AECM-83-0244, Final Deficiency Rept PRD-83/01 Re Potential Failure of GE Hea Relays to Operate When Trip Solenoid Energized.Initially Reported on 830217.Suspect Relays in Unit 2 Will Perform Satisfactorily.Not Reportable Under 10CFR50.55(e)

Final Deficiency Rept PRD-83/01 Re Potential Failure of GE Hea Relays to Operate When Trip Solenoid Energized.Initially Reported on 830217.Suspect Relays in Unit 2 Will Perform Satisfactorily.Not Reportable Under 10CFR50.55(e)

ML20069K349
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	04/18/1983
From:	Mcgaughy J MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, AECM-83-0244, AECM-83-244, NUDOCS 8304260312
Download: ML20069K349 (4)

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MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Helping Build Mississippi P. O. B O X 164 0, J AC K S O N, MIS SIS SIP PI 3 9 2 05 D ,

JAMES P. McGAUGHY. JR. April 18,1983; l vice earsiormt y 9 4

&' Y Of fice of Inspection & Enforcement ,

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission p ,

Region II 6 101 Marietta Street, N.W.

Suite 2900 -

Atlanta, Georgia 30303 6 Attention: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator

SUBJECT:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Docket No. 50-416/417 License No. NPF-13 File 0260/15525/15526/16694.4 PRD-83/01, Final Report, GE HEA Relays AECM-83/0244 Re ference: AECM-83/0195, 3/18/83 On February 17, 1983, Mississippi Power & Light Company notified Mr. R.

Butcher, of your of fice, of a Potentially Reportable Deficiency (PRD) at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) construction site. The de ficiency concerns GE HEA Relays.

As previously reported, MP&L has evaluated this deficiency and determined that it is not reportable for Unit 1. Also, a Final Report was to be delayed until MP&L Project Engineering had determined whether or not the rationale supplied by our Architect / Engineer substantiates that there would be no impact on safety for Unit 2. MP&L has determined that this deficiency is not reportable for Unit 2.

Details are provided in our attached Final Report.

Yours truly, S

.( :C ACP:dr d

ATTACHMENT cc: See page 2 8304260312 830418 . t q ^e I.- icOWc.2 PDR ADOCK 05000416 S PDR T:' L '1

/

Member Middle South Utilities System

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Mr. J. P. O' Reilly AECM-83/0244 NRC Page 2 cc: Mr. J. B. Richard

'Mr..R. B. McGehee Mr. T. B. Conner Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director Of fice of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. G. B. Taylor South Miss. Electric Power Association P. O. Box 1589 Hattiesburg, MS 39401

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Attachment to AECM-83/0244 Page 1 of 2 FINAL REPORT FOR PRD-83/01

1. Description of the Deficiency On August 31, 1981, Mississippi Power & Light Company received GE Service Advice (SA) 721-PSM-165.1 concerning a potential problem with GE HEA Relays which may fail to operate when the trip solenoid is energized. The Service Advice concluded that the af fected relays were manufactured with malformed torsion springs during the period from May 1979 through December 1980.

This deficiency is not applicable to the NSSS scope of supply for either Unit 1 or Unit 2 in that none of the safety-related HEA Relays which GE supplied to Grand Gul'f, were manufactured during the spring problem period.

This deficiency is not applicable to the Bechtel scope of supply for Unit I in that a field inspection, by MP&L Plant Staf f, revealed no GE HEA Relays which had been installed in safety-related applications. Therefore, the determination has been made that this deficiency is not reportable for Unit I under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) or 10CFR21.

For the Unit 2 Bechtel scope of supply, an investigation / inspection was performed to determine if any of the HEA relays, noted by the Service Advice, were used in safety-related equipment. Two (2) relays were ident-ified in safety-related applications. They are:

(1) 25AA-Cubicle #1 - Device 186B-2-Relay Type 12HEA61C238 (2) 26AB-Cubicle #1 - Device 186B-2-Relay Type 12HEA61C238 The G. E. Service Advice indicates those relays manufactured with malformed torsion springs will perform satisfactorily within the limits of applied control voltage, 80% to 112.5% of nominal. Our Architect / Engineer has determined that since the control voltage for these relays will be within this voltage range, these relays will perform as designed.

For the Unit 2 Balance of Plant (BOP) - PGCC there are no relays with this deficiency.

II. Analysis of Safety Implications The function of relay 186B-2 is to trip and lockout the incoming 4.16KV breaker. Should this relay fail to operate, the overcurrent relaying and/or the time /overcurrent neutral relaying for the connected ESF transformer will trip the transformer breaker and the associated diesel generator will start and feed the bus loads. After the diesel generators have picked up the bus loads the operator can verify the availability of an alternate souce of power and manually sychronize the bus to an alternate source of power from the available ESF transformers.

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Attachment to AECM-83/0195 '

Page 2 of 2 The design function of this relay is to trip the ESF bus during the fault condition which would have to occur to challenge the relay. Only one-(1)

ESF Division would be af fected at a time.

Therefore, our Architect / Engineer and MP&L Project Engineering have determined that there would be no impact on plant safety and that this deficiency is 'not reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) for Unit -

2.

III. Corrective Actions Taken Our Constructor has determined that their corrective action will be to (1) test the relays per S. A. 721-PSM-165.1 and replace if necessary or (2) simply replace the relays.

All corrective actions will be' completed by October 15, 1983.

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