A07615, Forwards Response to 881021 Request for Addl Info Re Tech Spec Changes for Generic Ltr 83-37

Forwards Response to 881021 Request for Addl Info Re Tech Spec Changes for Generic Ltr 83-37

ML20196B883
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	12/02/1988
From:	Mroczka E CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO., NORTHEAST UTILITIES
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
A07615, A7615, GL-83-37, TAC-54538, NUDOCS 8812070075
Download: ML20196B883 (16)

Text

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NORTHEAST UTILITIES con.,.i Omc.. . s,m.n si,..i. B.,nn Conn.ci,cui l cIC U $'$YrY$ U P O 80x 270

- a .ci . %. w" H AR JOAD. CONNECTICUT 061410270 k k J '".D C$N,'cCI. (203) 665 4 000 December 2, 1988 Docket No. 50-213 A07615 Re: 10CFR50.90 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

References:

(1) E. J. Mroczka letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Proposed Changes to Technical Specifications, Generic Letter 83-37, dated July 1, 1988.

(2) F. M. Akstulewicz letter to J. F. Opeka, Outstanding Technical Specification Issues, dated November 13, 1986.

(3) A. B. Wang letter to E. J. Hroczka, Request for Additional Information, dated October 21, 1988.

Centi men:

Haddam Neck Plant Responses to Request for Additional Information Regarding Technical Spnification Changes for Seneric Letter 83-37 fTAC No. 54538)

Or. July 1,1988, Connectkut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPCO) submitted a proposed amendment to facility oper4 ting license DPR-61 for the Haddam Neck Plet (Reference (1)). That amendment would revise :ertain technical pecifications in response to Generic letter 83-37 as applicable to the Haddam Mck Plant (Referu.ce (2)). The enclosed additional information is provided in response to the Staff's request for additional information regarding technical specification changes for Generic Letter 83-37, (Reference (3)). As indicated in Enclosure I. CYAPCO expects to submit the revised Technical Specification Table 3.23-1 and corresponding ACTION statements to the NRC by January M , 1989.

If there are any quenions regarding this submittal, please :ontact our licensing representative directly.

Very truly yours, CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY

/ h Ms b' E. K)troczkn ~ ~ v pol Senior Vice President 6712070o75 FDR m:20: I

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conalssion A07615/Page 2 December 2, 1988 cc: W. T. Russell, Region I Mainistrator A. B. Wang, NRC Project Manager, Haddam Neck Plant J. T. Shediosky, Senior Resident Inspector, Haddam Neck Plant l

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A07615 l t

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i Enclosure I Haddam Nc:k Plant Response to Request for Additional Information [

Regarding Technical Specification Changes for  !

Generic Letter 83-37 j

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December 1988

Enclosurt 1 A07615/Page 1 Enclosure I P

Haddam Neck Plant Resoonses to Reauest for Additional Information Reaardino igchnical Soecification Chanaes for Generic Letter 83-37 A) RCS Vtati

1) The intent of GL 83-37 was to always have at least 1w ven: paths operable. The ACTION statement refers to the PORU n th.9 mck-up vent path. Are the PORVs qualified similar tr .; At alls so that credit can be given to the PORVs as an alt ' M e pai.e

2) As previously stated by the Staff, removal of ' > < rWr tb vent valves is not necessary. Provide the basis fo: i Y ,ing j'.,. from the vent valves.

Resoonse Al) The Haddam Neck Plant PORVs are qualified for the harsh environment following a loss of coolant accident. A seismically qualified compressed air supply is also provided to the PORVs.

A2) In regard to this item, the ACTION Statement requires the removal of power from both valves in the operable vent path. This is to maintain the single failure design features of the system. For example, if power was not rer oved with one valve in a vent path inoperable, the vent path would remain susceptible to an inadvertent actuation of the operable valve. This concept is explained in the Bases section of the proposed specification: '

"The valve redundancy of the RCS vent paths serves to minimize the probability of inadvertent or irreversible actuation..."

Removing power from the vent valves is also necessary to prevent the valves from opening following hot shorts as postulated by 10CFR50, Appendix R analyses.

B) Lona Tore Auxiliary Feodwater System Evaluation

1) Provide the proposed Technical Specification change for the l auxiliary feedwater system.

Response

B1) In Reference (1), CYAPCO determined that the existing Technical  ;

Specifications (Section 4.8; are appropriate and adequate. One l difference between Generic Letter 83 37 and the existing Technical i Specifications for the Haddam Neck Plant is that the existing Technical  :

Specifications do not specify the number of auxiliary feedwater pumps

! required to be operable. In light of the ongoing effort to implement the

Enclosure I A07615/Page 2 Standard Technical Specifications (STS) at the Haddm Neck Plant, CYAPC0 concludes there is no need to change the existing Technical Specifications. It is envisioned that the format and clarity of the Technical Specifications will be enhanced as part of the STS conversion process, but these refinements would not result in any fundamental changes to the provisions of the Technical Specifications in question, We expect to submit the STS for the Auxiliary Feedwater System by February 15, 1989. A proposed Technical Specification section and 3/4.7.1.3) is attached herewith for your information only. (3/4.7.1.2 C) Noble Gas Effluent Monitors

1) Provide the basis for having only one noble gas monitor location as compared to the seven monitoring locations recommended in GL 83 37,

2) Provide the basis for not including the alarm / trip setpoint and measurement range for the noble gas monitor as recommended by GL 83-37. If an alarm / trip setpoint is established, the corresponding action statement needs to be added.

3) Provide the basis for allowing isolation of the stack wide range noble gas monitor during periods of high steam generator blowdown.

4) The action statement for lens than the Minimum Channels Operable should provide for a preplanned alternative method of noble gas monitoring.

Resoonse Cl) Generic Letter 83-37, NUREG 0737 and Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2 list all potential release paths from DWRs of post-accident noble gas activity, recognizing that some plants may have separate monitored release paths for certain systems. However, the guidance included in the above documents, includes a footnote that states that if these separate releases are routed to a common discharge point, only one monitoi is required at the final discharge point.

At the Haddam Neck Plant, all potential release paths are routed to the main stack and hence only one monitor is required. The only exception to this would be release from the secondary side steam safety and atmos)heric dump valves. These are currently monitored per procedures by porta)le health physics survey instruments. There is a project to evaluate the installation of fixed monitors to these releases. Should such monitors be installed, they would be added to the Technical Specifications. However, at this time, the main stack noble gas monitor is the only monitored release path and hence the only one required to be in the Technical Specifications.

C2) For radiation monitors, the applicable range and alarm setpoints are all subject to change based on a number of factors such as:

1) The nuclide mix being monitored, which changes depending on the type of accident and time after the accident or reactor trip.

j Enclosurn I A07615/Page 3

2) Background readings which change with time.

3) Detector sensitivity which can change with time.

4) System flow rates.

5) Bases for the alarm setpoint can change frequently for technical or philosophical reasons. For example, the alarm setpoint may bc established at a level of release corresponding to an Alert Emergency Action Lovel. A year later it may be decided to change the alarm setpoint to a level indicative of change in conditions such as 2 x normal. Or the release rate corresponding to an Alert Emergency Action Level may be recalculated based on updated meteorological codes.

Given all of the reasons why setpoints and ranges may change with time, specifying them in the Technical Specifications has some major drawbacks.

It would create the )ossible need for a number of technical specification changes and it woulc reduce the flexibility to change setpoints to more meaningful values if desired. These setpoints are included in the plant's survoillance Procedures (SUR 5-2-60 for Containment High Range 1

Radiation Monitors and SUR 5.2-77 for Noble Gas Effluent Monitors) and are controlled administrative 1y.

Therefore, we believe that radiation monitor setpoints should only be in the Technical Specifications if the setpoint providc a safety function such as automatic release isolation. At the Haddam Neck Plant, the stack noble gr.s monitor does not provide any safety function, and is used only to supply information to follow the course of an accident. Similarly, the containment high range radiation monitor provides no automatic safety function, and is used only in post-accident conditions. The containment high range radiation monitor is used in the emergency operating procedures to select the appropriate high-head recirculation path (only until completion of planned ECCS modifications) and is also one of the parameters that can be used to determine whether adverse containment environmental conditions exist. However, they adequately serve this function independent of the alarm setpoint. The range meets our design criteria submitted in our Regulatory Guide 1.97 response to the NRC. If for some reason it changed such that it was in conflict with that submittal, a resubmittal would be required.

C3) During periods of high steam generator blowdown, the wide range stack monitor is subject to moisture buildup problems in the sample lines. To prevent this problen, the monitor is taken out of service during these periods. This is considered acceptable for the following reasons:

1) The monitor is not being rendered INOPERABLE. It is still OPERABLE, but not in service. This is similar to other designs such as the high range stack monitor which does not sample stack releases until the normal range monitor alarms and signals the need for the high range monitor to initiate flow. The footnote requires that once every six days the monitor must be turned on to prove operability.

Enclosure !

A07615/Page 4

2) The Haddam Neck Plant has a redundant stack monitor for the normal range noble gas effluent monitoring. This monitor must be OPERABLE at all times if the wide range monitor is out of service (per Effluent Technical Specifications). Should this monitor alarm, the operator could easily isolate blowdown, if not already isolated ,

automatically, and turn on the wide range stack monitor, f

3) The periods of high steam generator blowdown occur infrequently for short periods of time - usually dwing start up.

j C4) Technical Specification Table 3.231 will be revised to include the word "Proplanned" to the ACTION statement for less than the minimum . channels  !

operable and the revised table will be submitted to the staff by  !

January 31, 1989.

D) Containment Hinh Ranae Radiation Monitor

1) Provide the basis for not including the alarm / trip setpoint and measurement range for the containment high range radiation monitor.

! If an alarm / trip setpoint is established, the corresponding action

statement naeds to be added.

I 2) Provide the basis for not including a functional test at least once i I

per month as reco unended by GL 83-37. l Resoonse f

01) Refer to the response to Item C2.

r D2) The GL 83-37 draft Technical Specification Table for Accident Monitors, i

as well as the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications (W STS) ,

only include a column for a daily channel check and a refueling i calibration. There is no requirement for a monthly functional test in the accident monitor table. The radiological monitor table (W STS), .

which includes radiation monitors for normal operation, has a column for i t functional tests, since monthly functional tests are a good practice for i i

monitors constantly in use for controlling normal station activities, j i Since these are the same monitors used for post accident purposes, they need not have this additional surveillance requirement. [

1

E) 1pstrumentation for Detection of inadacuate Core Coolina J

1) Core Exit Thermecouples (CET) -

a) The staff recommends that CYAPCO specify that the number of  !

CETs will be at least 4/ quadrant except Quadrant IV which will be 3/ quadrant and that the total number of channels will be l 16/ core.  !

b) Provide a discussion of the distribution of CETs in Quadrant [

III and why Qutdrant !!! requires only one channel operable  !

versus the recomendation in GL 83-37 for two operable [

channels, i

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Enclosure I A07615/Page 5 l

c) Provide the basis for why there is no action statement for less '

than the minimum of channels operable for the CETs as recomended in GL 83 37.

2) Reactor Vessel Water level (RVWL) a) Provide the basis for why there is no action statement for less i than the total number of channels operable for the RVWL ,

channels as recommended in GL 83-37.

3) Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin Monitor (SM) ,

a) Provide the basis for why there is no action statement for less than the total number of channels operable for the SM channels ,

I as recommended in GL 83 37.

, b) CYAPCO should revise the action statement to limit the time the  !

SMM can be inoperable. An additional statement such as 1 "Restore the system to o)erable tatus at the next scheduled refueling," as was prov< ded for the RVWL system, would be acceptable. '

Resoonse t

Ela) CYAPC0 agrees with the Staff's recommendation and, therefore, Technical l Specification Table 3.231 will be revised and submitted to the Staff by  ;

j January 31, 1989. [

l Elb) As indicated in Figure 1, the limiting quadrant is Quadrant IV where there is a total of three CET channels. This interpretation is reached ,

) oy u $ ting CETs on the axis to be half in the quadrant and taking no  !

j credit for the center thermocouple (H8). Technical Specification Table l 3.23-1 will be revised to reflect the above and submitted to the Staff by l January 31, 1989, t l

Elc) Technical Specification Table 3.23-1 will be revised to include an ACTION

(

statement for less than the minimum channel operable for the CETs and the t revised Table 3.23 1 will be submitted to the Staff by January 31, 1983.

E2a) Technical Specification Taole 3.23-1 will be revised to include an ACTION statement for less than the total number of channels operable for the F RVWL channels and the revised Table 3.23 1 will be submitted to the staff by January 31, 1989.

E3a) Technical Specification Table 3.231 will be revised to include an ACTION f and statement for less than the total number of channels operable for the SMM i E3b) channels and include the staff's recommended words to limit the time the l SNM can ba inoperable. These changes will be submitted to the Staff by

• January 31, 1989. i l

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FIGURE 1 CONNECTICUT YANKEE CORE Core Exit Thermocouples

• For each quadrant, credit is taken for half of the CETs on an axis. ,

• No credit taken for center CET.(H10 ,

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15 14 13 12 ll 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1- l CALLED NCRTH X

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Quadrant II ,

X X X Quadrant I i X X 0 X X ,

X X X X X l

1 X X X X x x x L, X X X X X X X K, X x x x x x ,

J X X X X x x x x x H G! l

. x x Fl 1 t

x E!

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D x x C l Quadrant 'III ,

Quadrant IV 8 l \

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X - CE' X - Currently out-of-service i 0 - Used for RV head Temp ,

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PLANT SYSTEMS h ". r' .,cmeg

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AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM [j .hi[j p j ,i[' y p; LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATI " - " il b 3.7.1.2 Two steam turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps capable of being sowered from an OPERABLE steam supply system and associated flow paths shall >e OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With one auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable, restore the inoperable auxiliary feedwater pump to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />,

b. With two auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable, immediately initiate corrective action to restore at least one auxiliary feedwater pump to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS ..

4.7.1.2.1 Each auxiliary feedwater pump shall be damonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days on a STAGGEP.ED TEST BASIS by:

a. Verifying that each steam turbine driven pump develops a discharge pressure of greater th6n or equal to 800 psig at a steam supply pressure of greater than or equal to 300 psig. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicible for entry into MODE 3;

b. Verifying that each non automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position, and 4.7.1.2.2 At least once per 18 % nths, the Auxiliary feedwater System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. Verifying the capability of each pump to attain rated flow of 450 gpm at 1050 psig;

b. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position upon receipt of an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation signal; and

c. Verifying that each auxiliary feedwater pump starts as designed automatically upon receipt of an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation signal.

HADDAM NECK 3/4 7 3

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l ELjT SYSTEMS

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SUPPLY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.3 The demineralized water storage tank (DWST) shall be OPERABLE with a minimum contained volume of 50,000 gallons of water and the primary water storage tank (PWST) shall be OPEP.ABLE with a minimum contained volume of 80,000 gallons of water.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With the DWST inoperable, restore the DWST to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

4

b. With the PWST inoperable, within 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />s:

l. Restore the PWST to OPERABLE status, or

2. Provide an equivalent supply from an alternate source, or

3. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVElllANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.3.1 The DWST and PWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying the contained water volume is within its limits.

l 4.7.1.3.2 The Recycle Primary Water Storage Tank (RPWST) shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying the contained i water volume is equivalent to the PWST requirements when the RPWST is the l alternate water source for the PWST.

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3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE 3/4.7.1.1 SAFFTY VALVES The OPERABILITY of the main steam line Code safety valves ensures that the Secondary Coolant System pressure will be limited to below 110%,(1100 psia), of its design pressure of 1000 psia during the most severe anticipated system operational transient. The maximum relieving capacity is associated with a Turbine trip from 100% RATED THERMAL POWER coincident with an assurr.ed loss of condenser heat sink (i.e., no steam bypass to the condenser).

The specified valve lift settings and relieving capacities are in accordance with the requirements of Section !!! of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code, 1971 Edition. The design total relieving capacity for all valves on all of t.he steam lines is 9.504,000 lbs/hr which is 122% of the total secondary steam flow of 7,790,000 lbs/hr at 100% RATED THERMAL POWER.

3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Auxiliary Feedwater System gnsures that the Reactor Coolant System can be cooled down to less than 350 F from normal operating conditions in the event of a total loss of offsite power.

Each steam turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump has a capacity sufficient to ensure adequate delivery of feedwater flow to remove decay geat and reduce the Reactor Coolant System temperature to less than 350 F within the Residual Heat Removal System operating range. With one auxiliary feedwater pump inoparable, the safest mode of operation is HOT SHUTDOWN with the decay heat removal function capable of being provided by the RHR System. With both auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable, the safest mode of operation is to maintain the status quo of the reactor until one auxiliary feedwater pump can be made OPERABLE.

3/4.7.1.3 AMRIARY FELOWATER SVPPLY The OPERABILITY of the demineralized water storage tank (DWST) and primary water storage tank (PWST) with the minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available to maintain the RCS at HOT STANDBY conditions for 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> with steam discharge to the atmosphere concurrent with total loss of offsite power. The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

s HADDAM NECK \. - 5 M! -

PLANT SYSTEMS .

BASES -

AVXILIARY FEEDWATER SUPPLY (Continued)

In addition, the auxiliary feedwater system can be initiated manually. In this case, feedwater is available from the DWST by gravity feed to the auxiliary feedwater pump. The specified 50,000 gallons of water in the DWST is adequate for decay heat removal for a period of at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Within this period, decay heat removal demands are reduced to approximately 150 gpm. Makeup water is available during this period from the PWST which contains a minimum volume of 80,000 gallons. The PWST transfer pumps can transfer 200 gpm from the PWST to the DWST. An alternate supply can be provided from the 100,000 gallons Recycled Primary Water Storage Tank, in the event that this source becomes exhausted, well water is available.

3/4.7.1.4 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY The limitations on Secondary Coolant System specific activity ensure that the resultant offsite radiation dose will be limited to a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 dose guideline vaiues in the event of a steam line rupture.

This dose also includes the effects of a coincident 0.4 gpm reactor-to secondary tube leak in the steam generator of the affected steam line. These values are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE TRIP VALVES The OPERABILITY of the main steam line trip valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blowdown in the event of a steam line rupture.

This restriction is required to: (1) minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and (2) limit the pressure rise within containment in the event the steam line rupture occurs within containment. The OPERABILITY of the main steam line trip valves within the closure times of the Surveillance Requirements are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure-inducedstressesinthesteamgeneratorsdonotexceedthgmaximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. Thglimitationsof70Fand200 psigarebasedonasteamgeneratorRTNDTof10Fandaresufffeientto prevent brittle fracture. The heatup and cooldown rate of 100 F/hr for the steam generators are specified to ensure that stresses in these vessels are maintained within acceptable design limits.

3/4.7.3 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Service Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analysis. A service water header is comprised of the two service water pumps associated with each diesel generator and the safety-related piping.

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NO. OF CHANNELS APPLICA8tE INSTRtMENT l CHANNELS OPERABLE MODES ACTION i

1. Containment Pressure 2 1 1,2,3 4,6

2. Reactor Coolant Cold Leg Temperature - Wide Range I/ loop 6 1/ loop I,2,3 4

3. Reactor Coolant Hot Leg Temperature - Wide Range 1/ loop 1/ loop 1,2,3 4 4 Reactor Coolant Pressure - Wide Range 2 1 1,2,3,4 1,2

, 5. Containment Water Level - Wide Range '

5 2 1 1,2,3 4,6 .

6. Core Exit Thermocouples 2/quadrante/

16/ core a 1,2,3 e)Af, (4 /cgtv w i. M

7. Main Stack Wide Range Mcbic Css Monitor 1 1 1,2,3,4*** 3

8. Containment Atmosphere-High Range Radiation Monitor 2 2 1,2,3,4 7

9. Reactor Yessel Water Level 2" 1" 1,2,3 54, 5

10. Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin Monitor 2 1 1,2,3 aff 8

_TARLE NOTATIONS H 3/genArc.ot

• Quadrant Mi may have only n dr .d """'""" C.

"A channel is composed of eight sensors in a probe. A channel is OPERABLE if four or more sensors, one or more in the head region (upper two) and three or more in the plenum region (lower six), are OPERABLE.

"*During periods of high steam generator blowdown, the main stack wide range noble gas monitor may be isolated for the duration of blowdown. In these cases, the monitor must he returned to service for at least 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> at the end of each six day period to demonstrate operability.

• P

T TABLE 3.23 1 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 - With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than the Total Number of

. Channels shown in Table 3.231 restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

ACTION :' - With the number of OPfRABLE accident monitoring ,

instrumentation channels less than the Minimum Channels '

OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.23-1, restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in at I m t HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. .

ACTION 3 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements, return one channel to operable status within 7 days, or else prepare and submit Special Report to the Comission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 10 days outlining:

the cause of the malfunction, the plans for_ restoring the channel to OPERABLE status, and gy~aTrernative rethods ap Lu) for estimating stack release rates during the interim.

ACTION 4 - With the number OPERABLE channels less than the Total Number of Channels shewn in Table 3.231, either restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days if repairs are feasible without shutting down or prepare and submit a Special report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 10 days outlining the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status and alternate rethods in effect for estimating the applicable parameter in the interim.

ACTION 5 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements, either restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> if repairs are feasible without shutting down or;

a. Prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status; and i

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b. Restore the system to OPERABLE status at the next scheduled refueling, ACTION 6 - With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than the MINIMUM CHANNELS ,

OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.23 1, restore the ,

inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, ,

. or submit a Special Report to the Comission pursuant to *~

Specification 6.9.2 within the next 10 days outlining the cause of the malfunction, the plans for restoring the channel (s) to OPERABLE status, and any alternate methods in affect for estimating the applicable parameter during the interim.

ACTION 7 - With less than the minimum channel (s) operable, restore the inoperable channel (s) to operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or else establish alternate means to determine if significant fuel failure exists. If still inoperable after 7 days, prepare and submit a Specini Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 10 days outlining: the cause of the inoperability, the plans for restoring operability, and the alternate means established. .

ACTION 8 - With the number of channels operable less than the ,

Minimum Channels OPERABLE. Determine the subcooling.

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