AECM-82-433, Interim Deficiency Rept Re Unqualified Bettis Air Actuators on Henry Pratt Valves.Initially Reported on 811029.Scope Expanded to Include Other Actuators.Subj Not Reportable Per 10CFR50.55(e).Final Rept Expected by 830331

Interim Deficiency Rept Re Unqualified Bettis Air Actuators on Henry Pratt Valves.Initially Reported on 811029.Scope Expanded to Include Other Actuators.Subj Not Reportable Per 10CFR50.55(e).Final Rept Expected by 830331

ML20071N576
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	10/01/1982
From:	Mcgaughy J MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, AECM-82-433, NUDOCS 8210080223
Download: ML20071N576 (4)

Text

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] h MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Helping Build Mississippi P. O. B O X 16 4 0. J A C K S O N, MIS SIS SIP PI 3 9 2 0 5 J AMES P. McGAUGHY, JR.

AS$1STANT VICE PRESIDENT Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, N.W.

Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 c.a .

N Attention: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator a

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Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

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SUBJECT:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station ? m Units 1 and 2 2:> .am License No. NPF-13 5 N2 Do cke t Nos. 50-416/417 SC File 0260/15525/15528- 3 ',

PRD-81/44, Interim R$rt W. '

6, Valves And Actuators Not Manufactured Under A QA

• Program AECM-82/433 Re fe rences: 1) AECM-82/279, 6/15/82

2) AECM-82/177, 4/20/82

3) AECM-82/97, 3/15/82

4) AECM-82/45, 1/29/82

5) AECM-81/470, 11/30/81 On October 29, 1981, Mississippi Power & Light Company notified Mr. P. A.

Taylor, of your office, of a Potentially Reportable Deficiency (PRD) at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) construction site. Originally, the investigation was concerned only with unqualified Bettis Air Actuators on Henry Pratt Valves.

As previously stated, we have completed our investigation for these type valves and actuators and have determined that it is not reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e). We also investigated the possibility that other type valve actuators and appurtenances may not have been manufactured under a QA program.

The investigation for the BOP scope of supply has been completed.

Although some of the actuators and appurtenances were not manufactured under a QA program, they have been qualified by tests and/or analyses and do not represent a reportable deficiency under 10CFR50.55(e). All details are given in our attached report.

' OFFICIM 8210080223 821001 DRADOCK05')00g ,

( Member Middle South Utilities System l

l

5 Mt. J. P. O' Reilly AECM-82/433-NRC Page 2 We' are continuing our investigation of valve appurtenances for the MSSS scope of supply.

This report was originally due on September 24, 1982. However, a one week extension was granted by Mr. R. Butcher on that date.

A Final Report will be submitted by March 31, 1983.

Yours truly, d$ 7 I. P. McGaughy, Jr.

p KDS:dr ATTACRHENT cc: Mr. N. L. Stampley Mr. R. B. McGehee Mr. T. B. Conner Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, firector Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cosmission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. G. B. Taylor South Miss. Electric Power Association P. O. Box 1589 Hattiesburg, MS 39401

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Attcchasnt to AECM-82/433 Pcg2 1 of 2 INTERIM REPORT J0. 6 FOR PRD-81/44

k. Description of the Deficiency This deficiency was originally reported because Bettis Air Actuators on Henry Pratt valves were not typical of the units used for original qualification testing. Upon investigation it was determined that the actuators had not been built under a QA prograra.

An investigation, including seistate qualification tests, component size and configuration inspection, and material evaluation was conducted. Based on the results of this investigation, it was concluded that the manufacture of the Bettis actuators without a QA program would not affect the safety of operatioras of the nuclear power plant and is not reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e).

MP&L expanded the scope of this PRD to include any other actuators and valve appurtenances that may have been manufactured without a QA program. An investigative plan was formulated for looking at this deficiency on other valves and appurtenances at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.

The investigative plan consisted-of the following:

1) A review and assessment was conducted of the current quality requirements in technical specifications to ensure quality requirements applicable to actuators and other valve appurtenance were clearly delineated.

2) The valve supplier's project approved QA programs were reviewed to determine the applicability of these programs to actuators and other valve appurtenances.

3) Previous audits of these valve suppliers performed by our Architect /

Engineer were reviewed to ascertain the implementation of the programs, as they pertain to actuators and other valve appurtenances.

4) Past Procurement Surveillance Reports by our Architect / Engineer were reviewed to detennine the appropriate time frame for either procurement or production of active actuators.

I This investigation was to determine the following for valves supplied for i

both the Nuclear Steam Supply System and Balance of Plant systems.

1) Had QA prograras been implemented by vendors during the manufacturing of not only valve actuators but also other valve appurtenances.

[ 2) If actuators and other valve appurtenances had not been manufactured l

under a quality assurance program, what was their degree of acceptability?

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Attrchment to AECM-32/433 P:ga 2 of 2

-II. -Analysis of Safety implications The potential exists for the valves to fail to function under seismic and environmental conditions.

Our investigations into each of the valve / valve appurtenance problems were conducted by tests, analyses, and review of vendor documents and program requirements. Emphasis was placed on the traditional problem areas such as >

material control, special processes, and non-code parts. In the Balance of Plant systems any questions were resolved satisfactorily where safety impacts were a consideration.

Our investigation into the NSSS scope of supply is continuing.

Since all 02 the valve appurtenances were found to be qualified either by test, analysis, or-other means this deficiency is not report.ible under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) 2

. Although it has been determined that failure of the Bettis Actuators due to

, degradation of the internals would not af fect safety, MP&L has elected to upgrade the seals, lubricants, and coating on the pins and rollers.

III. Corrective Actions Taken MP&L was asked to show why this PRD and PRD-82/32 were separate problems.

. Although some of the same valves and actuators were included in both PRD's

.the main difference is that this PRD involved a program deficiency in that proper controls were not placed on all of the valve supplier's and sub-suppliers. PRD-82/32 involved a hardware design problem. Sufficient

, strength through the thickness of the yoke at the bottom of the keyway was not provided.

Details of PRD-82/32 are given in our Final Report which was AECM-82/313, July 9, 1982.

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