IR 05000245/2012007

IR 05000336-12-007, 05000423-12-007, on 4/16/12 - 5/11/12, Millstone Power Station, Units 2 and 3, Component Design Bases Inspection

ML12172A119
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	06/20/2012
From:	Doerflein L T Engineering Region 1 Branch 2
To:	Heacock D A Dominion Resources
References
IR-12-007
Download: ML12172A119 (38)

Text

SUBJECT: MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNITS 2 AND 3 - NRC COMPONENT DESIGNBAS ES I N S pECTt O N RE pO RT 05000336/201 2007 AN D 0500 0423 l 20 1 2007

Dear Mr. Heacock:

On May 11,2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection atyour Millstone Power Station, Units 2 and 3. The enclosed inspection report documents theinspection results, which were discussed on May 1 1, 2012, with Mr. Stephen E. Scace, SiteVice President, and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.ln conducting the inspection, the team examined the adequacy of selected components tomitigate postulated transients, initiating events, and design basis accidents. The inspectioninvolved field walkdowns, examination of selected procedures, calculations and records, andinterviews with station personnel.This report documents one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green). Thisfinding was determined to be a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the verylow safety significance and because it was entered into your corrective action program, the NRCis treating this finding as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of theNRC's Enforcement Policy. lf you contest the NCV in this report, you should provide aresponse within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, tothe U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington DC20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region l; the Director, Office ofEnforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and theNRC Senior Resident Inspector at Millstone Power Station. In addition, if you disagree with thecross-cutting aspect assigned to the finding in this report, you should provide a response within30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to theRegionalAdministrator, Region l, and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at Millstone PowerStation. ln accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in theNRC Public Docket Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRC'sdocument system, Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS).ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (thePublic Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,Lawrence T. Doerflein, ChiefEngineering Branch 2Division of Reactor SafetyDocket No. 50-336, 50-423License No. DPR-65, NPF-49

Enclosure:

I nspection Repo rt 05000336/20 1 2007 a nd 05000 423 l 20 1 2007M

Attachment:

Supplemental Informationcc w/encl.: Distribution via ListServ f n accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in theNRC Public Docket Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRC'sdocument system, Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS).ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (thePublic Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RNLawrence T. Doerflein, ChiefEngineering Branch 2Division of Reactor SafetyDocket No. 50-336, 50-423License No. DPR-65, NPF-49

Enclosure:

I nspectio n Report 05000336/20 1 2007 a nd 05000 423 l 201 2007wi

Attachment:

Supplemental lnformationcc w/encl.: Distribution via ListServDistribution w/encl: (via email)W. Dean, RA (RIORAMAIL RESOURCE) S. Shaffer, DRP, SRID. Lew, DRA (RIORAMAIL RESOURCE) B. Haagensen, DRP, RlD. Roberts, DRP (RIDRPMAIL Resource) J. Krafty, DRP, RlJ. Clifford, DRP (RIDRPMAIL Resource) C. Kowalyshyn, AAC. Miller, DRS (RIDRSMAIL RESOURCE) RidsNrrPMMillstone ResourceP. Wilson, DRS (RIDRSMAIL RESOURCE) RidsNrrDorllpll-1 ResourceM. McCoppin, Rl OEDO ROPreports ResourceR. Bellamy, DRP D. Bearde, DRST. Setzer. DRP E. Burket, DRSE. Keighley, DRP L. Doerflein, DRSJ. DeBoer. DRPDOCUMENT NAME: GlDRS\Engineering Branch 2\Burket\MS CDBI 201 2007.docxADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: ML12172Al"l9V suNstReviewV Non-sensitiven SensitiveVnPublicly AvailableNon-Publicly AvailableOFFICERI/DRSRI/DRSRI/DRPRI/DRSNAMEEBurket*CCahill*RBellamy*LDoerfleinDATE5t29t125t31t126t1t126t20t12Previous CorrcurenceFICIAL RECORD COPY U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION IDocket No: 50-336, 50-423License No: DPR-65, NPF-49Report No: 05000336/2012007 and 0500042312012007Licensee: Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.Facility:Millstone Power Station, Units 2 and 3Location: P.O. Box 128Waterford, CT 06385Inspection Period: April 16 through May 1 1,2012Inspectors: E. Burket, Reactor Inspector, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS),Team LeaderS. Pindale, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRSJ. Richmond, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRSD. Orr, Senior Reactor lnspector, DRSS. Rich, Vermont Yanl<ee Resident Inspector, Division of Reactor ProjectsC. Edwards, NRC Mechanical ContractorS. Kobylarz, NRC Electrical ContractorApproved By: Lawrence T. Doerflein, ChiefEngineering Branch 2Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

lR 0500033612012007, 0500042312012007; 411612012 - 511112012; Millstone Power Station,Units 2 and 3; Component Design Bases Inspection.The report covers the Component Design Bases Inspection conducted by a team of fiveU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspectors and two NRC contractors. One findingof very low safety significance (Green) was identified. The finding was considered to be a non-cited violation (NCV). The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White,Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (lMC) 0609, "Significance DeterminationProcess." Cross-cutting aspects associated with findings are determined using IMC 0310,"Components Within the Cross-Cutting Areas." The NRC's program for overseeing the safeoperation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "ReactorOversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.NRC-ldentified FindinqsGornerstone: Mitigating Systems. Green: The team identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) involving anon-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion lll, Design Control,because Dominion had not verified the adequacy of their design with respect to theUnit 2 emergency motor control center (MCC) control circuit voltage drop calculation.Specifically, Dominion did not account for various parameters that affect availablevoltage at motor starter contactors including fuse resistance, minimum control powertransiormer (CPT) size, maximum control circuit cable length, actual quantity of controlcircuit contacts, and containment temperature during a design basis accident (DBA). Asa result, the worst case circuit conditions for determining acceptable contactor voltagewere not evaluated. Dominion entered the issue into the corrective action program andperformed an operability assessment of the most bounding circuit and determined thatsufficient voltage would be available to meet its design basis function.The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it wasassociated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone andadversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability andcapability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirableconsequences. The team evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609,Significance Determination Process, Attachment 4, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening andCharacterization of Findings." The finding was determined to be of very low safetysignificance because the design deficiency was confirmed not to result in loss ofoperability or functionality. The team determined that this finding had a cross-cuttingaspect in the area of Problem ldentification and Resolution, Corrective Action Programbecause Dominion did not thoroughly evaluate the problem when it was identified andentered into the corrective action program in 2009. [lMC 0310, Aspect P.1(c)l(Section 1R21.2.1.1)

REPORT DETAILS

1. REACTOR SAFEWCornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity1R21 Component Desiqn Bases Inspection (lP 71 111.21).1 lnspection Sample Selection ProcessThe team selected risk significant components for review using information contained inthe Millstone Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and the U,S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission's (NRC) Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model for the MillstonePower Station. Additionally, the team referenced the Risk-lnformed Inspection Notebookfor the Millstone Power Station (Revision 2.1a) in the selection of potential componentsfor review. In general, the selection process focused on components that had a RiskAchievement Worth (RAW) factor greater than 1.3 or a Risk Reduction Worth (RRW)factor greater than 1.005. The components selected were associated with both safety-related and non-safety related systems, and included a variety of components such aspumps, transformers, diesel engines, batteries, and valves'The team initially compiled a list of components based on the risk factors previouslymentioned. Additionally, the team reviewed the previous component design basesinspection (CDBI) reports (05000336/2009006 & 05000423/2009006 and05000336/2006010 & 05000423/2006010) and excluded the majority of thosecomponents previously inspected. The team then performed a margin assessment tonarrow the focus of the inspection to 24 components and four operating experience (OE)items. The team selected a main steam isolation valve (MSIV) to review for large earlyrelease frequency (LERF) implications. The team's evaluation of possible low designmargin included consideration of original design issues, margin reductions due tomodifications, or margin reductions identified as a result of material condition/equipmentreliability issues. The assessment also included items such as failed performance testresults, corrective action history, repeated maintenance, Maintenance Rule (aX1) status,operability reviews for degraded conditions, NRC resident inspector insights, systemhealth reports, and industry OE. Finally, consideration was also given to the uniquenessand complexity of the design and the available defense-in-depth margins.The inspection performed by the team was conducted as outlined in NRC InspectionProcedure (lP) 71111.21. This inspection effort included wall<downs of selectedcomponents; interviews with operators, system engineers, and design engineers; andreviews of associated design documents and calculations to assess the adequacy of thecomponents to meet design basis, licensing basis, and risk-informed beyond d_esign basisrequirements. Summaries of the reviews performed for each component and OE sampleare discussed in the subsequent sections of this report. Documents reviewed for thisinspection are listed in the Attachment.Enclosure 2.2 Results of Detailed Reviews.2.1 Results of Detailed Component Reviews (24 samples).2.1.1 Unit 2 Shutdown Coolino Svstem Suction Valve. 2-5l-652a. Inspection ScopeThe team inspected the shutdown cooling system motor operated valve to verify that itwas capable of meeting its design basis requirements at degraded voltage conditions atthe motor starter and the motor terminals. The team confirmed the calculated minimumvoltage at the motor terminals and motor starter contactor was based on the motorcontrol center voltage available at degraded grid conditions. Finally, corrective actioncondition reports (CR) and system health reports were reviewed to verify deficiencieswere appropriately identified and resolved, and that the motor and starter were properlymaintained.b. Findinqslntroduction: The team identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green)involving a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion lll, DesignControl, because Dominion had not verified the adequacy of their design with respect tothe Unit 2 emergency motor control center (MCC) control circuit voltage drop calculation.Speci1cally, Dominion did not account for various parameters that affect available voltageat safety-related motor starter contactors including fuse resistance, minimum controlpower tiansformer (CPT) size, maximum control circuit cable length, actual quantity ofcontrol circuit contacts, and containment temperature during a design basis accident(DBA). Therefore, the worst case circuit conditions had not been evaluated.Description: The team found during review of calculation PA-91-004-290E2, Emergency1,trc Control Circuit Voltage Drop, that Dominion did not properly validate assumptionsfor bounding the effects on circuit resistance with respect to the maximum control circuitcable conductor temperature for DBA conditions, the effects of control power transformersecondary-side fuse resistance, and the effect on circuit resistance for the actual quantityof control circuit contacts. The team noted that the calculation also did not considercircuits with the smallest control power transformer (CPT), with the smallest CPT fuse,and with the maximum control circuit length when determining the voltage available atMCC contactor coils. As a result, the team concluded the worst case circuit conditions fordetermining acceptable contactor voltage were not evaluated'The team noted that 90 volts was considered to be the minimum acceptable voltage forcontactor pickup based on data from the manufacturer and plant testing that wasperformed on spare contactors in 1993. The team confirmed that adequate voltagewould be available for the 2-Sl-652 contactor when considering the circuit conditions thatwere not previously evaluated, such as fuse resistance and control circuit cableconductor temperature during DBA conditions inside containment. However, the teamnoted that worst case conditions were not evaluated for other contactor control circuits,specifically circuits that contained a 60 volt-ampere CPT, a 0.6 ampere CPT secondaryEnclosure 3fuse, the longest control circuit length, and the maximum number of control circuitcontacts, all of which contribute to an increase in the voltage drop to the contactor when itis energized during pick-up. The team was concerned that the worst case or boundingcircuit conditions were not evaluated by Dominion and that the available contactor voltagefor limiting conditions was not determined. Dominion addressed the team's concerns bydetermining that the service water pump strainer motor circuit 85154 was the worst casefor pick-up voltage drop to the contactor based on a preliminary calculation. Dominionengineers calculated that the voltage available at the contactor coil was 90.19 volts,which was slightly more than 90 volts that was evaluated to be the minimum acceptablepick-up voltage. The team reviewed the design inputs for the preliminary calculation toverify conservatism in the parameters that were evaluated to provide assurance that theworst case or bounding conditions were considered. The team confirmed for circuit85154 that the available contactor voltage in the preliminary calculation was marginallyacceptable and the calculation supported Dominion's operability assessment in conditionreport (CR) 474634.During the 2009 component design basis inspection (CDBI), a question was raised by theteam regarding the assumptions used in calculation PA-91-004-290E2. To address thequestion, Dominion initiated a condition report (CR322576) with a corrective action toreview the calculation and provide clarification and a more accurate justification for theassumptions used. At the time, Dominion did not have any concerns with operability ofthe circuits because they felt the assumptions were conservative and that the worst casecircuit was bounded. Upon the start of the 2012 CDBI, the condition report was still openwith a pending due date of November,2012.Analvsis: The team determined that the failure to adequately validate calculationassurnptions and determine the adequacy of the voltage at safety-related motor operatedvalve contactors for the most limiting control circuit components and design basisaccident environmental conditions was a performance deficiency. The performancedeficiency was more than minor because it was similar to IMC 0612, Appendix E,Examples of Minor lssues, Example 3.j, in that the design analysis deficiency resulted ina condition where the team had reasonable doubt regarding the operability of variousmotor control circuits. In addition, the performance deficiency was associated with thedesign control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected thecornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems thatrespond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. In accordance withIMC 0609, Attachment 4, "Phase 1 - lnitial Screening and Characterization of Findings,"the team conducted a Phase 1 Significance Determination Process (SDP) screening anddetermined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was adesign deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability in functionality.This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem ldentification andResolution, Corrective Action Program, because Dominion did not thoroughly evaluatethis problem when it was identified in 2009. Dominion's evaluation in 2009 incorrectlydetermined that assumptions were valid and that the worst case circuit was bounded.llMC 0310, Aspect P.1(c)lEnclosure 4Enforcement: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion lll, Design Control, requires, in part,that design control measures provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design.Contrary to the above, as of May 10,2012, Dominion's design control measures had notverified the adequacy of the design regarding the Unit 2 emergency MCC control circuitvoltage drop calculation. Specificatly, not all parameters which affect voltage wereaccounted for in the calculation and the calculation did not determine the effect onavailable voltage at contactors for the most limiting circuit components and design basisenvironmental conditions. Because this violation is of very low safety significance, andhas been entered into Dominion's corrective action program (CR 474634), this violation isbeing treated as an NCV, consistentwith Section2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.(NCV 05000336/2012007-01, Inadequate Assumptions used in Emergency MotorControl Genter Control Circuit Voltage Drop Calculation).2.1.2 Unit 2'B'Reactor Buildino Closed Coolino Water Heat Exchanqer. X18Ba. Inspection ScopeThe team inspected the 'B' reactor building component cooling water (RBCCW) heatexchanger to ensure that it was capable of removing the required heat loads duringdesign basis events. The team reviewed design basis documents, eddy current andthermal performance test results, service water full flow test results, and heat exchangercleaning and inspection reports to verify that the heat exchanger could maintain adequateheat removal capability and system integrity during design basis events. The teamreviewed selected operating procedures for normal, abnormal, and emergency conditionsto ensure consistency with the licensing and design bases. Additionally, the teamperformed a walkdown of the heat exchanger, interviewed system and design engineers,and reviewed system health reports to evaluate the material condition of the heatexchanger as well as overall component health. Finally, the team reviewed correctiveaction documents to verify Dominion was identifying and correcting issues, and to verifythere were no adverse trends.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.1.3 Unit 2 'A' Service Water Strainer. L1Aa. Inspection ScopeThe team selected the 'A'service water (SW) strainer for review to verify it was capableof performing its design basis function. This component is located immediatelydownstream of the service water pump and provides filtration of particulate from theservice water flow streams prior to their distribution to various safety-related and non-safety-related heat exchangers. The team reviewed selected operating procedures fornormal, abnormal, and emergency conditions to ensure consistency with the licensingand design bases. The team reviewed maintenance procedures and completed workorders to verify those activities were performed in accordance with vendorrecommendations. The team performed a walkdown of all three strainers to assess theirEnclosure 5material condition and their operating environment. The team discussed design,operation, and component history with engineering staff to evaluate performance historyand overall component health. Finally, the team reviewed recent corrective actiondocuments and system health reports to determine if there were any adverse trendsassociated with the strainer, and to verify Dominion was identifying and correcting issues.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.1.4 Unit 2 'A Main Steam Atmospheric Dump Valve. 2-MS-190Aa. Inspection ScopeThe team inspected the'A main steam atmospheric dump valve (ADV) to verify the valvewas capable of performing its design basis function. The ADV is an air operated valvethat provides steam generator pressure control and decay heat removalwhen the maincondenser is unavailable. The valve is a normally closed valve that fails closed whencontrol power or instrument air are lost but can be opened manually to perform itsfunction.The team reviewed the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR), the technicalspecifications (TS), and the TS Bases to identify the design basis requirements of thevalve. The team reviewed drawings, operating and maintenance procedures, andcompleted maintenance and modifications to verify the safety function was maintained.The team reviewed valve testing procedures and stroke timing data to verify acceptancecriteria were adequate and that performance was not degrading. The team discusseddesign, operation, and component history with engineering and operations staff toevaluate performance history overall component health, and the feasibility of manualoperation during emergencies. The team also conducted a walkdown of the 'A ADV toassess its material condition and to verify the installed configuration was consistent withplant drawings, procedures, and the design basis. Finally, the team reviewed correctiveaction documents to verify Dominion was identifying and correcting issues, and to verifythere were no adverse trends.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.1.5 Unit 2 'A Main Steam lsolation Valve. 2-MS-64Aa. Inspection ScopeThe team inspected the 'A main steam isolation valve (MSIV) to verify the valve wascapable of performing its design basis function. The MSIV is an air operated valve thatcloses to isolate the 'A steam generator on low pressure in either'A or'B'steamgenerator or high containment pressure. The valve is normally open and fails closed on aloss of control power or instrument air.Enclosure 6The team reviewed the UFSAR, the TS, and the TS Bases to identify the design basisrequirements of the valve. The team reviewed drawings, operating procedures andcompleted maintenance to verify the safety function was maintained. The team reviewedvalve testing procedures and stroke timing data to verify acceptance criteria wereadequate and that performance was not degrading. The team discussed design,operation and component history with engineering staff to evaluate performance historyand overall component health. The team also conducted a walkdown of both MSIVs toassess their material condition, and to verify installed configuration was consistent withplant drawings, procedures, and the design basis. Finally, the team reviewed correctiveaction documents to verify Dominion was identifying and correcting issues, and to verifythere were no adverse trends.b. FindinosNo findings were identified..2.1.6 Unit 2'B'Emeroencv Diesel Generator Electrical Review. H7Ba. Inspection ScopeThe team inspected the 'B' emergency diesel generator (EDG) to verify that it wascapable of meeting its design basis function. The team reviewed the one-line diagramsfor the EDG, the vendor nameplate rating data, and the EDG load study to ensure thatthe EDG was operated consistent with its rating, and capable of operating under theworst case design basis loading conditions. The team's review included the startingcomponents, such as starting air solenoids, generator field flash, and the generatorbreaker close coil. The team reviewed the adequacy of voltage available for the startingcomponents, and ensured that surveillance testing adequately verified that thecomponents would be functional. The team reviewed the brake horsepower basis forselected pump motors to ensure loads were adequately considered in the loading studyat worst case motor load conditions. The team also performed walkdowns of the Unit 2EDGs to assess the material condition and the operating environment for indications ofdegradation of equipment. Finally, corrective action documents and system healthreports were reviewed to verify deficiencies were appropriately identified and resolved,and that the emergency diesel generator was properly maintained'b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.1.7 Unit 2'A' 125 Vdc Batterv and DC Bus 201Aa. Inspection ScopeThe team reviewed the design, testing, and operation of the 'A' 125 Vdc battery and the201A DC bus to verify they could perform their design basis functions to provide directcurrent (DC) power to connected loads during normal, transient, and postulated accidentconditions, including station blackout (SBO) events. Specifically, the team reviewedEnclosure 7design calculations and drawings, including the battery sizing calculation, load profilestudies, short circuit analysis, voltage drop calculations, and battery terminal connectionresistances. The team performed this review to evaluate whether the battery capacityand DC distribution system were adequate for the equipment load and duration requiredby design and licensing requirements, and to assess whether adequate voltage wasavailable to meet minimum voltage specifications for connected loads during worst caseloading conditions. In addition, the team also reviewed the DC over current protectivecoordination studies to verify there was adequate protection for postulated faults in theDC system.The team reviewed battery maintenance and surveillance tests, including performanceand service discharge tests and routine surveillance tests, to assess whether the testingand maintenance was sufficient and whether those activities were performed inaccordance with approved procedures, vendor recommendations, industry standards,and design and licensing requirements. The team compared the service test andperformance test load profiles to the load profile studies for the loss-of-coolant accident(LOCA) with a concurrent loss-of-offsite power and the SBO design assumptions to verifythe load testing enveloped the predicted worst case loading conditions. In addition, theteam compared as-found test and inspection results to established acceptance criteria toevaluate the as-found conditions and assess whether those conditions conformed todesign basis assumptions and regulatory requirements'In addition, the team interviewed design and system engineers, maintenance technicians,and licensed operators regarding the design, operation, testing, and maintenance of thebattery and battery bus. The team performed field walkdowns of the battery and batterybus to independently assess the material condition of the battery cells and associatedelectrical equipment, and to determine whether the system alignment and operatingenvironment was consistent with design basis assumptions. Specifically, the teamvisually inspected the battery for signs of degradation, such as excessive terminalcorrosion and electrolyte leaks. Finally, the team reviewed recent corrective actiondocuments and system health reports to determine whether there were any adverseoperating trends, and to assess Dominion's capability to evaluate and correct problems.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.1.8 Unit 2 Condensate Storaqe Tank. T40a. Inspection ScopeThe team reviewed the design, testing, inspection, and operation of the condensatestorage tank (CST), and associated tank level instruments, to evaluate whether it couldperform its design basis function as the preferred water source for the auxiliary feedwaterpumps. Specifically, the team reviewed design calculations, drawings, and vendorspecifications, including tank sizing and level uncertainty analysis, and pump vortexcalculations to evaluate the adequacy and appropriateness of design assumptions andoperating limits.Enclosure 8The team interviewed system and design engineers, and reviewed instrument testrecords and tank inspection procedures to determine whether maintenance and testingwas adequate to ensure reliable operation and to evaluate whether those activities wereperformed in accordance with regulatory requirements, industry standards, and vendorrecommendations. The team also reviewed results of recent internal and external visualinspections of the CST, and conducted a walkdown of the tank area to independentlyassess the material condition of the CST and associated instrumentation. Finally, theteam reviewed recent corrective action documents and system health reports todetermine if there were any adverse trends associated with the CST, and to assessDominion's capability to evaluate and correct problems'b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.1.9 Unit 2 'A' Power Operated Relief Valve. RC402a. Insoection ScooeThe team reviewed the design, testing, and operation of the 'A' power operated reliefvalve (PORV) to assess whether it could perform its design functions. Specifically, theteam reviewed design calculations and specifications, the reactor coolant system designbasis summary document, the TS and TS Bases, drawings, the vendor manual, andoperating procedures to evaluate the PORV's adequacy for plant pressure control atnormal operating temperature and pressure, reactor vessel low-temperature over-pressure protection, and to provide a flow path for primary side feed and bleed operationsusing the emergency operating procedures.The team reviewed surveillance test records and operating procedures to assess whetherthe PORV was appropriately tested and operated within required design limits andwhether testing adequately verified component functionality. The team compared recentas-found test and inspection results to established acceptance criteria to evaluate the as-found conditions and assess whether those conditions conformed to design basisassumptions and regulatory requirements. The team's review included PORV steam andwater relief capacity at expected plant operating conditions, PORV seat leakage history,and assessment of any adverse impact due to seat leakage. In addition to themechanical review, the team also assessed whether the PORV solenoid would haveadequate minimum DC voltage to operate under worst case 125 Vdc battery loadingconditions. Finally, the team reviewed recent corrective action documents and systemhealth reports to determine whether there were any adverse trends, and to assessDominion's capability to evaluate and correct problems.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.Enclosure 9.2.1.10 Unit 2'A'Motor Driven Auxiliarv Feedwater Pump. AFW-P9Aa. Inspection ScopeThe team inspected the 'A' motor driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump to verify that itwas capable of meeting its design basis requirements. The AFW pumps provideemergency feedwater to the steam generators in response to transient and accidentevents for all credible feedwater line break, main steam line break, and steam generatortube rupture scenarios. The team reviewed the AFW system hydraulic model and thedesign basis hydraulic analysis/calculations to verify that required total dynamic head(TDH), required net positive suction head (NPSH), and potential for vortex formation hadbeen properly considered under all DBA/event conditions. The team reviewed systemoperating procedures to ensure they were consistent with the design function of the pumpand with relevant calculations for maintaining adequate NPSH, control of vortexing, andprevention of pump runout.The team also reviewed pump in-service test (lST) procedures, recent test results, andtrends in test data to verify that pump performance was consistent with design basisrequirements. The IST acceptance criteria were reviewed to verify appropriatecorrelation to accident analyses conditions, taking into account set-point tolerances andinstrument inaccuracies. Additionally, the team discussed the AFW pump design,operation, and performance with the engineering staff, and reviewed operator logs toevaluate pump performance. Seismic design documentation was reviewed to verifypump design was consistent with limiting seismic conditions. The team reviewed designdocumentation to verify pump motor design was consistent with the environmentalqualification (Ea) basis for limiting temperature/radiation conditions. The team conducteda detailed walkdown of the pump to assess the material and environmental conditions,and to verify that the installed configuration was consistent with system drawings, and thedesign and licensing bases. The team reviewed the maintenance history of the pumpand system by sampling corrective action documents, work orders, and system healthreports to ensure there were no adverse trends and to assess Dominion's ability toidentify, evaluate, and correct problems.b. FindinosNo findings were identified..2.1.11Unit 2 'B"Containment Air Recirculation Unit. F148a. Inspection ScopeThe 'B' containment air recirculation (CAR) unit is one of four ventilation fans withassociated coolers and has a risk important function to remove containment heat duringdesign basis accidents, such as a loss-of-coolant accident or a main steam line break incontainment. The team inspected the CAR unit to verify it was capable of meeting itsdesign basis requirements during these postulated accidents. The team reviewedelectrical diagrams associated with breaker and fan controls, and piping and instrumentEnclosure 10diagrams associated with containment ventilation and the RBCCW system to ensure allcomponents of the 'B' CAR unit were appropriately included in a test or maintenanceprogram. The team verified that Dominion ensured through testing and flow balancemeasurements of the RBCCW system that the flow as assumed in containmenttemperature and pressure response calculations was obtained for each CAR unit. Theteam verified that CAR unit surveillance testing was performed consistent with technicalspecification requirements and replicated the system response that would exist during asafety injection actuation signal. The team verified breaker overcurrent protective relayset-points to ensure that the 'B' CAR fan motor and electrical bus were adequatelyprotected but that the CAR unit was not subject to spurious tripping, and to determinewhether proper coordination was maintained. The team also reviewed corrective actiondocuments and system health reports, and interviewed system and design engineers todetermine whether there were any adverse operating trends or existing issues affecting'B' CAR unit reliability. Finally, the team performed a visual examination of control roomCAR unit controls and 480Vac breakers at associated load centers.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.1

.12 Unit 2 4160 Volt Bus 24El34B Tie Breaker. 4505a. Inspection ScopeThe team inspected the 4.16kV Bus 24El34B tie breaker 4505 to verify it was capable ofmeeting its design basis requirements. The team reviewed bus load flow calculations todetermine whether the breaker was applied within its specified capacity rating underworst case accident loading and grid voltage conditions. The team reviewed short circuitcalculations to determine whether the circuit breaker was applied within its specifiedratings. The team reviewed schematic diagrams and calculations for 4.16kV busprotective relays to ensure that equipment was adequately protected, the breaker was notsubject to spurious tripping, and to determine whether proper coordination wasmaintained. The team performed a visual inspection of the A505 breaker and itsprotective relays to assess material condition and the presence of hazards that couldimpact the operation of the equipment. The team reviewed preventive maintenanceprocedures and verified that maintenance was performed on the breaker consistent withvendor requirements. The team reviewed 4.16kV breaker operating procedures toensure racking-in operations appropriately performed testing to verify breaker operabilityupon return to service. The team specifically reviewed breaker trip and close coil pickupvoltage testing to ensure the 125Vdc system would support 4.16kV breaker operationduring station blackout events. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documentsand completed maintenance and testing records to determine whether there were anyadverse operating trends, and to verify deficiencies were appropriately identified andresolved.Enclosure

11b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.1.13 Unit 3 'A Boric Acid Transfer Pump, 3CHS*P2Aa. Inspection ScopeThe team inspected the 'A boric acid transfer pump (BATP) to verify the pump wascapable of performing its design basis function. The BATP is a canned centrifugal pumpthat provides a flow of concentrated boric acid to the suction of the charging pumps tocontrol reactivity during normal and abnormal conditions. The pump automatically startson a safety injection actuation signal, and it is capable of being manually controlled toprovide enough boric acid to bring the reactor to hot shutdown conditions without anycontrol rod assemblies inserted.The team reviewed the UFSAR, the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) and TRMbasis, and the design basis summary document to identify the design basis requirementsfor the pump. The team reviewed drawings, operating procedures, and completedmaintenance documents to verify the pump function was maintained. The team reviewedpump IST procedures and results to verify acceptance criteria were adequate and thatperformance was not degrading. The team reviewed the BATP net positive suction headrequirement and available NPSH to ensure the pump was capable of fulfilling its safetyfunction at the required flowrate with low tank level. The team discussed design,operation, maintenance and component history with engineering staff to evaluateperformance history and overall component health. The team also conducted awalkdown of both BATPs to assess material condition and to verify installed configurationwas consistent with plant drawings and procedures, and the design basis. Finally, theteam reviewed corrective action documents to verify Dominion was identifying andcorrecting issues, and to verify there were no adverse trends.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.1.14 Unit 3 Reactor Plant Component Coolinq Water Suroe Tank. 3CCP*TK1a. lnspection ScopeThe team inspected the reactor plant component cooling water (RPCCW) surge tank andassociated level switches to verify the tank was capable of performing its design basisfunction. The surge tank provides net positive suction head for the RPCCW pumps andmakeup water for the RPCCW system. The tank is divided by a partition that extendspartway up the tank so that the loss of water from one train of the RPCCW system will notaffect the other train. The RPCCW system consists of safety and non-safety relatedpiping, and the level switches isolate the non-safety-related piping on decreasing surgetank level, preventing a failure of the non-safety portion from impacting the safety-relatedfunction of the system.Enclosure 12The team reviewed the UFSAR, the TS and TS Bases, and the design basis summarydocument to identify the design basis requirements for the tank and level switches. Theteam reviewed tank volume calculations and the level switch set-point calculation to verifysufficient volume would be maintained in the tank under all conditions. The teamreviewed drawings, operating procedures, and completed maintenance documents toverify the tank and level switch functions were maintained. The team reviewed tankinternal and external inspection results to verify tank condition was not degrading. Theteam discussed design, operation, maintenance, and component history with engineeringstaff to evaluate performance history and overall component health. The team alsoconducted a walkdown of the tank, the level switches, and portions of the RPCCW pipingto verify the installed configuration was consistent with plant drawings, procedures, andthe design basis. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents to verifyDominion was identifying and correcting issues, and to verify there were no adversetrends.b. FindinssNo findings were identified..2.1.15 Unit 3 'A' Emerqencv Diesel Generator (3EGS*EG-A) Mechanical Support Svstemsa. Inspection ScopeThe team inspected the mechanical support systems associated with the'A' emergencydiesel generator, including the fuel oil, starting air, ventilation, and jacket water coolingsystems to ensure the EDG could perform its design basis function in response totransient and design basis events. The team reviewed the UFSAR, TS, design basiscalculations, vendor documents, and procedures to identify the design basis,maintenance, and operational requirements for the EDG and its support systems. Theteam reviewed fuel oil consumption calculations to ensure TS requirements were metunder design basis loading conditions. The team also reviewed the design specificationfor the starting air system, air start test results, and the normal operating pressure bandto verify that the starting air system was properly sized and could meet its design functionfor successive starts. The team reviewed EDG surveillance test results, operatingprocedures and maintenance work packages to determine the overall health of the EDGengine and its mechanical support systems.The team performed severalfield walkdowns of both Unit 3 EDGs to independentlyassess the material condition and the operating environment of the EDGs and associatedequipment. During the walkdowns, the team compared localand remote EDG controlswitch positions, breaker position indicating lights, and system alignments to design andlicensing basis assumptions to verify the adequacy of Dominion's configuration control.The team interviewed engineers to evaluate past performance and operation of theEDGs. The team reviewed the system health report and corrective action documents todetermine if there was any adverse equipment operating trends, and to ensure problemswere properly identified and corrected. Additionally, the team observed portions of the 34EDG monthly test on April 17,2012, and conducted pre- and post-operation walkdownsto ensure proper operation and to assess material condition.Enclosure 13b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.1.16 Unit 3 Safetv Iniection Pump Discharqe to Hot Leo Containment Penetration lsolationValve. 3SlH.CV8824a. Inspection ScopeThe team inspected the safety injection pump discharge to hot leg containmentpenetration isolation valve to verify that it was capable of meeting its design basisfunction of closing automatically upon receipt of a Phase A containment isolation signal.The team reviewed diagnostic testing and in-service test results, including stroke timeand friction and seat loading, to verify acceptance criteria were met and performancedegradation could be identified. The team reviewed design documentation to verify thevalve and its actuator were operated consistent with design requirements. The teamreviewed the functional history of the isolation valve by sampling corrective action reports,the system health report, and preventive and corrective maintenance records to ensureDom i nion appropriately identified, characterized, and corrected problems.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.1.17 Unit 3 480 Volt Bus 32R Transformer. 34C5-1Xa. Inspection ScopeThe team inspected the 4160-480 volt transformer 34C5-1X to verify that it was capableof meeting its design basis requirements. The transformer was designed to providepower to 480 volt emergency bus 32R. The team reviewed load calculations todetermine the design basis maximum load and reviewed the bus load center equipmentvendor ratings to ensure they were in conformance with the design basis. The team alsoreviewed the coordination/protection calculation for the transformer incoming line andload side breakers for design basis load flow conditions, and transformer protection andcoordination. The team performed a walkdown of the transformer to assess theobservable material condition. Also, the team reviewed surveillance tests to verify theacceptance criteria satisfied design basis load requirements and transformer protectionsettings. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action reports and system health reportsto verify deficiencies were appropriately identified and resolved.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.Enclosure 14.2.1.18 Unit 3 4160 Volt Bus 34Da. Insoection ScopeThe team inspected bus 34D to verify that it was capable of meeting its design basisrequirements. The bus switchgear is designed to provide power to and to control theoperation of the connected safety-related loads. The team reviewed load calculations todetermine the design basis for maximum load and reviewed the switchgear equipmentvendor ratings for conformance with the design basis. The team also reviewed thecoordination/protection calculation for the incoming line and feeder breakers for designbasis load flow conditions, and bus protection and coordination. The team performed awalkdown of bus 34D to assess the observable material condition. The team alsoreviewed surveillance tests on the incoming line and feeder breakers for adequacy ofresults in accordance with design basis setting requirements. Finally, corrective actiondocuments and system health reports were reviewed to verify deficiencies wereappropriately identified and resolved, and that the bus 34D switchgear was properlymaintained.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.1.19 Unit 3'D' Service Water Pump. 3-SWP-P1 Da. Insoection ScopeThe team inspected the 'D' service water pump to verify that the pump was capable ofperforming its design basis function. The pump has a safety-related function to providean adequate supply of cooling water flow to safety-related components during abnormaland accident conditions such as a LOCA or a loss-of-offsite power. In addition, the pumpprovides an emergency source of make-up water to the spent fuel pool and anemergency backup source of water to the auxiliary feedwater system and to the controlbuilding chilled water system.The team reviewed the SW pump submergence requirements and availablesubmergence to ensure the PumP was capable of fulfilling its safety function at themaximum flowrate assumed and lowest intake level. The team assessed the systemhydraulic calculations under normal, transient, and LOCA conditions to ensure the pumpprovided adequate cooling to safety-related components and that design requirements forflow and pressure were properly translated into IST acceptance criteria. The teamevaluated pump performance to ensure there was no degradation by reviewing ISTresults. Additionally, the team discussed the SW pump design, operation, andperformance with the engineering staff, and reviewed operator logs to evaluate pumpperformance. Seismic design documentation was reviewed to verify pump design wasconsistent with limiting seismic conditions. The team reviewed design documentation toverify pump motor design was consistent with limiting environmental conditions. TheEnclosure 15team reviewed the SW pump performance curve and design basis flow requirement toevaluate the required capacity for the brake horsepower required by the pump duringdesign basis conditions.In addition to the mechanical review, the team reviewed the 4160 Vac system load flowcalculation and motor nameplate data to confirm that adequate voltage would beavailable at the motor terminals for design basis conditions. The inspectors alsoreviewed the motor overcurrent relay setting calculation, relay settings and recentovercurrent relay calibration tests to evaluate whether the protective relays would providefor reliable motor operation at design basis minimum voltage conditions. The teamconducted a detailed walkdown of the pump and SW bay to assess the material andenvironmental conditions, and to verify that the installed configuration was consistent withsystem drawings, and the design and licensing bases. Finally, corrective actiondocuments and system health reports were reviewed to verify deficiencies wereappropriately identified and resolved, and that the 'D' SW pump and motor were properlymaintained.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.1.20 Unit 3'B' 125 Vdc Batterv Bus. 3018-1a. Inspection ScopeThe team reviewed the design, testing, and operation of the 125 Vdc battery bus, andassociated distribution panels to evaluate whether the loading of the DC bus was withinequipment ratings and to determine whether the bus could perform its design basisfunction to reliably power the associated loads under worst case conditions. Specifically,the team reviewed calculations and drawings, including voltage drop calculations, shortcircuit analysis, and load profile studies to evaluate the adequacy and appropriateness ofdesign assumptions. The team also reviewed the DC over current protective coordinationstudies to verify there was adequate protection for postulated faults in the DC system.ln addition, the team interviewed system and design engineers, and walked down the125 Vdc battery bus and distribution panels to independently assess the materialcondition and determine whether the system alignment and operating environment wasconsistent with design basis assumptions. Finally, the team reviewed recent correctiveaction documents and system health reports to determine whether there were anyadverse operating trends, and to assess Dominion's capability to evaluate and correctproblems.b. FindinosNo findings identified.Enclosure 16.2.1.21Unit 3 'D' Containment Recirculation Sprav Svstem Pump. 3RSS*P1 Da. Inspection ScopeThe team inspected the 'D' containment recirculation spray system (RSS) pump to verifythat the pump was capable of performing its design basis function. The pump's safety-related function is to provide an adequate supply of spray water for containmentdepressurization following a design basis LOCA and later during the recirculation modefor core heat removal. The team reviewed the RSS pump NPSH requirements andavailable NPSH to ensure the pump was capable of fulfilling its safety function at themaximum flowrate assumed and lowest containment sump level. Seismic designdocumentation was reviewed to verify pump design was consistent with limiting seismicconditions. The team assessed the system hydraulic calculations under LOCA conditionsto ensure the pump would provide adequate spray water and that design requirements forflow and pressure were properly translated into IST acceptance criteria. Additionally, theteam discussed the RSS pump design, operation, and performance with the engineeringstaff, and reviewed operator logs to evaluate pump performance. The team evaluatedpump performance to ensure there was no degradation by reviewing IST results. Theteam reviewed design documentation to verify pump motor design was consistent withEQ basis for limiting temperature/radiation conditions. The team conducted a detailedwalkdown of the pump and RSS heat exchanger cubicle to assess the material andenvironmental conditions, and to verify that the installed configuration was consistent withsystem drawings, and the design and licensing bases. The team reviewed themaintenance history of the pump and system by sampling corrective action conditionreports, work orders, and system health reports to ensure there were no adverse trends,and to assess the licensee's ability to identify, evaluate, and correct problems.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.1.22 Unit 3 'B' Turbine Driven Auxiliarv Feedwater Pump Steam Supplv Valve. 3MSS*AOV31Ba. Inspection ScopeThe team inspected the 'B' turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump steam supply valve toverify the ability of this valve to perform its design basis functions, including supply ofmain steam to the turbine driven AFW pump for loss-of-feedwater events. The teamreviewed the calculations for maximum differential pressure and the inputs/outputs of thecomputer programs used to determine required thrust and valve weak link. Diagnostictesting and IST surveillance results, including stroke time and available thrust, werereviewed to verify acceptance criteria were met and performance degradation could beidentified. The team reviewed the maintenance and functional history of the valve bysampling corrective action condition reports, the system health report, and preventivemaintenance/corrective maintenance records. The team also conducted a detailedwalkdown to visually inspect the material condition of the valve and its support systemsand to ensure adequate configuration control.Enclosure 17b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.2.1.23 Unit 2 and Unit 3 Station Blackout Diesel Generatora. Inspection ScopeThe team inspected the station blackout diesel generator (SBO DG) to verify that is wascapable of meeting its design basis requirements. Specific components of the SBO DGreviewed included its DC batteries and the uninterruptible power supply, as well as thequality and storage requirements of the fuel oil. The team reviewed electrical one-linediagrams, piping and instrument diagrams, calculations, and operating procedures toensure that the SBO DG was operated consistent with its ratings and was capable ofoperating under design basis conditions. The team reviewed the adequacy of the SBODG to support the 4.16kV safety busses for Unit 2 and Unit 3, and ensured thatsurveillance testing adequately verified that the SBO DG was periodically started andtested from a simulated blackout condition of one-hour duration. Design and systemengineers were interviewed regarding the design, operation, testing, and maintenance ofthe diesel generator. The team performed a walkdown of the diesel generator andsupport systems to assess the material condition of the equipment. Finally, a sample ofcondition reports was reviewed to ensure Dominion was identifying and properlycorrecting issues associated with the SBO DG.b. FindinosNo findings were identified.2.1.24 Unit 3 480 Volt Vital Load Center 32Ra. Inspection ScopeThe team inspected the 480 Vac vital load center 32R to verify it was capable ofperforming its design basis function. The team reviewed electrical distributioncalculations including load flow, voltage drop, short-circuit and electrical protectioncoordination. This review evaluated the adequacy and appropriateness of designassumptions; and verified that load center capacity was not exceeded and voltagesremained above minimum acceptable values under design basis conditions. The teamreviewed the electrical overcurrent protective relay settings for the supply and selectedbreakers at the load center to verify that the trip setpoints would not interfere with theability of the supplied equipment to perform its safety function as assumed in the designbasis while ensuring the trip setpoints provided for adequate load center protection. Theteam reviewed plant operating procedures to verify design limitations were not exceededfor load center crosstie operation and that separation between divisions was maintainedconsistent with technical specification requirements. The team reviewed systemmaintenance test results, interviewed system and design engineers, and conducted fieldwalkdowns to verify that equipment alignment, nameplate data, and breaker positionswere consistent with design drawings, and to assess the material condition of the loadEnclosure 18center. Finally, a sample of condition reports was reviewed to ensure Dominion wasidentifying and properly correcting issues associated with the 32R load center as well asother 480Vac system components.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.2 Review of Industrv Ooeratinq Experience and Generic lssues (4 samples)The team reviewed selected OE issues for applicability at the Millstone Power Station.The team performed a detailed review of the OE issues listed below to verify thatDominion had appropriately assessed potential applicability to site equipment andinitiated corrective actions when necessary..2.2.1 NRC lnformation Notice 2011-14. Component Coolinq Water Svstem Gas Accumulationand Other Performance lssuesa. Inspection ScopeThe NRC issued information notice (lN) 2011-14 to inform licensees of recent operatingexperience regarding air intrusion into component cooling water (CCW) systems, as wellas other CCW system performance issues. The team reviewed Dominion's evaluation ofthe susceptibility of the Unit 2 reactor building CCW system and the Unit 3 reactor plantCCW system to these types of problems. Specifically, the team reviewed drawings andprocedures, and interviewed engineering staff to determine whether Dominion had fullyaddressed allthe potential issues identified in the information notice.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.2.2 NRC lnformation Notice 2008-06. Instrument Air Svstem Failure Resultino ln ManualReactor Tripa. Inspection ScopeThe NRC issued lN 2008-06 to inform licensees of an event involving an instrument airsystem failure that resulted in a manual reactor trip. The team reviewed Dominion'sevaluation of the instrument air system's susceptibility to leaks. Specifically, the teamreviewed the condition report and corrective actions related to a similar event thatoccurred at Millstone Unit 2 prior to the publication of the information notice to determinewhether those corrective actions were sufficient to address the potential issues identifiedin the information notice.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.Enclosure 19.2.2.3 NRC lnformation Notice 2011-12. Reactor Trips Resultinq from Water Intrusion intoElectrical Equipmenta. Inspection ScopeThe team assessed Dominion's review and follow-up actions to address the issuesdescribed in NRC lN 2011-12. This lN described several events where uncorrectedwater leaks caused electrical faults and grounds that resulted in reactor trips. In twoinstances, the electrical fault resulted in plant trips with complications because ofadditional latent design and preventive maintenance deficiencies. Specifically, the teamreviewed Dominion's evaluations and follow-up corrective actions for this operatingexperience item to determine whether Dominion's actions were adequate and appropriatefor the described issues.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.2.4 NRC lnformation Notice 2010-05. lnadeouate Electrical Connectionsa. Inspection ScopeThe team evaluated Dominion's applicability review and disposition of NRC lN 2010-25.The lN was issued to inform licensees about operating experience regarding inadequateelectrical connections that were caused by a variety of deficient maintenance practices.Additionally, the lN described events at four nuclear power plants that occurred fromelectrical connection problems.The team assessed Dominion's evaluation of the lN as it applied to the Millstone PowerStation, including their review of station practices and procedures to ensure electricalconnections were properly reassembled after maintenance, and periodically verified tightand with low resistance consistent with vendor requirements. The inspection included areview of corrective action documents, interviews with engineering and maintenancepersonnel, and plant walkdowns of the Unit 2 and Unit 3 medium voltage bus ducts. Theteam verified that Dominion considered all configurations and voltage levels of electricalconnections as described in the information notice.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.Enclosure

4OA2 ldentification and Resolution of Problems (lP 71152)a. Insoection ScopeThe team reviewed a sample of problems that Dominion had previously identified andentered into the corrective action program. The team reviewed these issues to verify anappropriate threshold for identifying issues and to evaluate the effectiveness of correctiveactions. In addition, corrective action CRs written on issues identified during theinspection, were reviewed to verify adequate problem identification and incorporation ofthe problem into the corrective action system. The specific corrective action documentsthat were sampled and reviewed by the team are listed in the Attachment.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.4046 Meetinqs. includinq ExitOn May 11,2012, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. Stephen Scace, SiteVice President, and other members of the Millstone Power Station management. Theteam reviewed proprietary information, which was returned to Dominion at the end of theinspection. The team verified that no proprietary information was documented in thereport.Enclosure

A-1ATTACHMENT

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Dominion Personnel

B. Badron, Supervisor, Licensing

T. Cleary, Licensing Engineer

J. Craffey, Principal Engineer

K. Deslandes, Supervisor, Engineering

D. Dodson, Supervisor, Engineering

R. Patel, Electrical Design Engineer

J. Rigatti, Manager, Nuclear Engineering

B. Saitta, Electrical Design Engineer

NRC Personnel

C. Cahill, Senior ReactorAnalyst

S. Shaffer, Senior Resident lnspector

B. Haagensen, Resident Inspector

J. Krafty, Resident lnspector

LIST OF ITEMS

Open and

Closed

05000336/2012007-01OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSEDNCV Inadequate Assumptions used in EmergencyMotor Control Center Control Circuit VoltageDrop Calculation (Section 1R21 .2.1.1)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Audits and Self-AssessmentsAudit 10-03: Engineering Programs and Design Control, dated 8l19l11Calculations & Enqineerino Evaluations00-059, MP3 SW System NPSH Calculation, Rev. 000-067, MP2 RBCCW Heat Exchanger Testing, Rev. A006-ST97-C-019, MP2 RBCCW Peak Temperature Analysis, Rev. 1006-3T97-C-023, Updated CONTRANS LOCA Containment Peak Pressure/TemperatureAnalysis for Millstone Unit 2, Rev. 1006-5T97-C-024,

MP-2 Containment Related Main Steam Line Break Analysis for FSAR Update,Rev. 0201-007-008, Seismic Analysis Report, Service Water Pumps, Rev. 301-ENG-O1884M3, Service Water Cubicle Internal Flooding Evaluation, Rev. 003705-US(B)-362, RSS Pump NPSH Requirements, Rev. 0Attachment

A-203-ENG-04035M2, SW System Design Basis Summary Calculation, Rev. 004-AOV-04063M3, Actuator Setup Calculation for the Category I Air Operated Valves - MSSSystem, Rev.005-ENG-04123M3, BoricAcid Storage Tank Volume Delivered to RCS - Post Fire, Rev. 209-lST-04441M3, Millstone Unit 3 IST Pump Summary of Design Flow Rates, Rev. 012179-953P(B), EDG Enclosure Ventilation, Rev. 212179GM-60-03.001CA,125 VDC Distribution Panel Feeder Breakers Trip Settings, Rev. 012179GM-60-03.001CB, Battery Breaker Trip Settings, Rev. 012179GM-60-03.405CA, Relay Settings - 600HP Service Water Pump, Rev.1fi272.A2-ME(B)-002, Sizing of CST Rupture Discs & Breather Valves, Rev. 125203-SP-EE-362, Millstone Unit 2 Station Blackout Safe Shutdown Scenario Document, Rev. 225203-SP-M2-SU-1046, MP 2 Appendix R Compliance Report, Rev. 013451C01-1187E3, BoricAcid Tank Level Channel Calibration, Rev. 184-065-00753GE, 480V Breaker Overcurrent Trip Device, Rev. 290-032-0293E2, CST Level LoopAccuracy, Rev. 591-019-152M3, ldentification of EDG Run Times Under Varying Fuel Oil Levels, dated 1l28lo292-120, MP2 SWS Design Basis Alignments - Summer & Winter, Rev. 396-018, MP2 Service Water Thermal Hydraulic Model, Rev. 196-ENG-02172M3, SBO Diesel Generator Run Time, Rev. 197-169, MP2 RBCCW - Design Basis Flow Distribution, Rev. 397-CST-01999M2, CST Inventory Evaluation, Rev. 197-ENG-01768E2, MP2 Pressurizer Pressure Loop Uncertainty, Rev. 197-ENG-01773E2, MPz DC System Analysis, Methodology, & Scenario Development, Rev. 197-ENG-01774E2, MP2 Battery 201A & Charger ElectricalVerification, Rev. 297-ENG-01 840E2, MP2 Thermal Overload Relays for MOVs on Safety Related MCCs, Rev. 197-ENG-01 862M2, RBCCW System Heat Loads and Flow Rates, Rev. 097-ENG-0191E2,4.16kV Switchgear Relay Settings, Rev. 098-CST-02644M2, CST Lo-Lo Alarm and AFW Pump NPSH, Rev. 098-ENG-02427E2, MP2 LTOP Pressure Setpoints, Rev. 198-ENG-02678E2, Cable Size Assessment for Class 1E Cables and Select Non-Class 1ECables (4160 VAC, 480 VAC, 120 V VitalAC and 125V DC), Rev. 098-ENG-02711M2, Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Acceptance Curve, Rev. 198-TBV-02682M2, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room-Maximum Prevailing RoomTemperature, Rev.099-517-896-RE, Station Blackout Calculation for NUMARC 87-00, Rev. 2ANP-2979, MP2 Cycle 21 Safety Analysis Report, Rev. 1CCN 91-019-152M3, EDG Run Times Under Varying Fuel Oil Levels, dated 3128107CN-PS-06-19, MP2 Mass Addition LTOP Transients, Rev. 2CN-SEE-I-11-22, Millstone Unit 3 Cycle 15 BORDER Evaluation, dated 8118111DCN

DM2-03-0290-02, Setpoint Change DC Bus Ground Detection Meters, dated 11115103DCN

DM3-00-0395-08, Revision to 125 VDC Battery Panel Breaker Settings, Rev. 0DM2-00-0211-07 , Replacement of the C CAR FaniMotor Assembly F14C, dated 3114108DMG-00-0013-07,lmplementation of Ultra Low Sulfur Diesel Fuel Oil for the SBO, EOF,Emergency Security and Fire Pump Diesels, dated 8/30/07DOM-NAF-3-0.0-P-A, GOTHIC Methodology for Analyzing the Response to Postulated PipeRuptures Inside Containment, dated 9/06EEQ-TRA-146.6 Att. C, Target Rock Pilot Operated Relief Valve Diagram, Rev. 0EQR 146-03, MP2 PORV Equipment Qualification Record, Rev. 1Attachment

A-3ER-AA-IST-PMP-101, Att. 1, MDAFW Pump IST Reference Value Evaluation, dated 3117110GSI-191-ECCS-04364M3, MPS3 RSS Pump NPSH with ECCS Strainer and Debris Bed, Rev.ME-696, Seismic Stress Analysis, Containment Recirculation Pumps, dated 3129198MlL3-34325-AR-001, Hydraulic Performance of Replacement Containment Sump StrainersMillstone 3 Power Station, Rev. 2MlL3-34325-TR-002, Large Scale Testing for Millstone 3 Replacement Containment SumpStrainers, Rev.0Millstone Unit 2 Turbine Building High Energy Line Break (HELB) Analysis, Rev. 2MOV8910-01542E3, GL89-10 MOV Electrical Sizing Calculation, Rev. 1MP-24-FAPAl.2-5, MDAFW Pump Test Data Evaluation, dated 6118/02MP2-ENG-ETAP-0401 4E2, MP2 Electrical Distribution System Analysis, Rev. 1MP2-SEIS.RPT, Seismic Evaluation Report, Vol.2, Rev. 0MP3-ENG-ETAP-04125E3, MP3 Electrical Distribution System Analysis, Rev. 0P(R)-1015, Reactor Plant Component Cooling Surge Tank Volume, Rev. 0P(R)-1188, BATP Minimum Flow Orifice Sizing Calculation: 3CHS*RO51A/8, Rev. 0P(R)-1194, ESF Bldg Flood Study, Rev. 2P(R)-711, Reactor Plant Component Cooling System Surge Tank Sizing, Rev. 1PA-079-126-0127E2, MP2 EDG Loading Calculation, Rev' 3PA-090-050-00308E3, Station Blackout Diesel Generator Loading, Rev. 3PA-84-065-753GE, 480 Volt Breaker Overcurrent Trip Devices Change Notice 10, Rev. 2PA-85-082-0812GE, MP3 Breaker and Fuse Coordination, Rev. 3PA-89-078-272E2, MP2 MOV Voltage Calculation, Rev' 0PA-91-004-290E2, Emergency MCC Control Circuit Voltage Drop, Rev. 0pA-91-019-556E3, Ampacity of RSST and NSST Secondary Cables and SBO Diesel Generatorand Emergency Generator Leads lnstalled in Duct Banks, Rev' 1Sp-3CCP-018, Reactor Plant Component Cooling System Surge Tank Low LevelActuationPoint, Rev.2SP-EE-363, Millstone Unit 3 Station Blackout Safe Shutdown Scenario Document, Rev. 6SP-M2-ME-1053, MP2 PORV Design Specification, Rev. 2SP-M3-EE-269, Electrical Design Criteria, Rev. 3US(B) 249, Determination of Max Water Level lnside Containment Following a LOCA, Rev. 3US(B) 295, RWST Draw-Down Rates and Switchover Levels, Rev. 8US(g) 361, Containment Recirc Sys (RSS) and Safety Injection Sys Hydraulic Analysis, Rev. 3W2-517-1070-RE, MP2 Internal Flooding Evaluation, Rev.0Corrective Action Condition Reports01 -1 094003-0188103-0670505-0549506-01 45706-01 79606-0184606-0224506-1 01 0007-0901 507-4390908-0779108-079311753371847271857671 85769190642321796322576324466324779328272331635331 836333889335122336522336563343478346910347899351 3893528743549303553503553873556083557113557583564483564573578903585543586283591 7536900337710837737237749137769037832138432638476538694038962339001 03939013941 89398042Attachment

39804440102740233840240140263940308640330940331 140453140466340494740710340794641 0981418327418879419268420006421695422160422201422841423930424175424367425328432098432569433385434340434740435063435575436253436737439014441520442164A-4442623443513446706446913447207447236448553448592448648448844451123454096454235454237458475459071459385460241464007464431466675468904471092.471151*471247*471487*471933*472108"472308.472986.473152.473226*473296473355473454*473461.473464"473518.473579*473585.473601.473971.474228.474229"474238.474245"474252*474261"474270*474333.474370*474380*474411*474503"474510"474629*474634*" CR written as a result of this inspectionDesign and Licensino Basis Documents25203-MP2-SFR, MP2 Safety Functional Requirements Manual, Rev.

IDBS-2301 , MP2 Reactor Coolant System Design Basis Summary, Rev. 0DBS-23134, Containment Air Recirculation and Cooling System, Rev. 0DBS-23198, MP2 Condensate Storage and Transfer System Design Basis Summary, Rev. 0DBS-2322, MP2 Auxiliary Feedwater System Design Basis Summary, Rev' 2DBS-2326A, MP2 Design Basis Summary for the Service Water System, Rev. 1DBS-2345C, MP2 125VDC Emergency System Design Basis Summary, Rev. 1DBS-BOP-0o1, MP3 Service Water System Design Basis Summary, Rev' 1DBS-EDG-QQ1, MP3 Design Basis Summary Document, EDG Engine, Rev' 1DBS-EDG-Q03, MP3 Design Bases Summary for the Station Blackout Diesel Generator, Rev. 1DBS-ELE-oo5, MP3 125 VDC Electrical Distribution System Design Basis Summary, Rev. 1DBS-NSS-OO3, MP3 Recirculation Spray System Design Basis Summary, Rev. 1DBS-NSS-ggs, MP3 Design Basis Summary for the Emergency Core Cooling System, Rev.ODBS-NSS-g97, MP3 Design Basis Summary for the Reactor Plant Component Cooling WaterSystem, Rev.0DM2-00-0189-07, Update to

DBS-2301, dated 10129109Drawings2214.802-044-021, MP3 RSS Pump Characteristic Curves, Rev' C2472110-185-241, Stm Sply Vlv to Aux FD Pmp, Rev B25203-11017, MP2 Misc. Yard Foundation (CST), Rev. 325203-13006, Sh. 21, MP2 Condensate Storage Tank, Rev. 625203-26002, Sh. 1,MPz Main Steam from Generators, Rev. 725203-26005, Sh. 3, MP2 Condensate Storage & Aux. Feed, Rev. 5725203-26008, Sh. 2,MP2 Service Water, Rev. 9925203-26009, Sh. 5, MP2 Instrument Air System, Rev. 33Attachment

203-26014, Sh. 2, MP2 Reactor Coolant System, Rev. 4125203-26022, Sh. 5, MP2 RBCCW System Cntmt Air Recirc and Coolant Unit, Rev. 2625203-26022, Sh. 1,MPz RBCCW System, Rev.4525203-26027, Sh. 1,MPz HVAC System TB, Intake Structure, WHSE & EDG Rooms, Rev.4825203-28406, Sh. 25, MP2 CST Level Control Level Setting Diagram, Rev. 525203-28500, Sh.99D,MPzTE-121Y,TE-125, and

PT-103 Cold Leg Temp. to Reactor LOOPDiagram, Rev.725203-29004, Sh. 198, MP2 GeneralArrangement Cooling Water Exchanger ReplacementChannels, Rev.225203-29004, Sh. 22,MP2 Reactor Building Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger, Rev. 125203-29004, Sh. 54,MPz RBCCW Heat Exchanger Bill of Material, Rev.425203-29008, Sh. 33, MP2 MDAFW Pump GeneralAssembly, Rev. B25203-29052, Sh. 1, MPz 34" 600# W.E. Main Steam Swing Disc Trip Valve - Air CylinderOperated, Rev. 1325203-29052, Sh. 2,MPz Schematic Diagram of Air Control System for MSSV Rev.425203-29087, Sh. 1, MPz Model D-100-160 Operator 8' 600 lb. A.N.S.l. Valve Assembly, Rev. 725203-30011,MPz Emergency

MCC 861 (22-1F) Facility Z.2Load Summary Aux Building,Rev.1325203-30022, Sh. 1, MP2 TB, (DV10) 125 VDC Distribution Summary Rev. 625203-30022, Sh. 3, MP2 TA, (DV20) 125 VDC Distribution Summary Rev' 525203-30024,MP2125 VDC System Single Line Diagram, Rev. 3225203-30078, MP3 125VDC System Single Line Diagram, Rev. 3225203-30107, Sh. 1, MP2125 VDC Load Center Circuit Breaker Settings, Rev. 225203-30107, Sh. 2,MP2125 VDC Load Center Circuit Breaker Settings, Rev. 125203-30107, Sh. 3, MP2 125 VDC Load Center Circuit Breaker Settings, Rev. 325203-32002, Sh. 15, 4.16kV Main Feeder Breaker 348-24E-2 (A505), Rev. 125203-32002, Sh. 15A, 4.16kV Main Feeder Breaker 348-24E-2 (A505), Rev. 125203-32007, Sh. 23 &24, MP2 Pressurizer Relief RC4021404 Schematic, Rev. 1225203-32007, MP2 Pressurizer Relief SOV RC402, Rev. 1225203-32008, Sh. 33, MP2 Shutdown Cooling lsolation

MOV 51652, Rev. 1625203-32011, Sh. 57, MPz B Containment Air Recirc Fan 148, Rev. 625203-32022, Sh. 3, MP2 Ctmt Air Recirc Fan MF14B Control, Rev. 1525203-32041 , Sh. 1, MP2 4 kV Diesel Generator Breaker Schematic, Rev. 1325203-32041 , Sh. 16, MP2 4.16KV Diesel Generator Engine Controls 15G-1 3U-2 (H4B), Rev. 1025203-32041, Sh. 19, MPz 4.16KV Diesel Generator Engine ControlslSG-13U-2 (H4B), Rev. 1025203-32041 , Sh. 2, 4.16KV DG Feeder Breaker 15G-13U-2 (H4B) (A401), Rev. 1525212-26904, Sh. 3, MP3 ChemicalVolume and Control, Rev. 3225212-26912, Sh. 3, MP3 Low Pressure Safety Injection/Containment Recirculation, Rev. 3825212-26913, Sh. 2, MP3 High Pressure Safety Injection, Rev. 3925212-26916, Sh. 1, MP3 EDG 'A' Lube Oil and Cooling Water, Rev. 4325212-26916, Sh. 2, MP3 EDG'A'Starting Air System, Rev. 3725212-26916, Sh. 5, MP3 EDG Exhaust, Combustion Air, and Vacuum System, Rev. 925212-26917, MP3 EDG Fuel Oil System, Rev. 2325212-26921, Sh. 1, MP3 Reactor Plant Component Cooling System, Rev. 3225212-26921, Sh. 2, MP3 Reactor Plant Component Cooling System, Rev. 2025212-26921, Sh. 3, MP3 Reactor Plant Component Cooling System, Rev. 3525212-26923, Sh. 1, MP3 Main Steam and Reheat, Rev. 5125212-26930, Sh. 2, MP3 Feedwater System, Rev. 44Attachment

212-26933, Sh. 1, MP3 Service Water, Rev. 4425212-26933, Sh. 2, MP3 Service Water, Rev. 7025212-26933, Sh. 4, MP3 Service Water, Rev. 4425212-26958, Sh. 1, MP3 Station Blackout Lube Oil System, Rev. 1025212-26958, Sh. 2, MP3 Station Blackout Diesel Cooling System, Rev. 725212-26958, Sh. 3, MP3 Station Blackout Diesel Fuel Oil System, Rev'1025212-26958, Sh. 5, MP3 Station Blackout Diesel Engine Air Intake & Exhaust System, Rev. 425212-26958, Sh. 6, MP3 Station Blackout DieselAir Conditioning, Ventilation & Heating, Rev. 225212-26958, Sh. 9, MP3 Station Blackout DieselAir Start System, Rev. 925212-28143, Sh. 1, MP3 Logic Diagram, EDG Fuel, Rev. 1225212-29022, Sh. 6, MP3 Reactor Plant Component Cooling Surge Tank, Rev. 425212-29044, Sh. 3, Outline 10x12x20

BC-VR 5 Stg, Rev. N25212-30001, MP3 Main One Line / Phasing Diagram, Rev. 2525212-30004, MP3 Main One Line Diagram, Rev. 1925212-30018, MP3 4.16KV One Line Diagram, Rev. 3925212-30027, Sh. 3, MP3 480V MCC One Line Diagram -Auxiliary Bldg, Rev. 3425212-30033, 480V One Line Diagram [3EJS.US-3A & 3EJS*US-38], Rev. 1425212-30033, MP3 480V One Line Diagram, Rev. 1425212-32001, Sh. 6AJU, MP3 Elementary Diagram 480 VAC MC - Containment RecirculatingCooling Coil Supply Valve [3CCP-MOV222l, Rev' 925212-32001, Sh. 6AJV MP3 Elementary Diagram 480 VAC MC - Containment RecirculatingCooling Coil Supply Valve [3CCP.MOV223], Rev. 925212-32001, Sh. 6AJY MP3 Elementary Diagram 480 VAC MC - Containment RecirculatingCooling Coil Supply Valve [3CCP.MOV226l, Rev. 920212-32001, Sh. 6AJZ, MP3 Elementary Diagram 480 VAC MC - Containment RecirculatingCooling Coil Supply Valve [3CCP-MOV227l, Rev' 925212-32001, Sh. 6GD, MP3 Elementary Diagram 480V MC - Boric Acid Transfer Pump[3CHS.P2A], Rev.1025212-52001, Sh. 7LX, MP3 Elementary Diagram 125VDC - Non-Safety Header Supply andReturn Valves [3CCP.AOV10A,B & 19A,B], Rev. 625212-92001, Sh. 7ME, MP3 Elementary Diagram 125VDC - Component Cooling Xconn Valves[3CCP.AOV1 79A,8], Rev. 825212-32001, Sh. 7MF, MP3 Elementary Diagram 125VDC - Component Cooling Xconn Valves[3CCP.AOV1 80A,8], Rev. 625212-32001, Sh. 7MG, MP3 Elementary Diagram 125VDC - Non-Safety Header Supply andReturn Valves [3CCP.AOV194A,B & 1974,8], Rev. 625212-59700, Sh. 5, Fin Details (Sump Strainer), Rev. 125302-29616, Sh.7,MPz 8-inch

POS-A-SET Rupture Disc, Rev.325302-29616, Sh. 8, MP2 12-inch

CAL-VAC Rupture Disc, Rev. 3Functional. Surveillance and Modification Acceptance TestinoDiagnostic Summary, 3SlH*CV8824, pertormed 1 0/30/1 1EDG Fuel Oil Sample Results, Particulate, Cetane Index, and API Gravity,

118109 - 4112112EN 31174, 3EGS*E1N2N1B/2B Thermal Performance Test, performed 8l25logEN31046D, Simulator Timed Start Test of the Station Blackout Diesel, performed 2122111ER-AA-HTX-1002, HX Program Visual and Leak Testing, performed 2113112ER-AA-IST-PMP-101 Att. 1, IST Pump Reference Value Evaluation Form for 3CHS.P2A,performed 2122112Attachment

A-7ER-AA-IST-PMP-101 Att. 1, IST Pump Reference Value Evaluation Form for 3CHS*P2A,performed 519110lC 3471A01, Station Blackout Diesel Uninterruptable Power Supply Testing, performed 2123112MTE-02048, Multi-Amp DC Circuit Breaker Test, performedTl5lllOP 3346D, SBO DieselOperating Log, performed3l21l12Pump Summary Report, MP3 'A' EDG Fuel OilTransfer Pump,

411109 - 4112112Pump Summary Report, MP3 'C' EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump,

411109 - 4112112SP 2604T, Actuation Tests of Various ESF Components, Facility 1, performed 518112SP 26074, Containment Air Recirculation and Cooling System Operability Test, Facility 1,performed 1 117 112,

2114112,

3113112,

4110112, and 518112SP 26078, Containment Air Recirculation and Cooling System Operability Test, Facility 2,performed 1 13112, 1 131 112,

2128112, and 41241 12SP 2610AO, 'A'AFW Pump and Recirc Check Valve lST, Facility 1, performed 3112112SP 261oAR, MDAFW Comprehensive Pump Testing, Facility 1, performed 4121111SP 2610E-001 , Main Steam lsolation Valve Closure Test, performed

412111,

4130111, and 9113111SP 2610E-017, Main Steam System Valve Remote Position Indication IST: 2-MS-64N648165A/65B, performed

412111 and 4130111SP 2610E-019, Manual Cycle of 2-MS-3A, 2-MS-190A, 2-MS-38, and 2-MS-1908, performed4122111SP 2610G-001, PORV Stroke Time IST Test, performed 4124111SP 2613, Periodic DG Slow Start Operability Test, performed 3128112SP 2613G, Facility 1 ESF Integrated Test, performed 414111SP 2613H, Facility 2 ESF Integrated Test, performed 4117111SP 3604C.4-001, 3CHS*P2A Quarterly IST Pump Test, performed 419112SP 3604C.4-OO2,3CHS.P2A Biennial IST Comprehensive Pump Test, performed 5/9i 10 and1111111SP 3626.7, SW Pump 3SWP.P1D Comprehensive Test, performed 3/10/11SP 3626.7, SW Pump 3SWP.P1D Operability Test, performed 2l1ol12SP 36304.7, 'A Train RPCCW Valve Stroke Time Test, performed 2116112SP 36464.1, EDG'A'OperabilityTest (24-Hour Run), performed

3123111,3122112,and4117112SP 3646D.1, SBO Diesel Black Start Test, performed 6122111SP 3670.4, Quarterly SBO PM, performed 3121112Valve Test Data, 3SlH.CV8824 (Stroke Time Closed),

4124107 - 2122112Valve Test Data, 3SIH.CV8824 (Stroke Time Open),

4124107 - 2122112Valve Test Data, 3SWP.AOV39A (Stroke Time Close),

114105 - 316112Valve Test Data, 3SWP.AOV39A (Stroke Time Open),114105 -316112Miscellaneous006-ST97-C-023, Containment Pressure/Temperature & Sump Water Temperature, Rev.102-AFW2322-1.01, Auxiliary Feedwater System MR Function, dated 212510909-15T-04441M3,Millstone Unit 3 IST Pump Summary of Design Flow Rates, Rev. 011-206072, Contract and Margin Test, EDG Set for Millstone Unit 3, dated 101101762-11-O}3,Temporary Modification, Temporary Leak Injection of ADV M22-MS-1908, Rev. 02425.220-01, Specification

SP-EE-342, Rev. 22472.1 10-185, Specification for Electro-Hydraulic and Air-Operated Control Valves, Rev. 525203-ER-98-0170, CST Inventory Licensing Basis

Memorandum, Rev' 026694-003, Operator Rounds, MP2 Strainer D/P Trend Results, 314112-5111123SWP-043B, Service Water Instrument Loop Calibration Report, Rev. 2Attachment

A-87604-M-20, RBCCW Heat Exchanger Data Sheet, Rev. 27604-M-250, Automatic Self-Cleaning Strainers for SW System, Rev. 8AFW-0O-C, Auxiliary Feedwater System Lesson Plan, Rev. 5Bulletin 206-381, ASCO Red-Hat Catalog

NP-1, Rev.1CDA026C/MC-00311, Containment Depressurization System Lesson Plan, Rev. 5Certificate of Conformance

EN-10-204-2.1, 8-inch

POS-A-SET-V Rupture Disc, dated 7112100Certificate of Conformance

EN-10-204-3,1.B, 12-inch V-CAL-VAC Rupture Disc, dated 7l12lA0DCR M2-97007, Vital Coolers for MCC B51 and 861 Enclosures - Auxiliary Building, Rev. 0DCR M3-07018,

SPU-Heat Removal Systems and Containment Analysis Design, Rev. 0DM3-01-0049-07, EDG: lmplementation of Ultra Low Sulfur Diesel Fuel, dated 1111108ECR 113-03, Aux Feedwater Pump Drive Motor Equipment Qualification Record, Rev. 3ER-96-0036, Plant Operating Instructions, Rev. 0FQP-22-9110, Qualification Report for Groups lX and X Control Valves, dated 5118182GMB-81-439, Trip Report, Containment Recirculation Pump Performance Test, dated 12118180IEEE 450, Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Lead-Acid Batteries, 1980 EditionJPM-040, Shift Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Suction to Firewater, Rev. 7Memorandum

PSM2-93-612, MPz Contactor Control Circuit Testing, dated 7102193MP2-ENG-98-018, CST lnventory &

CN-241 Single Failure

Memorandum, dated 7122198NAI 8907-09, GOTHIC Containment Analysis Package Qualification Report, Yer.7.2NUCENG-11-23, Att. 1, Open Margin lssues List, dated 12122111OD

000468, 'A' EDG Load Swings During Monthly Testing, dated 1127112Plant Process Computer Trend of RPCCW Surge Tank Level,2l3l12to 513112Program Health Report, Air-Operated Valves, Q4-2011Publication No. 9079600-991, Basler Electric Co. Operating and Service Manual, Rev.1Pump and Valve Bases Document, MP3 Diesel Fuel Oil System, Rev. 4Pump and Valve Bases Document, MP3 High Pressure Safety Injection System, Rev. 3RBC-QO-C, MP2 Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System Training, Rev. 6RT 4764, GE Report of Test Induction Motor Mark No. 3SWP.P1D, Rev. 1SP 2670-002,'B' RBCCW HX DP Determination Trend Results,

1118109 - 218112SP-EE-321, MP3 Technical Setpoint Control Listing, Rev.2Station Blackout Diesel Generator Performance Monitoring and Trending Plan, dated 1114104SWP076C, Service Water System Lesson Plan, Rev. 3SWS-00-C , MP2 Service Water System Training, Rev. 6System Health Report, MPz125 VDC Systems, Q4-2011System Health Report, MP2 6.9kV and 4.16kV Distribution, Q4-2011System Health Report, MP2 Auxiliary Feedwater, Q4-2011System Health Report, MP2 CAR Fans, Q1-2012System Health Report, MP2 CST & Aux Feedwater, Q4-2011System Health Report, MP2 Main Steam, Q4-2011System Health Report, MP2 Reactor Coolant System, Q4-2011System Health Report, MP3 6.9kV and 4.16kV Distribution, Q4-2Q11System Health Report, MP3 125 VDC Systems, Q4-2011System Health Report, MP3 480Volt AC Load Centers, Q4-2011 and Q1-2012System Health Report, MP3 Chemical and Volume Control System, Q1-2012System Health Report, MP3 Containment Recirculation Spray, Q4'2011System Health Report, MP3 Emergency Diesel Generator and Fuel Oil, Q4-2011System Health Report, MP3 High Head Safety lnjection, Q4-2011System Health Report, MP3 Reactor Plant Component Cooling System, Q4-2011Attachment

A-9System Health Report, MP3 Service Water, Q4-2011T3-12-007, Temporary Modification, Fail Open 3HVP.MOD2OA, Rev. 0Valve Summary Report Millstone Unit 2 - 2-MS-190A,

111110 - 111112Valve Summary Report Millstone Unit 2 - 2-MS-64A,

111104 - 111112Valve Test Data Evaluation Form (3SWP*398), Baseline Test, dated 9120106Operatinq ExperienceNRC Information Notice 2008-06, Instrument Air System Failure Resulting in Manual ReactorTrip, dated 4110108NRC lnformation Notice2Ol0-25,Inadequate Electrical Connections, dated 11117110NRC lnformation Notice 2011-12, Reactor Trips Resulting from Water Intrusion into ElectricalEquipment, dated 61 1611 INRC Information Notice2011-14, Component Cooling Water System GasAccumulation andOther Performance lssues, dated 7118111Operatinq ProceduresAOP 2501, Diagnostic for Loss of Electrical Power, Rev. 1AOP 2564, Loss of RBCCW, Rev. 4AOP 2565, Loss of Service Water, Rev. 4AOP 3561, Loss of Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water, Rev. 11AOP 3566, lmmediate Boration, Rev. 10ARP 2590A-145, A-37, MSlActuation Sig Ch 1 Trip, Rev. 0ARP 2590A-146, B-37, MSI Actuation Sig Ch 2 Trip, Rev. 0ARP 2590D-027, C-7, Main Steam lsol Valve 1 Air Pres Lo, Rev. 0ARP 2590E-028, SW Pump A Strainer Trouble, Rev. 0ARP 2590F-033, 4kV Bus 24El34B Tie Bkr A505 Trip, Rev. 0ARP 2590F-035, 4kV Bus 348/24E Tie Feeder Undervoltage, Rev. 0EOP 2530, Station Blackout, Rev. 11EOP 2532, Loss of Coolant Accident, Rev. 29EOP 2534, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Rev. 25EOP 2536, Excess Steam Demand Event, Rev.24EOP 2537, Loss of All Feedwater, Rev. 21EOP 2541, Appendix 23, Restoring Electrical Power, Rev. 0EOP 2541, Appendix 36, ADV Local Operation, Rev. 0EOP 2541, Appendix 9, Aligning Fire Water to AFW, Rev. 0EOP 35

ECA-0.3, Loss of All AC Power - Recovery with the SBO Diesel, Rev. 13EOP 35

GA-25, Aligning SBO Diesel to Bus 34A or 348, Rev. 1OP 23134, Containment Air Recirculation and Cooling System, Rev. 9OP 23164, Main Steam System, Rev. 33OP 23198, Condensate Storage and Surge System, Rev. 15OP 2322, Auxiliary Feedwater System, Rev.27-02OP 2326A, Service Water System, Rev. 24OP 23304, RBCCW System, Rev. 23OP 2345CO,125 VDC Station Battery System - Operating, Rev. 0OP 2345CS, 125 VDC Station Battery System - Shutdown, Rev. 0OP 23484, 6,900 and 4,160 Volt Breaker Operation, Rev. 3OP 3326, Service Water System, Rev. 23-11OP 33304, Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water, Rev. 17Attachment

A-10OP 3343, Station Electrical Service 4.16kV, Rev. 14OP 33444, 480 Volt Load Centers, Rev. 14OP 3346A, EDG'A' - Starting Air Valve Lineup, Rev. 8OP 33468, Diesel Fuel Oil, Rev. 10OP 3353.EGPA, EDG Panel 'A'Annunciator Response, Rev. 4OP 3353.ME1C 2-78, RPCCW Surge Tank Level LoW Rev. 5OP 3353.M838 4-4A, BAT A Level High, Rev. 6OP 3353.M83B 4-48, BAT A Level Low, Rev. 6OP 3353.M838 5-48, BAT A Empty, Rev. 6OP 3353.MB8B, Main Board 88 Annunciator Response, Rev. 3OP 3353.S8O, ARP 3-5, Fuel Oil Day Tank Level Low, Rev. 4OP 3353.S8O, ARP 3-7, Fuel Oil Storage Tank Level Low, Rev. 4ProceduresAOV 1603, Fisher type 657NS Diaphragm Actuator Size 40, 45,70 Maintenance, Rev. 0CBM 114, Testing and Adjustment of Air Operated Valves Utilizing Fisher FlowScannerAOVDiagnostic Test Equipment, Rev. 2CMP 7804, GE ModelAM Magen-Blast Circuit Breakers PM, Rev. 4C-MP-780H,

AK-50 &

AK-75 Air Circuit Breaker PM, Rev. 1C-MP-782AE, Overcurrent Device Testing for MCC & Molded Case Breakers, Rev. 3CP 3802CW, Closed Cooling Water Systems Chemistry Control, Rev. 0CPT 1 407, Panel Meter and Transducer Calibration, Rev. 1CPT

1425112, Relay Type IFC Overcurrent, Rev. 2C-SP-750, Battery Weekly & Quarterly Surveillance, Rev. 2C-SP-760, Battery Discharge Test, Rev. 3CY-AA-AUX-310, EDG Fuel Oil Sampling and Testing, Rev. 4EN 21241, RBCCW System Facility 1 Flow Balance Verification, Rev.2EN 21242, RBCCW System Facility 2 Flow Balance Verification, Rev. 1EN-21154A, Tank Inspection Plan, Rev. 2EN-31154, Tank lnspection Plan, Rev. 3ER-AA-NDE-W-602, W-2 Visual Examination Procedure, Rev. 4MP 3720CM, DieselAir Start System and Component Repair, Rev. 2MP 3720CP, 24 Month EDG Mechanical PM, Rev. 0MP 37404, Overhaul of Boric Acid Transfer Pumps, Rev. 5MP 3762BE, Fisher Control Valve Maintenance for E Design Valve Bodies and ANSI Class 1500and 2500, Rev. 4MP 3782CA, 480 Volt Load Center Breaker PM and Testing, Rev, 13MP 3782D8,

AKR-30 &

AKR-50 Air Circuit Breaker Preventive Maintenance, Rev. 9MP 3784AD,4.16 and 6.9 KV Switchgear Bus & Cubicle Maintenance, Rev' 4MP-24-BKR-REF00, Circuit Breaker Maintenance Program, Rev. 6MP-26-EPl-FAP02-006, Manager of Technical Support Center, Rev. 7MTE-1152, Multi-Amp DC Circuit Breaker Tester Calibration, Rev. 4PI-AA-200, Corrective Action, Rev. 19PT-214248, AK Breakers with EC Trip Devices, Rev. 2SA-M-109, Heat Stress Management, Rev. 5SP 21160, Auxiliary and Main Feedwater System Leakage Test, Rev. 5SP 21167, Relief Valve Testing (lST), Rev. 6Attachment

A-11SP 2510E, MSIV Closure and Main Steam Valve Operational Readiness Testing, Rev. 11SP 2605CS-001,2-Fire-94A lST, Rev. 0SP 2610CS-006, 2-CN-29A ManualValve Stroke lST, Rev. 0SP 2619G, AC Electrical Sources lnoperability, Rev. 2SP 26694, Unit 2 Aux Building Rounds, Rev. 54SP 2670, Saltwater Cooled HX D/P Determination, Rev. 11SP 3616A.1, Main Steam System Valve Operability Tests, Rev. 13SP 3626.4, Service Water Pump 3SWP.P1A Operational Readiness Test, Rev. 14SP 36468.1, EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump P1A Operational Readiness, Rev. 9SP 36468.5, EDG Fuel Oil Storage Tank Dewatering, Rev. 8SP 36468.6, EDG Fuel Oil System Cross-Connect Capability Test, Rev' 8SP 3712T, Containment Penetration Overcurrent Device Surveillance Testing for Load Center,MCC, and Molded Case Breakers, Rev. 9SP-M3-EE-269, Electrical Design Criteria, Rev. 3Vendor Technical Manuals25203-127-AU, MP2 lnstallation, Operation, & Maint. of C&D Batteries, Rev. 325203-174-004, MP2 Installation, Operation, & Maint. of Cyberex Battery Chargers, Rev. 225203-731-003, MP2 Technical Manual, Target Rock PORV, Rev. 125203-300-049, Installation, Operation & Maint. of Custom 8000 Horizontal Induction Motors,Rev. 125203-680-001A, Struthers-Wells Heat Exchangers, Rev. B25212-001-017, lnstallation, Operation and Maintenance of BATP, Rev. 425212-004-001, Installation, Operation and Maintenance of Service Water Pumps, Rev. 125212-185-001, Installation, Operation & Maint. of Control Valves and Accessories, Rev. 125212-241-001, Installation, Operation & Maint. of EDG Engine (Coltec Industries, Inc.), Rev. 2425212-262-001, MP2 Installation, Operation, & Maint. of DC Distribution Panels, Rev. 2GEI 88761H, Instructions and Recommended Parts for Maintenance, AM'4.16-250-8, Rev.

HWM2-300-017 A, Miscellaneous GE Furnished Electrical Equipment, Rev. 0Work Orders5310218302853102191 1 36531021967975310219681453102198814531 021 98908531022024725310223951453102251885531022589665310225920353102259509531 02286330531 02293003531 02301 0645310231723953102325832531 02337558531

0233801 95310234263153102343679531023515505310235155253102354589531 02355597531

0235591 153102360001531 023605045310236050553102365355531 02365357531 023684015310237076253102372032531023743255310237432653102376770531 0238046053142425458531 0244809953102452215531

0245961 6531024775455310250496653M2040558653M2040762653M2041163953M2041 176853M2050182053M2050284153M2050412853M2050845253M2060543853M2060688453M2060699153M2060702853M2060780153M2060847453M2060877253M2060881 153M2070253653M2070255953M2070256053M2070449953M2070948953M2080308653M2080737753M20808949Attachment

253M2206069153M2901257153M2950787753M301 1468753M301 1481453M3040604053M3060874953M3061390253M3070348353M3070406653M3070435753M3070439253M3071 157353M3070449553M30807734M20406522M20406523M20704977M20704978M20175511M30021973M30022078M30022087M3031 2700M30312701M30710667ACADAMSADVAFWBATPCARccwCDBICPTCRCSTDBADCDGDRSDRPEDGEOPEQlMcINIPISTKVtERFLOCAMSIVMCCNCVNPSHNRCOEPORVPRARAWRBCCWRPCCW

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Alternating CurrentAgencyruide Documents Access and Management SystemAtmospheric Dump ValveAuxiliary FeedwaterBoric Acid Transfer PumpContainment Air RecirculationComponent Cooling WaterComponent Design Bases lnspectionControl Power TransformerCondition ReportCondensate Storage TankDesign Basis AccidentDirect CurrentDiesel GeneratorDivision of Reactor SafetyDivision of Reactor ProjectsEmergency Diesel GeneratorEmergency Operating ProcedureEnvironmental QualificationInspection Manual Chapterlnformation NoticeInspection Procedureln-Service TestKilovoltLarge Early Release FrequencyLoss-of-Coolant AccidentMain Steam lsolation ValveMotor Control CenterNon-cited ViolationNet Positive Suction HeadNuclear Regulatory CommissionOperating ExperiencePower Operated Relief ValveProbabilistic Risk AssessmentRisk Achievement WorthReactor Building Component Cooling WaterReactor Plant Component Cooling WaterAttachment

A-13RRW Risk Reduction WorthRSS Recirculation Spray SystemSBO Station BlackoutSDP Significance Determination ProcessSPAR Standardized Plant Analysis ReportSW Service WaterTDH Total Dynamic HeadTRM Technical Requirements ManualTS Technical SpecificationUFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis ReportVAC Volts, Alternating CurrentVDC Volts, Direct CurrentAttachment