AECM-83-0246, Final Deficiency Rept PRD-83/03 Re Omitted Specified Insulation Wraps from GE Iac Overcurrent Relays.Initially Reported on 830217.Deficiency Not Reportable for Unit 1. Nonconforming Relay Replacement to Be Completed by 831015

Final Deficiency Rept PRD-83/03 Re Omitted Specified Insulation Wraps from GE Iac Overcurrent Relays.Initially Reported on 830217.Deficiency Not Reportable for Unit 1. Nonconforming Relay Replacement to Be Completed by 831015

ML20069K510
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	04/18/1983
From:	Mcgaughy J MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, AECM-83-0246, AECM-83-246, NUDOCS 8304260377
Download: ML20069K510 (4)

Text

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9 MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Helping Build Mississippi l~~

P. O. B O X 18 4 0, J AC K S O N, MIS SIS SI P PI 3 9 2 0 5 April 18,198b ,

JAMES P. McGAUGHY. JR. g .

vice passietut Of fice of Inspection & Enforcement 3 { [2, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ro ,

Region II ',

101 Marietta Street, N.W. p '

Suite 2900 E3 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 - -

Attention: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator ' '

SUBJECT:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Docket No. 50-416/41' License No. NPF-13 File 0260/15525/15526/16694.4 PRD-83/03, Final Report, GE IAC Overcurrent Relays AECM-83/0246 Re ference: AECM-83/019 7, 3/18/83 On February 17, 1983, Mississippi Power & Light Company notified Mr. R.

Butcher, of your office, of 6 Potentially Reportable Deficiency (PRD) at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) construction as i t e . The deficiency concerns GE IAC Overcurrent Relays.

As previously reported, MP&L has evaluated this deficiency and determined that it is not reportable for Unit 1. Also, a Final Report was to be delayed until MP&L Project Engineering had determined whether or not the rationale supplied by our Architect / Engineer substantiates that there would be no impact on safety for Unit 2. MP&L has determined that this deficiency is not reportable for linit 2.

Details are provided in our attached Final Report.

Yours truly, j'

/

i i f ACP:dr ATTACHMENT cc: See page 2 dWp(uV, ,y p' 8304260377 830418 PDR ADOCK 05000416 S PDR Member Middle South Utilities System f+'A/

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Mr. J.s P. O'Reilly AECM-83/0246 NRC Page 2 cc: .Mr. J.lB. Richard

~Mr. R. B. McGehee Mr. T. B. Conner '

Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Washington, D.C. 20555 ,

Mr. G. B. Taylor South Miss. Electric Power Association P. O. Box 1589 Hattiesburg, MS 39401 f

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a Attachment z to AECM-83/0246 Page 1 of 2 1

FINAI.' REPORT FOR PRD-83/03

1. - Description of the Deficiency On May 3, 1982, Mississippi Power"& Light Company received GE Service Advice (SA) 721-PSM-168.1 concerning a problem with General Electric IAC Overcurrent Relays where two (2). of the three (3) specified insulation wraps were omitted between two leads of the operating coil of the time

, overcurrent : unit. . The Service Advice states that the relays were manu-factured ' from January 1972 through July 1981.

This deficiency is not applicable to the NSSS scope of supply for either Unit 1 of Unit 2, in that CE did not . supply the suspect relays to Grand Gulf.

This deficiency although applicable to the Bechtel scope of supply for Unit 1:was determined not reportable. MP&L Plant Staff conducted a field inspection to determine if any of the subject relays were manufactured within the time frame identified in the Service Advice. Plant Staff's investigation determined that sixty-three (63) of the subject IAC relays were furnished to Unit 1. Three (3) relays were located in the spare 4

parts inventory, twenty (20) were used in safety-related applications and the remaining forty (40) were used in non-safety-related applications.

Nuclear Plant Engineering (NPE) -Electrical evaluated the twenty (20) safety-related relays and the determination was made that failure of any 4- "

of -the twenty (20) would not degrade plant safety. Therefore, the deter-

, mination has been made-that this deficiency is not reportable, for Unit 1, under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) or 10CFk21.

For the Unit 2 Bechtel scope of supply, an investigation was performed to determine if any of the IAC relays, noted by the Service Advice, were .

used in safety-related equipment. Twelve (12) relays were identified in safety-related applications. They were:

4-(1) - (6) 25BA1 thru 25BA6 - Meter and Relay Compartment -

Device 51. N/T - Relay Type 121AC52A801 A (7) - (12) 26BB1 thru 26BB6 - Meter and Relay Compartment -

Device $1 N/T - Relay Type 121AC52A801A U The design function of the relays is to trip on a bus ground fault condition. The bus would not be available-in any case, since a trip would have to occur to initiate a challenge to the relay. Only one division would be af fected uat a time, since electrical design does not assume a fault condition on one division simultaneous with a single active failure on a redundant division.

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Attachment to AECM-83/0246 Page 2 of 2 For the Unit 2 Balance of Plant (BOP) -PGCC there were five (5) relays identified. They are:

(1) 2H12-P801 Device N41-M705(451:1/UT21) Relay Type 121AC51A801A

.(2) 2H12-P912 Device 2R12-M701(251H/T21B1) Relay Type 121AC51A801A (3) 2H12-PdI2 Device 2R12-M702(251N/T2182) Relay Type '121AC51A801A <

(4) 2H12-P812 Device 2Rll-M704(151N/T21A1) Relay Type 121AC51 A801A (5) 2H12-P812 Device 2Rll-M705(151N/T21A2) Relay Type 121AC51A801 A These five relays are non-class IE and have no impact on plant safety.

II. Analysis of Safety Implications Our Architect / Engineer and MP&L Project Engineering have determined (based on the single failure criterion) that any one device failure would not adversely af fect the safe operation of the plant and that this deficiency is not reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) for Unit 2.

III. Corrective Actions Taken For Unit 1, the three (3) relays located in spare parts have been removed from inventory. The replacement of the twenty (20) safety-related relays and the repair of the remaining forty (40) relays is estimated to be completed by May, 1983.

For Unit 2, our Constructor hae determined that the corrective action will be to replace the nonconforming relays. This corrective action will be completed by Oct ober 15, 1983.

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