B12244, Forwards Reviews for Isap Topics 1.29, Flooding Evaluation, 1.53, Containment Emergency Sump Performance & 1.62, Feed & Bleed Sys Mod

Forwards Reviews for Isap Topics 1.29, Flooding Evaluation, 1.53, Containment Emergency Sump Performance & 1.62, Feed & Bleed Sys Mod

ML20215N703
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	10/27/1986
From:	Opeka J CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO.
To:	Charemagne Grimes Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
B12244, NUDOCS 8611070178
Download: ML20215N703 (11)

Text

.. .

CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY N

B E R L i fl. CONNECT 1 CUT P o Box 270 HARTFORD. CONNECTICUT 06141-0270 T ELEPHONE 203-665-5000 October 27, 1986 e Docket No. 50-213 B12244 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

'A ttn: Mr. Christopher I. Grimes, Director Integrated Safety Assessment Project Directorate Division of PWR Licensing - B U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

References:

(1) 3. F. Opeka letter to C.1. Grimes, dated May 17,1985.

(2) H. L. Thompson letter to 3. F. Opeka, dated July 31,1985.

Gentlemen:

Haddam Neck Plant Integrated Safety Assessment Program In Reference (1), Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPCO) provided a proposed scope for the Integrated Safety Assessment Program (ISAP) review of the Haddam Neck Plant. In Reference (2), the Staff formally issued the results of the ISAP screening review process, establishing the scope of ISAP for Haddam Neck and initiating issue-specific evaluations. Reference (1) also indicated that for each issue or topic included in ISAP, CYAPCO would provide a discussion of the safety objective and an. evaluation of the plant design with respect to the issue being addressed to identify specific items to be considered in the integrated asseument. In accordance with this commitment, reviews for the following ISAP topics are attached:

1) ISAP Topic No.1.29 " Flooding Evaluation"

2) ISAP Topic No.1.53 " Containment Emergency Sump Performance"

3) ISAP Topic No.1.62 " Feed and Bleed System Modifications" If you have any questions concerning the attached reviews, please contact us.

Very truly yours, CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY

. 3. F. Opeka b M '-

U Senior Vice President

-8611070178 861027 i g\

PDR ADOCK 05000213 p PDR

Docket No. 50-213 B12244 Haddam Neck ISAP Topic No.1.29 Flooding Evaluation October 1986

l s N r

Haddam Neck ISkP Topic No.1.29 '

Flooding' Evaluation j-I. - Introduction ,

SEP Topic III-3.C addressed inspections of water-control structures (i.e., *;

dams, reservoirs, conveyance facilities) which are used in conjunction '

with nuclear power plants and whose _ failure could cause radiological consequences adversely affecting the ~ public health and safety. The structure's purpose ir. to control or convey water for either emergency cooling operations or flood protection. ..A. s Review Criteria

~

II.'

1.10CFR100 Appendix A'. ,

2. Standard Review Plan Sections 2.5.4 and 2.5.5 -

3. Regulatory Guide 1.127 i III. Related Topics / Interfaces None.

IV. Evaluation In Reference 1, the Staff concluded that Haddam Neck met the accep-tance criteria for Inservice Inspection of Water Control Structures with the following exceptions:

1. Comprehensive report forms should be developed to convey field

- inspection information to the appropriate inspection program manager.

2. Criteria'for initiating "special inspections" should lbe developed to ascertain the. integrity - of structures after the occurrence. of extreme environmental events.

.3. Inspection frequencies for each item should be established and

~

included in the formal documentation. e

\

4. Inspections should be performed by qualified technical personnel and directed by qualified engineering personnel.

7

5. . A program for technical review and evaluation of inspection reports should be established. ,

q .-

. CYAPCO's' responses to these concerns (Reference 2) are summarized below. l o CYADCO's maintenance procedures contain a procedure / check-off s'

form which is utilized to note and verify the results of inspections .

of flood - protection equipment. Procedure / check-off forms are reviewed and approved by the job supervisor and department head before final disposition. Results of inspections performed under '

Operations Department instructions are recorded in the Station Log. -

\

i

m .

4

.o The need for "special instructions" following extreme environmental .

events is evaluated on a ~ case-by-case basis by Operations and 3 Maintenance personnel. "Special instructions" may be initiated by

-any member of.the Operations or Maintenance staff upon suspicion or evidence of a breach of a water control structure.

o' CYAPCO utilizes ~ Northeast ' Utilities computerized Production

• Maintenance Management System (PMMS) for tracking and implementing maintenance activities at the Haddam Neck Plant.

+

Implementation of maintenance procedures. is established 'and maintained through the PMMS. Presently, work orders authorizing ~

these inspections are generated through the PMMS on a prescribed basis. Operations Department inspections are performed with a

' frequency outlined in the formalinstructions.

.o Inspections-at Haddam Neck are performed by certified CYAPCO maintenance or operations personnel. CYAPCO personnel are ,

trained, qualified and certified as inspection personnel per the Haddam Neck Plant . procedures. Maintenance -inspections are directed by maintenance supervisors certified per the Haddam Neck

. procedures for training and qualifying supervisory personnel.

4 Operations Department inspections are performed under the supervision of the on-duty shift supervisor.

o CYAPCO's standard procedure is for supervisory review of work performed under a: work order upon completion of the task. As

noted . in CYAPCO's response to the first NRC concern, the procedure / check-off form is reviewed and approved by the job supervisor and department head before final disposition. -Based upon the results of the inspection and the supervisory review,-corrective actions, if necessary, are initiated.

In response,' Reference 3 forwarded the Staff's comments and indicated 1

tha't further information was necessary to complete:the review process.

One area of specific concern was related to having a qualified engineer involved with or in -charge of the water - control structure inspection program. Another Staff concern was the absence of-a centralized filing 1.

system for water control structure inspection evaluations and reports.

These Staff concerns will be subsequently addressed by CYAPCO'and a l response will be forthcoming.

.V. Conclusions Based on the above, CYAPCO will be providing further information to the Staff. . Also, further evaluation will be undertaken in the integrated assessment.

. VI. References

1. 3. A. Zwolinski letter to 3. F. Opeka, "Haddam Neck-IPSAR Section 4.1.4(i) Emergency - Procedures (Flooding)," dated September 24,1985.

2. 3. F. Opeka letter to C. I. Grim ~es, "Haddam Neck Plant SEP Topic

' III-3.C, ' Inservice Inspection of Water Control Structures,'" dated

. January 15,1986. '

, . - - - ,. - , , , _ , _ , , . , - , , . , , . . _ . , . _ , , ~ - . , , , , _ _,, _ _ , . , , . _ , . - - .m .~ .

f

-3 '

. \.

3. . F. M. - Akstulewicz letter to' 3. F. Opeka, "SEP Topic III-3.C - ,

' Inservice _ -Inspection of - Water-. Control -Structures," ~ dated September 18, 1986.

1 1

i il' i.

f i

) .;

s, k'

a f '

t

s. .

f >-

i -q 1

t

, ( 'n 4

1

. ./

j. Docket No. 50-213 B12244

?

y

}:

V J

Haddam Neck ISAP Topic No.1.53 I

i Containment Emergency Sump Performance f

i I.

l October 1986

Haddam Neck ISAP Topic No.1.53 Containment Emergency Sump Performance (USI A-43)

I. Introduction The containment emergency sump is vital to the operation of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and containment spray system in the recirculation mode following a postulated . loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA)in the Haddam Neck Plant for the long-term core cooling and the removal of heat and fission products from the containment atmosphere. It is postulated that break-initiated debris, containing the insulation. from the piping and equipment inside containment, could either cause blockage of the sump or~otherwise adversely affect the operation of the pumps, spray nozzles, and valves of the safety systems. Another concern is that adverse flow conditions with respect to sump operation, such as air entrainment, cavitation, and vortex formation could compromise the performance of the ECCS and containment spray system. These conditions will further be aggravated by the blockage resulting from debris.

II. Review Criteria Unresolved Safety Issue A-43, " Containment Emergency Sump Performance".

III. Related Topics / Interfaces

-None IV. Evaluation By letter dated July 7,1982 (Reference 1), CYAPCO was requested to provide the NRC with the status of and progress towards completion of the

. Unresolved Safety Issues (USI's) at Haddam Neck. On October 13, 1982 (Reference 2) CYAPCO presented its positions'on each USI applicable to Haddam Neck. USI A-43, " Containment Emergency Sump Performance",

was addressed in this submittal. This response stated the emergency sump at the Haddam Neck plant is of standard design. Anti-~vortexing features of this design include a belled mouth of the suction pipe and a grating located approximately one foot above the recirculation suction.

V. Conclusions Based on the present emergency sump design, CYAPCO has concluded that the system presently in place is adequate.such that Haddam Neck can be operated without endangering public health and safety, pending ultimate resolut!an of this generic issue.

VI. References

1. G. C. Lainas letter to W. G. Counsil, " Unresolved Safety Issues Status for the Haddam Neck Plant", dated July 7,1982.

2. W. G. Counsil letter to D. M. Crutchfield, "Haddam Neck Plant -Status of Unresolved Safety Issues", dated October 13,1982.

3. NUREG/CR-3616, " Transport and Screen Blockage Characteristics of Reflective Metallic Insulation Materials", Alden Research Laboratory, January,1984.

4. NUREG-0897, Revision 1, Draf t, " Containment Emergency ~ Sump Performance - Technical Findings Related to USI A-43", U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 30,1984.

5. NUREG-0869, Draft Revision 1, "USI A-43 Regulatory Analysis", U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, September,1984.

a 4

9 y - - - ~ - - - -

--=r: e--- 1 ---ww-- -=n - -- - - - - ,

u = . - -

---

m-- -- '

+rs-- - -

Docket No. 50-213 B12244 Haddam Neck ISAP Topic No.1.62 Feed and Bleed System Modifications October 1986 I-

f .-

t nc .

Haddam Neck ISAP Topic No.132 Feed-and-Bleed System Modifications I. Introduction Feed-and-bleed is a-means of cooling the core down to the residual heat removal (RHR) ~ system operating conditions in the event that the' steam generators are unavailable to remove core decay heat. -Feed-and-bleed is currently needed to demonstrate compliance to 10_ CFR 50.49 if a main steam line break outside containment were to compromise all capability to inject feedwater and auxiliary feedwater into the steam generators.

Such an incident would result in a reactor trip followed by an initial rapid cooldown, and subsequently followed by a gradual reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature and pressure rise as the secondary side of the steam generators boils dry. If all attempts to restore feedwater are unsuccessful, theLoperator begins feed-and-bleed when the RCS pressure approaches the power operated relief valve (PORV) setpoint of 2285 psia and the core exit temperature approaches 575 degrees F,. or the. steam- generator level decreases below 21%, whichever comes first.

The operator begins feed-and-bleed by starting at least one charging pump and then holding open just one PORV and its associated block valve. An alternate method using at least'one high pressure safetyJinjection (HPSI) pump would require the opening of two PORVs and-their associated block valves. Pump suction is taken from the refueling water storage tank (RWST). The PORY flow decreases pressurizer pressure and increases level until water. enters the PORV and two-phase flow is discharged. The discharge flow is piped to the pressurizer relief tank (PRT). Eventually, the tank rupture disc passes water and steam into the containment.

If -the chargin (LPSI) pumpwere (s)gstarted pumpby (s)a safety were injection stoppedsignal,~

and. Iow pressure the operator safety injection would shut off the LPSI pump (s) and restart the charging pump (s). After about 100,000 gallons'have been pumped from the RWST, the operator would I

. align the containment sump valves to the RHR system to provide long-term

.- cooling.

, II. Review Criteria

! 1). 10CFR50.49 " Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment"

2) SEP Topic III-5.A, " Effects of Pipe Break on Structures, Systems and Components Inside Containment"

3) SEP Topic VI-2.D, " Mass and Energy Release for Possible Pipe Break Inside Containment" 1 4) SEP Topic VI-3, " Containment Pressure and Heat Removal I

Capability" III. Related Topics / Interfaces l ISAP Topic No.1.31 " Pipe Breaks Outside Containment" 1) l 2) ISAP Topic No. 2.15 "Long Term Small Break LOCA and ECCS I

Modifications" i

L

m

. t lb

. IV. Evaluation In an effort to minimize reliance on the feed-and-bleed cooling method to demonstrate compliance to 10CFR50.49,.CYAPCO has analyzed the issue and determined that much of the equipment for which feed-and-bleed was relied upon to obviate qualification has been qualified as part of other qualification-related upgrades. The remaining unqualified equipment could .

be qualified In the 'near term. Accordingly, CYAPCO has committed to pr_oceed - with - the remaining qualification ' activities as noted in -

' Reference 5, if the Staff concurs that such action will effectively resolve

. the Staff's concern regarding' CYAPCO's reliance.on feed-and-bleed for environmental qualification outside containment.

V. Conclusion CYAPCO is continuing its dialogue with the Staff on this issue. Pending ~

further review by 'the. Staff, CYAPCO considers that this ISAP topic 'is being appropriately addressed. However,. further analysis will be undertaken in the integrated assessment.

VI. References

1. H.L. Thompson, Jr. letter to 3.F. Opeka, " Environmental Qualification of Equipment Outside Containment," dated September 30,1985,

2. H.L. Thompson, Jr. letter to 3.F. Opeka, " Environmental Qualification of Equipment Outside Containment,". dated October 17,1985.

3. 3.F. Opeka letter to C.I. Grimes, "Haddam Neck Plant - Environmental Qualification of Equipment Outside Containment," idated December 13,1985.

4. F.3. Miraglia letter to 3.F. Opeka, " Environmental Qualification of .

Equipment Outside Containment," dated July 7,1986.

5. 3.F. Opeka letter to F.3. Miraglia, "Haddam Neck Plant -

i Environmental Qualification 'of Equipment -Outside Containment,"

dated August 11,1986.

l i.

I l

J l

h ,

r

, , . . _ . . _ , _ _ . , , . . . ~ . . . . _ _ , , _ _ . _ . _ ~ _ . , _ . , _ , - . - _ , _ , - . _ . _ _ _ . , - _ _ - . . .~, . . ,