05000272/LER-1982-070, Forwards LER 82-070/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 82-070/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20065M161
Person / Time
Site: Salem 
Issue date: 10/06/1982
From: Midura H
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Haynes R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20065M165 List:
References
NUDOCS 8210210134
Download: ML20065M161 (3)
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LER-1982-070, Forwards LER 82-070/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
2721982070R00 - NRC Website
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text

- - - -

O PSIEG I

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station October 6, 1982 f

Mr.

R.

C. Haynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-070/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No.

1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-070/03L.

This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

}

b H.

J. Midura General Manager -

Salem Operations RF:ksyg,/

l CC:

Distribution l

8210210134 821006 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S

PDR

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The Energy People p#

j miso mesi L

Report Number:

82-070/03L Report Date:

Occurrence Date:

09-12-82 Facility:

Salem Generating Station, Unit 1 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

DNB Parameters - Pressurizer Pressure - Out of Specification.

This report was initiated by Incident Reports82-274 and 82-283.

CONDITIONS PRIOR.TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 100% - Unit Load 1080 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 2245 hours0.026 days <br />0.624 hours <br />0.00371 weeks <br />8.542225e-4 months <br />, September 12, 1982, during the performance of functional testing of Pressurizer Pressure Channel ~III instru-ment, the Control Room Operator noticed that pressure was approximately 2205 PSIA and decreasing.

A survey of the control board revealed that the pressurizer controller was'in the manual mode of operation.

The automatic. mode had been selected prior.

to the occurrence.

Control was returned to automatic, the backup heaters energized and pressure started to increase.

With pressure less than the Technical Specification limit of'2220 PSIA, Action Statement 3.2.5 was entered, retroactive to the time of discovery of the problem. ~ Pressurizer pressure increased until 2250 hours0.026 days <br />0.625 hours <br />0.00372 weeks <br />8.56125e-4 months <br /> when it returned within specification limits and Action Statement 3.2.5 was terminated.

The minimum pressure reached during the l

transient was 2200 PSIA.

At 1436 hours0.0166 days <br />0.399 hours <br />0.00237 weeks <br />5.46398e-4 months <br />, September 14, 1982, a similar malfunction of the pressurizer pressure controller was observed, and Action Statement 3.2.5 was entered for a'second time. 'The control room operator again returned the controller ' to the automatic mode and pressure was returned to within limits.

The action statement was terminated at 1448 hours0.0168 days <br />0.402 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.50964e-4 months <br />, September 14, 1982; minimum' pressure observed was 2155' PSIA.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Investigation of the first occurrence showed no link to performance of the surveillance.

In both. instances, the controller tested satisfactorily following the malfunction.

A similar. problem had l

occurred on June 4, 1982'(see~LER 82-038/03L), with no identifiable failure in the controller.

The occurrences were therefore attributed to;an intermittant problem in'either the pressure-l controller or the manual-auto station..

i I

LER 82-070/03L' '

ENALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

In accordance with the Technical Specification basis for Limiting Condition for Operation 3.2.5, compliance with the Specification limits assure DNB parameters are within the steady state envelope of operation assumed in the transient and accident analyses of the FSAR.

The limits are consistent-with-the initial FSAR assumptions, and have been analytically demonstrated adequate to maintain a minimum DNBR of 1.30 throughout each analyzed _ transient.

The FSAR does not consider, however, events starting during transients which are already in progress.

Action Statement 3.2.5 requires:

With any of the DNB parameters exceeding.its limit, restore the parameter to within its limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, or reduce thermal power to less than 5% of rated thermal power within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.-

The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> limit contained in the action statement ensures that, following unexpected transients of the type involved in these

[

occurrences, DNB parameters are returned within the envelope assumed' in the FSAR.

In both instances, pressurizer. pressure was within the DNB limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and consequently, no risk to the health or safety of the public was involved.

These occurrences constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted-by a limiting condition for operation,'and were reportable in' accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

In the event the operator had failed-to notice the decreasing.

pressure, a Pressurizer Pressure-Low trip would have initiated a reactor shutdown at 1880 PSIA, maintaining a minimum DNBR of 1.30, as demonstrated by the FSAR.

As such, the' occurrence would still not have involved any risk to the health or safety of the public.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

As noted, in both instances pressure'was returned to within limits and the-action statement was terminated within the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> interval.

The manual-auto station was. replaced'and'the channel was satis-factorily' tested on September 16, 1982; no further problems'have been noted.

~

FAILURE DATA:

Hagan Corporation Manual-Auto Station Model 124 4

l

- Prepared By-R.

Frahm Genefal Manager --

Salem Operations SORC Meeting No.

82-88

'w-,

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