RBG-47432, License Amendment Request 2013-18 Re Revision of Ultimate Heat Sink Design Capacity

License Amendment Request 2013-18 Re Revision of Ultimate Heat Sink Design Capacity

ML14051A170
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	02/10/2014
From:	Olson E Entergy Operations
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RBG-47432
Download: ML14051A170 (35)

Text

Entergy Operations, Inc.

River Bend Station 5485 U. S. Highway 61 N St. Francisville, LA 70775 En

-tffI Tel 225 381 4374 Fax 225 381 4872 eolson@entergy.com Eric W. Olson Site Vice President RBG-47432 February 10, 2014 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT:

License Amendment Request 2013-18 Revision of Ultimate Heat Sink Design Capacity River Bend Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-458 License No. NPF-47

REFERENCE:

1. River Bend Station - NRC Component Design Bases Inspection Report 05000458 / 2011008, 12/6/2011 (ML113400127)

RBF1-14-0006

Dear Sir or Madam:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, Entergy Operations Inc. (EOI) hereby requests approval of a revision to the River Bend Station - Unit 1 Operating License. The change revised the River Bend Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report to credit makeup to the ultimate heat sink in less than 30 days to account for system leakage and for operation with more than one division of standby service water in operation.

In accordance with the requirement of 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this letter and all applicable attachments will be sent to the designated official of the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality..

While this amendment request is neither emergency nor exigent, Entergy requests approval by February 10, 2015. The amendment will be implemented within 60 days of approval. If you have any questions regarding the information in this submittal, please contact Joseph A. Clark at 225-381-4177. This document contains no commitments.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on February 10, 2014.

EWOidhw 6.

RBG-47432 February 10, 2014 Page 2 of 2 : Description of Proposed Change : Description of Prior Licensing Basis Changes : Previously-changed Licensing Basis Pages : Description of Prior Analytical Deficiencies : Pending Design Basis Changes cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV 1600 East Lamar Blvd.

Arlington, TX 76011-4511 NRC Sr. Resident Inspector P. 0. Box 1050 St. Francisville, LA 70775 Department of Environmental Quality Office of Environmental Compliance Radiological Emergency Planning and Response Section JiYoung Wiley P.O. Box 4312 Baton Rouge, LA 70821-4312 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Mr. Alan Wang Washington, DC 20555-0001 Public Document Room Public Utility Commission of Texas 1701 N. Congress Ave.

Austin, TX 78711-3326

RBG-47432 Attachment 1 Description of Proposed Change

4.

River Bend Station - Unit 1 RBG-47432 Attachment 1 Page 1 of 5 1.0 Description This LAR is requesting NRC approval for changes made to the River Bend Station (RBS) Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) in 2002 to credit makeup to the ultimate heat sink (UHS) in less than 30 days to account for system leakage and for operation with more than one division of standby service water (SSW) in operation (i.e.,

no emergency diesel generators (EDG) are assumed to fail). Approval for this change is requested to address a violation where the NRC determined that the change made by the site under 10CFR50.59 resulted in more than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a structure, system, or component (SSC) important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR. Attachment 2 describes the prior changes that are the subject of the violation.

The inventory losses in the UHS basin following a design-basis loss of offsite power /

loss of coolant accident ( LOP/LOCA) were re-calculated in response to a second violation in which NRC identified non-conservative assumptions regarding pump heat.

The losses are slightly increased as a result of revision of the associated design calculation where the design safety margin after 30 days is reduced from 73,387 gallons to 49,000 gallons. In addition, the same re-analysis resulted in minor changes in the maximum service water supply temperature, maximum heat rejection to the UHS, and time of maximum heat rejection to the UHS. Attachment 3 identifies those changes associated with the pump heat re-analysis.

2.0 Background Following the 2011 Component Design Basis Inspection (Reference 1), NRC issued RBS a non-cited violation of 10CFR50.59 for changing the UHS inventory license basis requirements to credit makeup in less than 30 days. Specifically, in 2002, RBS revised the UFSAR and design calculations to credit makeup in less than 30 days to account for system leakage and for operation with more than one division of SSW in operation (i.e.,

maximum safeguards conditions) where a failure of the worst case emergency diesel generator (EDG) is not assumed. This change was made under 10CFR50.59 under the premise that the design basis for 30 days inventory with no makeup did not include leakage or operation SSW with no failures of the EDGs.

Also, following the same inspection, NRC issued a second non-cited violation for utilizing a less conservative assumption (i.e., frictionless form of the conservation of energy equation) in the 30-day inventory analysis of the UHS regarding pump heat. In response to this violation, RBS has revised the affected design calculation demonstrating that the UHS contains 30 days of inventory without makeup for the design basis condition in which the most conservative failure of an EDG is assumed and not accounting for system leakage. This same methodology was also utilized in re-analyzing the maximum safeguards scenarios discussed above.

The standby cooling tower (SCT) and water storage basin form a part of the SSW system which functions as the UHS. The SSW system operates under emergency conditions, in conjunction with the UHS, to remove heat from those plant components required for safe shutdown and cool-down of the unit. The safety-related SCT is designed to function as the ultimate heat sink for the station in those situations where

River Bend Station - Unit 1 RBG-47432 Page 2 of 5 the normal cooling towers are unavailable. The SCT is designed to provide cooling water at less than 95°F to permit safe shutdown and cooldown of the unit, and to maintain it in a cold shutdown condition for up to 30 days with no need for replenishment. The SCT is a mechanical draft counter flow cooling tower with four 50 percent capacity cooling cells. Each redundant SSW loop is connected to two 50 percent tower cells.

The System Design Criteria for SSW states:

The UHS shall be designed to provide sufficient cooling water for a period of 30 days to permit a safe shutdown condition, i.e., reactor temperature below 105°F, when normal cooling towers are unavailable. Certain operational practices (Maximum Safeguard Load scenarios), which involve using more than the minimum complement of equipment necessary for achieving and maintaining safe shutdown, will require monitoring of the SCT level and possible operator actions to maintain SCT inventory for 30 days. Cooling water for normal station operation, including shutdown, shall be provided by the normal cooling towers.

The capacity of the SCT water storage basin is based on the time needed to evaluate the situation, to take corrective action to mitigate the consequences of an accident, and if required, to take any necessary measures to permit water replenishment. Additionally, alternate methods are available for ensuring the continued capability of the sink beyond 30 days. The current minimum volume required in the basin for 30 days of operation following a design-basis LOCA (assuming operation of one division of SSW) is 6,347,989 gallons. The UHS basin has a capacity of approximately 6,421,376 gallons at the minimum water level of 111,-1 0". This excludes approximately 69,596 gallons, which constitutes the volume from minimum pump submergence elevation of 65'-0" down to the basin floor elevation of 64'-6".

RBS Calculation PM-194, Revision 8, "Standby Cooling Tower Performance and Evaporation Losses without Drywell Unit Coolers" contained inconsistencies in the methodologies utilized for determination of pump heat added to the Standby Cooling Tower (SWP-TWR1) basin by the following pumps: Standby Service Water Pumps SWP-P2A and SWP-P2C, Residual Heat Removal Pump E12-PCO01A, High Pressure Core Spray Pump E22-PCO01A, and Low Pressure Core Spray Pump E21-PCOO1.

Additionally, heat added to the standby service water due to friction from operation of the Division I Standby Service Water pumps, SWP-P2A/C and the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump, SFC-PIA was not included in the calculation, which is non-conservative.

These deficiencies are documented in the station's corrective action program. PM-194 has been subsequently updated to remove inconsistencies in the methodology and non-conservatisms, as well as other calculation items non-compliant to the engineering calculation procedures.

The findings affected the existing SCT basin margin of 73,387 gallons, and the required makeup water analyzed by the maximum safeguards calculation. UFSAR Section 9.2.5 was changed in 2002 to credit makeup to the UHS to account for system leakage and operation of two divisions of standby service water (no failures of EDGs). Additionally, Technical Specification Basis 3.7.1 (Standby Service Water System and Ultimate Heat Sink) was revised to credit makeup water sources to account for system leakage and

River Bend Station - Unit 1 RBG-47432 Page 3 of 5 when operating with no failures of EDGs. The Bases change was made under the same 50.59 evaluation as the UFSAR change.

The UHS is capable of meeting Regulatory Guide 1.27 requirements for a 30-day inventory without makeup, considering no system leakage and the failure of one EDG.

Standby service water system leakage was not considered in the original license basis for the system's ability to have a 30-day inventory. The original UFSAR indicated that the system maximum losses from the UHS consisted of natural evaporation, forced evaporation, drift, and cooling for the penetration valve leakage control system. These losses were quantified in the UFSAR to demonstrate compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.27. Neither the UFSAR nor Regulatory Guide 1.27 discussed how leakage was addressed. River Bend Station was licensed without requiring consideration for leakage.

Therefore, it was concluded that system leakage was not a part of the license basis.

3.0 Technical Analysis RBS evaluated the revision of the UHS evaporation losses and heat input for the design-basis scenario which assumes that one EDG has failed using the more conservative assumption for pump heat, where the brake horsepower energy at the pump shaft during operating conditions is assumed to be converted to heat. That analysis concluded that the UHS inventory is sufficient to support LOP/LOCA heat loads without makeup for 30 days as required by Reg. Guide 1.27. The design safety margin of 73,387 gallons of water has decreased to 49,000 gallons. This analysis is based on the original UFSAR assumption of the failure of an EDG, and does not include leakage, as was the case in the original UFSAR. Additionally, all maximum SSW temperatures are within design limits.

The scenario in which no EDG failures occur was evaluated using the same assumptions for pump heat as the design-basis scenario. This evaluation also accounted for anticipated system leakage. In that evaluation, it was determined that at approximately 22 days following the LOCA event, the basin water level would fall below the minimum level required for pump submergence.

A 2002 engineering evaluation assessed the availability of alternate makeup sources.

These alternate makeup sources include: (1) temporary power to the deep and shallow-well pumps, (2) using the fire protection diesel-driven pumps and system providing makeup through the existing piping, (3) makeup using circulating water flume basin using to the fire protection diesel driven pump and piping, and (4) temporary tank trucks, hoses, and makeup using temporary power to the deep well pumps and existing makeup water piping. These makeup sources are documented in off-normal operating procedures. It is concluded that adequate makeup sources are available 22 days into the postulated event to supply makeup if needed to the UHS for the case where an EDG is not assumed to fail and system leakage is accounted for.

River Bend Station - Unit 1 RBG-47432 Page 4 of 5 4.0 Regulatory Analysis Entergy has evaluated whether a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of Amendment," as discussed below:

The NSHC determines whether that operation of a licensed facility in accordance with a proposed amendment does not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The three criteria listed are separately addressed below. The changes discussed in this submittal are in accordance to the three criteria.

1. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

No. The UHS does not initiate any accidents discussed in Chapter 15 of the RBS UFSAR. Moreover, the design and operability requirements remain consistent with those of the plant system currently addressed by the RBS Technical Specifications (TS) and the capacity and the characteristics of the UHS meet the RBS design criteria. The UHS remains capable of meeting the requirements of Reg. Guide 1.27 to provide sufficient inventory to support post LOCA DBA heat removal for 30 days without makeup assuming a single failure of an EDG without accounting for leakage. For the scenario where no EDG is assumed to fail and all divisions of SSW are in operation and where allowances for leakage are assumed, adequate makeup sources are available within the approximate 22 day time frame needed to maintain inventory. Therefore this proposed change does not involve an increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

No. The proposed change introduces no new mode of plant operation and there is no alteration to the UHS design function or the ability of the UHS to perform its design function. Therefore, there is no possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

No. During shutdown associated with a design-basis LOCA, coincident with a loss of offsite power and failure of one EDG, the UHS water basin contains sufficient capacity to provide cooling for a period of 30 days in accordance with RG 1.27. The total water loss due to leakage during a 30-day period is increased from approximately 6.35E6 gallons to 6.38E6 gallons in the system. This reduces the inventory safety margin from approximately 73,000 gallons to 49,000 gallons of water in the UHS water basin.

River Bend Station - Unit 1 RBG-47432 Page 5 of 5 In addition, the maximum service water supply temperature increases from 89.97°F (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> post-accident) to 92.1 OF (5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> post-accident) during a design-basis accident, coincident with a LOP and a failure of the Division 2 EDG. For a maximum safeguards shutdown scenario, the maximum service water supply temperature reaches 92.36°F approximately 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> post-accident. For both of these cases, the maximum temperature does not exceed the design basis limit of 950 F.

These changes do not impact the design basis parameters of the UHS or compliance with RG 1.27. Moreover, the existing TS operability and surveillance requirements are not reduced by the proposed change. Therefore, the operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

5.0 Environmental Analysis A review has determined that the proposed amendment would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed amendment does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluent that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

RBG-47432 Attachment 2 Description of Prior Licensing Basis Changes

River Bend Station - Unit 1 RBG-47432 Page 1 of 2 In 2002, a revision to- UFSAR Section 9.2.5 was evaluated in accordance with 10CFR50.59 to credit makeup to the ultimate heat sink (UHS) to account for system leakage and when operating two divisions of standby service water (SSW). Additionally, Technical Specification Bases 3.7.1 (Standby Service Water System and Ultimate Heat Sink) was revised to credit makeup water sources to account for system leakage and when operating two divisions of SSW. The UFSAR change and Bases revision were based on the same 50.59 evaluation. Those changes are indicated in Attachment 3.

The UHS is capable of meeting Regulatory Guide 1.27 requirements for a 30-day inventory without makeup, considering no system leakage. Standby service water system leakage was not considered in the original license basis for the system's ability to have a 30-day inventory. The original UFSAR indicated that the system maximum losses from the UHS consisted of natural evaporation, forced evaporation, drift, and cooling for the penetration valve leakage control system. These losses were quantified in the UFSAR to demonstrate compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.27. Neither the UFSAR nor Regulatory Guide 1.27 discuss how leakage was addressed, River Bend Station was licensed without requiring consideration for leakage. Therefore, system leakage was not a part of the license basis. A 50.59 and USAR change in 2002 clarified that makeup will be required to account for system leakage.

During the 2011 Component Design Basis Inspection, the 50.59 response that was determined to be inadequate is question 2 ("Result in more than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a structure, system, or component important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR?")

NEI 96-07 (Guidelines for 10CFR50.59 Implementation) states that the term "malfunction of an SSC important to safety" refers to the failure of structures, systems and components (SSCs) to perform their intended design functions. The design function of the UHS as described in the UFSAR section 9.2.5 is as follows: "The capacity of the UHS water storage basin is designed to provide necessary cooling for the period of time (30 days) needed to evaluate the situation, to take corrective action to mitigate the consequences of an accident, and if required to take any necessary measures to permit water replenishment. In addition, procedures are available for ensuring continued capability of the sink beyond 30 days." This design function assumes failure of an EDG and does not include system leakage.

The ability to provide makeup to the UHS in less than 30 days is only credited for non-design basis scenarios and therefore does not result in a failure of the UHS basin, does not create a new leakage, does not impact the integrity of the existing piping, does not increase natural evaporation, does not increase forced evaporation, does not increase drift, and does not increase cooling requirements for supplied systems. Therefore, there is no increase to the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a structure, system or component as evaluated in the UFSAR.

NEI 96-07 also states that the cause and mode of a malfunction should be considered in determining whether there is a change in the likelihood of a malfunction. The response to question 2 did not adequately address the impact to existing or new malfunctions,

River Bend Station - Unit 1 RBG-47432 Page 2 of 2 however; there are no new malfunctions created nor is there any impact to an existing malfunction as discussed in the above paragraph.

The NRC inspector had a specific question regarding example 4 of NEI 96-07 under question two which states that "the change involves a new or modified operator action that supports a design function credited in safety analyses provided that 1) the action is reflected in plant procedures and operator training, 2) the licensee has demonstrated that the action can be completed in time required considering the aggregate affects (workload, environmental conditions etc.), 3) the evaluation of the change considers the ability to recover from credible errors in performance of manual actions an, and 4) the evaluation considers the effect of the change on plant systems. However, the RBS position is that providing makeup for system leakage is not a design function as described in the USAR, so example 4 does not apply.

RBG-47432 Attachment 3 Previously-changed Licensing Bas*is Pages (changes are ý )

SSW System and UHS B 3.7.1 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.1 Standby Service Water (SSW) System and Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)

BASES BACKGROUND The SSW System is designed to provide cooling water for the removal of heat from unit auxiliaries, such as Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System heat exchangers, standby diesel generators (DGs), HPCS DG, and room coolers for Emergency Core Cooling System equipment required for a safe reactor shutdown following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient. The SSW System also provides cooling to unit components, as required, during normal shutdown and reactor isolation modes. During a DBA, the equipment required for normal operation only is isolated from the SSW System, and cooling is directed only to safety related equipment.

The SSW System consists of two independent cooling water headers (subsystems A and B), and their associated pumps, piping, valves, and instrumentation. The two SSW pumps on each supply header are sized to provide sufficient cooling capacity to support the required safety related systems during safe shutdown of the unit following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). Subsystems A and B service equipment in SSW Divisions 1 and 2, respectively. Additionally, the two redundant systems merge to supply the HPCS diesel generator jacket water cooler and the HPCS pump room unit cooler.

The UHS consists of one 200% cooling tower and one 100% capacity water storage basin. The basin is sized such that sufficient water inventory is available to provide heat removal capability to safely shut down the plant and to maintain it in a cold shutdown condition for a 30 day period with no externaujmakeup wter source av (Rgulatory UHS uses five vaneial fans for eachofur towercels in an induced draft system arrangement. Each of the four tower cells is powered by either Standby Diesel Generator A or B (Division 1 or 2). Two operating cells are sufficient for safe shutdown. Normal makeup for the UHS basin is manually controlled and provided through the Makeup Water Treatment System by plant makeup wells.

Cooling water is pumped from the cooling tower basin by the four SSW pumps to the essential components through the two main supply headers (subsystems A and B). After removing (continued)

RIVER BEND B 3.7-1 Revision No. 110

SSW System and UHS B 3.7.1 BASES BACKGROUND heat from the components, the water is discharged to the cooling tower (continued) where the heat is rejected through direct contact with ambient air.

Subsystems A and B supply cooling water to equipment required for a safe reactor shutdown. Additional information on the design and operation of the SSW System and UHS along with the specific equipment for which the SSW System supplies cooling water is provided in the USAR, Section 9.2 and the USAR, Table 9.2-15 (Refs. 2 and 3, respectively). The SSW System is designed to withstand a single active or passive failure, coincident with a loss of offsite power, without losing the capability to supply adequate cooling water to equipment required for safe reactor shutdown.

Following a DBA or transient, the SSW System will operate automatically without operator action. Manual initiation of supported systems (e.g.,

suppression pool cooling) is, however, performed for long term cooling operations.

APPLICABLE The UHS consists of one 200% cooling tower and one 100% capacity SAFETY ANALYSES water storage basin. The basin is sized such that sufficient water inventory is available to provide heat removal capability to safely shut down the plant and to maintain it in a cold shutdown condition for a 30 da period with~ no additional maku wae ore vial (Ref, 1)-

requremnt) The ability of the SWysem to support long term cooling of the reactor or containment is assumed in evaluations of the equipment required for safe reactor shutdown presented in the USAR, Sections 9.2, 6.2.1, and Chapter 15, (Refs. 2, 4, and 5, respectively). These analyses include the evaluation of the long term primary containment response after a design basis LOCA. The SSW System provides cooling water for the RHR suppression pool cooling mode to limit suppression pool temperature and primary containment pressure following a LOCA. This ensures that the primary containment can perform its intended function of limiting the release of radioactive materials to the environment following a LOCA. The SSW System also provides cooling to other components assumed to function during a LOCA. Also, the ability to provide onsite emergency AC power is dependent on the ability of the SSW System to cool the DGs.

(continued)

RIVER BEND B 3.7-2 Revision No. 110

SSW System and UHS B 3.7.1 BASES APPLICABLE The safety analyses for long term containment cooling were performed, SAFETY ANALYSES as discussed in the USAR, Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 (Refs. 4 and 6, (continued) respectively), for a LOCA, concurrent with a loss of offsite power, and minimum available DG power. The worst case single failure affecting the performance of the SSW System is the failure of one of the two stnby

,DGs, which wouldi trn ffecQt one SSW sub~system. ffiuede o (SARsetn 9iTheSS ow assumed inmthe analysesis 5800 gpm per pump to the RHR heat exchanger (USAR, Table 6.2-2, Ref. 7). Reference 2 discusses SSW System performance during these conditions.

The SSW System, together with the UHS, satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO The OPERABILITY of subsystem A (Division 1) and subsystem B (Division 2) of the SSW System is required to ensure the effective operation of the RHR System in removing heat from the reactor, and the effective operation of other safety related equipment during a DBA or transient. Requiring both subsystems to be OPERABLE ensures that either subsystem A or B will be available to provide adequate capability to meet cooling requirements of the equipment required for safe shutdown in the event of a single failure.

A subsystem is considered OPERABLE when:

a. The associated pumps are OPERABLE; and

b. The associated piping, valves, instrumentation, and controls required to perform the safety related function are OPERABLE.

OPERABILITY of the UHS is based on a maximum water temperature of 88°F with a minimum basin water level at or above elevation 111 ft 10 inches mean sea level (equivalent to an indicated level of _>78%) and four OPERABLE cooling tower fan cells.

The isolation of the SSW System to components or systems may render those components or systems inoperable, but may not affect the OPERABILITY of the SSW System.

(continued)

RIVER BEND B 3.7-3 Revision No. 110

RBS USAR o -8 The increase in water chemistry concentration due to the absence of blowdown from the system has no effect on the operation of the UHS or the standby service water system during 30 days of operation. However, the system is operated with a controlled makeup if the normal plant makeup wells are operable following an accident.

8+*-

The makeup water required after 30 days of operation is a maximum oPrimary makeup water is provided by the normal plant makeup wells which are described in Section 9.2.3. Makeup to the basin is manually controlled to maintain the water level above el 111 ft 10 in which is the minimum basin operating level. Should the primary makeup water source become unavailable, this makeup can be supplied by any of the following alternate methods:

A hypochlorite feed system is provided to inhibit biological growth in the UHS water storage basin. This system consists of a 1,000-gal. feed tank, a metering pump, a recirculation pump, and a network of distribution piping to allow treatment of separate compartments within the basin from the surface to the bottom elevation. A programmable controller sequences the opening and closing of solenoid valves on each branch of the piping network for a set amount of time to allow an adequate chemical dosage in each zone. The recirculation pump is a self-priming type which draws from the basin water surface and provides a medium for injection of the chemical and adequate dispersion through the diffuser pipes. An alternate means of adding chemicals can be achieved by using the systems tank drain valve, direct addition to the basin will allow for dispersion of the chemical through out the basin.

Sodium hypochlorite or alternative biocides or corrosion inhibitors may periodically be added to the UHS basin as needed, based on sampling and analysis performed by the chemistry department.

84--

Revision 24 9.2-29

RBG-47432 Attachment 4 Description of Prior Analytical Deficiencies

River Bend Station - Unit 1 RBG-47432 Page 1 of 1 During the 2011 Component Design Basis Inspection at RBS, calculation PM-194 Rev.

8, "Standby Cooling Tower Performance and Evaporation Losses without Drywell Unit Coolers", (dated 7/21/2009) was reviewed. The calculation contains methodology for determination of pump heat added to the UHS basin by the following pumps: Standby Service Water Pumps "A" and "C," Residual Heat Removal Pump "A," High Pressure Core Spray Pump, and Low Pressure Core Spray Pump. An assumption in the calculation states that, "All horsepower input tothe various pump motors is assumed to be converted into heat and transferred to Standby Service Water". This assumption is inconsistent with the actual methodology for determining SSW pump heat addition which is based upon heat added due to pump inefficiency. The assumption is also inconsistent with the methodology for determining emergency core cooling (ECCS) pump heat addition based upon the energy equation. In addition, an assumption with respect to the negligible contribution of kinetic energy in turbulent flow (i.e. heat generated due to friction in the flowing fluid) was not documented in the calculation. These inconsistencies are not in compliance with the requirements of Entergy procedures governing engineering calculations".

The calculation deficiencies have no adverse impact on the operation of the standby service water pumps, ECCS pumps, or the Standby Cooling Tower. The pump heat is utilized in the calculation to quantify the evaporation losses to demonstrate that design and license requirements regarding UHS inventory for 30 days can be met. Subsequent correction of the deficiencies demonstrates that the calculation conclusions are not affected. The pending changes are indicated in Attachment 5.

RBG-47432 Attachment 5 Pending Design Basis Changes (16 pages)

ATTACHMENT 9.1 LBDCR FORM PAGE 4 OF 19 RBS. USAR.

9*. 2, 5.,2 Sys temn D*,sr.ption 0-4'i2;. o-*6

.The; EJHS at.: River, Bend Station consists of one, 200. percent Seismic Category I cooling tower: and one 1,00 ,percent capacity water Storage, basin,, The 'basin holds approximately '66,25,314 gal of

'usable water at the hnormal twatr.d 1evel, of. 113 ,.ft. 4 in. to the..

minimum: pump SUbmergence level of. '5 ft an i-n, wh:": ifs availabble.

to make up for drift and. evaporative losses: over 30 days of,

• operation. Major, component *design data:: are given in Table 9.2. 5.

1e2ý-e The: cooling tower is designed to nominally remove :37,9.5 x 106 Btu/hr- at ,a maximum service water flow of '33,'0,0,,0 gpm. Design' temperature for, ,cold water leaving the ',tower' is 9,316F,:F c~orrespondihg to a de~sign tower inlet:water temperature of 116,0F.

The designs ,,ambleieni. wet-bulb temperature of 8l*F was. based upon the maximum :mean: 'I,-day*wet bulb temperature of, :0:.:30 F recorded on

'July 27., 19,69.,

The maximum ,al*lowable :c6ld: 'water temperatur, is nominally '95OF',.

corresponding to.aluethe assumed for' evaluation, of the containment iheat removal,,systems (Section 6.2:.2).

Heat tra~nsfer to, standby service water is seen:. to occur immediately after*a, DB,,:, 'postulatled as -a large br'e'ak of a m'ain steam line (DBA-MSL) coincident- wiith a complete loss of offsite power. The loss of';off'site, power is assumed. to- laast for the full 3'0 day post shutdown period. :The single: failure of the

'Div-ision II. diesel. generator is postulated. to occur' immediately after. trip. 4tO5 The: :maximum heat Ltrans fer rate .to standby service water: is, calculated to oc-cu- .2 to -I hr :after station trip when heat reject:iOh,'t6 st.andby service water occurs; as. follows in the 'unit:.

Heat rejec~ion oi the *standby serv ice water system, by the: RHR.

heat 'exchanger, and conta inment unit cooler is postulated to begin 0.5: hr 'after the DBA. Calculation, of heat :rejection rates for the: period 0:5., hr. through 3. days', frbm the., RHR, heat exchanger, and containment. unit cooler. i's described in. :.eqcti'on, 16.2..I 'and sh6own graphi,,cal ooy Fig,4 ,6.2-159 and,, 6." 2-21. ..

,Heat rejection rates :for- the. period' 4 days: to .30 days. were determined as. follows. The RHR, heat, exchangers 4are, postulated to remove the" total quantit-y of core, decay heat produced during that'.

interval., Containment -unit, co*ler heat rejection rates during this 'interval are %approximatedby a' straight line continuation ,of, Fig,. 6.2-21.

Revision 23 9; 2-24 EN-LI-113 Rev. 9

ATTACHMENT 9.1 LBDCR FORM PAGE 5 OF 19 RBS USAR.

The. analfysis, ýfor- th'e decay heat input. from the reactor core- to

.the UHS is based upon; Branch Technical Positi.on ASB. 9'...2. A 10

.percent margin is added to.o. the fission product. heat: rate, to:. cover the unce'rtainty in nuclear properties for the. time interval :10' to. IP. sec;,.. Decay heat rates due: to fission products.nd. hea*y element.-, as well as combined decay heat ,ratesi. are tabulated i~n.

Table. 9 .2-4.

Total. integrated: decay he'at input:. 'to stkandby serviice :water from

.core: dpecay heat due to fission produCts, and heavy. elements is given. "n Table 9.-2-5 aned 'ehown pr Pig. ... .6.

The .integrated heat rejection from. the plant auxiliaries. is. given

in Table 9..2-6'. The plant auxiliaries heat input to the standby sebrvice 'water system. is presented. in Table 9:..2.-7. , ...... o--

Heat rejection. due to pump heat is ,given in Table 9.2-9, The tbt4l integrated decay heat inpu..tb toervi.e

-heStandby

.water from rea~ctor' core decay' 'heat,,-sensible.heat, pump.heat., and plant. au.xiliarie's. heat is: tabulated, in. Table. 9;2-l:0ý. The operating status f6r safeguardl equipment operating during. the

,30-da*y period 'is, listed 'in Table 9..2:-13,.

i->12 .,-46 92.11' 1.538 The "maximum :rate.: of heat: rejectiorf 'to st'indby\/;serv*ie water from

'all' 'sources 'as shown, in. Table 9,, 2-illi s-412. _X ix6a t/'

Band o.cu5.6 hrs .. af ter shutdown. This corresponds. to a maximumn

• :se Tho-rvice. water,

.~ti'r-.,u..-t supply temperat~ure'

• .*:roturo' of o:5C,*7nr of 4.

ozur ,tOF 1:..=

at -*,56 flow.

Cold and hot water temperatures are listed in Table :9.2-11.

Cold, Wdteiý temperatures exitineg, the" UHS. c01n to,#.4r. were cad.!a.,t.eed: using, the fo".w ing methods.

Cold water temperatures, were. 'determined: ýusing vendor-supplied tower:. performance curve.s which relat&' cold water temperature and.

ambient wet bulb, temperature for var~ying values of cooling: tower range, and constant .tower water flows..., The vendor has suppl.eid.

.ccurves for 50 percent, through 11i0percent at 10 percent intervals of. the design tower flow of *33,00'0' gpm. The vendor .curves are provided. as Figures 9..2-I9a through. 9..2-.9g., These curves are based on both the Cooling Tower Institute Test Code .ATC-105,ý "Ac.c*Ceptance Test: Code for NWatet Cooling Towe"rs and 'vendor's proprietary' data 'fbr :the ceramic: tile fill material.

Revision: 23 9.2-25 113 Rev. 9

ATTACHMENT 9.1 LBDCR FORM PAGE 6 OF 19 RBS USAR

.Heat rejiection rates- and 'service water: flow rates were determined at specific periods: of time; following shutdown. Tower cooling ranges were calculated using the relationship:

AT =(R

where-AT cooling -range ( 0 F)

O HR = Heat reje.tion rate (Btu/hr'),

Q 96Seviced waiter flow ý(-lbmf/hr) 0 p=Speci:fic ýheat 6f water. (Btui/lbm zF)

Cold water 'temperatures were then interpolated from the, performance cduraes'. Hot water temperatures were found from the following relationship:;

Hot Water Temp = Cooling: Range ÷, Cold Water Temp Val:ues of hot: water temperature calculated using, the above methods are. conservative, yielding results higher than expected actual temperaturesi. A: cooling tower ýoperating in a closed Jloop

.dissipates all the- heat rejected to it by' allowing hot water temp.erature's to: rise: 'or fall to an equilibrium point defined by

-the amount. of heat the ambient air -is capable of picking up. For conservatism, the analysis of cooling tower operation disregards the dampening effect the, large volume:of water stored in the basin has upon the system operating temperatures.

.During operation, somedport'iof of increasing: or decreasing plant heat' loads goes toward&raisincg the basin water's sensible heat, while the: remainder is discharged by the tower through forced

evaporation. As a result, cold -water temperatures tend to follow the changes in heat rejection rates., but :reach the calculated values only in the dihig term. The calculated Values of cold water temperatures, therefore, should be considered as conservative upper boundaries instead of actual temperatures..

e4.16; e414 *. 12 During' the tf irst 1 hr 'after shutdown, all of the heat rejected from :the statiorn is assumed to go, directly toward increasing the temperatureý of the Watet sPtored in the SCT basin; During thi's time, no: creit is taken for heat removal by natural evaporation from either, :the pool surface or i-n the tower fill. At shutdown.

there iosf f>-',tal

. .... of water in -the basin.

,42,.gal 6,431,346 . ..

spndig to.. . ..

toa el .. v t .... o ater level

6.: f =t. . Q ofi.. 111' ft ;10 in (this includes water to an eevation -of 65 :ft 0 in, which is: the minimum :pump submergence level). From Table 9.;=2-10, +/-=027 x TO Btus: are

.rejected to :service -water during the, first 1 hr., This w ill raise-the: av6erage 'temperature of the basin water b. -... F,. ....

1~.2+*- 14<(-e 16*.-.ý K824.1.x, 10A7 1.55 Revision 243": 9 62 - -2 6:. )

ATTACHMENT 9.1 LBDCR FORM PAGE 7 OF 19 RBS USAR 1.550o0r 89.550F.

,-->16 -14 .- >1*i2.. . . .. ."

The anticipAted nmaximum SCTT basdi. tempertature prior'. t shutdown is 88 0 F;, At: 1 hr after \.hutdown, the, average. basin. Water teimperature. would be 88.F 9+".F. .i .,7. The first 1 hr I represents all of the heat rejected to standby service water, which. raises the sensible heat of the basin. The cooling towerý fans may be started at 1 hr after shutdown with6ut affecdt'ing th.h ab'ility of the uiltimat4 heat. sink to. rmove plant heat.

The following estimated maximum losses occur for the UNSý:

Loss up to Total. LObss tfor:

24 hr 3.0 days

.(gal) (Cral)

Forced.

Evapor'aton: Natural Evap0ration ."86 X 102: 2'.3.59. xý 10 and Drift 3*.82 ......... :6

-e-&.4+x 1. o*  : .2. 7..ýa9

.... x 1I, PV LCS A*ir Compressor

..(cooling water not- 288. *8-'4-:'-"x

64. i04 reco*e'red.

• 4 .x 1 .0.2 8* . 4,° ..

386 . 6.380 Total: "#.recqp x 10o 6009.8 X.1,0" 6.38 which is 6.9419x0 106 gal of water lost.:.

ýForced evaporation was. c*!culated by the following rel~ationship:

i(LH) where:.

• Eaporation

,Ev  :(gal)

TH = Total integrated, heat (Btu)

LH =.Latent. heat of incoming. water (Btu/l:bm)

-P =:Density f. incoming water (lbm/ft'2 3)

C, Conversion factort of 74891 gal/ft2 Revidsion 23 9'.. 2:'2.7 .ev. 9

ATTACHMENT 9.1 LBDCR FORM PAGE 8 OF 19 RBS USAR air- 7 a fraction -

Evaporation calcu!*ed' by this equation is also consejrlative. As stated previously,, . .. . 2..

. .te . p........... 4f the: heat load forcedg0es to rai~sin'g the sentsible evaporation. is expected to r-.- he atbz:zz....

of th 7,03zr4;. 0 Adltualt...

e-e-'.theý calculated

. . ..* .. ...... ... value,

.. .... .... ..... b e le b les. than ss than The q uantity: ýof water, naturally: evaporated: from the surface of the UHS, storage basin' is minimal for' a semi-enclosed 'ba~sin such as this. For natural evaporation to occur,; the, vapor pressure of the ambient air must be lower than the vapor pressure of. the water. During UHS operation, the air near the: surface of the water is saturated at the temperature of the cold 'water leav.ing the fill fnat'eria." Correspondingly, the water surface temnperatu,'e is :at or below this temperature, thus inhibiting natural ev.aporation;

-12' *>

A. !net solar and. atmospheric heat load of, 6. 819x' 6§ Btu/day was assumed to be impressed upon the water surface through the 54- ft :x 54 ft center' plenum .and a corresponding evaporation rate to dissipate thils heat added into :'he total integrated evaporation and'drift values shown in Table 9.2-12. Sun heat load is based conservatively on solar radiation incident to a horizontal: surface at 300-45.' north latitude and assuming no cloud cover.

Maximum cooling tower drift .loss. is, assumed to be 0O.01 percent of the :standby service: wat.,6er flowt' rat6,, based upon data fu-drnished by the UHS supplier. Drift loss is a function of the, internal 'tower design: and is independent of ambient. conditions (e.g., wind speed:, temperature., humidity). Cooling towers of similari design were tested at Oak Ridge National Laboratory by, the Environmental Systems Company for the EPA. In. their report Development and Demonstration of Low-Level IDrift Ins trumentation,, :October 1971,,

average drift losses of 0,.005 percent were found.

tested: at Oak Ridge National Laboratory had two-pass The towers Wood slat drift. eliminators. The towers described herein: Utilize three-pass, close :space polyvinyl ichloride drift eliminators with lower air velocities Which :should be more efficient. Thus, basi n c~aa'city calculations:,, based upon 0,.001 'percent drift. loss',.

conservatively predict tpower drift loss*

9->14 9->6 The cooling tower storage facility: has a capacity' of approximat-!--, , at the minimum basin water level :of 6,431,346 L3* 10 in, (as mentioned earlier)', This excludesi the i:.6,4311346..- 4,.approximate 70,000 gallons, which represents the water from the minimum pump, submergence el. of 65 ft 0 in to the basin floor elevation of: 64 f t %6 in. During the first '30 days of operation following a DBA,,., x 10' gal pf water 'are lost due to- nin-hnn-returned, c' ' water Supply. to PVLCS,, 'evaporation and drift,. The: re ining -3, -8¶-gal of water are used as a design safety margin,..

6,<-i 12*-' 14<*-' ~ 4,O 6......

.6.3838 . "

NMM EN-LI-1 13 Rev. 9

ATTACHMENT 9.1 LBDCR FORM PAGE 9 OF 19 RBS USAR The, licensing basis, capacity determination, inventory losses, and design safety margln deSCribed previ'ously assumes, that 'the Division 2 diesel ,generator failed at the beginning of. the event.

If divi-sion: 2 does not fail as assumed, additional heat load would be placed on the UHS due to the second division, operating.,

In this case, the inventory of the UHS would be less than 30-days. (Note ýthat 30-days UHS inventory is: available to meet RG 1..27 requirements: based. on th&e licending basis capacity determination,) In addition, the, licensing basis capacity.

determination does not assume any: UHS or. Standby Service Water System leakage. The UHS design margin 7 gallons) and makeup sources are available to. address the *ditional heat load from D+/-ivisioh 2 and post. eVent system leakage.ý. Makeup quantities anid surces to the UHS are discussed beloW;.1 Operator actions would be. required for th-is ýevent to ensure adeU long term UHS

.inventory.:

49,000 Revfisin 23R 9.2:-28a EN-LI-1 13 Rev. 9

ATTACHMENT 9.1 LBDCR FORM PAGE 10 OF 19 RBS USAR

-- ý14 flnAY HF37 R(Y.T(WTOY AWN CONTATNMP.NTINT.TC.OOLE.R FF.AT TOh2, TO STAKDBY!SUVI::E WATER FO:.LCWING A L&BB~ FA:.AxN S3'SM Lflm.DBA-M*L I (HRA7 Rix-noval 'Ratp.e4 StufHr)

-.rtegr-l Beat T-mc..Atcr Timc (sCC) RIHR EVR Total -. p Adjuptcd .oa.d (STU)

Stuteown Ad** stnent Total 0.00 hr C.. OOE400. 0.000E400 0.0005E00 0.0005400 0.0004E000 0.0OOE400 0.000E400 10.0C rin 6.OOE02: 0.000E+60 0.0005.00 0.0004E+00 1.071E407 .- *071E+407 _79 4_ _E__&_

5.F5 hT 1 . s0P.F+03 7.960E207 -7.809E2.4. 7.952E+07 1.132E.07 ;5..-

07-. b.-t5 +54E-95 .6 I .r 3.60E+03 9.114E207 -1.996E+44 9.112E407 8.142E*06 8.297E507 9.M3 -0esE407- 6 1.5 hr 5.40E+03i 9.440E+07 -1.076E+04 9.459E+07 8.142E+06 8.645E+07 1.37 44:80+07

2 hr 1.20E+03 9.799E.07 6.315E,03 9.799E-07 8.142E-06 8.985E-07 1,7$ -4.40E807 2;5 hr 9.O0E+03; 1.011E+408 1.150E+04 1.011E+08 8.142E406 9.2941+07. 7

1 hr 1 ;08r.+04 1.033E+08 2.653X+04 1.034E+08 8:142E+06 9.522E+07 2.59 -4k742+07 4 hr 1.44E+04. 1.061E5,08 4.983E204 1.061.E08 8.142E-06 9.799E507 3.41 -0G46E,07 5 1r 1.80E+04 1.070E0,8 "6.911E+04 1.0715E08 8.142E+06 9:895E407 4.22 -&W847E-07

" hr 2..16E+04 1.070E+08 8.672E4+ 1:071E+08 8.142E406 9.892E507 5.(63 -9.94E507.

8 hr 2.88E-04. 1.054E+08 .1.045E+05 1.055E+08 8.142E+06 9.732E+07 666 -4.62E+o0- 7 10 hr 3.60Et04, 1.019E+08 1.000E+05 . 1.020E+08 8.142E+08 9.383E+07 8.29 . E+08- 7.

12 hIz 4.32E+04: 9.774E207 1.329E+05 9.787E507 8.142E2.6 8.973E507 9.5Je .IL83E+08- 7

16. hr 5.76L1+04. :1162407 1.310E+05 9.129E+07 8.142E+06 8.315E+07 1.32 -MA8E+08 20 .20E+04 hr 8.572E,07. 1-54E+05 .:8.587E207 .....142E400 7.773E507. 1..64<-.2.2uE108 24 hr S. 64E+04 8.088E507 .1.353E+05 8.102E-07 8.142E506 7.288E507 1.97 4.40E-08 2 d 1.73k;405: 6.5815E07 1.055E*05 6.592E+07 8.142E-06 5.777E+07 U.927-4 E+09- 8

3. d 2 .59E+05 5.749E-07 .9.215E404 5.759E-07 8.142E206 4,944E-07 5.8F 4,8;E_0% l 4 d 3.46E+05 5.195E407 a8.327E+04 5.204E407 8.142E-06 4,389E507 7.83 -4.400o- 8 5 d 4 .32E405 4.780E+07 .7.662E+04 4.708E507 8.142E406 3.974E207 9.79 4*4NE09 8 6 d 5.18E+05 4.4802E07 7.181E+04 :4.487E507 8.142E+06 3.673E407 1.17 34 iE-o9

7. d 6.05E+05 4.187E407 6.711E+04 .4194E+07 8.142E506 3.879E+07 1.37T a uE+o& 9 8 .d. 6.91E+05 3.984E207 6.3852E04 3.9905E07 8.142E-06 3.1765E07 1T.TF4-5065- '

9 d 7..78E+05 3.780E+40 6.059E+04 . 3;787E-07 8.142E406 2.972E407 1.75ii.ii~ 9,

10. d

• E. 64Et05 3.617E407 .5.798E+04 .3.623507 8.142E406 2.809E+07 1.96. 4 SE+O-15 d 1.30E+06 3.091E407 4.954E404 :3.090E07 8.142E206 2.282E507 2.93: am4E-20 d 1.!3E+06 2.709E507 :4342+044 2.7142+07 8.142E+06  !.899E507 3:91 999E+509 5 d 2.. 16F.+06 2.474+071 1 . 3.966E+04 . 2.478E+07 8.142EE06 1.664 4.

4.07 ,1 +o09

• %30: d 2.59I+06 2.36,0 2.636E+04 2.272E-07 &142E+06 1.458E+07 Z.V 44W+09

..1.440

.Revjsj3n 2 I -of 1 NMM EN-LI-113 Rev. 9

ATTACHMENT 9.1 LBDCR FORM PAGE II OF 19 RBS USAR.

TABLE 9.2-6 PLANT AUXILIARIES HEAT LOAD (BTU/hr) I INPUT TO STANDBY SERVICE WATER LEOLLOWING A DBA

" )12 12<:

• Component 0 - 30 min 30 min - 1 hr i hr - 2 hr 2 hr - Day 1 Day I- Day Day 10 - Day 10 30 SDG Jacket Wtr Cooler 'A' 2..203E+07 1.203E+07 1.203E+07 1.203E+07 1.203E÷07 1.203E+07 HPCS DG Jacket Cooler 8.580E+06 :8.5805+06 8.580E+06 8.580E+06 8.S5803+06 8.580E+06 Control Room Chillers 2..803E+06 . 2 803E+06 2. 803E506 .803E÷06, 2.803E+06 2.803E+06:

Fuel Pool .0 2.1o479E+07 1:301OE+O. 1.1399E+07.

Coolers: .0.60005+00 3sO6-:ýQgQ.-- 4-.-a!a4-O a946134;:~ ~4..44&8-e. 1-.4464&-O Aux Building Unit Coolers _ _Values typical ae ross all times.

HVR-UC2 *,.an.-

I ... 4-64&9+04

., 4-4&0&; . 61.66.6.*-

-r,. 8.789E+4.4 HVR -UC3 '8-V4 4 +4- * .".. 48;9- 09. "" 4-g&

a8& : 8-2 -Q 5.396E+05:

HVR-UC6 4-+ "" 4.073E405 41L73 HvA-UC7 &95 6. 4- .:64Gr4 4.4.E4,...& 4-,8.,*,3 .& 4 .A-&6IB..' 2.M4Et05 HVR- UC8 4-4&44&. 4:040+" 4' 6GO..4& 44&49+" 4.0&49+-4& 4 N- Or 2.424E+05.

5.576E+05.

164-.

E*RR*Pump 0.OE0* 0.0E0 Coble r 'A' 0.0009+00 -ie9-13r - ý1-.91e.9e4- 5.160B.-04 5.360R4.04 5.360E+04 PVLCS Air .1. 1200 1-.200 1.200 1.200.

.Co2 rsso* +/-*sE+05 "D2O'1E405 ~ -5.. E+05 .. 2 E+05 1 :1,-. E+0S 1 1.29 E+05 4 -

z' " RMS.RE15A .1.118E+05 1.118Et05:

rFVz-K"1.] tk pI .UUU..+UZ. 2.00OE4*02, NOTE: These heat rates assume a coincident loss of otfaite power.

."Fuel Pool Loads decrease from thevalue shown through the remafnlng time perIdddshown.

Revision 17 "1 of 1 NMM EN-LI-113 Rev. 9

ATTACHMENT 9.1 LBDCR FORM PAGE 12 OF 19 RE3S USAR Add this column TABLE 91,2-7 V: " .

.PLANT AUXILIARIES. HEAT INPUT TO STANDBY SERVICE WATA Time *SP*Heat Rejection Ra Time '(sec) qrý 1.40 0.0

'e--)16 'p-+14 *-->12 o0.o ifhr 7 0.5 -i8 x 1 O 2.620 1.320 4 ,4'x "-o:

1.0, 3 .6:x 1 o 4 16 9 2.629 2.630 44 4 X: 110 1.5 :53/4 4 :c 1Io 3 4 6 2.620'940 - x i10 2.0 7.2 :x 1 o 2.148 4- i6260 5.249 :r44 x: 160 2*. 5 9.0 'x 11of 2.122 -4.14 2.625 :7.629.9.6W. x 1'07

-3.0.

A3.0 *1-* 08 x 102.095 4,444 '9.9961.4,449 x 16-7.

1.0, 2.043; 4.360 1.469, 3,-5 x. 1o0 5.0 1.80ý x 10 ' 4 465-1.990'*.'1 .'90,- x i0 2,.1'6. X. lo 1938 4. a: 2.392:.2-.42() x Wo:

'8,. 0 2.88 x 0' 1.832 4: 160.-2 .so 3 x' 10p

.10.0 ,3.60: x lo 1.727 4 4-175' 4,g+gX 108.

12.0 4..32 x. 1o0 4 ' .1624-r 444. 5 354ý. q4! X-' 10" 5.76 x' 1.06 1.412 :4_44 6 ::6924,4.4 x 10'

20.:0 7::.20 x Io' 4 1o.3 4.q . 8.285:0 -464).t 1x s

ý24. 0 8.64, k ltO 1.301 4.4,-3 A4Q 9.856 n x! i0

• 1.236' .r9 4 1925 4..9 . X: 10' 2 days 1,.73: x' 10'10S'

'3 2:.59 x 1.265 9.. 9 2,82.2. . x: 0 4 .3.46: x, 10 "1.245M -999 3.7934,*4,3 x' 109

.-32': x 2226 -..

1o' 4.71994-4,44 X. 10' 5 %.18X? 1 ;a,4 1.0'207

.. 0 1 6,,. x9: 10' x' lo'p 10* 1.189. r

'7 6.05 x 8 6,1x .172:. Q 10* 7.472i 4 X 10'

9. :7.76: x. 10 1 8I.3824z x. 10' 10 :8.64 x 10 1.140~999 9.287ý9.,44@1 X: 10.,

.15 1.30" x 10 1.069 3.494 .3761-7. -*;40.4 X 10'ý 20 '1.. 73 x. 106: :1.010 g4y* 1.816a.A. x 10.10 25 2. 16, x i1.0 0.9 60 . 2.249-Q: 3. 1 6

30 2.59. x 10ý: o,917.sP g. .. .oa.4. K 1010.

12*-. 14*--, 16<--.

Revision 17' I of 1 NMM EN-LI-1 13 Rev. 9

ATTACHMENT 9.1 PAGER F3ORM1 PAGE 13 OF 19 RBS USARP TABLE 9.2-9 HEAT REJECTED BY OPERATING PUMPS FOLLOWING DBA Tiiie Heat Rejection 'Rate Infegrated T-ime (sec). (Btu/hr) :x 106 Heat* (Btu).

i-414 -412: 0.000 0.000.6 +/-6o 0.'0 hr I 14<-

0.5 1.8 1,0A 1.-1t.j &:z 5.56: 6 4q8x. l.op 1.0. 3.6 8.1-42: .9.63 107:

1.5: 5.-4 8.1-42 1.37 2.0. 7.2 io3 8.142 1.78 io7 8.142( 6-ag ~-s 2.18 i0 7 2,. 5: 9.0 1.08 i:63 .8.142 2.590 x 10 7 3.0O 1.*44: 8:142 421.5 3.41 4.22 107 5.0 .1.a80 8.8142 ile X..

6.0 2 6 10 4 .,.5.03 x 7 8:.0 2.88: 8.142 :6.66 io i10

.10, i0*:

10:.0 3.60 1i04 8.142. 8.29ý 1O8 12%.0 4.32 8.142- .9.92 1.04 1.32 x

16. 0 5.76 8.142 7.20 10, 8.142 1.64 6 A:;05 .1.08:

.24.0 8..-64 8.142 t197 108 108.*

i 0. a 2 daYs 1.733 8.142 &-9450 .3..92.

1:04 8.142 5.88 ýv$ x

". :2.59 4 1,61 7.83:

8.142 25 4-32 1.0 8.142. ,9.79'

.6 5.18, 8.142, 1.17 6.05 106 8.1 42 1.237 lo,

,8 6.:91 :1.56: 10' 65 8.142 9 7.76 8.142 -1.76: x 10 8.64 8.142 1.96 105 .:2.93 1.30 8.142 x 1o0 20 1.73 8;142.. :3.91 25 2.16 8.142, .4.89, .444.j.. x lo9 30 2.59 8.142, 5.86 I2<-,

Revision '21 1 of 1 NMM EN-LI-113 Rev. 9

ATTACHMENT 9.1 LBDCR FORM PAGE 14 OF 19 RBS USAR TABLE 9.2-10 TOTAL INTEGRATED HEAT INPUT TO

'STANDBY SERVICE WATER FROM RNR HEAT EXCHANGERS, CONTAINMENT UNIT COOLER, RUMPS, A-40 PTANT A:'XTTARITR.S TuLal IrtLooqraLed .HeaL,.BLio)

RHR Hicat Exchangcrs. and PKaft Total.

Timte (ec) Contfainmeht Unit Cooler Auxiliarie 9 Ihte~jted Neat

.-- i6

.-014 "-o12 :-"6 ,-8.687 J. 0 0.0 S10:'

3.5 hr 1.8 x lo0 .6.478*I.' 2.7* .z 10' 4.2 10' 14* 3.6 V*16'

/ . X 163 4.t64 x. 107 .9.0 xio-10 932 x 10' 47 'x 100

.1.a0 1.329 . 10 1.669 x 10' .8._W¶"-_1-' 2-394 x 108 24.0 8..64 x10d 2.o59 z.10  ::1664. x: 10. . .E 3.228 :x lop 7.037 x 10.. 8..197 x 100.51 7 1o' -26 2i.lo. x X 10"° 5 days 4:..32 x..101 10 s..:64*L.* 10 1:.102 .,1.636 9.445 2 2 10? 2.2 10'a 30 2.:59 x.10' 2.*:059 z 10'P 9 .-

x 100 .8 lj 10P 5..3.74 x 1 6" - 124<. :14< 1 "6< .

0.01 0.0 '0.0"

-s:56ox..0*6 1.320 x10^7 2-745,x 1I*7

• 9.630wx 106 2.630 x 10(]7 8.241 x 10*7 1.780 x 10A7 5.249 x 10A7 2.032x 10x8 1.970x 1008 9.856 x 10*A8 3.242x 109 9.790x 1008 4.719 x 10~9 1.274x 10A10 1.960x 10*9 9.287 x 10( 9 2.227 x 10010 5.860 xl A9 2.676 x 10*10 5.321, x 101.10 Revision 21. 1 of 1.

NMM EN-LI-113 Rev. 9

ATTACHMENT 9.1 LBDCR FORM PAGE 15 OF 19 RBS 'USAR TABLE 9,.2-11 STANDBY COOLING TOWER PERFORMANCE FOLLOKING A LARGE BREAK OF A MAIN 'STEAM LINE (DBA-MSL)

Forced Integrated

Heat Load Service. Water Evaporation Evaporation Cold. Water Hot"W rH Ti..e ( :Btu/hr) qe,) Flow (qpm) Rate (qpm) Jtal) Temp. (F) Te F) 0.5 h 03 4.5575.07 3980 0;000H+O0 0 N/A I hr .6. 3 . 1.239E+08 11800 0.0009.00 Nj 89.97' . 111.06 7.r" 05.. 1.3475+08 118"00 263.61 15,816 88.a6. 111.50 3 hr 1.088,04 11ý4100+08 11800 276.24 32,391 89. . 112.77 4 hr 1.440.04 1=4 .08 11800 284.00 49.431 .04 113.7.1 5 hr 1809,04 1.468E+ . 131800.. .287.78 66,697 89.16 114.15 8r 2.IM804 1.420.0 180 288.70 84,01 89.16 114.23 h2.4 ÷04 ... 4645.08 0Boo 287.01 I #461 89.06 113.99 i0 hr 36;.(;04 .1.439E+08 118 * .281.94 '332,294 88.99 113.48 I" hr 4.32E.04 1.41508 ' 274.53 3185,.238 88.71 .112..56 06ý hr. 5.168E÷4 .1.347E+08 .263.63 . 248.509 88.56 111.50 20 hr  ?.206E04 1.287E+08 11800 "4A08903 88.39 110.31 24 hr 8.648+04 11800 " 4.2360+08

1. .36t844 88.24 109.28 d 1.731?.0 1.1125.08. 11800 216.52 678,638 86.08 .105.01 3 1 2.595+05 9.9505+07 1100 193.20 956,966 85.38 102.32 4 d 3.40.05 9.256E+07 1 179.59 215.572 84.98 10D.74 S a 4.1205 8.771E+07  : 0loo 170.04 1 4 433 84.72 99.65 d 8.1880S

.413E+07; " 11800 162.99 1 695 1 " 84.44 98.76 7 a 6.c5i4.05 8.11556 11800 157.05 1"921 299 . 83.40 97.22 a d 6.918+05 7,&6E67 11800 .152.19 2, 140,446 96.86 9 d 7.789ý05 71'7.6635+07 11800 .148.22 2"353.888 8351. .96.56 t0 86.644L" 04,-'- 7.4800,07 11800 144.61 2 S62.127 83.3003

15. 1 i1ý. 06 .7'.1415÷07 9000. .138.46 3,S59.042 8380974 20 d .730+076 .687E07 9000 129.52 4,491,&01 83.40 9 2 25 2.16E+06 6.3760+07 9000 123.47 5,380.573 83.30 " .97 .54 a 2.592+06. 6.157E+07 .. 9000 . 1 19.14 8 ,354 16;2 8"3 . . "96.94 ..

6.-. 12.- 144- 264-TO BE UPDATED Replace with Table Ishown on next page...

Revision 23 I.of 1 NMM EN-LI-113 Rev. 9

ATTACHMENT 9.1 LBDCR FORM PAGE 16 OF 19 SCT Surf Total SW :Forced Evap,:Drift,. Integrated Heat Load Service Water Evaporation and Leaks Water Loss Cold Water Hot.Water Tirrm Time (sec) (Btulhr) Flow(gpm) Rate (gpm) (gpj). (gal) Temnp (LF) Temp (F) 0:5 hr 1.80E+03 1.027E+08 13210 199 . 3,87 3.273E+03 88.51 104.10 1 hr 3.60E+03 1..175E+08 13210 228 3.87 9 802E+03 89.55 107.40 2 hr 7.20E+03 1.463E+08 15370 285 4.08 2.414E+04 91.80 110.90 3 hr 1,08E+04 1;511E+08 15368 294 4.08 4.178E+04 92.00 111.80 4.hr 1.44E+04 1.533E+08 1 15365 299 4.08 5.982E+04 92.09 112.20 5 hr .1.80E+04 1.538E+08 15363 300 4.08 7,800E+04 92.10 112.20 6 hr 2.16E+04 1.532E+08 15361 298 4.08 9.620E+04 92.08 112.10 8.hr 2.88E+04 1.506E+08 15356 293 4.08 1.322E+05 92.00 111.70 10 hr 3.60E+04 1.460E+08 15352 284 4.08 1.673E+05 91.80 110.90 12 hr 432E+0-4 1;409E+08 15347 274 4.08 2.014E+05 91.60 110.00 16hr 5.768+04 1.322E+08 15338 257 4.08 2.660E+05 91.20 108.60 20 hr 7.20E+04 1.257E+08 15329 244 4.08 3.271E+05 91.00 107.50 24 hr 8.64E+04 1.208E+08 15319 235 4.08 3.855E+05 90.80 106.60 2d 1.73E+05 1.056E+08 15264 .204 4.07 7.073E+05 88.20 102.10 3d 2.59E+05 9.785E+07 15209 189. 407 9.980E+05 87.80 100.70 4d 3.46E+05 9.189E+07- 15154 178 4.06 1.268E+06 8750 99.70

.5d 4.32E+05 8.738E+07 15098 169 4.06 1.523E+06 87.20 98.90 6d 5.18E+05 8.405E+07 15043 162: 4.05 1.767E+06 87.10 98.30 7d 6:05E+05 8.090E+07 14988 156 4.04 2.003E+06 86.90 97.70

• 8d 6.918E+05 7.861E+07 14933 152 4.04 2.230E+06 86.80 97.30 9d 7.78E+05 7.639E+07 14878. 148 4.03 2.452E+06 86.60 97.00 10 d 8.64E+05 7.456E+07 14822 144 4.03 2667E+06 86.50 96.60 15d 1,30E+06 6.832E807 12061 132 3.75 3.687E+06 85.20 96.60 20 d 1:73E806 6.385E+07 11854 1231 3.73 4.633E+06 84.90 95.80 25 d 2.16E+06 6.096E+07 11658. 118 3.71 5.527E+06 84.70 95.20 30 d 2.59E+06 5.844E+07 11471 113 3.69 6.382E+06 84.60 94.80 NMM EN-LI-113 Rev. 9

ATTACHMENT 9.1 LBDCR FORM PAGE 17 OF 19 RLE 9.2-12 TOTAL NT*.ZRATED E"VAPO RATION AND DRIFT FOLLOWING. BA Inteqrated Forced Inteqrnted Inteqrated Integrated Hatural Total eFgrated

""(e Evacoration (gai Drift. gal) W:4 Lrakaga .(gall fEvapzratio- (gall L6 a 0.0 imr 0.0 " 0.0 :0.6 0.0.:

oý.*=

0* .6 a 10?' o.ý0 30' 16 4' 303 I'hour "3.6 x 10 0.0 71L 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 7.2 x 10'o 15,820 . .142 120 5 16,03~o

3. hours 1.08 z 10', 32,390 :213 18O 98 32,811 4: hours 1.44 x 10' 49,430 , 284 240 131 50s014 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> 1.80 x 10 .66,700 55 300 164 67,444

6. hours 2..216ir 10" 84 020 ' . 360 197 84,930 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> 2.88. 10' 118,.500 56 263 2480 119,698 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> 3.60 . 10' 152,300 .08 329 153,8a59 "12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 4:.32 z 10' 185,200 850 720 396 17.1.30 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> 5.76 . 10' 248,500 1133 524 251.055

.20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> 7.76 x 10 308,900 1416 651206* 312,.103 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> :8.64 10' 366,800 78740 78 370,699 2 days 1.73 . 10' 678,700 3488 2680 1572 686,4L9 3 days 2.59 . 10' 957,000 5098 4320 2357 968,673

4. days, 3.46 .10' 1,216,'0

• 6798 5760 3144 1.231.,204 5 days :4.32 -10' 1,461 8497 . 7200 931 1,,479,990 6 days 5.18 . 10'I.00 1, 10186 8.640 4178.2 7 days 6.05 i 10' .921,000 11896 " 10080 5500 1,948,708 8:.day 6.81. x 10' 2,141,000 13585. 11520 6286 2,1171,.781 9 days 7.76 a 2,354,000 15295 . L 2960 7077 :2,389.149:

10 days 8.64 10' 2,562,000 16994 W,1 14400 7863 .2,601,313 15 days 1 . 10' 3,559,000 23473 '~21600 11797 615,841 20 'days .73 10' 4,492,000 29954 *. 2880015701 C ,012 2

5."a 2.16 a 10' 5,381,000 35433 36000 19662 56,4472, 6 30 a* 2.59 z 10' 6,239,000 42912 43200 23594 6i347,98 Note: Information added to Table 9,2-I.l Revision 21 1. of 1 NMM EN-LI-1 13 Rev. 9

a

-h 0

ca Figure 9.2-16 z TOTAL INTEGRATED RHR HEX This Figure has AND CONTAINMENT UNIT COOLER been deleted. HEAT INPUT TO SSW FOLLOWING LOCA m Refer to Table 9.2-5 z

r-I-

RIVER BEND STATION UPDATED SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT REVISION 14 SEPTEMBER 2001

ATTACHMENT 9.1 PAGER F9ORM1 PAGE 19 OF 19 RIVER BEND STATION UPDATED. SAFETY ANALYSIS:REPORT REVISION 15 MAY20.02 NMM EN-LI-113 Rev. 9