Model K-225, had recently been rebuilt by the vendor, Brown-Boveri, after experiencing other failures due to wear and agin The licensee inspected other rebuilt breakers to determine if the assembly error was an isolated cas One other deficiency was found in the Containment Air Cooler Recirculation fan V-2 The licensee investigation into the cause and source of the prob'lem isi continuin CFR Part 21 reporting is being considere Additipnal information concerning these breakers can be1found in Pal~sades LER 255/8700 ' On May 28, 1987, while performing Q0-23 11Alternate Hot Shutdown Panel Instrument Check 11 for the first time at power, operators identified that the remote shutdown panel hot and cold temperature indications were reversed for one primary coolant loo The*
instruments were declared inoperable at 7:30 p.m., entering a seven day Limiting Condition for Operatio The preliminary investigation found that prior to the addition of the panel, the temperature instrumentation wiring was revers~d in two place The double reversal led to correct control room indicatio Since one reversal was upstream of the panel and one downstream, the panel indications were incorrec The licensee is continuing the investigation to determine the time of miswiring, root cause and corrective action Review of this issue will be tracked as an Unresolved Item (255/87014-02(DRP)). As a result of lessons learned in the outage and during startup activities the licensee has included listings of long range equipment concerns and items receiving priority attention in the
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daily status report to the Vice President of Nuclear Operation This has helped in focusing management attention and resources on equipment problem No violations or deviations were identifie.
Maintenance The inspector reviewed and/or observed the following selected work activities and verified whether appropriate procedures were in effect controlling removal from and return to service, hold points, verification testing, fire prevention/protection, radiological controls, and cleanliness where applicable: Repair of P-55A Charging Pump Oil Leaks (CVC-24702341, CVC-24702192). Miscellaneous Waste Transfer Pump Repair (RWS-24700926, RWS-24606546). Repair of P-558 Charging Pump 480 Volt Breaker (CVC-24702906).
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Surveillance The inspectors reviewed surveillance activities to ascertain compliance with scheduling requirements and to verify compliance with requirements relating to procedures, removal from and return to service, personnel qualifications, and documentatio The following test activities were inspected: M0-8 M0-38 M0-33 GOP-13 *Dwo-1 SH0-1 Primary and Secondary Computers-PD.IL Check and Control Rod Out-Of-Sequence Alar Auxiliary Feedwater System Inservice Test Procedure - P8C onl Control Room Emergency Ventilation - train B onl Daily Leak Rate Calculations - Results of the licensee calculations were verified using the NRC leakrate program RCSLK9-VG with good result Daily Control Room Surveillanc Operators Shift Surveillanc No violations or deviations were identifie.
Licensee Event Reports Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the inspectors examined the following reportable events to determine whether:
reportability requirements were met; immediate corrective action was accomplished as appropriate; and corrective action to prevent recurrence has been accomplished per the Technical Specification *
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(Closed) Special Report CLER) 255/87010:
Technical Specification 3.2 requires that a Special Report be submitted when certain Fire Protectio instruments are inoperabl This Special Report documents several inoperable water flow switch fire detectors whose failure was attributed to erosion of the flapper These were the first identified failures of these detector The four failed detectors will be replaced and since the failure is related to the end of the normal service life, ot_her similar detectors are planned to be replace At the time of this writing, one detector (WFS-281) has not been replaced and a fire patrol watch is bei.ng maintained until replacement.parts are availabl LER-255/87013 relates to the same even (Open) LER 255/87013:
Technical Specification 3.22.1, which requires a fire watch patrol be established for an inoperable water f.low switch fire detector, was violated from March 22 until April :20, 1987.:
A quarterly operations checklist had been performed whi~h d~termined that the fire sprinkler header water flow switch WFS-2G2 was :inoperabl An hourly fire watch patrol was*not established as the compensatory measure in the 1-2 Diesel Generator Roo The Auxiliary Operator performing the test on March 22, 1987, noted the deficiency and wrote a work reques The Shift Supervisor (SS) reviewed the checklist but did not identify the Technical Specification (TS) action requiremen While releasing the detector for repair on April 20, the SS found that no hourly fire watch patrol had been establishe The licensee identified the root cause of the event as unfamiliarity with the TS and a poor procedure which does not reference the TS nor specify the required action if components are found inoperabl The purpose of the water flow switch fire detectors is to provide early detection and location of fires which will reduce the potential' damage to safety-related equipmen Although the Diesel GeneratoriRoom annunciated alarm was not compensated for by a fire watch, the Suppression System remained operable and the sprinkler actuatiqn would result in an annunciated alarm i~ the control room when the fire suppression system pump starte Additional review of licensee corrective actions is required before a determination is made whether the violation will be cited or no Therefore,.this report remains ope No violations or deviations were identifie.
Engineered Safety Feature Walkdown The inspector performed a partial walkdown of the 11A 11 and 118 11 Auxiliary Feedwater pump subsystems and verified:
That each accessible valve in the flowpath was in its required position and operable, that power was aligned for components that activate on an initiation signal, that essential instrumentation was operable, and that no conditions existed which would adversely affect system operatio No violations or deviations were identifie..*.. )~.... :.
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..., ' Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in ~rder to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or deviation An Unresolved Item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph.
.Management Interview A management interview was conducted on June 3, 1987, at the end of the inspectio The scope and findings of the inspection were discusse The inspector also discussed the likely information content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents/p~ocesses as proprietar ~
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