3F0686-23, Forwards Responses to NRC 851217 & 860502 Requests for Addl Info Re Isolation Devices & Parameter Selection & Displays, Per Suppl 1 to NUREG-0737.SPDS Functional Description & Display Document Also Encl

Forwards Responses to NRC 851217 & 860502 Requests for Addl Info Re Isolation Devices & Parameter Selection & Displays, Per Suppl 1 to NUREG-0737.SPDS Functional Description & Display Document Also Encl

ML20211N375
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	06/30/1986
From:	Eric Simpson FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:	Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20211N379	List: 3F0686-23, Forwards Responses to NRC 851217 & 860502 Requests for Addl Info Re Isolation Devices & Parameter Selection & Displays, Per Suppl 1 to NUREG-0737.SPDS Functional Description & Display Document Also Encl ML20211N395 ML20211N421
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 3F0686-23, 3F686-23, NUDOCS 8607030085
Download: ML20211N375 (18)

Text

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Florida Power CORPORATON June 30, 1986 3F0686-23 Mr. John F. Stolz, Director PWR Project Directorate #6 Division of PWR Licensing B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Crystal River Unit 3 Docket No. 50-302 Operating License No. DPR-72 NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 Safety Parameter Display System

Dear Sir:

Florida Power Corporation is submi.tting this letter in response to NRC letters of December 17, 1985 and May 2, 1986.

Enclosure 1 to this letter titl ed " Response to NRC Letter - Isolation Devices" provides the responses to the additional inforration requested in NRC letter of December 17, 1985.

Enclosure 2 to this letter provides the responses requested in NRC [[letter::3F0586-05, Forwards List of Documents & Meetings Since Fall of 1984 Re Exemption from GDC 4 & Snubber Optimization Plan & Related Documentation to Support 860424 Request for Amend to License DPR-72 for Snubber Optimization Approval|letter dated May 2,1986]]. This enclosure has two attachments:

(1) FPC CR-111, Safety Parameter Displ ay System Functional Description, Drawing No. 1151659, Rev. A4.

8607030085 860630 PDR ADOCK 05000302 p PDR O}

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GENERAL OFFICE: 3201 Thirty-fourth Street South e P.O. Box 14042

• St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 * (813) 866-5151 A Flor lda Progress Company

June 30, 1986 3F0686-23 Page 2 I (2) Crystal River Unit 3, Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) Displays,

{ Document No. B&W 51-1121942-02.

Sincerely, ,

I I E. C. Simpson

. Director, Nuclear Operations j Engineering and Licensing i .

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$ EMG/feb l

, xc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace

Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2900 l Atlanta, GA 30323 l

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ENCLOSURE 2 REPONSE TO NRC LETTER MAY 2, 1986 PARAMETER SELECTION AND DISPLAYS 4

QUESTION NO. 1 - PARAMETER SELECTION i

As a result of our review, the staff noted that the following variables are not displayed in the Crystal River SPDS:

1. Neutron flux, power range

2. Neutron flux, intermediate range

3. Reactor Core System, water level

4. Residual Heat Removal System, coolant flow rate

5. Containment Sump, water level i

6. Status of Containment Isolation 1 7. Containment Hydrogen Concentration i

{ Steam Generator Radiation RESPONSE N0. 1 I With the exception of variables No. 3, 6 and 7, all variables listed are displayed in the Crystal River Unit 3 SPDS. A detailed description of the i SPDS inputs and displays is described in "FPC CR-III Safety Parameter Dis-play Systemrunctional Description," Dwg. No. 1151659, page 1 thru 50 (copy j attached).

Parameter 3 " Reactor Core System Water Level" The variable " Reactor Core System Water Level" is not contained within i

the FPC SPDS data base at this time.

i j As required by NRC order dated December 10, 1982, this instrtmentation

!' was installed during Refuel V and FPC is now awaiting NRC approval and guidance as to how this system is to be used to support operator action.

j Parameter 6 - Status of Containment isolation

The SPDS contains logic information which will identi fy to the i operator that the ES system has actuated.

Engineered Safeguard Containment Isolation Matrix indicating lights are located on the panel nearby to the SPDS operating CRT and is con-figured for quick and easy containment isolation status.

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l Parameter 7 - Containment Hydrogen Concentration FPC measurement of hydrogen concentration is an off-line system which requires time and administrative procedures to implement.

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I QUESTION N0. 2 - DATA VALIDATION l

l The licensee's safety analysis did not describe how data are validated j prior to their display and use by control room personnel. We request that the licensee describe the technique (s) used to validate data, and to

describe how valid / invalid data are cooed for display in the SPDS.

l RESPONSE N0. 2 1  !

l Data validation is performed on redundant signals as follows:

The following sets of points will have redundant signals:

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1. T-Cold Loop A

2. T-Cold Loop B j 3. T-Hot Loop A

4. T-Hot Loop B l 5. RCS Pres Loop A i 6. RCS Pres Loop B

! 7. RCS Pres Low RNG A t

8. RCS Pres Low RNG B 4

! Deviation Check

{' All the above points will have a redundancy check performed. This is done by checking the difference between redundant channels values. If j the difference between the maximum and minimum values is greater than five times the string accuracy, a question mark will be displayed next

! to the applicable alphanumeric data.

! T-Cold Deviation Check l

i When performing a deviation check on T-Cold, the Reactor Coolant Pump 3 (RCP) run status flag must be checked. If the pump is not running, a

, deviation check will not be done on that loop, and the T-Cold value

] corresponding to that pump will be flagged with a question mark.

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, A-D Converter

! Checks - each data-handler will perform a calibration check on its i analog to digital converts. If a failure is found, a flag will be

} sent to the SPDS. The SPDS will then flag all analog signals with a j question mark.

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OVESTION NO. 3 - HUMAN FACTORS PROGRAM The licensee's safety analysis states that the SPDS will be located in the control room. The SPDS provides information to control room personnel via selectable displays and automatically displays alert signals. The select-able displays include: (1) the Low-Range Pressure-Temperature (P-T) format, (2) the AT0G P-T format, (3) the Inadequate Core Cooling (ICC) format, (4) two " normal" power operation formats, and (5) four pages of alphanumeric data, which contains several key process variables and system variables.

The location of data within the SPDS was defined in Table 2.1, " Parameters Required to Monitor the Five SPDS Safety Functions," of the safety analy-sis. No illustrations of these display formats were provided in the safety analysis.

Our analysis of the data contained in Table 2.1 identified several poten-tial human engineering discrepancies (HEDs). For example, we noted that information on the Reactor Coolant System Integrity Critical Safety Func-tion (CSF) is contained in: (1) the Low-Range P-T display format, (2) the AT0G P-T display format, (3) the ICC display format, (4) the alphanumeric display format, and (5) alerts. We fail to see how a concise display of data for the Reactor Coolant System Integrity CSF is achieved. We request that the licenses provide a description of the human factor principles and practices used for the design and development of the display system, or to provide justification that clearly illustrates how each of the critical safety functions may be rapidly and reliably evaluated by a user of the display system.

RESPONSE N0. 3 Illustrations of the display formats is contained in Drawing 1151659 Rev.

A4, page 1 thru 61, titled "FPC CR-III Safety Parameter Display System Functional Description" and B&W Document No. 51-1121942-02 titled " Crystal River Unit 3 Safety Parameter Display System Displays." Copies of both documents are enclosed.

The basic Human Factors principles for the symptom-oriented procedures and the SPDS displays resulted from the Abnormal Transient Operating Guidelines (AT0G) work done at B&W. This work was done on a generic basis for all B&W plants. It involved detailed fault-tree analysis of all design basis acci-dents, and demonstrated that the operator could effectively recover from these transients by dealing with symptoms, rather than determining the root cause of the accident. A major finding of this work was that the operator needed simple displays which allowed him to assess fundamental physical parameters, such as ability of the system to transfer heat to its ultimate j heat sink. The basic Human Factor's principle involved was that if the  ;

operator could quickly assess the direction to take to recover from the transient from such displays, he wold not have to take the time to evaluate the cause, and thus could quickly and effectively deal with recovering the l plant. t I

Thus, for example, the operator assesses RCS integrity and heat removal capability from noting the relationships between T-Hot, T-Cold, RCS pressure and secondary side Tsat. These are all presented on one display, and corrective action can easily be ihntified for any one that is out of specification in conjunction with the symptom-oriented emergency procedures.

This Human Factor's principle was originated in the AT0G analysis, and has been verified to be effective throughout design reviews, verification and validation efforts, and operator training.

QUESTION N0. 4 - DESIGN VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION PROGRAM Tiie licensee's safety analysis did not contain a description of the Design Verification and Validation Program used to develop the system. In Section 3.0, " Applicable Events," of the safety analysis, a general discussion on six initiating events used in the AT0G development program is presented.

However, from the material presented, it is not clear that the SPDS was validated. No evidence was provided to demonstrate that the SPDS does allow a user to rapidly and reliably evaluate each of the CSFs for a wide range of events. We request that the licensee provide the staff with the Design Verification and Validation Program used in the development of the SPDS.

RESPONSE N0. 4 Routine simulator training has been used to demonstrate the effectiveness of using the symptom-oriented emergency operating procedures in conjunction with the SPDS. Specifically, every operator is trained to recover from the si x (6) initiating events used in the ATOG development program. These include:

1. Excessive Feedwater

2. Loss of Main Feedwater (LOFW)

3. Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR)

4. Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP)

5. Small Steam Leak

6. Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident (SBLOCA)

In conjunction with this, the operator is challenged with recognizing and dealing eifectively with each (f the five critical safety functions. The training has demonstrated that the design basis, as outlined in the safety analysis, is an effective operator tool.

Specific areas that are challenged and judged in the training include:

1. Ability of operator to correctly identify when a critical safety function is lost, or in jeopardy.

2. How quickly he identifies proper corrective action and takes it.

3. Use of other information available to him, including normal con-trol board instruments, to augment and confirm the assessment provided by the SPDS.

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FPC considers that this routine and continual confirmation of the effec-

, tiveness of the SPDS and AT0G procedures justify the effectiveness of the .

lI operator's ability to evaluate CSF's for a wide range of events.

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,, '. ENCLOSURE 1 RESPONSE TO NRC LETTER--ISOLATION DEVICES

1. ISOLATION DEVICE ISOLATION AMPLIFIER CIRCUIT, P/N 6612712Al ODESTION

a. For the type of device used to accomplish electrical isolation, describe the specific testing performed to demonstrate that the device is acceptable for its application. The description should include elementary diagrams when necessary to indicate the test configuration and how the maximum credible faults were applied to the devices.

RESPONSE

The isolation amplifier circuit, P/N 6621712Al is used in the Buffer Amplifier, Summing / Difference Amplifier, Log Rate Amplifier and Count Rate Amplifier to accomplish electrical isolation of analog signals generated in safety systems such as the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and the Saf ety Features Actuation System (SFAS).

Figure 1 illustrates a typical analog signal path where amplifiers A and B2 process the protective action signal while amplifier Bi provides the isolated analog output signal. Various faults aE the output of B1 are acceptable when signal V2 and signal V3 are essentially unaffected. The worst case fault is assumed to be the case where a high voltage is applied at the output of B1 and results in a short circuit fault between the By input and output. The maximum tolerable fault voltage at the output of Bi was determined to be 400 VDC and 400 volts peak AC.

The analog isolation device was subjected to three types of testing--passive tests, credible fault voltages and high fault voltages. These tests were conducted in the fault voltage range 0 to 608 volts peak 60 hz AC and 0 to 475 VDC.

The passive tests were performed to illustrate the ef fects of faults such as shorted and open isolator outputs. In the first -

tes t , the output of B1 was connected to ground. In the second test the output of B1 was opened.

The credible fault voltage tests subjected the output of the isolator to foreign voltages which are credible due to exposure of the transmission line and load. Pour different test cases were run. Two of the tests (tests 4 and 5) illustrated the effects of having the output of B1 connected to the +15V supply and to the -lSV supply. These testa verified the adequacy of Page 1 OF 11 i

isolation at the low end of the credible fault range. The other two tests were designed to verify the adequacy of isolation in the center and upper portion of the credible fault voltage range for both AC and DC potentials. The output of B1 was connected to a fault voltage of +265 VDC in test 5. In tes t 6, the output of B1 was connected to a fault voltage of 200 VRMS.

In the high fault voltage tests the output of the isolator is subjected to foreign voltages in the upper region of the credible fault voltage range and beyond for both AC and DC potential. In test 7, the output of B1 is connected to +475 VDC. In tes t 8 the output of B1 is connected to 430 VRMS (608 y peak).

Test results revealed an extremely low percentage of error and low values of ripple were induced in the protective action signal V2 and V5 . No unacceptable effects were found in the tests.

00ESTION

b. Data to verify that the maximum credible faults applied during the test were the maximum voltage / current to which the device could be exposed, and define how the maximum voltage / current was determined.

RESPONSE

The maximum voltage to which the SPDS can be exposed is a single failure of an analog supply of 120 VAC f 10%. The analog signals from the analog isolator circuit are routed to the RECALL /SPDS via instrumentation cable trays. These low level analog signal cables are not routed in wireways containing power or control cables. The only types of cables mixed with instrumentation cabling are telephone and low level paging circuits. Therefore, the device should not be exposed to voltages above 120 VAC f 10%.

Although, the analog isolation device successfully passed testing at fault voltages ranging from 0 to 608 volts peak 60 hz AC and 0 to 475 VDC, it was determined that any fault voltage in excess of 400 VDC/400 V peak AC could result in a failure of the main amplifier.

The maximum credible fault voltage was determined in the following manner. The worst case fault was assumed to be the case in which a high voltage is applied at the output of B1 and it results in a short circuit fault between the By input and output. In this case, the impedance between the fagit source and the IE output of A is minimum and equal to R 10 ohms. Since the main amplifier output current capability 1 (=I is 0.005 amps and the main amplifier current loads (II) is g)001 0. amps, then (12 ) under fault conditions could be as much as 0.004 amps.

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Therefore, the maximum tolerable fault voltage at the output of B1 is E(fault) =I xR1, 2 (fault)S

= 0.004 x 10

= 4 00 volts Under worst case fault R1 is required to dissipate 1.6 watts (160% of power dissipation) and not breakdown with 400 volts impressed across its terminals. Since the resistor can be operated up to 180% of rated wattage, it will not be damaged.

However higher fault voltages may cause the maximum resistor ratings to be exceeded.

OUESTION

c. Data to verify that the maximum credible fault was applied to the output of the device in the transverse mode (between signal and return) and other faults were considered (i.e.,

open and short circuit).

RESPONSB The isolation device circuit was subjected to eight t es ts in which the transmission line connected to the output of an isolation device circuit was open circuited, short circuited, grounded, or subjected to credible fault voltages up to and including the maximum credible fault voltages of 400 VDC and 400 V peak AC. See response to question la for description of each t es t . See Figure 2 for summary of test data.

QUESTION

d. Define the pass / fail acceptance criteria for each type of device.

RESPONSE

The analog isolation device was subjected to tests designed to demonstrate the amplifier would not exceed its limits under fault potentials up to and including 400 VDC and 400 volts peak AC.

Page 3 OF 11

QUESTION

e. Provide a commitment that the isolation devices comply with the environment qualification (10CFR 50.49) and with the seismic qualifications which were the basis for plant licensing.

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RESPONSE

The isolation amplifier circuit is located in modules residing in the RPS or SFAS cabinets. These cabinets are located outside of containment in a controlled environment. Therefore, they are not subject to the environment qualification requirements of 10CFR50.49.

The isolation amplifier device has been seismically qualified to meet seismic requirements which were the basis for plant licensing.

l QUESTION

f. Provide a description of the measures taken to protect the safety systems from electrical interference (i.e.,

Electrostatic Coupling, EMI, Common Mode and Crosstalk) that may be generated by the SPDS.

e RESPONSE The following precautions have been taken to prevent electrical interference to other systems in the plant.

! 1. The incoming power connections to the .9PDS contain RF traps I

which decouple both incoming and outgoing high frequency.

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2. Connections to lE plant signals are through lE isolation dev ices .

3. The SPDS equipment is enclosed in a grounded metal cabinet with the doors closed.

4. All wiring into and out of the SPDS cabinet is inside grounded conduit. Video signals are, in addition, in 1

co-axial cable, with grounded shields.

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2. ISOLATION DEVICE VOLTAG E-TO-CURRENT CONVERTER, P/N 2AO-VAI OUESTION I a. For the type of device used to accomplish electrical 1 isolation, describe the specific testing performed to demonstrate that the device is acceptable for its application. The description should include elementary i diagrams when necessary to indicate the test configuration I

and how the maximum credible f aults were applied to the l devices .

t 4 RESPONSE The scaling voltage-to-current converter, P/N 2AO-VAI converts an input signal of -10 to +10 vdc signal to an output signal between 4 and 20 mA. The converter consists of two independent input / output channels. Each channel provides electrical isolation of its output signal.

Three isolation tests were performed on the output of the i module to ensure proper isolation during a seismic event (Figure 2) . Test 1, illustrated the effects of having both outputs of Channel A grounded for 10 seconds during 1 SSE.

j Neither chann el of the 2AI-I2V current-to-voltage converter j

i which fed the 2AO-VAI voltage-to-current converter shifted more than 0.5% when one channel of the 2AO-VAI's output was grounded. Also, both channels of the 2AO-VAI functioned t

properly after the test was completed.

In test 2, 600 volts ac is applied between both output leads tied SSE.

together and earth (ground) for 10 seconds during 1 Both converters 2AO-VAI and 2AO-V21 remained operational during this test.

There was some ac feedthrough to the 2AI-I2V.

1 In the third test, 600 volts ac is applied across the output leads during a third SSE for 10 seconds. The application of i

600 volts across the output of channel A produced the following damage:

Circuit foil from the (+) output lead connection to J9 opened.

Circuit foil from the (-) output lead connection to J14 opened.

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Resistor R32 (402 ohms, +3%, 6W) opened.

Capacitor C17 (6.8 microfarads tantalum) opened.

Capacitor C11 (4.0 microfarads polycarbonate) shorted.

Diodes CR19, 20, 21, and 22 (Type IN4447) open ed .

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No damage occurred to Channel B or the 2AI-I2V voltage-to-current converter due to the application of the test voltage to channel A.

QUESTION

b. Data to verify that the maximum credible f aults applied during the test were the maximum voltage / current to which the device could be exposed, and define how the maximum i voltage / current was determined.

RESPONSE

A maximum credible fault voltage of 600 VAC was applied during the test, however, it is assumed that the device would not be exposed to voltages above 120 VAC i 10%.

This assumption is based on the fact that the low level analog signals from the voltage-to-current converter are routed in instrumentation cable trays and are not routed in wireways containing power or control cables. The only types of cables mixed with instrumentation cabling are telephone and low level paging circuits. Therefore, the analog signals are exposed to very low voltages. Since the maximum voltage to which the SPDS can be exposed is a single failure of an analog supply of 120 VAC 10%. It is assumed that the device will not be exposed to voltages above 120 VAC 10%.

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i OUESTION

! c. Data to verify that the maximum credible fault .was applied to the output of the device in the transverse mode (between signal and return) and other faults were considered (i.e.,

i open and short circuit).

RESPOlgl3 Three fault conditions considered were (1) grounding both outputs

. of Channel A, (2) applying 600 volts ac between both output leads l tied together and earth (ground) and (3) applying 600 volts ac i across the output leads. Each test was performed for 10 seconds i during a SSE condition. See response to question 2a for l description and results of each test.

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OUESTION

. d. Define the pass / fail acceptance criteria for each type of device.

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RESPONSE

! The device was required to provide proper isolation during a seismic event under the following conditions:

a) Both outputs of channel A grounded for 10 seconds 1

) b) A fault voltage of 600 VAC applied between both output leads j tied together and ground for 10 seconds c) A fault voltage of 600 VAC applied between both output leads 3

for 10 seconds i

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! f. Provide a description of the measures taken to protect the safety systems from electrical interference (i.e.,

Electrostatic Coupling, EMI, Common Mode and Crosstalk) that may be generated by the SPDS.

i l RESPONSE See response to question If.

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3. ISOLATION DEVICE CONTROL RELAY, P/N SUK6-76 Documentation describing specific testing performed on this device to demonstrate electrical isolation is not available.

However, the Sylvania control relay, P/N SUK6-76, is a heavy duty, type PM, 10 amp, 600 volt max, AC relay. Credit is taken for the 600 volt design isolation voltage between contact and coil. In addition, separation of wiring of the relay installation

is provided within the cabinet.

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i r!GURE 1 - TYP! CAL ANALOG $1GNAL ! 0LATOR

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Protective Signal Path j _ _ _ - - --------

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I ggS Analog $39 mal Isolator w.m Protection System i

Non-eratection System 3

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CMaractee stics of the Isolation Aaouriee Creewit .

A. The 220 ohe resistors prectuee overtoad of the of the related amputier m the event of an maevertent short at the ampufier output.

B. The gem of A, E g. and 3 2 is essentially unity, C. The dynssc signat range is 10 vetts i

D. Aaotifiers A, B . and 32 are capable of swootying j wo to five mittfamperes mwmum eithout twtmg.

I E. The normal loseng on amotifier A is approximately 0.0001 amperes per each eriven anot.fier.

F. The mammwm mout cerent to amouf rer 32

! is 0 0001 taceres.

. G tre emanges m the vatwo of R eat be refiestee

) as a srgnet error e the owtout signat at R g.

Changes m Rg are, theref ore, sett annwntiating.

H. The crotect we action s'gaat is conservatively coesiaeces as wa af f ectea so tomq os c reent 12 aces act estees 0.004 aaperes unaee f ast cona ticas at tme 9 estaat

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SUMMARY

OF TEST DATA FOR ANALD6 ISOLATOR

VALE OF VI : VAL E OF V2 : VK UE OF V3 : VALUE OF V4 : VALUE OF V5 :  :  :

IEST  : CON 0li!0NS : CON 0!TIONS : CONOli!0NS : CONOli!DNS : CONO!TIONS : V5  :  ! ERROR DESCRIFi!C4

REFEEEE FAULT .! R.E.F.E.R.E.E..E...F.A.U.L.T...:

R.E.F.E.R.E.E..E...F.A.U.LT R.E.F.E.R.E.E..( F AULT  : REFERENCE FAULT : REF - FAULT  : (10V SPANI : REMARKS i . . . .

l  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :

. El Dutput Oper.  : +5.000 : +5.000 : -4.992 : -4.992: -0.030 l -0.030 : +4.970: +4.970 : +4.953 : +1.953 0.00  : 0  : Acceptable

2. B: Output Srcunded: +5.000 : +5.000 : -4.992 : -4.992:' -0.030 : -0.030 : +4 970: 0.000 : +4.953 : +4.953 : 0.00  : 0  : Acceptable

3. Output of St  : +5.000 : +5.000 : -4.992 : -4.992: -0.030 : +5.540 : +4.970: +15.000 : +4.953 : +4.954 : +0.001  : 0  : Acceptable Ecznetted to +15v :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :

4. Entent of B:  : +5.000 : -

+5.000 : -4.992 : -4.991: -0.030 : -5.540 : +4.970: -15.000 : +4.953 : +4.954 : +0.001  : 0  : Acceptable ~

Eennected to -15v :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  : w L Dutout of B:  : +5.000 : +5.000 : -4.992 : -4.993: -0.030 : +265.000 : +4.970: +2:5.000 : +4.953 : +4.953 : O

+0.00  : 0  : Acceptable Cennected to +265v:  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :

e. Octput of B1  : +5.000 :

: a

+5.000 : -4.992 : -4.994: -0.030 : 200 VRMS : +4.970: 200 VRMS : +4.953 : +4.952 : -0.002  : 0  : Acceptatte g Eennected to  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :

Nh EE 60 m  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :

7 Output of 91  : +5.000 :

+5.000 : -4.992 : -4.994: -0.030 : +475.000 : +4.970: +475.000 : +4.953 : +4.951 : -0.001  : 0  : Acceptable Connected to +475v:  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :

9. Outcat of 91  : +5.000 : +5.000 : -4.992 : -4.993: -0.030 : 430 VRMS : +4.970: 430 VRMS : +4.953 : +4.951 -0.002  : 0  : Acceptable 43h RMS 60 Hz  !  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :(With !av:  :  :

86MI v PeatI  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  : 60 Hz  :  :  :

:  :  :  :  :  :  :  :  : Rippie) :  :  :

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FIGURE 2 SEISMIC TEST SETUP 2AD-VAI Custori ECEP 9206 Voltage-to-Current Converter t

10 2 afIPS POWUt 2 Alt +3 Pts SUPPLY k k

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-15 C +15 C

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g 2AO-Var 400 V en CumstOff Bel-IEV R m-h

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