05000272/LER-1982-086, Forwards LER 82-086/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 82-086/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20067B778
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	11/24/1982
From:	Midura H Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20067B780	List: 05000272/LER-1982-086, Forwards LER 82-086/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
References
NUDOCS 8212060309
Download: ML20067B778 (3)

LER-2082-086, Forwards LER 82-086/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2722082086R00 - NRC Website

text

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O PSEG Public Service Elecuic and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station November 24, 1982 Mr. R. C. Haynes -

Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue

, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 REPORTABLE, OCCURRENCE 82-086/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station 4, ' Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrencq 82-086/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

.-- , Sincerely yours,

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. 6 s p #p44-H. J. Midura

,t General Manager -

'3 Salem Operations

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Report Number: 82-086/03L Report Date: 11-24-82 Occurrence Date: 10-27-82 Facility: Salem Generating Station Unit 1 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Penetration Fire Barriers - NLn-Functional.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-398.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 6 - RX Power 0% - Unit Load 9 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On October 27, 1982, during performance of fire barrier penetration surveillance for the 122' Elevation of the Auxiliary Building, 5 penetrations were found to be non-functional. Penetrations 1417A1000lSS, 14'1A10003N, 1417A20005S, 1417B20007E, and 1417B20008E were involved.

Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11 was already in effect dating back to 9001 hours0.104 days <br />2.5 hours <br />0.0149 weeks <br />0.00342 months <br />, October 29, 1981, due to other open penetrations (See LER 81-196/03L). A fire watch patrol for the area was already assigned, in compliance with the action statement.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

One fire barrier was open as the result of construction; two penetrations were found inadequately sealed. Sealing of the remaining two barriers was apparently overlooked at installation and had

' remained undetected during subsequent surveillance. The surveillance procedure originally did not specifically identify the penetrations or their location An improved procedure had recently been implemented; this is the first occasion on which the improved procedure was performed for this area.

i ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

l The functional integrity of the penetration fire barriers ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility. This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire affecting redundant safety related equipment. The barriers are a passive element in the fire protection i program.

Technical Specification 3.7.11 requires:

With one or more of the above required penetration fire barriers non-functional, establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected penetration within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

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i ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

As noted, a fire watch was stationed throughout the occurrence. The event therefore involved no risk to the health and safety of the public. Due to further degradation of the design feature, however, the occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation. It is therefore reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The non-functional fire barriers were sealed on October 27, 1982. As noted, an improved surveillance procedure is being' utilized to demonstrate required fire barriers are functional. The procedure contains provisions to identify and include any additional non-functional barriers as they are discovered.

FAILURE DATA:

Similar problems were discovered during recent surveillance of fire barriers in the Control Room (see LER 82-046/03L).

Prepared By R. Frahm / h, b d Gene (al Manager -

Salem Operations SORC Meeting No. R? 1n6

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