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MONTHYEARML20148K1811997-06-13013 June 1997 Forwards Results of Review of 951025 Submittal Re UHS for ANO-1.Meeting Requested to Discuss Concerns & to Understand Why Licensee Consider That UHS Operability & EQ Requirements Are Satisfied.Info Submitted Are Accurate & Complete Project stage: Meeting 1997-06-13
[Table View] |
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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEAR1CAN109906, Forwards Framatome Technologies,Inc non-proprietary TR BAW-10235P, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheet of Once-Through Sgs, Rev 11999-10-19019 October 1999 Forwards Framatome Technologies,Inc non-proprietary TR BAW-10235P, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheet of Once-Through Sgs, Rev 1 ML20217J4971999-10-18018 October 1999 Requests Addl Info Re Results of Util Most Recent Steam Generator Insp at ANO-2 & Util Methodology Used to Predict Future Performance of SG Tubes ML20217J3871999-10-15015 October 1999 Informs That Topical Rept BAW-10235P, Management Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through SG, Rev 0 Marked as Proprietary Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure 2CAN109902, Submits Withdrawal of Code Case N-593 for ANO-2 Replacement SGs1999-10-15015 October 1999 Submits Withdrawal of Code Case N-593 for ANO-2 Replacement SGs ML20217J3601999-10-15015 October 1999 Informs That Topical Rept BAW-10235P, Management Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Integranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through SG, Rev 1 Marked as Proprietary Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure 2CAN109903, Forwards Response to RAI Re Proposed Tech Specs Change for Special SG Insp1999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards Response to RAI Re Proposed Tech Specs Change for Special SG Insp ML20217D1721999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards RAI Re 990729 Request for Amend to TSs Allowing Special SG Insp for Plant,Unit 2.Questions Re Proposed Insp Scope for Axial Cracking Degradation in Eggcrate Support Region Submitted.Response Requested by 991015 1CAN109905, Discusses Insp of Once Through SG Tubing Surveillance Performed During 1R15 Scheduled RFO on 990910.Category C-3 Results,Included1999-10-0404 October 1999 Discusses Insp of Once Through SG Tubing Surveillance Performed During 1R15 Scheduled RFO on 990910.Category C-3 Results,Included ML20212L0621999-10-0101 October 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation & Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR50,App R,Section III.G.2, Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability 1CAN099908, Withdraws 990919 Exigent TS Change Request to Allow Continued Installation of re-rolls for One Cycle of Operation Through End of Cycle 16 in Conjunction with Addl Insp Criteria1999-09-30030 September 1999 Withdraws 990919 Exigent TS Change Request to Allow Continued Installation of re-rolls for One Cycle of Operation Through End of Cycle 16 in Conjunction with Addl Insp Criteria 2CAN099902, Requests That NRC Assign CENPD-132,Suppl 4-P, Calculative Methods for Abb Cenp Large Break LOCA Evaluation Model, Review Priority So That Approval Will Be Granted No Later than Oct 31,20001999-09-29029 September 1999 Requests That NRC Assign CENPD-132,Suppl 4-P, Calculative Methods for Abb Cenp Large Break LOCA Evaluation Model, Review Priority So That Approval Will Be Granted No Later than Oct 31,2000 1CAN099903, Forwards Rev 0 to COLR for ANO-1 Cycle 16, IAW TS 6.12.31999-09-27027 September 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to COLR for ANO-1 Cycle 16, IAW TS 6.12.3 1CAN099907, Requests That Alternative Be Allowed in Accordance with 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) & (II) as Discussed in Encl 1.Encl 2 & 3 Stress Analysis & Flaw Evaluation Summaries Ref in Encl Alternative1999-09-26026 September 1999 Requests That Alternative Be Allowed in Accordance with 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) & (II) as Discussed in Encl 1.Encl 2 & 3 Stress Analysis & Flaw Evaluation Summaries Ref in Encl Alternative 1CAN099906, Forwards 1R15 Growth Data Obtained & Analyzed Through 990922 & Includes Plus Point Voltages,Axial Extent & Circumferential Extent Patches,As Well as Preliminary Growth Conclusions Based on Analysis of Data1999-09-24024 September 1999 Forwards 1R15 Growth Data Obtained & Analyzed Through 990922 & Includes Plus Point Voltages,Axial Extent & Circumferential Extent Patches,As Well as Preliminary Growth Conclusions Based on Analysis of Data 2CAN099901, Informs That G Kendrick,License SOP-43658,no Longer Has Need to Maintain Operating License on Ano,Unit 2.Entergy Requests That License for Individual Be Withdrawn,Due to Resignation, Effective 9908271999-09-24024 September 1999 Informs That G Kendrick,License SOP-43658,no Longer Has Need to Maintain Operating License on Ano,Unit 2.Entergy Requests That License for Individual Be Withdrawn,Due to Resignation, Effective 990827 2CAN099904, Forwards Ano,Unit 2 10CFR50.59 Rept for Time Period Ending 990225.Rept Contains Brief Description of Changes in Procedures & in Facility as Described in Sar,Tests & Experiments Conducted & Other Changes to SAR1999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards Ano,Unit 2 10CFR50.59 Rept for Time Period Ending 990225.Rept Contains Brief Description of Changes in Procedures & in Facility as Described in Sar,Tests & Experiments Conducted & Other Changes to SAR ML20212F5031999-09-22022 September 1999 Forwards SER Granting Relief Requests 1-98-001 & 1-98-002 Which Would Require Design Mods to Comply with Code Requirements,Which Would Impose Significant Burden Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(i) 1CAN099905, Submits Supplemental Info in Support of SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria.Proposed TS Rev & Info Related to Use of Alternate Repair Discussed in Attachments1999-09-17017 September 1999 Submits Supplemental Info in Support of SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria.Proposed TS Rev & Info Related to Use of Alternate Repair Discussed in Attachments ML20212D9961999-09-16016 September 1999 Informs That on 990818,NRC Completed Midcycle PPR of Arkansas Nuclear One.Nrc Plan to Conduct Core Insps at Facility Over Next 7 Months.Details of Insp Plan Through March 2000 Encl 1CAN099902, Forwards Proprietary Rev 1 to Topical Rept BAW-10235P, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through Sgs, in Response to 990831 Rai.Proprietary Encl Withheld1999-09-15015 September 1999 Forwards Proprietary Rev 1 to Topical Rept BAW-10235P, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through Sgs, in Response to 990831 Rai.Proprietary Encl Withheld 2CAN099905, Informs That Jk Caery,License OP-42589 & as Bates,License OP-42506,no Longer Need to Maintain Operating License at Ano,Unit 2.Withdrawal of Licenses Is Requested1999-09-0909 September 1999 Informs That Jk Caery,License OP-42589 & as Bates,License OP-42506,no Longer Need to Maintain Operating License at Ano,Unit 2.Withdrawal of Licenses Is Requested 1CAN099901, Forwards Responses to 990831 RAI Containing follow-up Questions Discussed on 990823-26,in Support of SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria. Revs to Proposed TSs Included in Attachments1999-09-0707 September 1999 Forwards Responses to 990831 RAI Containing follow-up Questions Discussed on 990823-26,in Support of SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria. Revs to Proposed TSs Included in Attachments ML20211P4121999-09-0707 September 1999 Requests NRC Staff Review & Approval of Integrated Nuclear Security Plan (Insp) & Integrated Security Training & Qualification Plan (Ist&Q), for Use by All Entergy Operations,Inc.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(d) 0CAN099906, Forwards Comments on Ano,Units 1 & 2 Specific Reactor Vessel Info Contained in Rvid,Version 2,in Response to NRC 990708 & 0715 Ltrs1999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Comments on Ano,Units 1 & 2 Specific Reactor Vessel Info Contained in Rvid,Version 2,in Response to NRC 990708 & 0715 Ltrs ML20211L4901999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313/99-12 & 50-368/99-12 on 990711- 0821.No Violations Noted ML20211J2351999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria for Plant, Unit 1 ML20211E6161999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards Amend 15 to ANO Unit 2,USAR,per 10CFR50.71(e) & 10CFR50.4(b)(6).Summary of 10CFR50.59 Evaluations Associated with Amend 15 of ANO Unit 2 SAR Will Be Provided Under Separate Cover Ltr with 30 Days 0CAN089905, Forwards Arkansas Nuclear One Units 1 & 2 FFD Program Performance Data for Period Jan-June 19991999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards Arkansas Nuclear One Units 1 & 2 FFD Program Performance Data for Period Jan-June 1999 ML20211F4181999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Licensee 980603 & 990517 Requests for Approval of risk-informed Alternative to 1992 Edition of ASME BPV Code Section Xi,Insp Requirements for Class 1, Category B-J Piping Welds ML20211G0731999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Applications for Renewal of Operating License for Kw Canitz & Aj South.Without Encls 1CAN089904, Forwards Addl Info in Support of SG Tube End Cracking Alternate Repair Criteria,In Response to NRC 990728 Rai. Proposed TS Changes Encl1999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Addl Info in Support of SG Tube End Cracking Alternate Repair Criteria,In Response to NRC 990728 Rai. Proposed TS Changes Encl ML20211C5101999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Certified Copies of Liability Insurance Policy Endorsements Issued in First Half of 1999 for Each Entergy Operations,Inc Nuclear Unit,Per 10CFR140.15 ML20211A9501999-08-12012 August 1999 Discusses 990720-21 Workshop Conducted in Region IV Ofc,Re Exchange of Info in Area of Use of Risk Insights in Regulatory Activities.List of Attendees,Summary of Topic & Issues,Agenda & Copies of Handouts Encl 0CAN089903, Submits Addl Response to NRC Second RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Gate Valves1999-08-12012 August 1999 Submits Addl Response to NRC Second RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Gate Valves IR 05000368/19990111999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313//99-11 & 50-368/99-11 on 990719-23.No Violations Noted.Insp Focused on Review of Licensed Operator Requalification Program & Observation of Requalification Exam Activities at Unit 1 2CAN089901, Forwards Description of Planned Scope & Expansion Criteria for Special SG Tube Insp,In Support of Proposed ANO-2 TS Amend for 2P99 Special SG Insp Submitted on 9907291999-08-0606 August 1999 Forwards Description of Planned Scope & Expansion Criteria for Special SG Tube Insp,In Support of Proposed ANO-2 TS Amend for 2P99 Special SG Insp Submitted on 990729 1CAN089902, Requests NRC Input on Encl Proposed Draft Format for ANO-1 License Renewal Application,Which Will Provide Option to Continue Operating Plant for Addl Twenty Years Beyond End of Current Operating License1999-08-0505 August 1999 Requests NRC Input on Encl Proposed Draft Format for ANO-1 License Renewal Application,Which Will Provide Option to Continue Operating Plant for Addl Twenty Years Beyond End of Current Operating License 2CAN089902, Informs That Tl Russell,License SOP-43587-1 & Jk Fancher, License OP-42300-1,no Longer Have Need to Maintain Operating License at ANO-2.Withdrawal of Licenses Requested1999-08-0404 August 1999 Informs That Tl Russell,License SOP-43587-1 & Jk Fancher, License OP-42300-1,no Longer Have Need to Maintain Operating License at ANO-2.Withdrawal of Licenses Requested ML20210L1461999-08-0303 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006.Requests Submittal of Ltr Identifying Individuals Taking Exam,Personnel Allowed Access to Exams & Mailing Address for Exams 0CAN089902, Submits 60 Day Response to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear Grade Activated Charcoal. Proposed Actions That Will Be Taken on ANO Unit 1 RB Purge Filtration Sys & Unit 2 Containment Purge & Exhaust Sys,Clarified1999-08-0202 August 1999 Submits 60 Day Response to GL 99-02, Laboratory Testing of Nuclear Grade Activated Charcoal. Proposed Actions That Will Be Taken on ANO Unit 1 RB Purge Filtration Sys & Unit 2 Containment Purge & Exhaust Sys,Clarified 0CAN089901, Forwards Info Re Estimate of licensee-originated Licensing Actions for ANO-1 & ANO-2,in Response to Administrative Ltr 99-02,dtd 9906031999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards Info Re Estimate of licensee-originated Licensing Actions for ANO-1 & ANO-2,in Response to Administrative Ltr 99-02,dtd 990603 ML20210L3581999-07-29029 July 1999 Ltr Contract,Task Order 43, Arkansas Nuclear One Safety System Engineering Insp (Ssei), Under Contract NRC-03-98-021 1CAN079903, Forwards non-proprietary Addendum to Rev 0 of Topical Rept BAW-2346P,in Support of Proposed TS Changes Revising SG Tubing Surveillance Requirements to Provide Alternate Repair Criteria for Tube End Cracks1999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards non-proprietary Addendum to Rev 0 of Topical Rept BAW-2346P,in Support of Proposed TS Changes Revising SG Tubing Surveillance Requirements to Provide Alternate Repair Criteria for Tube End Cracks ML20216D8131999-07-28028 July 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re SG Tube End Cracking Alternate Repair Criteria for Plant,Unit 1 ML20216D3561999-07-23023 July 1999 Discusses non-cited Violation Identified in Insp Rept 50-313/98-21,involving Failure to Have Acceptable Alternative Shutdown Capability for ANO-1 ML20210C2191999-07-21021 July 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313/99-08 & 50-368/99-08 on 990530-0710 at Arkansas Nuclear One,Units 1 & 2,reactor Facility.No Violations Noted.Conduct of Activities at Plant Generally Characterized by safety-conscious Operations ML20209H5251999-07-15015 July 1999 Informs That as Result of NRC Review of Licensee 980701 & 990311 Responses to GL 92-01,rev 1 & Suppl 1 & Suppl 1 RAI, Staff Revised Info in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database & Releasing Database as Rvid Version 2 1CAN079901, Forwards Proposed Changes to Current Util 990409 Submittal Re Rev to RB Structural Integrity Requirements Contained in Plant Ts.Proposed Revs Affect ACs & Applicable Bases Re ISI Reporting for Containment Structures,Tendons & Anchorages1999-07-14014 July 1999 Forwards Proposed Changes to Current Util 990409 Submittal Re Rev to RB Structural Integrity Requirements Contained in Plant Ts.Proposed Revs Affect ACs & Applicable Bases Re ISI Reporting for Containment Structures,Tendons & Anchorages 0CAN079902, Responds to NRC Telcon RAI Re Proposed Administrative Controls TS Changes.Revised TS Pages Which Replaces Pages Previously Provided in 981124 Submittal,Encl1999-07-14014 July 1999 Responds to NRC Telcon RAI Re Proposed Administrative Controls TS Changes.Revised TS Pages Which Replaces Pages Previously Provided in 981124 Submittal,Encl ML20209E5551999-07-0808 July 1999 Informs That as Result of NRC Review of Util Responses to GL 92-01,rev 1,suppl 1,staff Revised Info in Rv Integrity Database & Releasing Database as Rvid Version 2 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20217J4971999-10-18018 October 1999 Requests Addl Info Re Results of Util Most Recent Steam Generator Insp at ANO-2 & Util Methodology Used to Predict Future Performance of SG Tubes ML20217J3871999-10-15015 October 1999 Informs That Topical Rept BAW-10235P, Management Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through SG, Rev 0 Marked as Proprietary Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure ML20217J3601999-10-15015 October 1999 Informs That Topical Rept BAW-10235P, Management Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Integranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through SG, Rev 1 Marked as Proprietary Will Be Withheld from Public Disclosure ML20217D1721999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards RAI Re 990729 Request for Amend to TSs Allowing Special SG Insp for Plant,Unit 2.Questions Re Proposed Insp Scope for Axial Cracking Degradation in Eggcrate Support Region Submitted.Response Requested by 991015 ML20212L0621999-10-0101 October 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation & Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR50,App R,Section III.G.2, Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability ML20212F5031999-09-22022 September 1999 Forwards SER Granting Relief Requests 1-98-001 & 1-98-002 Which Would Require Design Mods to Comply with Code Requirements,Which Would Impose Significant Burden Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(i) ML20212D9961999-09-16016 September 1999 Informs That on 990818,NRC Completed Midcycle PPR of Arkansas Nuclear One.Nrc Plan to Conduct Core Insps at Facility Over Next 7 Months.Details of Insp Plan Through March 2000 Encl ML20211L4901999-09-0101 September 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313/99-12 & 50-368/99-12 on 990711- 0821.No Violations Noted ML20211J2351999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re SG Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack Alternate Repair Criteria for Plant, Unit 1 ML20211F4181999-08-25025 August 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Licensee 980603 & 990517 Requests for Approval of risk-informed Alternative to 1992 Edition of ASME BPV Code Section Xi,Insp Requirements for Class 1, Category B-J Piping Welds IR 05000368/19990111999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313//99-11 & 50-368/99-11 on 990719-23.No Violations Noted.Insp Focused on Review of Licensed Operator Requalification Program & Observation of Requalification Exam Activities at Unit 1 ML20211A9501999-08-12012 August 1999 Discusses 990720-21 Workshop Conducted in Region IV Ofc,Re Exchange of Info in Area of Use of Risk Insights in Regulatory Activities.List of Attendees,Summary of Topic & Issues,Agenda & Copies of Handouts Encl ML20210L1461999-08-0303 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006.Requests Submittal of Ltr Identifying Individuals Taking Exam,Personnel Allowed Access to Exams & Mailing Address for Exams ML20210L3581999-07-29029 July 1999 Ltr Contract,Task Order 43, Arkansas Nuclear One Safety System Engineering Insp (Ssei), Under Contract NRC-03-98-021 ML20216D8131999-07-28028 July 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re SG Tube End Cracking Alternate Repair Criteria for Plant,Unit 1 ML20210C2191999-07-21021 July 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313/99-08 & 50-368/99-08 on 990530-0710 at Arkansas Nuclear One,Units 1 & 2,reactor Facility.No Violations Noted.Conduct of Activities at Plant Generally Characterized by safety-conscious Operations ML20209H5251999-07-15015 July 1999 Informs That as Result of NRC Review of Licensee 980701 & 990311 Responses to GL 92-01,rev 1 & Suppl 1 & Suppl 1 RAI, Staff Revised Info in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database & Releasing Database as Rvid Version 2 ML20209E5551999-07-0808 July 1999 Informs That as Result of NRC Review of Util Responses to GL 92-01,rev 1,suppl 1,staff Revised Info in Rv Integrity Database & Releasing Database as Rvid Version 2 ML20209D8521999-07-0707 July 1999 Responds to Util 990706 Request That NRC Exercise Discretion Not to Enforce Compliance with Actions Required by TS 3.7.2, Auxiliary Electrical Sys. NOED Warranted & Approval Granted for Extension of Allowed Outage Time to 14 Days ML20209A8561999-06-25025 June 1999 Refers to Investigation Rept A4-1998-042 Re Potential Falsification of Training Record by Senior Licensed Operator at Arkansas Nuclear One Facility.Nrc Concluded That Training Attendance Record Falsified IR 05000313/19990071999-06-21021 June 1999 Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-313/99-07 & 50-368/99-07 Issued on 990514.Adequacy of Min Staffing Levels May Be Reviewed During Future Insps ML20196D4241999-06-21021 June 1999 Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp of License SOP-43716 Issued on 990325.Believes That NRC Concerns Have Been Adequately Addressed at Present ML20207H3551999-06-10010 June 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313/99-05 & 50-368/99-05 on 990411-0529.No Violations Noted ML20195G3481999-06-0909 June 1999 Ack Receipt of ,Transmitting Changes to Facility Emergency Plan,Rev 25,under Provisions of 10CFR50,App E, Section V IR 05000313/19993011999-06-0909 June 1999 Discusses Arrangements for Administration of Licensing Exam During Wk of 991213,per Telcon of 990602.As Agreed,Exams Repts 50-313/99-301 & 50-368/99-301 Will Be Prepared Based on Guidelines in Rev 8 of NUREG-1021 ML20195F1631999-06-0808 June 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313/99-06 & 50-368/99-06 on 990524-28.Violation Identified & Being Treated as Noncited Violation ML20207G3111999-06-0707 June 1999 Ack Receipt of Changes to ANO EP Implementing Prcoedure 1903.010,Emergency Action Level Classification,Rev 34 PC-2, Received on 981218,under 10CFR50,App E,Section V Provisions. No Violations Identified ML20207G7951999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards Notice of Violation Re Investigation Rept A4-1998-042 Re Apparent Violation Involving Initialing Record to Indicate Attendance at Required Reactor Simulator Training Session Not Attended ML20207E7131999-06-0202 June 1999 Discusses EOI 990401 Request for Alternative to Requirements of Iwl for Arkansas Nuclear One,Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(B) & ASME BPV Code Section XI & Forwards Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Alternative ML20207B9521999-05-26026 May 1999 Discusses GL 98-04, Potential for Degradation of ECCS & CSS After LOCA Because of Const & Protective Coating Deficiencies & Foreign Matl in Containment. Staff Will Conduct Limited Survey in to Identify Sampling ML20207B4171999-05-24024 May 1999 Forwards Corrected Cover Ltr to Insp Repts 50-313/99-07 & 50-368/99-07 Issued 990514 with Incorrect Insp Closing Date ML20207A7771999-05-24024 May 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313/98-21 & 50-368/98-21 on 981116-990406.One Violation of NRC Requirements Occurred & Being Treated as Noncited Violation,Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20206U4541999-05-17017 May 1999 Discusses Util & Suppl Re Changes to License NPF-06,App a TSs Bases Section.Staff Offers No Objection to These Bases Changes.Affected Bases Pages,B 202, B 2-4,B 2-7,B 3/4 2-1,B 3/4 2-3 & B 3/4 6-4,encl ML20206S4721999-05-14014 May 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313/99-07 & 50-368/99-07 on 990426- 30.No Violations Noted.However,Nrc Requests That Util Provide Evaluation of Licensee Provisions to Maintain Adequate Level of Response Force Personnel on-site ML20207B4271999-05-14014 May 1999 Corrected Ltr Forwarding Insp Repts 50-313/99-07 & 50-368/99-07 on 990426-30.No Violations Noted.Areas Examined During Insp Included Portions of Physical Security Program ML20206R4741999-05-13013 May 1999 Informs That Staff Reviewed Draft Operation Insp Rept for Farley Nuclear Station Cooling Water Pond Dam & Concurs with FERC Findings.Any Significant Changes Made Prior to Issuance of Final Rept Should Be Discussed with NRC ML20206N7011999-05-12012 May 1999 Informs That NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Reorganized Effective 990328.As Part of Reorganization, Division of Licensing Project Management Created ML20206M7581999-05-11011 May 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Relief Request from ASME Code Section XI Requirements for Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20206S1761999-05-11011 May 1999 Responds to Informing of Changes in Medical Condition & Recommending License Restriction for Senior Reactor Operator.No Change Was Determined in Current License Conditions for Individual ML20206N4161999-05-11011 May 1999 Discusses Completion of Licensing Action for GL 96-01, Testing of Safety-related Logic Circuits, for Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20206S4211999-05-10010 May 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313/99-04 & 50-368/99-04 on 990228- 0410.Four Violations of NRC Requirements Identified & Being Treated as Noncited Violations Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20206H1031999-05-0606 May 1999 Forwards Results of Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam, Administered on 990407,to Nominated Employees of Facility. Requests That Training Dept Forward Individual Answer Sheet & Results to Appropriate Individuals.Without Encl ML20206F0611999-04-29029 April 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Licensee Re ISI Plan for Third 10-year Interval & Associated Requests for Alternatives for Plant,Unit 1 ML20205R6331999-04-20020 April 1999 Ack Receipt of Which Transmitted Rev 39 to ANO Industrial Security Plan,Submitted Under Provisions of 10CFR50.54(p).No NRC Approval Is Required,Since Util Determined Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan ML20205P4641999-04-15015 April 1999 Forwards for Review & Comment Draft Info Notice That Describes Unanticipated Reactor Water Draindown at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Unit 2,Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 & Ja Fitzpatrick NPP ML20205N7251999-04-13013 April 1999 Forwards Summary of 990408 Meeting with EOI in Jackson, Mississippi Re EOI Annual Performance Assessment of Facilities & Other Issues of Mutual Interest.List of Meeting Attendees & Licensee Presentation Slides Encl ML20205M6881999-04-12012 April 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation on Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Request Relief 96-005 ML20205L7711999-04-0909 April 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-313/99-03 & 50-368/99-03 on 990202- 17.No Violations Noted ML20205K7681999-04-0606 April 1999 Forwards RAI Re risk-informed Alternative to Certain Requirements of ASME Code 11,table IWB-2500-1 ML20205G8871999-04-0202 April 1999 Forwards RAI Re GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Movs, for Plant, Units 1 & 2.Response Requested within 60 Days of Date of Ltr 1999-09-22
[Table view] |
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Mr. C. Randy Hutchinson Juna 13, 1997 Vice President, Operations ANO
. Entergy Operations, Inc. I 1448 S. R. 333 l Russellville, AR 72801
SUBJECT:
ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNIT 1 (ANO-1) ULTIMATE HEAT SINK FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN AND ACCIDENT HITIGATION (TAC NO. M94948) l
Dear Mr. Hutchinson:
1
~
As discussed in our letter to you dated October 25, 1995, the Nuclear l Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has questioned the accuracy of information
- that has been submitted concerning the ultimate heat sink (VHS) for ANO-1. We l have completed our review of your response to our request for additional information dated February 23, 1996, as well as a review of various supplements and amendments to the license application for ANO-1, our Safety l Evaluation Report (SER) dated June 6, 1973, ANO-1 Technical Specification l
requirements for the UHS, and your initial submittal of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report dated July 15, 1982. The results of our review are
- included as an enclosure to this letter.
i You stated that the Dardanelle Reservoir is the UHS for ANO-1 for mitigation l of the design-basis loss of coolant accident. This assertion seems to be predicated on information that was provided in Table 9-9.2.3 submitted with I Amendment No. 22 to the license application for ANO-1 dated December 14, 1971, I and does not take into consideration the preponderance of information that exists on this issue. We have found that the information in Table 9-9.2.3 is inconsistent with the information that was submitted relative to the VHS and service water system during the licensing of AN0-1.
The NRC staff would like to meet with you to discuss our concerns and to l understand why you consider that UHS operability and EQ requirements are !
l satisfied and information submitted to the NRC is complete and accurate. i Please coordinate a suitable, near term, date to meet with the staff to discuss this matter.
Sincerely, l ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:
l George Kalman, Senior Project Manager Division of Reactor Projects III/IV l Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-313 i
' i
Enclosure:
NRC Review cc w/ encl: See next page DISTRIBUTION:
l Docket File PUBLIC PD4-1 r/f GKalman l JRoe EAdensam (EGAl) CHawes WBeckner l OGC ACRS TGwynn, RIV JTatum Document Name: AR194948.LTR See )revious concurrence
- OFC PH/PD4-1 LA/PD4-1 PD4-1 36 W
NAME GKalman/vw CHawes* WBeckner DATE C /O /97 6/11/97 b/ \S /97 COPY YES/NO YES/NO YES/NO OFFICIAL RECORD COPY % d],*, b . . a 9706170374 970613 l PDR ADOCK 05000313 t
p PDR
a . p arc e 4 UNITED STATES j
j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20666-0001
%*****/ June 13, 1997 Mr. C. Randy Hutchinson Vice President, Operations AN0 Entergy Operations, Inc.
1448 S. R. 333
- Russellville, AR 72801
SUBJECT:
ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNIT I (ANO-1) ULTIMATE HEAT SINK FOR SAFE {
SHUTDOWN AND ACCIDENT MITIGATION (TAC N0. M94948)
Dear Mr. Hutchinson:
i As discussed in our letter to you dated October 25, 1995, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has questioned the accuracy of information that has been submitted concerning the ultimate heat sink (VHS) for ANO-1. We 3 have completed our review of your response to our request for additional information dated February 23, 1996, as well as a review of various supplements and amendments to the license application for ANO-1, our Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated June 6,1973, ANO-1 Technical Specification requirements for the UHS, and your initial submittal of the Updated Final l
Safety Analysis Report dated July 15, 1982. The results of our review are '
included as an enclosure to this letter.
You stated that the Dardanelle Reservoir is the UHS for ANO-1 for mitigation of the design-basis loss of coolant accident. This assertion seems to be predicated on information that was provided in Table 9-9.2.3 submitted with Amendment No. 22 to the license application for ANO-1 dated December 14, 1971, and does not take into consideration the preponderance of information that exists on this issue. We have found that the information in Table 9-9.2.3 is inconsistent with the information that was submitted relative to the UHS and service water system during the licensing of ANO-1.
The NRC staff would like to meet with you to discuss our concerns and to understand why you consider that UHS operability and EQ requirements are satisfied and information submitted to the NRC is complete and accurate.
Please coordinate a suitable, near term, date to meet with the staff to discuss this matter.
Sincerely, p ^ --
George Kalman, Senior Project Manager Division of Reactor Projects III & IV Office.of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-313
Enclosure:
NRC Review cc w/ encl: See next page
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l i . l l . Mr. C. Randy Hutchinson i Entergy Operations, Inc. Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit I cc:
Executive Vice President Vice President, Operations Support I l & Chief Operating Officer Entergy Operations, Inc.
l Entergy Operations, Inc. P. O. Box 31995 P. O. Box 31995 Jackson, MS 39286-1995 Jackson, MS 39286-199 Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway Director, Division of Radiation P. O, Box 651 l Control and Emergency Management Jackson, MS 39205 i Arkansas Department of Health
! 4815 West Markham Street, Slot 30 i Little Rock, AR 72205-3867 l
l Winston & Strawn l 1400 L Street, N.W.
l Washington, DC 20005-3502 Manager, Rockville Nuclear Licensing !
Framatone Technologies !
l 1700 Rockville Pike, Suite 525 )
Rockville, MD 20852 l Senior Resident Inspector l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i
P. O. Box 310 London, AR 72847 Regional Administrator, Region IV U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
! 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 l Arlington, TX 76011-8064 County Judge of Pope County .
l Pop'e County Courthouse 1
! Russellville, AR 72801 1
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l l ~NRC REVIEW OF THE ANO-1 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK l
INTRODUCTION The licensee for Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1), has asserted that the l Dardanelle Reservoir is the ultimate heat sink (VHS) for mitigating the design l basis loss-of-coolant accident. As described in a letter to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) dated April 14, 1989, the licensee stated:
l "The design basis for ANO-1 was established with the Dardanelle l Reservoir providing the ultimate heat sink (UHS) for normal l shutdown and emergency recovery following a design basis LOCA, l Consistent with this design basis, the original DBA LOCA l containment pressure / temperature analysis - and all subsequent l reanalyses submitted to the NRC - have been performed with a l constant SW temperature associated with use of the Dardanelle l Reservoir as the UHS. Subsequent to the original design, an l
emergency cooling pond (ECP) was added to the site. However, from a DBA LOCA containment pressure / temperature analysis perspective, the basis remains for the utilization of the Dardanelle Reservoir for LOCA recovery.'
ASSESSMENT While the NRC staff agrees that the Dardanelle Reservoir is the UHS for normal l power operation, the licensing basis for ANO-1 specifically credits use of the ECP as the UHS for mitigation of design-basis accident conditions. The staff's view is supported by the licensee's Application for License for ANO-1, including Supplements and Amendment to the Application, the staff's licensing safety evaluation report (SER), the ANO-1 Technical Specifications, and the original ANO-1 updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) submittal, as discussed below.
Supolement No. 3 to the Aeolication for License dated May 3.1968 Response to Question 2.7 states:
"The emergency shutdown cooling water will be supplied from an emergency reservoir...."
The licensee's response did not credit the Dardanelle Reservoir for l providing emergency shutdown cooling water.
Supolement No. 4 to the Acolication for License dated June 5. 1968 Response to Question 11.1.1:
The licensee included the emergency reservoir and pipeline in the !
listing of Class I structures, systems, and components.
ENCLOSURE ,
The Dardanelle Reservoir was not identified as a Class I structure.
This is significant because only Class I structures are relied upon for mitigation of the design-basis LOCA (see the discussion associated with Amendment 30 below).
C_orrectign to Sucolement No. 6 to the Acolication for license dated July 11.1968 Relative to the service water system, Section 9.3.1, " Design Basis," was revised to state:
"In the unlikely event of the complete loss of cooling water from the Dardanelle Reservoir due to the failure of the Dardanelle Dam, water will be supplied by gravity flow from the emergency reservoir...."
Spoolement No. 7 to the Acolication for License dated Auaust 15. 1968 Response to Question 16.1 states:
"The emergency reservoir will be sized to provide a 30-day cooling water supply. The size of the reservoir is based on the assumption that decay heat will initially be removed by utilizing one of the emergency feedwater pumps and the condensate normally available on site, thereafter cooling will be as described in Question 2-7 of Supplement 3.
Preliminary calculations show that, assuming an initial temperature of 85 'F, the reservoir temperature will increase approximately 10 *F, to 95 'F in about a day and maintain that temperature thereafter."
Amendment No. 21 to Apolication for Licenses dated September 27. 1971 Emergency Cooling Pond discussion on Page 1-71 states:
"The cooling pond will serve as a heat sink for normal plant shutdown of either Unit 1 or 2 as well as the source of emergency cooling water for simultaneously shutting down both Unit I and 2 in the unlikely event of a loss of the Dardanelle Reservoir water inventory. It is sized to contain sufficient water for dissipating the total combined heat transferred to the Unit I and 2 service water systems as a result of the Design Basis Accident in one unit and a normal plant shutdown of the other unit..."
Miscellaneous discussion on Page 1-71 and 1-71a:
The licensee indicated that the Reservoir Water Canals were considered to be common facilities for Units 1 and 2 and stated that " Failure of any of these shared systems will be of no serious consequence since none of the shared systems are safety related."
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This indicates that the licensee was not relying on water from.the Dardanelle Reservoir via the Re'servoir Water Canals for accident mitigation purposes.
Amendment No. 22 to the Acolication for License dated December 14. 1971 Response to Question 9.2.3 states:
"The service water piping is such that adequate flow is delivered to all components under all modes of operation. The Table following this )
response summarizes the line sizes, flow paths, temperatures, NPSH and i flows for the limiting modes of operation." For DBA conditions, the table (Table 9-9.2.3) only provided information relative to operation using the Dardanelle Reservoir as the UHS, and failed to recognize use of the ECP as the most limiting mode of operation.
Given all of the other information that was provided by the licensee i relative to the UHS and the service water system (both prior to and i following this amendment submittal), the table is in error and should be ;
corrected.
Amendment No. 24 to the Aeolication for Licenses dated February 29. 1972 !
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Discussion pertaining to Class 1 Seismic systems and equipment:
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"This class includes piping systems and equipment whose failure could )
cause uncontrolled release of radioactivity or those essential for safe shutdown and immediate or long-term operation following a loss-of-coolant accident."
The ECP is designated as Seismic Class I whereas the Dardanelle Reservoir is not. Therefore, the Dardanelle Reservoir was not credited j for " safe shutdown and immediate or long-term operation following a ;
loss-of-coolant accident."
Amendment 25 to the Aoolication for License dated March 31. 1972 I Response to GDC Criterion 44, " Cooling Water," states:
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" Structures, systems and components important to safety are cooled by the service water system. The service water ~ system is redundant with I two 100% capacity trains and three 100% capacity pumps which can be j operated either from offsite power or from onsite emergency power. The ;
ultimate heat sink for the service water system is either the Dardanelle Reservoir or the emergency cooling pond." j Amendment 26 to the Aeolication for License dated April 21. 1972 Response to Question 9.5.4 states:
"The pond is a Class 1 structure..."
1 l The significance of this is provided in the discussion associated with ;
l Amendment 30, below. '
!' Response to Question 9.6.1:
In addressing ECP operating modes to be permitted by Technical-Specifications, the licensee indicated that the ECP could support the operation of up to 2 service water pumps simultaneously on each unit for mitigation of a LOCA on one unit and concurrent shutdown of the other j unit. -
i While this response superseded the information provided by Amendment 22, I l_ Table 9-9.2.3 was not corrected to reflect these " modes of operation."
l Response to Question 9.6.3 states:
"The basis for the Technical Specification for the ultimate heat sink is that the pond function for a minimum period of thirty (30) days..." ,
l Response to Question 9.6.4 states:
"Since there is slightly more stored energy in Unit 2, the operating condition which results in the minimum margin to Technical Specification limits is a Unit 2 DBA and a concurrent Unit I shutdown..." ,
1 Response to Question 9.6.5 states: )
i "A minimum water level necessary for safe plant operation is specified '
based on 30 day emergency cooling pond operation following a Unit 1 ,
Design Basis Accident...A new minimum pond level will be specified for concurrent Unit 2 operation to allow for emergency cooling pond ;
operation following a Unit 2 DBA with a Unit I shutdown." '!
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l Amendrrent 30 to the Apolication for license dated September 15. 1972 Q List:
l The licensee added the ECP to the Q List. As quoted from the Q List,
! "The basic purpose of this list is to specifically identify those items within the scope of the Nuclear Quality Assurance Program...
The list is to include all Class I structures, systems, and equipment.
Class I structures, systems and equipment are those whose failure could cause uncontrolled release of radioactivity or those essential for the !
safe shutdown and the immediate and long-term operation following a loss l of coolant accident...." !
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l l The Dardanelle Reservoir was not included on the Q List as a Class 1 l structure and was therefore not considered " essential for the safe 1 shutdown and the immediate and long-term operation following a loss of )
coolant accident..."
SELs!1ted June 6. 1973 Section 1.2, " General Plant Description," states:
"The ANO-1 power plant is one of two pressurized water nuclear plants i proposed to be operated at the Arkansas Nuclear One site...
The only shared engineered safety feature will be the emergency cooling pond, an ultimate heat sink for both units."
Consistent with the information that was submitted by the licensee, the staff only credited the ECP as the ultimate heat sink for ESF purposes. ,
1 Section 2.4.1, " Hydrologic Description," states: l "The minimum navigational pool level of the Dardanelle Reservoir is...to provide two feet of storage for power generation...The ultimate heat i sink for the ANO-1 plant includes a 14-acre man-made emergency cooling 1 water storage pond..." ,
I Consistent with the information that was submitted by the licensee, the staff credited the Dardanelle Reservoir as the UHS for normal operation of the plant while the ECP was recognized as the source of emergency cooling water.
Section 2.4.6, " Cooling Water," states:
"During normal operation,1700 cfs of cooling water for once-through cooling for ANO-1 is to be taken from Dardanelle Reservoir through the intake canal...and discharged back into the reservoir through the discharge canal...The emergency cooling pond will serve as a heat sink for normal plant shutdown of either Unit I or Unit 2, as a source of water for simultaneously shutting down both units in the event of a loss of the Dardanelle Reservoir water inventory, or a plant accident...
The staff has concluded that the emergency cooling pond as a primary portion of the Ultimate Heat Sink is adequate..."
Consistent with the information that was submitted by the licensee, the staff only credited the Dardanelle Reservoir for normal operation of the plant while the ECP was specifically recognized for accident mitigation.
, Section 3.2, " Classification of Structures, Components, and Systems," quotes I from the FSAR:
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" Class 1 structures, systems and equipment are those whose failure could l cause uncontrolled release of radioactivity or those essential for safe reactor shutdown and the immediate and long-term operation following a loss of coolant accident..." )
Since the Dardanelle Reservoir is not a Class I structure, it cannot be relied upon for accident mitigation purposes.
Section 9.3.1, " Service Water System," states:
- "The service water system (SWS) arovides cooling water to all components !
, essential for the plant's safe slutdown...The SWS, which acts as an intermediate heat sink for all vital components, receives its water supply from the Dardanelle Reservoir during normal operation and the emergency cooling pond during accident conditions..."
- Section 9.3.4, " Ultimate Heat Sink," states
- "Two sources of cooling water are available for reactor equipment to use as an ultimate heat sink, the Dardanelle Reservoir and an onsite l
emergency cooling pond. The emergency cooling pond is a seismic '
- Category I structure which will be used for both normal and emergency l operations. Cooling water flow from the Dardanelle Reservoir will be l l terminated and flow from the emergency pond will be initiated during i 3
normal plant shutdown, accident conditions, and whenever the reservoir
, drops to an unacceptable low level... Cooling water will be supplied by i
gravity flow from the pond through seismic Category I supply lines to the service water pumps located in the intake structure... Based on our evaluation of the Ultimate Heat Sink, we conclude that the design, which meets the position set forth in Regulatory Guide 1.27, " Ultimate Heat j Sink," is acceptable."
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lechnical Specifications Specification 3.11 states specific requirements for the emergency 4 cooling pond to assure a sufficient supply of cooling water inventory.
l There is no TS associated with the Dardanelle Reservoir.
- UFSAR Submittal dated July 15. 1982 The UFSAR submittal generally incorporated and reflected the information that was provided in the Application for License, including Supplements and Amendments that were made to the original application, except that the licensee's response to GDC 44 for cooling water systems was not
- included in the UFSAR (see Amendment 25 to the Application for License
, dated March 31,1972).
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- l CONCLUSIONS l
Based on the information reviewed by the staff and discussed above, it is
, clear that the UHS for ANO Unit I consists of both the Dardanelle Reservoir and the ECP. However, it is also clear that the Dardanelle Reservoir is only relied upon for dissipating heat during normal power operation of the unit while the ECP 1:: crcdited for dissipating heat during emergency shutdown and i accident conditions. Further, the ECP must be able to perform its accident 1 4
mitigating function assuming the worst-case single failure consistent with the i
- design basis of the plant.
i The staff found that the information contained in Table 9-9.2.3 (submitted with Amendment No. 22) was not consistent with the preponderance of information that was submitted on this subject during plant licensing.
Licensees have recently been reminded of their responsibilities to maintain their FSARs accurate and up-to-date, and this inconsistency should be corrected at the next FSAR update. l l
Principle contributor: James Tatum, SPLB Date: June 13, 1997