Text

Submittal of Request for Amendment to the Technical Specifications
	ML13169A068
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	06/13/2013
From:	Olson E; Entergy Operations
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	RBG-47322
	Download: ML13169A068 (77)
	v • d • e

Entergy Operations, Inc.

River Bend Station Entergy 5485 U.S. Highway 61 N St. Francisville, LA 70775 Tel 225-381-4374 Eric Olson Site Vice President RBG-47322 June 13, 2013 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT:

Application for Technical Specification Changes; Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Improved Standard Technical Specification Change Traveler, TSTF-423, "Technical Specifications End States."

River Bend Station, Unit 1 Docket No. 50-458 License No. NPF-47

Dear Sir or Madam:

In accordance with the provisions of Section 50.90 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy) is submitting a request for an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) for River Bend Station (RBS), Unit 1.

The proposed amendment would modify TS to risk-informed requirements regarding selected Required Action End States as provided in the referenced document. The availability of the model safety evaluation for this TS improvement was announced in the FederalRegister on February 18, 2011 as part of the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP). provides a description of the proposed change. Attachment 2 provides the existing TS pages marked up to show the proposed change. Attachment 3 provides the existing TS Bases pages marked up to show the proposed change (for information only). provides a summary of the regulatory commitments made in this submittal.

Although this request is neither exigent nor emergency, your prompt review is requested.

Once approved, the amendment shall be implemented within 60 days.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Joseph A.

Clark at (225) 381-4177.

AZ-4

RBG-47322 Page 2 of 3 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on June 13, 2013.

Sincerely, EWO/JAC/bmb RBF1-12-0064 License Amendment Request (LAR) 2013-02 Attachments:

1. Analysis of Proposed Technical Specification Change

2. Proposed Technical Specification Changes (mark-up)

3. Changes to Technical Specification Bases Pages - For Information Only

4. List of Regulatory Commitments cc: Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV 1600 E. Lamar Blvd.

Arlington, TX 76011-4511 NRC Senior Resident Inspector P. 0. Box 1050 St. Francisville, LA 70775 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Mr. Alan Wang MS 0-8B1 One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Office of Environmental Compliance Radiological Emergency Planning and Response Section JiYoung Wiley P. O. Box 4312 Baton Rouge, LA 70821-4312 Public Utility Commission of Texas Attn: PUC Filing Clerk 1701 N. Congress Avenue P. 0. Box 13326 Austin, TX 78711-3326

Attachment I RBG-47322 Analysis of Proposed Technical Specification Change to RBG-47322 Page 1 of 5

1.0 DESCRIPTION

The proposed amendment would modify Technical Specifications (TS) for River Bend Station - Unit 1 (RBS) to risk-informed requirements regarding selected Required Action End States.

The changes are consistent with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved Industry/Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) TSTF-423, Revision 0, "Technical Specifications End States, NEDC-32988-A."

The availability of this TS improvement was published in the Federal Register on February 18, 2011, as part of the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP).

2.0 PROPOSED CHANGE

The proposed amendment would modify RBS TS to risk-inform requirements regarding selected Required Action end states. Additionally, it would modify the TS Required Actions with a Note prohibiting the use of limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.0.4.a when entering the preferred end state (Mode 3) on startup.

The proposed TS changes are included as Attachment 2 of this submittal. The technical variations or deviations from TSTF-423, Revision 1 are of two types; differences in RBS specific TS and those TS changes in TSTF-423 which RBS is not requesting. In some cases, an adaptation of TSTF-423 was required for incorporation into the TS due to administrative differences in format (e.g., condition letter designation, etc). Each of these differences is identified in Section 4.1.

The associated Bases are included as Attachment 3 for information.

3.0 BACKGROUND

The background for this application is adequately addressed by the NRC Notice of Availability of the Proposed Models for Plant-Specific Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-423, Revision 1, "Technical Specifications End States, NEDC-32988-A," for Boiling Water Reactor Plants Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP) published on February 18, 2011.

4.0 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

Entergy has reviewed the Safety Evaluation (SE) published on February 18, 2011, as part of the CLIIP Notice of Availability of the Model Safety Evaluation. Entergy has concluded that the information in the GE topical report and TSTF-423 as well as the Safety Evaluation prepared by the NRC, are applicable to River Bend Station (RBS), and provide justification for the incorporation of the proposed changes into the River Bend Station, Unit 1, TS. The following is noted with respect to this conclusion:

1. The discussion regarding Control Room Air Conditioning (CRAC), NUREG-1434 TS 3.7.3) discusses that this is a non-risk significant system for most BWR's. For to RBG-47322 Page 2 of 5 River Bend, the OPERABILITY of this system is impacted through interlocks to Switchgear Room cooling, which is another subsystem of the overall Control Building HVAC system (HVC) and which is a risk significant function. However, the logic supporting the proposed changes for CRAC remains valid even with consideration of the need for Switchgear Room cooling at River Bend.

2. RBS has motor-driven main feed pumps, which remain available at low vessel pressure conditions. However, the impact on risk associated with these feedwater pumps would follow the same logic as for the BWR/6 motor driven HPCS pump, as discussed in NEDC-32988-A, with the proviso that the importance to risk of the feedwater pumps is much smaller than for the HPCS pump. One particular reason for this is the large contribution of Loss of Offsite Power to, in general, BWR core damage frequency (CDF) and also to the RBS CDF, which lessens the importance of feedwater as an injection source. Thus, the conclusions of the risk assessments discussed in NEDC-32988-A are unaffected.

3. RBS has containment unit coolers and does not have a containment spray system.

However, the role of the containment unit coolers in preventing containment overpressure failure is basically the same as that assumed in NEDC-32988-A for the containment spray system. Thus, the conclusions of the risk assessments performed in NEDC-32988-A for containment spray are directly applicable to the RBS containment unit coolers.

As discussed in the notice of availability published in the FederalRegister on February 18, 2011 for this TS improvement, plant-specific regulatory commitments are made as follows:

Entergy has previously committed to the guidance of NUMARC 93-01 Section 11, which provides guidance and details on the assessment and management of risk during maintenance. This commitment was included in the application for TSTF-427 and approved by the NRC in Amendment 173 therefore, no new commitment is required

Entergy will follow the guidance established in TSTF-IG-05-02 "Implementation Guidance for TSTF-423, Revision 2, Technical Specification End States, NEDC-32988-A."

4.1 Optional Changes and Variations TSTF-423 is based on NUREG-1434, "Standard Technical Specifications General Electric Plants, BWR/6." RBS, Unit 1 TS are based on NUREG-1434, but are not identical to this guidance. As a result, an adaptation of TSTF-423 was required, in some cases, for incorporation into the RBS, Unit 1 TS due to administrative differences in format (e.g.,

condition letter designation, etc).

Changes to individual line items to align with the provisions of TSTF-423 are:

1. Changes to RBS TS 3.6.4.3, Standby Gas Treatment, were needed to incorporate entry into Mode 3 in lieu of the current requirement to enter TS 3.0.3.

to RBG-47322 Page 3 of 5 A new Required Action C is added. This additional Required Action is consistent with TSTF-423 as it replaces entering TS 3.0.3 with the Required Action to enter Mode 3.

2. Changes to RBS TS 3.7.1 are needed to incorporate TSTF-423 line item TS 3.7.1.

These changes are consistent with TSTF-423 but require modification to the standard due to the RBS current licensing basis.

The proposed TS for RBS will separate the shutdown Required Actions into one addressing issues with a single division, revised Required Action H, and one addressing issues with two division, new Required Action I. This allows the single division actions to be limited to Mode 3 while the remainder of the issues being addressed by the new Required Action and including Mode 4 as an end state. The description of changes to the TS are as follows:

Condition H will be revised to address conditions for one division of Standby Service Water (SSW)/Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) inoperable, RBS items A, E, or G not met.

This will be consistent with TSTF revised Condition C.

A new Condition I will be added to address conditions for both division of SSW/UHS inoperable, RBS items B, D, or F not met. This will be consistent with TSTF-423 TS 3.7.1 revised Condition E. Conditions addressing "Both SSW subsystems inoperable for reasons other than Condition F." and "Three or four UHS cooling tower fan cells inoperable" will also be addressed by this Condition.

3. Changes to RBS TS 3.7.2, Control Room Fresh Air, were needed; RBS currently has Required Action B addressing two divisions inoperable during Mode 1, 2 or 3 operations. Required Action C will require entry into Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months if Required Action B is not met consistent with the TSTF.

4. The TS changes in TSTF-423, Revision 0 included changes to STS sections 3.4.4, "Safety/Relief valves (S/RVs)" which are not applicable to the RBS TS. The RBS TS 3.4.4 Conditions differ from those in STS 3.4.4 such that the technical justification provided in Reference 1 is not directly applicable.. Specifically RBS TS 3.4.4 Condition A addresses one or more S/RVs inoperable; whereas, STS 3.4.4 Condition A is limited to a single inoperable S/RV.

5. Changes to RBS TS 3.8.7 are limited to Division 1 and 2 only. RBS Division 3 has no inverters for safety related functions. Therefore, requirement to shutdown due to an inoperable inverter is not required.

to RBG-47322 Page 4 of 5 Minor administrative changes were made to the following items.

TSTF-423 Item Change 3.6.1.9 MSIV LCS System identified as MS-PLCS, no functional difference.

3.7.3 Control Room Fresh RBS TS 3.7.2 Air 3.7.4 Control Room AC RBS TS 3.7.3 3.7.5 Offgas RBS TS 3.7.4 In addition to changes in TSTF-423, as discussed above, RBS is not requesting changes to a number of the line items identified in TSTF-423. The individual line items are TS; 3.4.4 SRVs, 3.6.1.8 PVLCS, and 3.6.5.6 Drywell Vacuum Relief System.

5.0 REGULATORY SAFETY ANALYSIS 5.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination Entergy has reviewed the proposed no significant hazards consideration determination (NSHCD) published in the FederalRegister as part of the CLIP. Entergy has concluded that the proposed NSHCD presented in the Federal Register notice is applicable to River Bend Station and is hereby incorporated by reference to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91 (a).

5.2 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria A description of the proposed TS change and its relationship to applicable regulatory requirements was provided in the NRC Notice of Availability of the Model Safety Evaluation published on October 3, 2006.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

Entergy has reviewed the environmental evaluation included in the safety evaluation published on February 18, 2011, as part of the CLIIP Notice of Availability of the Model Safety Evaluation. Entergy has concluded that the staff's findings presented in that evaluation are applicable to RBS, Unit 1 and the evaluation is hereby incorporated by reference for this application.

to RBG-47322 Page 5 of 5

7.0 REFERENCES

1. TSTF-423, Revision 1, "Technical Specifications End States, NEDC-32988-A," dated December 22, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML093570241).

2. FederalRegister, [Vol. 76, No. 34, p.9614], "Notice of Availability of the Proposed Models for Plant-Specific Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF)

Traveler TSTF-423, Revision 1, 'Technical Specifications End States, NEDC-32988-A,' for Boiling Water Reactor Plants Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process,"

dated [February 18, 2011] (ADAMS Accession No. ML102730585).

3. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, "Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required Action End States for BWR Plants," December 2002 (ADAMS Package Accession No. ML030170090).

4. NRC Model Safety Evaluation of TSTF-423, Revision 1, dated February 2, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML102730688).

Attachment 2 RBG-47322 Proposed Technical Specification Changes (mark-up)

Note, markup deletions identified by strikethrough (delete) and additions identified by underline (addition).

TS TS Pages 3.3.8.2 3.3-75 3.5.1 3.5-2, 3 3.6.1.6 3.6-23 3.6.1.7 3.6-25 3.6.1.9 3.6-29 3.6.2.3 3.6-37 3.6.4.1 3.6-46 3.6.4.3 3.6-51 3.7.1 3.7-3 3.7.2 3.7-6 3.7.3 3.7-9 3.7.4 3.7-12 3.8.1 3.8-4 3.8.4 3.8-24 3.8.7 3.8-35 3.8.9 3.8-39 to RBG-47322 Page 1 of 18 RPS Electric Power Monitoring 3.3.8.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring LCO 3.3.8.2 Two RPS electric power monitoring assemblies shall be OPERABLE for each inservice RPS motor generator set or alternate power supply.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODES 4 and 5 with any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or both inservice A.1 Remove associated 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months power supplies with one inservice power electric power monitoring supply(s) from service.

assembly inoperable.

B. One or both inservice B.1 Remove associated 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months power supplies with both inservice power electric power monitoring supply(s) from service, assemblies inoperable.

C. Required Action and CA1 - NOT, - -

associated Completion LCO 3.0.4.a is pot Time of Condition A or B anplicable wh,.en entering not met in MODE 1, 2, MODE 3.

or3.

Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months G12- ReoinMODE 4, 36 ceins (continued)

RIVER SEND 3.3-75 Amendment No, 8 1 to RBG-47322 Page 2 of 18 ECCS - Operating 3.5.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Two ECCS injection CA1 Restore one ECCS 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months subsystems inoperable. injection/spray subsystem to OR OPERABLE status.

One ECCS injection and one ECCS spray subsystem inoperable.

D. Required Action and D.1 NOTE associated Completion LC 3,0,A.a is not Time of Condition A. B, applicable whenrentegng or C not met.

Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months D.2 - eOR-MOD 3=10W E. One ADS valve inoperable. E.1 Restore ADS valve to 14 days OPERABLE status.

F. One ADS valve inoperable. FA1 Restore ADS valve to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OPERABLE status.

AND OR One tow pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem F.2 Restore low pressure 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months inoperable. ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.

G. Two or more ADS valves G. I NOTE inoperable. LCO 3.A04a is not anlcable whenreInterina

-OR MODE 3 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months RIVR EN Aenden N.

RIVER BEND Amendment No. 84-_

to RBG-47322 Page 3 of 18 E-CCS- operatiNg 3.5.1 ACTIONS CONDTION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME G, (continued) G Rqd--. ractr 36 h8WheFG dome-prcsuo t d-o epis-we-Required Action and 6 Ig, associated Completion Time of Condition E or F not met.

H. HPCS and Low Pressure H.A Enter LCO 3.0.3, Immediately Cote Spray (LPCS)

Systems inoperable.

OR Three or more ECCS injectionispray subsystems inoperable.

OR HPCS System and one or more ADS valves inoperable.

OR Two or more ECCS injection/spray subsystems and one or more ADS valves inoperable.

RIVER BEND 3.5-3 Amendment No. 81 to RBG-47322 Page 4 of 18 LLS Valvep 3,6.1,6 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1.6 Low-Low Set (LLS) Valves LCO 3.6.1.6 The LLS function of five safety/relief valves shaN be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS_

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One LLS valve inoperable. A.1 Restore LLS valve to 14 days OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B-1 -- NOTE associated Completion LCO 3..4.a is not Time of Condition A not a~glicable when entedng met. MODE Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Tw~o 0; moANLQ:n

8. MODE WAU C. Two or more LLS val*s C.I Be in MODE 3. 12 hou inoperable.

AND C.2 Be in MODE 4 _ u RIVER BEND 3.6-23 Amendment No. 81 to RBG-47322 Page 5 of 18 Primory Containment Unit Coolers 3.6.1.7 3,6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6,117 Primary Containment Unit Coolers LCO 3.6.1.7 Two primary containment unit coolers shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required primary A.1 Restore required primary 7 days containment unit cooler containment unit cooler inoperable, to OPERABLE status.

B. Two required primary B.1 Restore one required 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months containment unit coolers primary containment unit inoperable, cooler to OPERABLE status.

C. Required Action and CA1 NOTE associated Completion LCO 3*.4ais not Time not met. appficable when enterina Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months AMD inMODE-44.

Wg hGOFS RIVER BEND A-A-^^4 fdý 04 to RBG-47322 Page 6 of 18 MS-PLCS 3.6.1,9 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1.9 Main Steam-Positive Leakage Control System (MS-PLCS)

LCO 3.6.1.9 Two MS-PLCS subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2. and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One MS-PLCS subsystem A.1 Restore MS-PLCS 30 days inoperable, subsystem to OPERABLE status.

8. Two MS-PLCS subsystems B.1 Restore one MS-PLCS 7 days inoperable, subsystem to OPERABLE status.

C. Required Action and C.1 --- NOTE associated Completion LCO 3..,4,ais-not Time not met. aspocable when _enedna MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months G2 DOM MnfODE 4.46m SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.9.1 Verify air pressure in each associated PVLCS 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months subsystem is _>101 psig.

(continued)

RIVER BEND Amendment No. 81 to RBG-47322 Page 7 of 18 RHR Sulpression Pool Cooling 3.6.2.3 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.2.3 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling LCO 3.6.2.3 Two RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY- MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One RHR suppression pool A.1 Restore RHR 7 days cooling subsystem suppression pool cooling inoperable, subsystem to OPERABLE status.

8- Reauired Action an* B,1 NOTE associated Completion 1&0 3.0,4 .?js at Time of Condition A not apolicable when enterinq met.

Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 8C. Two RHR suppression pool 8C.1 Restore one RHR 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months cooUng subsystems suppression pool cooling inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLE status.

.D.Required Action and GD.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Conditon C not AND met.

GD.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months RIVER BEND 3.6-37 Amendment No. 8+. 165 to RBG-47322 Page 8 of 18 Sm-nnelary rnnt~inrn-nt-Op,.rating 3.6.4.1 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6,4.1 Secondary Containment-Operating LCO 3.6-4-1 The shield building and auxiliary building shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A, Secondary containment AA Restore secondary 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Inoperable. containment to OPERABLE status, B. Required Action and B,1 NOTE associated Completion LCO 3,0.4.a is Time not met, aP*Ilcable when entejirn MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months AND B.2 -=-go-n-MODE 4.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6,A.11 Verify shield building annulus and auxiliary building 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months vacuum is _>3.0 and a 0.0 inch of vacuum water gauge, respectively.

(continued)

RIVER BEND 3.6-46 Amendment No. "1, 4-4 I to RBG-47322 Page 9 of 18 SGT System 3.6.4.3 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System LCO 3.6.4.3 Two SGT subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPUCABILfI'Y: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDrIION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One SGT subsystem A-1 Verify OPERABLE SGT 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months inoperable, subsystem not operating in the primary containment purge flow path-A.2 Restore SGT 7 days subsystem to OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 - NOTE associated Completion LCO 3.0.4.a is not Time not met. awlacab*"e-weentering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ANG 84- -8~-MDE4. 36 howr~

C. Two SGT subsS.terr ... T.OTE inoverabLe in MODE I. 2I ICO 3.0.4.a is not oraolicable wbgenrntering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months RIVER SEND 3,6-51 Amendment No. 81 to RBG-47322 Page 10 of 18 SSW System and UHS 3.7A1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME H. Required Action and H.1 - NOTE associated Completion Li 1,0,4,.a is aot Tk*e of Condition A, 8--., applicable when enterinag E, Fror G not met. MODE_3, Be In MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months AND H.2 Bo ins.

MO-ME 4. 36-hea; I, Reauired Action end . Be ai -MQDE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months assoiated Completion Time of Condition 8, D or F AN..D 1.2 Be in MODE, 4, 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months OR Both SSW subsystems inoperable for reasons other than Condition F.

OR Three or four UHS cooling tower fan cells inoperable, SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.1.1 Verify the water level of UHS cooling tower basin is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months k 78%.

SR 3.7.1.2 Verify the average water temperature of UHS is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months

! 880F.

SR 3.7.13. Operate each cooling tower fan cell for .' 15 minutes. 31 days R (VER BEND 3.7-3 Amendment No. 81 to RBG-47322 Page 11 of 18 CRFA System 3.7.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 - NOTE Associated Completion LCO 3.0.4-a is rmt Time of Condition A or B aoopitcble when enterlno not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3. MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months fc2 ein PODE-A 6ha D. Required Action and - .- NOTE associated Completion LCO 3,0.3 is not applicable.

Time of Condition A not met during movement of recently irradiated fuel D.1 Place OPERABLE CRFA Immediately assemblies in the primary subsystem In emergency containment or fuel building mode.

or during OPDRVs.

OR D.2.1 Suspend movement of Immediately recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment and fuel building.

AND D.2.2 initiate action to suspend Immediately OPDRVs.

1. Two CRFA subsystems E.1 NOTE I..e f-a" inoperable in MODE 1, 2, LCO 3.g.4.a is not or 3 for reasons ot.w than aooticabje when enteginq Conditioni 5. MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months (continued)

RIVER BEND 3.7-6 Amendment No. 81-1;9-132, 154 to RBG-47322 Page 12 of 18 rontnlm Room AC System 3.7.3 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.3 Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System LCO 3.7.3 Two control room AC subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILFTY; MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of recently irradiated fuel assembNes in the primary containment or fuel building.

During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One control room AC A.1 Restore control room AC 30 days subsystem inoperable, subsystem to OPERABLE status.

B. Two control room AC BA Verify control room area Once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months subsystems inoperable, temperature s 104"F.

B.2 Restore one control room AC 7 days subsystem to OPERABLE status.

C. Required Action and C-1 -- N*OTE Associated Completion LC 3.0.4a isot Time of Condition A or B aoolicable when enterinn not met in MODE 1, 2. or 3. MODE 3.

Be In MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Ci 1!AtMOAN.4ue (continued)

RIVER SEND 3.7-9 Amendment No.84-440, 132 to RBG-47322 Page 13 of 18 Main Condenser Offgas 3.7,4 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.4 Main Condenser Offgas LCO 3.7.4 The gross gamma activity rate of the noble gases measured prior to the holdup pipe shall be :ý 290 mCi/second after decay of 30 minutes.

APPLIC~ABILITY- MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3 with any main steam line not isolated and steam jet air ejector (SJAE) in operation.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Gross gamma activity rate A. 1 Restore gross gamma 72 houes of the noble gases not activity rate of the noble within limit, gases to within limit, B. Required Action and B.1 Isolate all main steam 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Cormpletion lines.

Time not met.

OR B.2 Isolate SJAE. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months OR B.34 -- NOTE LCO 31o04oa is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

--lA.MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months AND 8.3.2 BenMOII . ,"

RIVER BEND 3.7-12 BAmendment No. 81 to RBG-47322 Page 14 of 18 AC Sourcas-Operating 3.8,1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. One required offsite circuit -NOT inoperable. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of AND LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems-Operafing," when any One required DG division is de-energized as a inoperable. result of Condition D.

D.1 Restore required 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.

OR D.2 Restore required DG to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months OPERABLE status.

E. Two required DGs E.1 Restore one required 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months inoperable. DG to OPERABLE status. OR 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months if Division III DG is inoperable F. Required Action and F. 1 NOTE Associated Completion LCO 3.0.4.a is nop Time of Condition A, 6, C. aooli able when ente.ing D, or E not met. MODE 3 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months AND G. Three or more required G.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately AC sources inoperable.

RIVER BEND Amendment No. 81 to RBG-47322 Page 15 of 18 DC Sources-Operating 3.8.4 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.4 DC Sources-Operating LCO 3.8.4 The Division I, Division II, and Division III DC electrical power subsystems shall be OPERABLE, APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required battery A.1 Restore battery terminal 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months charger on Division I or II voltage to greater than or inoperable, equal to the minimum established float voltage.

AND A.2 Verify battery float current Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months s 2 amps, AND A.3 Restore battery charger to 7 days OPERABLE status.

B, Division I or 11DC B. 1 Restore Division I and II 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months electrical power DC electrical power subsystem inoperable for subsystems to reasons other than OPERABLE status, Condition A.

C. Division III DC electrical CA Declare High Pressure Immediately power subsystem Core Spray System and inoperable. Standby Service Water System pump 2C inoperable.

D. Required Action and D.1 --- NOTE associated Completion LCO 3.0.4,a. is not Time for Division 1 or 2 apolicable when entering DC electrical cower MODE 3.

subsystem for not met. ------

Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months AND D42 Be inMODE C,

.. _(continued}

RIE BN 382 Aedmn o.81. 4 RIVER SEND 3.8-24 Amendment No. 84-.148 to RBG-47322 Page 16 of 18 flC Sniircsri-perting 3.8.4 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Reauired Acion and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time for Division 3 DC AND electrical oomet subsystem for nlot met. E.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months to RBG-47322 Page 17 of 18 Invetters-Operating 3,8.7 3,8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.7 Inverters-Operating LCO 3.8.7 The Division I and Division II Invertefs shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS K*t,%'1"1 d!%

4 --

Enter appicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems-Operating," with any AC vital bus de-energized.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Division I or11 inverter A.1 Restore Division I and II 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months inoperable. inverters to OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 --- NOTE associated Completion LCo 3-0-4,a Is not Time of Condition A not soalicable when enterrno met. MODE 3.

Be In MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months AN4 G.2e 1_ADE4.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.7.1 Verify correct inverter voltage, frequency, and 7 days alignment to required AC vital buses.

3. AmnmntN.8 END RIVER RIVER SEND 3,8-35 Amendment No. 61 to RBG-47322 Page 18 of 18 Uistrihnintfn Systasn~- perating 3.8.9 ACTION (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. One or more Division I or C. 1 Restore Division I and II 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months II DC electrical power DC electrical power distribution subsystems distribution subsystems AND inoperable, to OPERABLE status.

16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months from discovery of failure to meet LCO D. Required Action and D.1 NOTE associated Completion LCO 3.0.4Wa snt apolicable Time of Condition A, B, when entering MODE 3.

or C not met.

Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months go22A IVIGDE-4. 6hu E. One or more Division III E.1 Declare High Pressure Immediately AC or DC electrical power Core Spray System and distribution subsystems Standby Service Water inoperable. System pump 2C inoperable.

F. Two or more divisions with FA Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable distribution subsystems that result in a loss of function.

RIVER BEND 3,8-39 Amendment No. 8M, 95

Attachment 3 RBG-47322 Changes to Technical Specification Bases Pages For Information Only Note, markup deletions identified by strikethrough (delete) and additions identified by underline (addition).

TS BASES Pages 3.3.8.2 B 3.3-220,222 3.5.1 B 3.5-7, 8, 14 3.6.1.6 B 3.6-36, 38 3.6.1.7 B 3.6-41, 42 3.6.1.9 B 3.6-48, 49 3.6.2.3 B 3.6-64, 65 3.6.4.1 B 3.6-85, 87 3.6.4.3 B 3.6-98, 100 3.7.1 B 3.7-6, 9 3.7.2 B 3.7-12a, 13, 16 3.7.3 B 3.7-19, 21 3.7.4 B 3.7-23, 24 3.8.1 B 3.8-13, 32 3.8.4 B 3.8-53, 54, 58 3.8.7 B 3.8-72, 73 3.8.9 B 3.8-85, 86, 87 to RBG-47322 Page 1 of 47 RPS Electric Power Monitoring B 3.3.8.2 BASES ACTIONS 8.1 (continued)

OPERABLE assemblies may then be used to power one RPS bus. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time is sufficient for the plant operatiohs personnel to take corrective actions and is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or removal from service of the electric power monitoring assemblies.

Alternately, If it is not desired to remove the power supply(s) from service (e.g., as in the case where removing the power supply(s) from service would result in a scram or isolation), Condition C or D, as applicable, must be entered and its Required Actions taken.

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or 8 are not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3, a pleat-shutdown muct bo pcfbama.

This plas.r the plan! ina e.iitlIG W.harc m~iftiffil OqUiPnPont. PeF.crd thrcuah the inooe~able RPS eleetrie carwe Mcnitor~in)a 0%et'dWQ W entrol Fads) is ot rcquired.- the plant must be brouoht to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimLed.The plant shutdown is accomplished by placing the plant in MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ..d in MODE-A w:.hWz 36-howe.

Remaining in the Aoolicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or ]Mwer than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 2) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However. voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also In accetable low-risk state.

Reguired Action C.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.O,4,a is not a Wlicable when entering MODE 3. This NOte orohibits the use of LCO 3.,0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startuo with the LCO not mat, However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.1*. if applicable, becouse LCO 3.0.4.b reauires performance of a risk assesslMent addressing in*perable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of.the accertability of entering MODE 3. and establishment of risk managementa ctions. if aworogriate, LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and tie Note does not preclude. changes ". ODES or other s.ecified condition-,in the Aprlicabilihy that are reaui[M to oQo=y with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

The allowed Completion Times-are Is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

RIVER BEND B 3,3-22D Revision No. 0 to RBG-47322 Page 2 of 47 RPS Electric Power Monitoring B 3.3.8.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3,8.2.3 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Performance of a system functional test demonstrates a required system actuation (simulated or actual) signal. The logic of the system will automatically trip open the associated power monitoring assembly circuit breaker. Only one signal per power monitoring assembly is required to be tested. This Surveillance overlaps with the CHANNEL CALIBRATION to provide complete testing of the safety function. The system functional test of the Class 1E circuit breakers is included as part of this test to provide complete testing of the safety function. If the breakers are incapabWe of operating, the associated electric power monitoring assembly would be inoperable.

I The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the condilions that apply during a plant outage and the I potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power, REFERENCES 1. USAR. Section 8.3.1.1.3.

2. NRC Generic Letter 91-09, 'Modification of Surveillance Interval for the Electric Protective Assemblies in Power Supplies for the Reactor Protection System."

3. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modificatin to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants. December 2002.

RIVER BEND B 3.3-222 Revision No. 143 to RBG-47322 Page 3 of 47 ECCS-Opoerting B 3.5.1 BASES ACTIONS C..

(continued)

With two ECCS injection subsystems inoperable or one ECCS injection and one ECCS spray subsystem inoperable, at least one ECCS injectionispray subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE subsystems provide adequate core cooling during a LOCA. However, overall ECCS reliability is reduced in this Condition because a single failure in one of the remaining OPERABLE subsystems concurrent with a design basis LOCA may result in the ECCS not being able to perform its intended safety function, Since the ECCS availability is reduced relative to Condition A, a more restrictive Completion Time is imposed. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is based on a reliability study, as provided in Reference 12.

D.1 antd'-2*

Ifany Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, or C are not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which-the

.. -doo, net app)ly overall plant risk is minimized., To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months s-end to MODE 4 wothiA .36 heurc.

Re.maining in the APolicability of the LCO is accetable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is simiar to or lower than the ris* in MODE 4 (Ref.

13) and because the time soent in MODE 3 to oerform the necessary regaks to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short.

Howeyer, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low.-rsk state.

Required Action D.1 is modified by a Note thatsgates that LCO 30,.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LC, 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startup with the LC= not met.

However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.&,4.b, ifaplicable.

because LCO 3.0,4.b reauires Performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and cgmponeDts. consideration of the results. determination of the acceptability of entering MODE 3. and establishment ofrsk mananement actions, ifapproorpiate. LCO 3.0.4 is not apolicable to, and the Note does not oreclude. changes in MODES or other soecifled conditions in the Agolicability that are reruired to comply with ACTIONS or that are cart of a shutdown of the unit, The allowed Completion Time-aefe is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

RIVER BEND 8 3.5-7 Revision No. 0 to RBG-47322 Page 4 of 47 ECCS-Operating B 3.5.1 BASES ACTIONS F.1 and F.2 (continued)

If any one low pressure ECCS injectionlspray subsystem is inoperable In addition to one inoperable ADS valve, adequate core cooling is ensured by the OPERABILITY of HPCS and the remaining low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems. However, the overall ECCS reliability is reduced because a single active component failure concurrent with a design basis LOCA could result In the minimum required ECCS equipment not being available. Since both a portion of a high pressure (ADS) and a low pressure subsystem are inoperable, a more restrictive Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is required to restore either the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem or the ADS valve to OPERABLE status. This Completion Time is based on a reliability study (Ref. 12) and has been found to be acceptable through operating experience.

G.1 eAd-G4 If any Required Action and associated Completion Tlime of Condition E or F are not met or if two or more ADS valves are inoperable, the plant must be brought to a Genditien Mode in which-#he4-G.doe not apply overall plant risk is minimized.. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months s-a.d-,ea.G:Or steam domo procsure Foducod to i. 100 psig wthn 326 h.... .

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the olant risk in MODE 3 Is similar to or lIwer than the riski, MODE 4 (Ref.

2, and because the time spent in MODE 3 to werform, the necessary remaim to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be sho!

However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may Pe made as it is also an acceptabll low-risk state.

Reouired Action G.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4,a is not applicable when enterinq MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startup with the LCO not met.

However, there is no restriction on the -use of LCO 3.0.4.b. if applicable, because LCO 3.0A.b reMuires g-eformance of a [isi assessment pddressing inooerable systems and components. .onsideration of tha results, determination of the acceotabilitv pf entering MODE 3. and establishmn.ent of risk management actions, if aoorooriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not a1pplicable to, and the Note does not preclude, rchanges in MODES or other specifild conditiQns in the Applicability that are req"ired to comolv with ACTIONS or that are part otl shutdown of the unit, RIVER BEND B 3.5-8 Revision No. 0 to RBG-47322 Page 5 of 47 ECCS-Operating B 3,5.1 BASES The allowed Completion Times-are is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

H.1 When multiple ECCS subsystems are Inoperable, as stated in Condition H,the plant is in a degraded condition not specifically justified for continued operation, and may be in a condition outside of the accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately, (continued)

RIVER BEND B 3.5-8 Revision No. 0 to RBG-47322 Page 6 of 47 ECCS-Operating B 3.5-1 BASES REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 6.3.2.2.3.

2. USAR, Section 6.3.2.2.4.

3. USAR, Section 6.3.2.2.1.

4. USAR, Section 6.3.2.2.2.

5. USAR. Section 15.2.8.

6. USAR, Section 15.6.4.

7. USAR, Section 15.65.

8. 10 CFR 50, Appendix K.

/ 9. USAR, Section 6.3.3.

10. 10 CFR 50.46.

11. USAR, Section 6.3.3.3.

12. Memorandum from R.L. Baer (NRC) to V. Stelto, Jr. (NRC),

"Recommended Interim Revisions to LCOs for ECCS Components," December 1, 1975.

13. USAR, Section 5.2.2.4.1.

14. NEDO-32291-A, "System Analyses for Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," January 1994.

15. RBS Technical Requirements Manual.

16. ASME OM Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants.

17. NEDC-32988WA,. Revision 2. Technical Jusfieaiin to $uggor Risk-lnformed Modification to Selected Reouired End Slates for BWR Plants, December 2002, RIVER BEND B 3,5-14 Revision No. 140 to RBG-47322 Page 7 of 47 LLS Valves B 3.6.1.6 BASES APPLICABLE LLS S/RVs are specified, all five LLS S/RVs do not operate In any DBA SAFETY ANALYSES analysis.

(continued)

LLS valves satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO Five LLS valves are required to be OPERABLE to satisfy the assumptions of the safety analysis (Ref. 2). The requirements of this LCO are applicable to the mechanical and electrical/pneumatic capability of the LLS valves to function for controlling the opening and closing of the S/RVs.

APPLICABIUTY In MODES 1,2, and 3, an event could cause pressurization of the reactor and opening of StRVs. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the LLS valves OPERABLE is not required In MODE 4 or 5.

ACTIONS A._1 With one LLS valve inoperable, the remaining OPERABLE LLS valves.are adequate to perform the designed function. However, the overall reliability is reduced. The 14 day Completion Time takes Into account the redundant capability afforded by the remaining LLS S/RVs and the low probability of an event in which the remaining LLS S/RV capability would be inadequate, I

I If or .--. ', oc am ln=porbio O"- r If the inoperable LLS valve cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO dces nit a overall lant risk is minimized.- To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to -MDE-4 ithip Remainio inINhe Apolicabilitv of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE.4_(Ref. 3_an'd.

because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessar repairs to metore the system to.OPERABLE status will be short. However, volunta.y Required Action B.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3,0.4.a Is ot aoolicable when enterino MODE3.- This Note orohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 durina startup with the LCO not met. However.

there is no restriction on the use of LCO 1.0.4.b, if app!icabl, becaue LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessmnent addressing inoperable systems and cornDonents, consideration of the esults, determination of the acceplabilgy 9f entering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management actions, if approoriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note dos not, preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Aoolicabilitv that are reauired to compIV witb ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

RIVER BEND B83.6-36 Revision No. 0 to RBG-47322 Page 8 of 47 LLS Valves B 36.1.6 BASES The allowed Completion Times ate reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions In an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

CJ and C.2 Iftwo or more LLS valves are inoperable, thgee .ould be ex essive-short duration StPYV vcycing durina an ovemressure event. Thei Vlant must be brought to a condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status. the plant must be brotight to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The 31lowed Comnpetion Tirmes are reasonable.

based on operating experience. toreach the reguired olant conditions from fu Lower conditions in an ordertv manner and without chatlenqino plant (continued)

RIVER SEND B 3.6-36 Revision No. 0 to RBG-47322 Page 9 of 47 LLS Valves B 3.6.1.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.6.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS frequency of the required relfief-mode actuator testing was developed based on the tests required by ASME OM Code (ref. 3) as implemented by the Inservice Testing Program of Specification 5.5.6. The testing frequency required by the Inservice Testing Program is based on operating experience and valve performance. Therefore, the frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.6,1.6.2 The LLS designed SIRVs are required to actuate autornatically upon receipt of specific Initiation signats. A system functional test is performed to verify that the mechanical portions (i.e., solenoids) of the automatic LLS function operate as designed when initiated either by an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.4.4 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

This SR is modified by a Note that excludes valve actuation. This prevents a reactor pressure vessel pressure blowdown.

REFERENCES 1. GESSAR-II, Appendix 3B, Attachment A, Section 3BA.8,

2. USAR, Section 5.2.2.

3. ASME OM Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants.

4. NEDC-32988-A. Revision 2, Technical Justiation to Support Risk-informed Modifation to Selected Required End States for BWRPlants. December 2002.

RIVER SEND 8 3.6-38 Revision No. 143 to RBG-47322 Page 10 of 47 LLS Valves 03.6.1,6 BASES APPLICABLE LLS S/RVs are specified, all five LLS SIRVs do not operate in any DBA SAFETY ANALYSES analysis.

(continued)

LLS valves satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO Five LLS valves are required to be OPERABLE to satisfy the assumptions of the safety analysis (Ref. 2). The requirements of this LCO are applicable to the mechanical and electrical/pneumalic capability of the LLS valves to function for controlling the opening and closing of the SJRVs.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, an event could cause pressurization of the reactor and opening of SIRVs. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the LLS valves OPERABLE is not required In MODE 4 or 5.

ACTIONS A.1 With one LLS valve Inoperable, the remaining OPERABLE LLS valves are adequate to perform the designed function. However, the overall reliability is reduced. The 14 day Completion Time takes into account the redundant capability afforded by the remaining LLS S/RVs and the low probability of an event in which the remaining LLS SIRV capability would be inadequate, B.1 If two OF m.., L,69.. volvc

. in.p...l*,wc*ilf the inoperable LLS valve I cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be'brought to a MODE in which theL4Q-daa&-Ret apply overall olant risk is minimized,. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and tW.MO DE 4 withi 36-hous.

Rernainin oin Me ApopicabilIU of the..LCO is acceotable bejause the pla!t risk In MODE 3 is sirrlar to or lower than the dak in MODE 4 (Ref. 3) and because the time soent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary reWlirs to restore the system to OPERABLEftatus wil be short. However, voluntary entry Into MODE 4may be made as it is also en acceptabIe ow-srik state.

Reauired Action B.1 is modilied by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a ij.

not aoolicabte when enterina MODE 3aThis Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 durino startuo wththe LCO not met. However themr is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4,b. if aplicable because LCO 3.0.4j.re**ures pge=rformance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems god componeort consideratlon of thl result&

determlination of the agcoptability of entedngMOQ.E 3, and estabrishmreit of risk management actions, ifaporoodate. LCO 3,0A4 is not applicable to9, and the Note doe not oreclude, chano.es In MODES V_ ~ger soecified conditions In the Aqolicabilfty that are reouired to compIv with ACTINSor that are oapr of a shutdown of It_ unit.

RIVER BEND 8 3,6-36 Revision No. 0 to RBG-47322 Page 11 of 47 LLS VaNes B 3.6.1.6 BASES The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly mannen and without challenging plant systems.

C. 1 and C.2 Iftwo or more LLS valves are inooerable, there could be qsiye short duration S/RV cvcling during an overpessure event. The olant must be brouaht to a condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve Ohf status. the plant must be bouaht to oaleast MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and MOOE 4 within 38 hours4.398148e-4 days 0.0106 hours 6.283069e-5 weeks 1.4459e-5 months . The allowed Comoletion Times are reasonate, based on opernaina exgprience, to reach the reauired Plant conditions from full orweer conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant ostemnse RIViER BEND B 3-6.36 Revision No. 0 to RBG-47322 Page 12 of 47 LLS Valves B 3.6.1.6 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3,15,16.1 REQUIREMENTS A manual actuation of each required LLS valve (those valves removed and replaced to satisfy SR 3A.4.1) is performed to verify that the valve is functioning property. This SR can be demonstrated by one of two methods. If performed by method 1), plant startup is allowed prior to performing this test because valve OPERABILITY and the setpoints for overpressure protection are verified, per ASME requirements (Ref. 3),

prior to valve installation. Therefore, this SR is modified by a note that states the surveiNance is not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test. The 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months allowed for manual actuation after the required pressure is reached is sufficient to achieve stable conditions for testing and provides a reasonable time to complete the SR. If performed by method 2). valve OPERABIUTY has been demonstrated for all instaled IJS valves based upon the successful operation of a test sample of S/RVs.

1. Manual actuation of the LLS valve, with verification of the response of the turbine control valves or bypass valves, by a change in the measured steam flow, or any other method suitable to verify steam flow (e.g., tallpipe temperature or pressure). Adequate reactor steam pressure must be available to perform this test to avoid damaging the valve. Also, adequate reactor steam flow must be passing through the main turbine or turbine bypass valves to continue to control reactor pressure when the LLS valves divert steam flow upon opening.

Sufficient time is therefore allowed after the required pressure and flow are achieved to perform this test. Adequate pressure at which this test is to be performed is consistent with the pressure recommended by the valve manufacturer.

2. The sample population of S/RVs tested each refueling outage to satisfy SR 3.4,4.1 will be stroked in the relief mode during 'as-found" testing to verify proper operation of the SIRV. The successful performance of the test sample of SIRVs provides reasonable assurance that all LLS valves will perform in a similar fashion. After the SIRVs are replaced, the relief-mode actuator of the newly installed S/RVs will be uncoupled from the S/RV, and cycled to ensure that no damage has occurred to the S/RV during transportation and Installation. Following cycling, the relief-mode actuator is recoupled and the proper connection to the S/RV lever is independently verified.

This verifies that each replaced SIRV will properly perform its intended function.

The STAGGERED TEST BASIS frequency ensures that both solenoids for each LLS valve relief-mode actuator are alternately tested. The (continued)

RIVER BEND B 3,"-,7 Revision No. 109 to RBG-47322 Page 13 of 47 LLS Valvee B 3.6.1.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.6.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS frequency of the required relief-mode actuator testing was developed based on the tests required by ASME OM Code (ref. 3) as implemented by the Inservice Testing Program of Specification 5.5.6. The testing frequency required by the Inservice Testing Program is based on operating experience and valve performance. Therefore, the frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.6.1.6.2 The LLS designed S/RVs are required to actuate automatically upon receipt of specific initiation signals. A system functional test is performed to verify that the mechanical portions (i.e., solenoids) of the automatic LLS function operate as designed when initiated either by an actual or simulated automatic Initiation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.4.4 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function.

The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

This SR is modified by a Note that excludes valve actuation. This prevents a reactor pressure vessel pressure blowdown.

REFERENCES I. GESSAR-1l, Appendix 3B. Attachment A, Section 38A.8.

2. USAR, Section 5.2.2.

3. ASME OM Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants.

4. NEDC-3298-A, Revision 2, Technigal Justification to-Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Reguired End States fOr BWRPlants. December 2002.

RIVER BEND 8 3,6-38 Revision No. 143 to RBG-47322 Page 14 of 47 Primary rnntainment Unit Coolers B 3.6.1.7 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

With two primary containment unit coolers inoperable, one unit cooler must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . In this condition, there is a substantial loss of the primary containment bypass leakage mitigation function. The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Completion Time is based on this loss of function and is considered acceptable due to the low probability of a DBA and because alternative methods to remove heat from primary containment are available.

Q1 --;*Ia-ý -

If the inoperable primary containment unit cooler cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which th- LCOI-de not,app. overall plant risk is minimiked. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .,d to MODE 4 within 36 hRw.s.

Remainina ip the Applicabifitv of the LCO is acceotable because the plani

,risk in MODE 3 is sifilar to or kWer than the risk In MODE 4 (Ref. 2) and because the time spent in MODE 3 io Derfonm the necessary reoairs to restore the uystem to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as. Htis also anI L~table low-rlsk state.

Reauired Action C. 1 is mo.dified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicIble when enteringA MODE 3. This Note o2Mhibits the useof LO 1%O.4.a to enter MODE 3 durina startuo with the LCO not met, However, ft@eris no restriction on the use of LCO 3U4,4 1 b. if a-lurcabie. !eais LCO 3-0.4.b mreuires performance of a risk a*sessment addressingi inoperable svste*. and comrnonents. consideration of The results, deternination of the acceptabilt of eniering MODE 3. anld establishent of risk management actions, if pooroorlate. LCO 3.A4 is not apollcable to, and the Note does not Preclude. chanaes in MODES or other soecifted conditions in the Aogicablily that are reauired to comlyv with_ CTIONS or that are padr of a shutown of the unit.

The allowed Completion Times-ereis reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.7.1 REQUIREMENTS Verfying the correct alignment for pressure relief and baickdraft dampers in the primary containment unit cooler ventilation flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for system operation. This SR does not apply to dampers that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured kn position, since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. This SR does not require any testing or damper manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those dampers capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.

RIVER SEND B 3.6-41 Revision No 0 to RBG-47322 Page 15 of 47 Primary Containment Unit Coolers B 3.6.1.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1,7.

REQUIREMENTS (continued) Verifying each unit cooler develops a flow rate z 50,000 cfm ensures overall performance has not degraded during the cycle. Such inservice tests confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance, and detect incipient failures by indicating, abnormal performance. The Frequency of this SR is consistent with that applied to pumps by the Inservice Testing Program.

SR 3.6.1.7.3 This SR verifies that each primary containment unit cooler actuates upon receipt of an actual or simulated automatic actuation signal throughout its' emergency operating sequence and that the pressure relief and backdraft damper in the flow path actuates to its' correct position. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.3.5 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. The 2A month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient If the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 6.2.1.1.3.4.

2, NEDC-32988--Ao Revision 2. Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Reauired End Slates for BWRPlants. Decrber 2002.

RIVER SEND B 3.6-42 Revision No. 143 to RBG-47322 Page 16 of 47 MS-PLCS B 3.6.1,9 BASES APPLICABILITY and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due (continued) to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the MS-PLCS OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5 to ensure MSIV leakage is processed.

ACTIONS 6.1 With one MS-PLCS subsystem inoperable, the inoperable MS-PLCS subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE MS-PLCS subsystem is adequate to perform the required leakage control function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the remaining subsystem could result in a total loss of MSIV leakage control function. The 30 day Completion Time is based on the redundant capability afforded by the remaining OPERABLE MS-PLCS subsystem and the low probability of a DBA LOCA occurring during this period.

PL With two MS-PLCS subsystems inoperable, at least one subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of the occurrence of a DBA LOCA.

If the MS-PLCS subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which tkhe LCD deers not ap*.overall plant ris* Is minimized, To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months a to MQD- 4 wi!thI 36 hourc.

Remaining in the Atolicability.of the LCO Is accetable because the vlant risk In MODE 3 IP,sfnilar to or lower than the risk In MODE 4 flRef. 4) and Dgcause the time scert in MODE 3 to performb-e necessaw reoaiM to restore the sYstem to OPERABLE status will be shortq,.However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceatabl, tywý-risk state.

ReauiredAction C.1 is modified by a Note that statesI.at LCO 3-0.4a is not a~oolicable when entering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3*Q,4,a to e&1er MODE 3 during startup with the LCO not met, However.

there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b. if a plicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b reouires perforrnance of-a -isk assessment addressing inoperab4e systemsarjd components. consideratIon of the r&sults.

determinatlon of the acceotability of enterna MODE 3, arnd establishmert of risk mana.ement actions, if aoorooriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applýable to.

and the Note doe not preclude, chalrgI in.MODES or other specMfed condifigns In the Applicability that are reguired to comply with ACZTJ0-_NS or thal are part of a shutdown obtle unit.

The allowed Completion Time&&rae i. reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

RIVER BEND B 3,6-48 Revision No. 0 to RBG-47322 Page 17 of 47 M.q-PLCS B 3.6.1.9 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1,91L (continued)

REQUIREMENTS from the PVLCS accumulators. Due to the support system function of PVLCS for SIRV actuator air, however, the specified minimum pressure of 101 psig is required, which provides sufficient air for intermediate and long term post-LOCA S/RV actuations. This minimum air pressure alone is sufficient for PVLCS to support the OPERABILITY of these S/RV systems and is verfied every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room, such as alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal PVLCS air pressure condition.

SR 3.6.1.9,2 Each PVLCS compressor is operated for a 15 minutes to verify MS-PLCS OPERABILITY. The 31 day Frequency was developed considering the known reliability of the PVLCS compressor and controls, the two subsystem redundancy, and the low probability of a significa-t degradation of the MS-PLCS subsystem occurring between surveillances and has been shown to be acceptabie through operating experience.

SR 3.6.1.9,3 A system functional test is performed to ensure that the MS-PLCS will operate through its operating sequence. The 2A month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Survei~lance were performed with the reactor at power, REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 6.7.

2. USAR, Section 15,6.5.

4. NEDC-32988-A. Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-rinfomred Modification to Selected RBgjur~ed End States for BWR Plants. December 2002 RIVER SEND B 3.6-49 Revision No. 143 to RBG-47322 Page 18 of 47 RHR Suppression Pool Cooling 8 3.6,2.3 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued)

Ifone RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem is inoomb.! .. nd is not restored to OPERABLE status .within the recjuited Comoletlon Time, the Plant must be brought to a condition in which overall olant &sk is minimized. To achieve this status. ft 1olant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Remaininm Inthe Apopicabilitv of the LCO is accentable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than thLrisk in MQDE 4 (Ref. 2) and because the time-spent in MODE 3 to oerform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. blowever. voluntary Wtry-into.MODE 4 may be made as itIs also an acceptable low-risk gtate.

Required Action B.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4-p. Is not applicable when entering MODE 3. This Note orohibfts the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 durinn startup with the LCO not met. However.

there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4,b.,. ifapplicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b reatires verformance of a risk assessment addressing inooerable systems and comoonents, consideration of the results, dtcrmination of the acceotability of entering MODE 3. and establishment of risk mana erngar actions, ifaoarooriate. LCO 3.0,4 is not applicable to.

and the Note does not pmreClde, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Anplicabillty that are required to comDIV with ACTIONS or that-pa ort of a shutdown of the unit.

The allowed Com2letion Time Is reasonable, based on operatia exoerience, to reach the required plant condiions froM fyl-l oer conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging Wlent systerns.

With two RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems inoperable, one subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . Inthis condition, there is a substantial loss of the primary containment pressure and temperature miligation function. The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Completion Time is based on this loss of function and Is considered acceptable due to the low probability of a DBA and the potential avoidance of a plant shutdown transient that could result in the need of the RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems to operate.

G!D.1 and j D-2 Ifthe Required Action and required Completion Time of Condition A C cannot be met or iftwo RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems are inoperable, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months , The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to RIVER BEND B 3.6-64 Revision No- 13S to RBG-47322 Page 19 of 47 RHR Suppression Pool Cooling B 3.6.2.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.2.3.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Verifying each RHR pump develops a flow rate > 5050 gpm, with flow through the associated heat exchanger to the suppression pool ensures that pump performance has not degraded during the cycle. Flow is a normal test of centrifugal pump performance required by ASME OM Code (Ref. 2). This test confirms one point on the pump design curve, and the results are indicative of overall performance. Such inservice inspections confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance, and detect Incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance. The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the inservice Testing Program.

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 6.2.

2. ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants.

3. NEDC-32988-& Revision 2. Technical Justificalion to SuocDrt ,Risk-Informed Mfodification to Selected Reauired.End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

RIVER BEND B 3-6-65 Revision No. 140 to RBG-47322 Page 20 of 47 Secondary Containment-Operating B83,8.4.1 BASES LCO auxiliary building, can be diluted and processed prior to release to the (continued) environment, For the secondary containment to be considered OPERABLE, it must have adequate leak tightness to ensure that the required vacuum can be established and maintained.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a LOCA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment. Therefore, secondary containment OPERABILITY is required during the same operating conditions that require primary containment OPERABILITY.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of the LOCA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES.

Therefore, maintaining secondary containment OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5 to ensure a control volume, except for other situations for which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building. The fuel building OPERABILITY during recently irradiated fuel handling is addressed in LCO 3.6.4.7, "Fuel Building Ventilation Systems-Fuel Handling."

ACTIONS A.1 If secondary containment is inoperable, it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem that is commensurate with the importance of maintaining secondary containment during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period aJso ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring secondary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where secondary containment is inoperable is minimal.

B.1 an4.&A If the secondary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which ho I tp* overall Ilant risk is minimrized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 ".'*h*i 365 hc*um, Remainifm in-the Aolplcabllitv of the LCO Is acceptable because the p&ant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower thain the rslK in MODE 4 (Ref. 4),

because the time soent in MODE 3 to Perform the necesSarLN*,pai's to r[e@tormehe_ yteim to OPERABLE status will be short. HoWM!Ver, pqplt entry into MNODE 4 rmabejnade as itis also an acceptable low-risk state.

Reouirvd Action QI Is modified by a Note that states thgt LCO 3.0.4.a is not anolicable when enterino MODE 3,I Tis Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during staruR with the LCO not mat. oeer.

there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b. if applicable, be.cause LCO 3.0,4bauiraerorrag, of, a rsk assessment addressing Inoperable systems and components, cngsideration of the rsults.

determination of the acceptability of entering MODE 3, ann etalishment of risk manamementactions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is lot applicable to RWVER BEND B 3.6-85 Revision No. 115 to RBG-47322 Page 21 of 47 Secondary Contalnment-ODeraling B 3.6.4.1 BASES and the Npte does w*xatpreclude, changes in MODES or other saecgfied conditions in the Anolicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are,,Part of a shutdowyn of the Undl The allowed Completion Times-are is reasonable, based on operating yx;erience, to reach the renuired olant conditons Jftron full power conditions in san orderly manner and without challenoino olant systems, (continued)

RIVER BEND 8 3.6-85 Revision No. 115 to RBG-47322 Page 22 of 47 Secondary Cnnta*nrimnt-Operating B 3-6.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.4 and SR 3.6-4.1.6 REQUIREMENTS The SGT System exhausts the shield building annulus and auxiliary building atmosphere to the environment through appropriate treatment equipment. To ensure that all fission products are treated, SR 3,6.4.1.4 verifies that the SGT System will rapidly establish and maintain a pressure in the shield building annulus and auxiliary building that is less than the lowest postulated pressure external to the secondary containment boundary. This is confirmed by demonstrating that one SGT subsystem wfil draw down the shield building annulus and auxiliary building to ýý0.5 and > 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge in <_18.5 and -ý 34.5 seconds, respectively. This cannot be accomplished if the secondary containment boundary is not intact. SR 3.6.4.1.6 demonstrates that each SGT subsystem can maintain > 0.5 and k 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months test period allows shield building annulus and auxiliary building to be in thermal equilibrium at steady state conditions.

Therefore, these two tests are used to ensure the integrity of this portion of the secondary containment boundary. Since these SRs are secondary containment tests, they need not be performed with each SGT subsystem, The SGT subsystems are tested on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, however, to ensure that in addition to the requirements of LCO 3.6.4.3, either SGT subsystem will perform this test_

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 15.6.5.

2. USAR, Section 15.7.4.

3* NEDC-32988-A. Revision 2. Technical Justification to Suoport Risk-Ifo!rmed Modifcation to Selected Reouirea, End States for BWR Plants. December 2002.

RIVER BEND B 3.8-87 Revision No, 143 to RBG-47322 Page 23 of 47 SGT System 8 3.6.4.3 BASES APPUCABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment. Therefore, SGT System OPERABILITY is required during these MODES.

In MODES 4 and 5. the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES.

Therefore, maintaining the SGT System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5.

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 With one SGT subsystem inoperable, action must be taken to verify that the OPERABLE SGT subsystem is not operating in the primary containment purge flowpath.

Additionally. the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE SGT subsystem is adequate to perform the required radioactivity release control function. However, the overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in the radioactivity release control function not being adequately performed. The 7 day Completion Time is based on consideration of such factors as the availability of the OPERABLE redundant SGT subsystem and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

B.1 andj-8 If the SGT subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time in MODE 1, 2. or 3. the plant must be brought to a MODE in wtich. the LCO d.es n-At pp-L- overall plant risk is minimized.. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 he, .

Remaining In the Apolicability of the LCO is acceotable because the olant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 41 and because the time soent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short, however. voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an accept~ble low-risk state.

Reguired Action CA1 is modified by a "otethat states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not aoIicable when entering MODE 3. This Note p*ohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 durinl startup with tfe LCQOnot Jet, However.

there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4,b, if aoolicable. because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components. consideration of the resuits.

determination of thegacceotabilitv of entering MODE 3. Ind establishment of risk rnana1ement actions, if approoriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not alolicable to, and the Note does not oreclude. changes in MODES or other specified conditions ip the Aofi**,ibitv that are required to comoIv with ACTiONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

RIVER BEND B 3.6-98 Revision No. 0 to RBG-47322 Page 24 of 47 SGT System 8 3.6.4.3 BASES The allowed Completion Timesrare is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

CA_

If both SGT subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1. 2. or 3. thb SGT system may not be c~abke of suovortina the reouir-d radioactivity release control function. Thereor'e, actions are reguired to enter LCO 3,0,3 Immediately. Therefore, the plant must be brouhlt to a MODE in which the oeral-pant jjsKj§ipimizegLTo achieve this status, the plant rnumjbe brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Remainingi in the Aplpicabiltlv of the LCO Is acceptab,le býu&sethe plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than -he.risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 4) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary reoairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status wit.he short, However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk st.te, Reauired Action C.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0,4,a is not applicable when entering MODE 3. This Note prohibitsthe use of LCO 3.0,4.a*to enter MODE 3 dudringstadup with the LCO not met. However.

thee Is

no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b. ifapoolicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performanr, of a risk asessrnent addressing inrweabLesystems and oomponents. consideration of the results.

determInation of the acce.tabitily of ntering MODM,1. and establishment of risk manaaement aiojns, if aopropriate, LCO 3.0.4 Is not applicabo to.

and the Note does not preclude, charMes in MODES or othW.rspecified conditions in the Aoplicabilitv that areteaulred to comply with ACTIONS or that are oart of a shutdown of the unit.

The allowed Completion T..im.e is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions fromfull Power Consjtin r -dye m-*rtreran dhout challenoring plant sytenIs.

RIVER BEND B83.6-98 Revision No. 0 to RBG-47322 Page 25 of 47 SGT System B 3.6.4.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3-6-4.3-4 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS availabjeý REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 41.

2. USAR, Section 6.2.3.

3. USAR, Section 15.6.5.

4. Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev. 2.

4, NEDC-32988-A. Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Infrormed Modificatlon to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants. December 2002.

RIVER BEND B 3.6-100 Revision No. 143 to RBG-47322 Page 26 of 47 SSW System and UHS B 3.7.1 BASES ACTIONS G.1 (continued)

Ifone SSW subsystem is inoperable for reasons other than Condition E or F.it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE SSW subsystem is adequate to perform the heat removal function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE SSW subsystem could result in loss of SSW function. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time was developed taking into account the redundant capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE subsystem and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

The Required Action is modified by two Notes indicating that the applicable Conditions of LCO 3.8.1. "AC Sources -Operating,' and LCO 3.4.9. "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Coolinq System-Hot Shutdown." be entered and the Required Actions taken ifthe inoperable SSW subsystem results in an inoperable DG or RHR shutdown cooling subsystem, respectively. This is in accordance with LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components.

H.1 end42 Ifay Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A.

BC, 9, E, , or G are not mret,- r -bth SSo ..... , r. ino. ...... fo rFia0G tOthor: than Condition F, or t o fo*r I co.lin; to*r fan ceo r ---- orMb, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and -inMODE _6-1.-3-h-.--e.

Reauired Action H.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when enten M 3. This Note prohitbits te ue of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startup with the LCO not met. However.

there is no restriction on the use of LC 3.0.4.b. ifa cgli.able, because LCO 3.0.4.b recuires oerfo nce of a k assessmntddesing o nsdderation of the results deteacwtaitv o enterinjl MODE 3, and establishment of s ma~naoerent actionsi1anntonflate- LCO 3.0A4 is-not 0a1Dlcble to.

and the Note does not Preclude ch !a-i lrr*qorte piffd cond-A s cb th-tarer I*-i A I or that are pait of a shutdown of the unit.

The allowed Completion Times-a*e is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unFi conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

L1and 1.2 If.any Reouired Action and associated Comletion Time of Condition B. D.

o rnmet, or both W subyems areinoeable. or three or four UHS mlo1i~ns tower fen cells are inoperable, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not aoply. To achieve this status, thie unit nmus -aced in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and In MODE 4'within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

The al~!owd Completi*on Tirre is reaonable, INSed on oweratliQ ex9eien.e, to reach the required plant 9ond0itons from full power Coni a rd rrnnran without challenging plant systems.

RIVER BEND 8 3.7-6 Revision No, 0 to RBG-47322 Page 27 of 47 SS-W SyWtem and UHS B 3.7.1 BASES REFERENCES 5. USAR. Chapter 15.

(continued) 6. USAR, Section 8,2.2.

7. USAR, Table 6.2-2.

8 NEDC-32988-A. Revision 2. Technical Justification to SuQoort Risk-Informed Mdigfation to Selea%! Reguired End States ror BWR Plants.

December 2002,.

RIVER BEND B 3-7-9 Revision No. 0 to RBG-47322 Page 28 of 47 CRFA System B 3.7.2 BASES ACTIONS implementation upon entry into the condition, regardless of whether entry (continued) is intentional or unintentional. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and the use of mitigating actions. The 90 day Completion Time is reasonabie based on the determination that the mitigating actions will ensure protection of CRE occupants within analyzed limits while limiting the probability that CRE occupants will have to implement protective measures that may adversely affect their ability to control the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a DBA. In addition, the 90 day Completion Time is a reasonable time to diagnose, plan and possibly repair, and test most problems with the CRE boundary.

In MODE 1, 2, or 3, ifthe inoperable CRFA subsystem or the CRE boundary cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes

"s6*^*t overall plant risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and In.M.DE 4 v.iuhin 2:60% ho-.

Weainrng isin MODin the Applicabilitv

.i*iia r* r ofo,,er.thar the LCO tersk Is acceptable in MODEbecause 4 (Ref.the5 Wlant an-d because the time soentin MODE 3 to perform the ne.esry repairs to restoree he system to OPERABLE sratus wil be sbort, Ho ,e,voluntary en DE 4 may be mada2t ialso an acce-tab1e k*:fsk state.

Reaulred Action C.1 is modified by a Note that state that LCO$3.0 _

not applicable when-e-n*dnte MODE 3. This Note Qrohi the use LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startup with the LCO not rnt. Howev r, there Ls no restricton on the use of LCO 3.0.4b. ifepplicable. because LCO 3.V4,b- requires Performance of aconsideration

no~eab~e vstesand *>m~nerts,, risk assessment addressing of the results, deter *tard establishment of rsk mana ement actions. I anorropriate, LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, andthe ate o no$ preclude channes in MODES or ote gIfiqd conditions Intre Applicabilly tha are required to comply with ACTIONS Qr

.tht ar cmart of a shutdown of the unit.

The allowed Completion Times-are is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

D.1, D.2.1. and 0.2.2 The Required Actions of Condition D are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving recently irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the (continued)

RIVER BEND B 3,7-12a Revision No. 132 to RBG-47322 Page 29 of 47 CRFA System 8 3.7.2 BASES ACTIONS C.1, QC2.1, and C.2.2 (continued) fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

During movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment or fuel building or during OPDRVs, if the inoperable CRFA subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE CRFA subsystem may be placed in the emergency mode. This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that would prevent automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action D.1 is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the CRE. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes the accident risk.

If applicable. movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary containment or fuel bulding must be suspended immediately.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probabilty of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release.

Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

E._I If both CRFA subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, for reasons other than an inoperable CRE, the CRFA System may not be capable of performing the intended function and the unit is in a condition outside of the accident anablses, Th-rfw, GCO 3.0.3 mýAst be-oe,,e4 Therefore. t;*e plant must be brought to a MOQE In which the verall plant riskismi , To achieve this status. the Want must be bE2_ght to at least MODE 3 wilthin 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Remainngt app hen en-licabil' of t .CO is Ncotae becausethse iLant

.0in 3 dtMODE tran thhe risk in MQDE o 4Howeera ecO3.0.,e the t= sentoinMn erform the necessarn reain to r stm e P ll be short, r yT, Reauie Action 2.1s i - fed b a stts C0i 3.0.4.a is not aoolcable eneneW[nnpMp E 3. raThi o tte~so 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3during startup wit the LCO not rnet. However.

tere Isno retidononeue LO304 f glcbe eas LCO S D4 b rew fipre! perf&mno ars ses nt addressina "nomeable systeMsnd components. onsideration of the results O mi ao thmR~ a k, -an - an eM~shmts

.of nsk managlement actions. if apprOQ ate. LCO 3.04 is r& applicabeg to.

an4 toýN does not Ulude cangs MDES or o scfe conditionsiiare re d to comply ith' ACTIONS r that are omit of a shutdown of the unit.

RIVER SEND B 3.7-13 Revision No. 132 to RBG-47322 Page 30 of 47 CRFA System B 3.7.2 BASES The allowed Completion Tihe is reas* .*ae, based on operxiting experiencJ, toea.,,the required plan$ con ftlons from full owr conditionojn an orderny manner and without Ohallenging plant systems.

(continued)

RIVER BEND B83.7-13 Revision No. 132 to RBG-47322 Page 31 of 47

(*RFA System B 3.7.2 BASES (continued)

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 6.4,1,

2. USAR, Section 9.4.1,

3. USAR, Chapter 6.

4- USAR. Chapter 15.

5. USAR, Chapter 6.4

6. USAR, Chapter 9.5 7, Regulatory Guide 1.196

8. NEI 99-03, "Control Room Habitability Assessmnent," June 2001

9. Letter from Eric J. Leeds (NRC) to James W. Davis (NEI) dated January 30, 2004, 'NEI Draft White Paper, Use.of Generic Letter 91-18 Process and Alternative Source Terms in the Context of Control Room Habitability." (ADAMS Accession No. ML040300694).

10. 10CFR50.87.

11 NEDC3-?98 -A. RevLoion 2. Techai@1 Justification to SuKoort.Risk-Informed M0olfication to Selected Req*uired End Sa~ oJW Prants. Decemnber 2002.

RIVER BEND B 3.7-16 Revision No. 132 to RBG-47322 Page 32 of 47 Control Room AC System B 3.7.3 BASES ACTIONS 61 (continued) function. The 30 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of an event occurring requiring control room isolation, the consideration that the remaining subsystem can provide the required protection, and the availability of alternate cooling methods.

B.1 and B.2 Ifboth control room AC subsystems are Inoperable, the Control Room AC System may not be capable of performing its intended function.

Therefore, the control room area temperature Is required to be monitored once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months to ensure that temperature is being maintained low enough that equipment in the control room is not adversely affected. With the control room temperature being maintained within the temperature limit, 7 days is allowed to restore a control room AC subsystem to OPERABLE status. These Completion Times are reasonable considering that the control room temperature is being maintained within limits, the low probabiity of an event occurring requiring control room isolation, and the avaiability of alternate cooling methods.

In MODE 1, 2, or 3, ifthe control room area temperature cannot be maintained _<104OF or ifthe inoperable control room AC subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time.

the uNt must be placed In a MODE that minimizes risk. To achieve this status the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months s-a4-4R MODE . --01shia 38 h..

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceotable because the plant risK in ,MOD 3 ms similar to or loýr than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 3) and because the tme spcnt in MODE 3t0o f& thie ssay rep airs to rtorE the . tern to OPERABLE status will be short. However. voluntary efy into MODE- 4 may be made as it Is also an acceptable 10w-dsk state.

notaep cablew gnetenn nn I T. $oteprohiitsthe urge LQ0 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 O suo witht. However.

there is no restriction on the use of L(O 3.9.4b. if 2DIIcýa. cause LCO 3,0.4.b re u.les errmance f k assessment addressing

"~I.. e ter-s ; -comoonents eoni---deratkon

-o%Ltns,.ifopproprato. LCO 3,0A4 of the is notresults applicable to, and lop Note do% not *e.Ju.,channes If in MCQF,E$,.or other specified conditions15-XIIE Mntee~lcb~t ht are requir-ed t.oCMDVwyi~tjACTONS 9 tfha lLt "rfa shutdown of the unwt,t The allowed Completion Times-are Is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

D.. D.2.1 and D.2.2 The Required Actions of Condition C are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply.

RIVER SEND B 317-19 Revision No. 6-13 to RBG-47322 Page 33 of 47 Control Room AC System B 3.7.3 BASES ACTIONS E.1 and E.2 (continued) not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

Also, if applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7,31 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the heat removal capabiity of the system is sufficient to remove the control room heat load assumed in the safety analysis, The SR consists of a combination of testing and calculation. The 2A month i Frequency is appropriate since significant degradation of the Control Room AC System is not expected over this time period.

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 64.

2, USAR, Section 9A.1.

3, NE*_ -32988-A. Revision 2, Technical Justificatio to Suocrt Risk-Irrforrned Modification to Senldcurd ! Sd_.twes for BWR RIVER BEND 8 3.7-21 Revision No. 143 to RBG-47322 Page 34 of 47 Main Condenser Offgas B 3.7.4 eASES (coyntued)

APPUCABILITY The LCO is applicable when steam is being exhausted to the main condenser and the resulting noncondensibles are being processed via the Main Condenser Offgas System. This occurs during M4ODE 1, and during MODES 2 and 3 with any main steam line not isolated and the SJAE in operation. In MODES 4 and 5, steam is not being exhausted to the main condenser and the requirements are not applicable.

ACTIONS A.1 Ifthe offgas radioactivity rate limit is exceeded, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is allowed to restore the gross gamma activity rate to within the limit. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is reasonable, based on engineering judgment considering the time required to complete the Required Action, the large margins associated with permissible dose and exposure limits, and the tow probability of a Main Condenser Offgas System rupture occurring.

B.1, B.2. and B.3,4.-aA444 Ifthe gross gamma activity rate Is not restored to within tlhe limits within the associated Completion Time, all main steam lines or the SJAE must be isolated. This isolates the Main Condenser Offgas System from the source of the radioactive steam. The main steam li-nes are considered isolated ifat least one main steam isolation valve in each main steam line is closed, and at least one main steam line drain valve in each drain line is dosed. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to perorm the actions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

An alternative to Required Actions B.1 and B.2 is to place the unit in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply, To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ....i..n.MDE 4 .... in Remaining Inthe Apiplicabil iv of the LCO is acceptable .1cause the plant risk inMODE 3 lsslmilartoor lowert han the rig in M F:,41Ref 41 and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necesay reoairs to restre the sytm to OPERABLE statu will hewv e . l entry into MODE 4 maY~ermade as t is a.so an ac-ce - tae [-r le, Required Action B,3 is modified b a Pote -thatstates that LCO 3.0.4.a is not ano~licable when enlerino MODE :, This Note prohibits the use VCO of 3,0.4,a to enter MODE 3 during ith theOJCQ not ete However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.4.b. ifacoilcable. because LCO 3g4,*b reiguires gerforrnnce Fa risk s ,dressIng irmmerabiesystems and comoonents, consi.ration of the results.

dr to e.tabilitv of entering-MO 3. and as ihment ftCtios ifWapoprlite. LCO 3.0.4 so licl and the Note does notJ ONredde. -;chan~ges in MODE-S or other sr.eSif11d conit on i te A ~olicabilitv ilatl .?m7ereguired to comply with ACTION5; gr that are part of A shultdown of the unit.

The allowed Completion Timee-a.e is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required utni conditions from ful power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

(contbnued)

WEIER BEND B 3.7-23 Revision No. 0 to RBG-47322 Page 35 of 47 Main Condenser Offoas B 3.7.4 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.41 REQUIREMENTS This SR requires an isotopic analysis of an offgas sample ifthe measured release rate of radioactivity increases significantly (by ;z 5W/0 after correcting for expected increases due to changes in THERMAL POWER),

within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months after the increase is noted, to ensure that the increase is not Indicative of a sustained increase in the radioactivity rate. The noble gases to be sampled are Xe-133, Xe-133m, Xe-135, Xe-1 38, Kr-85m, Kr-

87. and Kr-88.

SR 3.7.42 This SR, on a 31 day Frequency, requires an isotopic ;analysis of an offgas sample to ensure that the required limits are satisfied. The noble gases to be sampled are Xe-1 33, Xe-1 33m, Xe-1 35, Xe-1 38, Kr-85m, Kr-87, and Kr-88, The 31 day Frequency is adequate in view of other instrumentation that continuously monitor the offgas, and is acceptable based on operating experience.

This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the SR is not required to be performed until 31 days after any main steam line is not isolated and the SJAE Is in operation. Only Inthis condition can radioactive fission gases be in the Main Condenser Offgas System at significant rates.

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 15.7.1.

2. NUREG-0800.

3. 10 CFR 100.

4. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2. Technical usfication to SuoDort Risk-Informed Modificationto 2002. SeLt&ed Required End rtates for B.

Plants, December RIVER SEND B 3,7-24 Revision No. 1 to RBG-47322 Page 36 of 47 AC Sources - Overating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS F.1 ot+/-

(continued)

Ifthe inoperable AC electrical power sources cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to MODE 3 within 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months s-al-te MODE 4 Wi-hin 36 hoUc-.

Remaining in the Apolicability ofthe LCO Is acceptable because the olant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the dskWin MODE 4 (Ref. 8) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntan, entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state, Reouired ActiOn G.1 is modified by a Note that states 11hat LCO 3.0.4.a is not aoolicable when entering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0-4-a to enter MODE 3 dudng startuo with the LCO not met, How-ever, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0,4.b. ifapoplcable. because LCO 3.0.4.b reauires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components. consideration of the results.

determination of the acceptability of enterIna MODE 3. and establishment of risk management actions, ifapproyriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to.

and the Nole does not Preclude. charmes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Aoolicability that are required to complv with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

The allowed Completion Times-are js reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

G.1 Condition G corresponds to a level of degradation in which all redundancy in the AC electrical power supplies has been lost. At this severely degraded level, any further losses in the AC electrical power system will cause a loss of function. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. The unit is required by LCO 3.0.3 to commence a controlled shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE The AC sources are designed to permit inspection and testing of all REQUIREMENTS important areas and features, especially those that have a standby function, in accordance with 10 CFR 50, GDC 18 (Ref. 8). Periodic component tests are supplemented by extensive functional tests during refueling outages under simulated accident conditions, The SRs for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the DGs are in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), and Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 10).

RIVER SEND B83.8-13 Revision No. 0 to RBG-47322 Page 37 of 47 AC Sources - Operating B 3,8.1 BASES REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A,GDC 17.

2. USAR, Chapter 8.

3. Regulatory Guide 1.9.

4. USAR, Chapter 6.

5. USAR, Chapter 15.

6. Regulatory Guide 1.93.

7. Generic Letter 84-15, July 2, 1984.

8. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18.

9. Regulatory Guide 1.108.

10. Regulatory Guide 1.137.

11. ANSI C84.1, 1982.

12. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI.

13. IEEE Standard 308.

14. 10 CFR 50.65,

15. Regulatory Guide 1.160,

16. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2. Technical Justificalion to Supoort Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for SWR Plants, December 2002.

(continued)

RIVER BEND 133,8-32 Revision No. 3-1 to RBG-47322 Page 38 of 47 DC Source* - Operating B 3.8.4 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued) loss of DC power to the affected division. The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months limit is consistent with the allowed time for an inoperable DC distribution system division.

If one of the required Division I or It DC electrical power subsystems is inoperable for reasons other than Condition A (e.g., inoperable battery, or inoperable battery charger and associated inoperable battery), the remaining DC electrical power subsystems have the capacity to support a safe shutdown and to mitigate an accident condition. Since a subsequent worst case single failure could, however, result in the loss of minimum necessary DC electrical subsystems, continued power operation should not exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Completion Time is based on Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 7) and reflects a reasonable time to assess unit status as a function of the inoperable DC electrical power subsystem and, if the DC electrical power subsystem is not restored to OPERABLE status, to prepare to effect an orderly and safe unit shutdown.

C._I With the Division III DC electrical power subsystem Inoperable, the HPCS and Standby Service Water System pump 2C may be incapable of performing their intended functions and must be immediately declared inoperable. This declaration also requires entry into applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.5.1, "ECCS - Operating," and LCO 3.7.1, "Standby Service Water JSSW) System and Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)."

D.1 ad-9*

If the inoperable DC electrical power subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which thc-l=c o E . To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to hn -,..DkhAn 3r ho*um.

If a Division 1 r2.DC electrical oower subsystem is inoperable and ngt restored within the provided Completifon Time. thp plant must be brought to-a condition in which overall olat risk is minimized. To achieve thisl statu*s. the., plant must be brogught to a ]least MODE 3 within 12lhours.

Remainina in the Aoppicabilftv of the LCO Is acceptable because the Plant risk in MODE 3 is similar toQr rower than th.e rsk In MODE 4 f&Ref 8) and because the time soent In MODE 3 to, erform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status wil b sghort. However. voluntary enrv into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceotabJe low-risk state&

Sequired Action D.1 is, modified by a Woe that stat_0s tha LCO 3.0-4-a is not apolicable when entering MODE 3- This Note crohibits the use of LCO 1.0.4,a to erter MODE 3 durina startup with the LCO notLmet. However.

there is no restriction on theuse of LCO 30.4.b, if apolicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b reauires perfoinalce of a risk assessmenptaddressinq RIVER BEND B 3.8-63 Revision No, 125 to RBG-47322 Page 39 of 47 DC Sources - OerAtng B 3.8.4 inoperable systems and comoorwdts. consideration of the resuljit.

determination of the acceptability of entering MODE 3. rand estabishment

_frisk managemnent actions. ifaoorooriate, LCO 3.0.4 is not aoolicablo,1.

and the Note does not r.eclude, channes in MODES or other specified conditiong Inthe Appi1cabilitv that are reguird to comply wilh ACTIONS or that are part of a shuldowI) of the unit.

The allowed Completon Time is reasonble, based on operatine exp)rience, to reamh the required plant conditions frQm f*uI power conditions in an orderly manner and widhout challenaina oltant ssterms.

The allowed Tir OOGOcRciOW~I, bcdo pftn BFmloio n~ioc~,to o~hthe FeqUiredfplaMi E.1 With the Division 3 DC electrical power subsystem inooerabte for reasons other than Conditlon A or B, the HPCS and C .Standby Service Wate' System mnay be ncaoable of Performlno their intended functions and must be immediately declared inoperable. This declaration also reguires entry into applicable Conditions arid-Required Actions of LCO 3.5-.LF-CCS -

Ooeratina." [and LCO 3.7.1, "Standby Service Water (SSWI System and

[Uhimate Heat SinkX UH817fl, (continued)

RIVER BEND 8 3.8-53 Revision No, 125 to RBG-47322 Page 40 of 47 DC Sources - Ooerating B 3.8.4 BASES ACTIONS 0.1 and 0.2 (cnninu.I conditios fRom full! powor: conditoesin an erdefty monneF-efidwithest shalizrnglng plant asztorn, Tho Ce~enipitn Time~to-0A 4148g hUnit t0 MODS 4 it oGS~rrncot M.'Ah tho ie rc Fquirod InRag ulotcFy-Guide 1.tO SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.4.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying battery terminal voltage while on float charge helps to ensure the effectiveness of the charging system and the ability of the batteries to perform their intended function. Float charge is the condition in which the charger is supplying the continuous charge required to overcome the internal losses of a battery (or battery cell) and maintain the battery (or battery cell) in a fully charged state. The voltage requirements are based on the nominal design voltage of the battery and are consistent with the initial voltages assumed in the battery sizing calculations. The 7 day Frequency is conservative with manufacturer's recommendations and IEEE-450 (Ref. 8).

SR 3.8.4.2 Visual inspection to detect corrosion of the battery cells and connections, or measurement of the resistance of each inter-cell, Inter-rack, inter-tier, and terminal connection, provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could potentially degrade battery performance.

Only those terminals and connectors which have visible corrosion must be measured for connection resistance.

The Surveillance Frequency for these inspections. which can detect conditions that can cause power losses due to resistance heating, is 92 days. This Frequency is considered acceptable based on operating experience related to detecting corrosion trends.

SR 3.8.4.3 Visual inspection of the battery cells, cell plates, and battery racks provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could potentially degrade battery performance.

(continued)

RIVER BEND 8 3.8-54 Revision No. 125 to RBG.-47322 Page 41 of 47 DC Sources - Opcarting B83.8.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.4.8 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS

1) Unexpected operational events which cause the equipment to perform the function specified by this Surveillance, for which adequate documentation of the required performance is available; and

2) Post corrective maintenance testing that requires performance of this Surveillance in order to restore the component to OPERABLE, provided the maintenance was required, or performed in conjunction with maintenance required to maintain OPERABILITY or reliability.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17.

2. Regulatory Guide 1.6, March 10, 1971.

3. IEEE Standard 308, 1978.

4. USAR, Section 8.3.2.

5. USAR, Chapter 6.

6. USAR, Chapter 15.

7. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.

8. IEEE Standard 450, 1995.

9. Regulatory Guide 1.32, February 1977.

10. Regulatory Guide 1.129, December 1974.

11. IEEE Standard 485.

12, NEDC-32988-A, Reision 2, Technical Justifiaion to Suopgrt Risk-Informed Mod~ficationto Selected Required End States for B.WR Plants, Dtuber 2002.

RIVER BEND B 3.8.58 Revision No. 120 to RBG-47322 Page 42 of 47 Inverters - Operating B 3.8,7 BASES ACTIONS A.

(continued)

Required Action A.l allows 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to fix the Inoperable inverter and return it to service or align an OPERABLE inverter to the Vital Bus. The 24 hou* limit is based upon engineering judgment, taking into consideration the time required to repair an Inverter and the additional risk to which the plant is exposed because of the inverter inoperability. This risk has to be balanced against the risk of an immediate shutdown, along with the potential challenges to safety systems that such a shutdown might entail. When the AC vital bus is powered from one of its Class 1E sources, it is relying upon Interruptible AC electrical power sources (offsite and onsite). The uninterruptible inverter source to the AC vital buses is the preferred source for powering instrumentation trip setpoint devices.

B.1 ap"-B.2 Ifthe inoperable devices or components cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a-t.lODE In--;h.sh the LCO derc net apply condition in which overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE - ;4th'm 36*hou .

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acce.table because the 04ant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 4) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perm the necessary reoairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However. voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceotable low-risk stale.

Reouied Action 8.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 30.4,a is not applicable when entering MODE 3. This Note PCrohibits the use of L, 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 dufnq, startup with the LCO not met. However, there is-no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b. ifapollcable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inooerable systems and conpoonents. cosideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of enterina MODE 3. and stabh of risk maenagement octions, ifaoprooriate. LCO 3.0A4 I not applicable to.

and the Note does not preclude. changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the ADolkcabilitv that are required to comoyi WiitlACTIONS or thLafare.-ert of a shutdown of the unit.

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.7.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that the inverters are functioning properly with all required circuit breakers closed and AC vital buses energized from the inverter. The verification of proper voltage and frequency output ensures RIVER BEND B 3.8-72 Revision No. 111 to RBG-47322 Page 43 of 47 Inverters - Operating B 3.8.7 BASES (oontlnued)

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Chapter 8.

2. USAR, Chapter 6.

3. USAR, Chapter 15.

4- NEDC-3.2988-A. Revision 2, Technical Justification to Pult Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

RIVER SEND B83.8-73 Revision No. 0 to RBG-47322 Page 44 of 47 Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.8.9 BASES ACTIONS Q1 (continued)

b. The potential for decreased safety when requiring entry into numerous applicable Conditions and Required Actions for components without DC power while not providing sufficient time for the operators to perform the necessary evaluations and actions for restoring power to the affected division; and

c. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component.

The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Completion Time for DC buses is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 3).

The second Completion Time for Required Action C.1 establishes a limdt on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. IfCondition C is entered while, for instance, an AC bus is inoperable and subsequently returned OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . This situation could lead to a total duration of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months , since initial failure of the LCO, to restore the DC distribution system. At this time, an AC division could again become inoperable, and DC distribution could be. restored OPERABLE. This could continue indefinitely.

This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "lime zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This allowance results in establishing the 'time zero" at the time the LCO was initially not met, instead of the time Condition C was entered. The 16 hour1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential of failing to meet the LCO indefinitely.

Ifthe inoperable electrical power distribution system cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Times, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO doec net app,. overall plant risk is minized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ,4ndt* MOdE 4 within a-6-4ma~s.

Remaining in ft Awlxicabilitv of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similarut xr lower than the risk In M02iE 4iRe..41and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necetsary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be shgrt, However, voluntary entry Into MODE 4 may be made as it is..also an acceptable Jow-risk state, Reoulred Action D.I is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not agolicable when*entering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LC&

3.0.4oa to enter MODE 3 during sta-tdu with the LCO.not met. However, thre is no restriction on the use of LCO 310.4,b. ifapplicable, becaus LCO 3.0.4.b requires performan.e of a risk assessment addressing RIVER SEND B 3."S8 Revision No. 103 to RBG-47322 Page 45 of 47 Distributiok Syctams-Operatlng 8 3.8,9 inoperable systems and components. consideration of the results.

determination of the acceptability of entergna MODE 3. and establishment of risk management actions, if anorooriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not aoppicable to, and the Note does not Preclude, chanaes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Aolicablilitv that are required to conp.y,with ACTIONS or th-at are part of a shutdown of the unit.

The allowed Completion Tlmes.-ae is reasonable, based on operatin experience. to reach the required plant conditions from fuM nower conditions in an ordedy manner and without challenging olant systems.

(continued)

RIVER SEND B 3."-5 Revision No. 103 to RBG-47322 Page 46 of 47 Distribution Syst.mRq-0perating B 3.8.9 BASES ACTIONS D.11 and D.2 (continued) rcaconable, basW~ on epecmting e~pefiens, to rooch Pie fequiod plavit onitions from full pouwcr nendiens in an oefl~y FannereAd-Witheu shallenging p~3ft-sýtfio L,.

With the Division III electrical power distribution system Inoperable, the Division III powered systems are not capable of performing their intended functions. Immediately declaring the high pressure core spray inoperable allows the ACTIONS of LCO 3.5.1, "ECCS - Operating," to apply appropriate fimitaions on continued reactor operation.

Condition F corresponds to a level of degradation in the electrical distribution system that causes a required safety function to be lost. When more than one Condition is entered, and this results in the loss of a required function, the plant is in a condition outside the accident analysis, Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. LCO 3.0.3 must be entered Immediately to commence a controlled shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.9.1 REQUIREMENTS Meeting this Surveillance verifies that the AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution systems are functioning property, with the correct circuit breaker alignment. The correct breaker alignment ensures the appropriate separation and independence of the electrical divisions Is maintained, and the appropriate voltage is available to each required bus.

The verification of proper voltage availability on the buses ensures that the required voltage is readily available for motive as well as control functions for critical system loads connected to these buses. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems, and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to subsystem malfunctions (continued)

RfVER BEND B 3.8-86 Revision No. 0 to RBG-47322 Page 47 of 47 Distribution Systemis-Operatiiig B 3.8.9 BASES (continued)

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Chapter 6.

2. USAR. Chapter 15.

3. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.

4. USAR, Section 8.3.

5r NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2. Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Reouired End Slates for BWR Plants, December 2002.

RrVER BEND B 3.8-87 Revision No. 0

Attachment 4 RBG-47322 List of Regulatory Commitments to RBG-47322 Page 1 of 1 List of Regulatory Commitments The following table identifies those actions committed to by Entergy in this document. Any other statements in this submittal are provided for information purposes and are not considered to be regulatory commitments.

TYPE (Check one) SCHEDULED ONE- CONTINUING COMPLETION COMMITMENT TIME COMPLIANCE DATE ACTION Entergy will follow the guidance established in X Upon TSTF-IG-05-02 "Implementation Guidance for Implementation TSTF-423, Revision 2, Technical Specification End States, NEDC-32988-A"

v t e Letter Sequence Request
TAC:MF2299, Technical Specifications End States, NEDC-32988-A (Approved, Closed)
Initiation Request, Request, Request, Request, Request Acceptance Administration Questions 29 July 2014 Answers Results Approval Other: ML15071A475
MONTHYEAR2014-07-29 [Table View]

RBG-47322, Submittal of Request for Amendment to the Technical Specifications

Text

SUBJECT:

Dear Sir or Madam:

1.0 DESCRIPTION

2.0 PROPOSED CHANGE

3.0 BACKGROUND

4.0 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

7.0 REFERENCES

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RBG-47322, Submittal of Request for Amendment to the Technical Specifications

Text

SUBJECT:

Dear Sir or Madam:

1.0 DESCRIPTION

2.0 PROPOSED CHANGE

3.0 BACKGROUND

4.0 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

7.0 REFERENCES

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