AECM-81-496, Final Deficiency Rept Re Failure of Dikkers Safety Relief Valves,Initially Reported 810807.Solenoid Valves Did Not Open in Required Time When Power Applied.Caused by Excess Loctite 640 on Ball Disc.Also Reported Per Part 21

Final Deficiency Rept Re Failure of Dikkers Safety Relief Valves,Initially Reported 810807.Solenoid Valves Did Not Open in Required Time When Power Applied.Caused by Excess Loctite 640 on Ball Disc.Also Reported Per Part 21

ML20069B397
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	12/15/1981
From:	Mcgaughy J MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
REF-PT21-81 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, AECM-81-496, NUDOCS 8112240200
Download: ML20069B397 (1)

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MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPKNY /-6

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office of Inspection & Enforcement 8 h.$I- <

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 8 i 101 Marietta Street, N.W. U ,

Suite 3100 d OEC"o "P o . 3U .! Ih

[3 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

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l Attention: Mr. J. P. O'Reill'y, Regional Administrator '

SUBJECT:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station s Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. O-416/417 File 0260/15525/15526 PRD-81/33, Final Report, Seitz Solenoid Valves for T Dikkers Safety Relief Valves AECM-81/496 a

Reference 1) AECM-81/348, 9/8/81

2) AECM-81/435, 11/2/81 On August 7, 1981, Mississippi Power & Light Company notified Mr. F. S.

Cantrell, of your office, of a Potentially Reportable Dericiency (PRD) at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) construction site. The deficiency concerns the failure of Dikkers Safety Relief Valves.

Based on the results of our investigation we have determined that this deficiency is reportable under 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR21. Details are provided in our attached report.

- Please note that our previous report was an interim report. However, the heading stated that it was a Final Report. This was an error.

b Yours truly,

, J. P. McGaughy, Jr.

KDS:dr ATTACHMENT cc: See page 2 8112240200 811215' 7h' g 7 /

gDRADOCK 05000416 ,r PDR Yb f <. T m .,

Member Middle South Utilities System

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'Mr. J. P. O'Reilly AECM-81/496 NRC Page 2 cc: Mr. N. L. Stampley Mr. R. B. McGehee Mr. T. B. Conner Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director Of fice of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. G. B. Taylor South Miss. Electric Power Association P. O. Box 1589 Hattiesburg, MS 39401 e

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• Attcchment to AECM-81/496 P ga 1 of 3 FINAL REPORT FOR PRD-81/33

1. Name and address of the individual ... informing the commission:

J. P. McCaughy, Jr.

Assistant Vice President, Nuclear P.O. Box 1640 Jackson, Mississippi 39205 Notification of Part 21 applicability made to Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, NRC, Region II by letter AECM-81/435, November 2, 1981.

2. Identification of the facility ... which ... contains a defect:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (CGNS) Units 1 and 2 Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150

3. Identification of the firm . . . supplying the basic component which . . . contains a defect:

Supplied to Grand Gulf by the General Electric Company, San Jose, Cali fornia.

4 Nature of the defect . . . and the safety hazard which . . . could be created by such a defect ...:

A. Description of the Deficiency During testing of Dikkers Safety Relief Valves by Wyle Laboratories, six (6) of the twenty (20) valves tested did not meet the Emergency Oper-ability Acceptance Criteria, i.e. , they did not open within the required time period when power was applied to the solenoid valves. In addition, another solenoid valve was reported to have failed the seat leakage test.

The deficiency af fects the Nuclear Boiler System and the Automatic Depres-

, surization System.

B. Analysis of Safety Implications If two (2) of these defective valves had been installed as Automatic Depressurization System Valves, the single valve failure criteria of FSAR Table 6.3-7 would not be met.

5. The date on which the information of such defect ... was obtained.

Mississippi Power and Light rece ved information of the deficiency on July 21, 1981. It was screened as signiftsant, evaluated for reportability, determined to be reportable, and reported to Mr. F. S. Cantrell of your of fice on August 7, 1981, under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e).

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,.. .' Attcchment to AECM-81/435 Pagm 2 of 3 One (1) interim report was filed on September 8,1981. The second interim report was filed on November 2,1981, at which time the commission was informed that MP&L had determined that this deficiency was also reportable under the provisions of 10CFR21.

6. In the case of the basic component . .. the number and location of all such components.

The Seitz solenoid valves are used at GGNS in both Unit 1 and Unit 2.

We do not have knowledge of the location of defective equipment other than at GGNS.

7. The corrective action which has been taken . .. the name of the individual . ..

reponsible for the action; and the length of time that has been ... taken to complete the action.

A. Corrective Actions Taken The cause of the deficiency has been determined to be the presence of "Loctice 640" on the ball disc. The excess "Loctice 640" that caused the malfunction oozed out from a nozzle seat during the process of installing the nozzle in the solenoid. The nozzle is force fitted into the front cover and is sealed in the vendor's shop as a separate sub-assembly. All twenty (20) solenoid assemblies for Unit I were inspected and " Loctite 640" was found on the ball disc of six (6) assemblies. All twenty (20) solenoid assemblies were returned to the manufacturer (Seitz) for disassembly, inspection, and cleaning.

After the cleaning, the assemblies were tested according to the approved production test procedure for solenoid control assemblies. The solenoid '

assemblies were re-installed on the Safety Relief Valves, and then retested. All valves satisfactorily met the acceptance criteria of the test. The reworked SRV solenoid and air control package has eliminated the identified problem. As the nozzle seat is installed only once (and not to be removed or reinstalled in the field), there is no potential of new " Loctite 640" being introducted into the solenoid control assemblies.

The spare solenoid control assemblies are presently undergoing the retro-fit. The Unit 2 assemblies will be re-worked in the future.

One solenoid valve originally was reported to have failed the seat leakage test. The excess air leakage subsequently was determined to be from the actuator cylinder. The cylinder was replaced by Wyle Laboratories with one from another valve. The valve then passed the seat leakage test. The problem with the cylinder was an isolated occurence.

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• Attcchment to AECM-81/435 Page 3 of 3 B. Responsible Individual G. B. Rogers, Jr.

Site Manager Mississippi Power and Light Company C. Length of Time to Complete Actions Mississippi Power & Light received information of the deficiency on July 21, 1981. General Electric issued Field Disposition Instruc-tions FDI-103/42382 on September 10, 1981, to do the disassembling, inspection, and cleaning. All Unit I work has been completed.

Inspection of spares is presently in progress. Inspection of Unit 2 valves vill be completed prior to Unit 2 fuel load.

8. Any advice related to the defect ... that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees:

As the deficiency did not originate with MP&L, we have no advice to offer.

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