ML20273A235
| ML20273A235 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 09/29/2020 |
| From: | Hay M NRC/RGN-IV/DRP |
| To: | Vercelli S Entergy Operations |
| Clark D | |
| References | |
| 4-2019-013, EA-20-058 IR 2020012 | |
| Download: ML20273A235 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000458/2020012
Text
September 29, 2020
Mr. Steven Vercelli, Site Vice President
Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
5485 U.S. Highway 61N
St. Francisville, LA 70775
SUBJECT: RIVER BEND STATION - NRC INSPECTION REPORT
05000458/2020012, INVESTIGATION REPORT 4-2019-013 AND
NOTICE OF VIOLATION
Dear Mr. Vercelli:
This letter refers to the investigation completed on April 19, 2020, by the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (OI) at the River Bend Station. The
purpose of the investigation was to determine if non-licensed operators willfully failed to
appropriately supervise qualifying trainees; if qualification cards for qualifying operator trainees
were willfully falsified by non-licensed operators; and if non-licensed operators willfully failed to
ensure that operator rounds for their watchstations were completed. In a telephonic exit briefing
on September 1, 2020, inspectors discussed the results of the investigation and inspection with
you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in
Enclosure 3.
Based on the results of this investigation, the NRC has determined that a Severity Level IV
violation of NRC requirements occurred, which involved a failure to maintain training
program records that were complete and accurate in all material respects. The violation is
cited in the Notice of Violation (Enclosure 1), and the circumstances surrounding it are
described in the Factual Summary (Enclosure 2) and Inspection Report (Enclosure 3). This
violation was evaluated in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The current
Enforcement Policy is included on the NRCs website at http://www.nrc.gov/about-
nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html. We determined that this violation did not meet
the non-cited violation (NCV) criteria specified in Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement
Policy. Specifically, this violation is being cited because it involved willfulness and was not
identified by the licensee.
You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the
enclosed Notice of Violation when preparing your response. If you have additional information
that you believe the NRC should consider, you may provide it in your response. The NRC
review of your response will also determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to
ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.
S. Vercelli 2
In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0305, Operating Reactor Assessment
Program, Section 13.02.b, the NRC will follow-up the violation using Inspection
Procedure 92702, Follow-up on Traditional Enforcement Actions Including Violations,
Deviations, Confirmatory Action Letters, Confirmatory Orders, and Alternative Dispute
Resolution Confirmatory Orders, during the next follow-up inspection to review actions required
by a Confirmatory Order issued to Entergy Operations, Inc. on March 12, 2018 (EA-17-132 and
EA-17-153), which will be scheduled in 2021.
Additionally, based on information developed during the investigation, the NRC has identified an
additional example of a previous Severity Level III problem documented in NRC Inspection
Report 05000458/2019014 (EA-18-174) (ADAMS Accession No. ML19112A197). This
additional example involved willful failure of three non-licensed operators to ensure that operator
rounds for their watchstations were completed as required. The circumstances surrounding this
violation are described in the Factual Summary (Enclosure 2) and Inspection Report
(Enclosure 3). Because the additional example occurred during the same time period as those
cited in NRC Inspection Report 05000458/2019014, was similar in nature, and because no
broad additional corrective actions are warranted, the NRC is not issuing a new enforcement
action consistent with the NRC Enforcement Manual, Section 1.3.6, Documenting Examples of
Violations Previously Cited.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure,
a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response will be made available electronically for
public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or in the NRCs Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, any response should not
include any personal privacy or proprietary information so that it can be made available to the
public without redaction.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, you may contact John Kramer, Senior
Enforcement Specialist, at 817-200-1121.
Sincerely,
Michael C. Digitally signed by
Michael C. Hay
Hay Date: 2020.09.29
16:00:19 -05'00'
Michael C. Hay, Deputy Director
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 50-458
License No. NPF-47
Enclosures:
1. Notice of Violation
2. Factual Summary
3. Inspection Report 05000458/2020012
cc w/ encls: Distribution via LISTSERV
SUNSI Review ADAMS: Non-Publicly Available Non-Sensitive Keyword:
By: DLP Yes No Publicly Available Sensitive NRC-002
OFFICE SPE:DRP/C SES/ACES TL:ACES AC:DRP/C RC OE
NAME CYoung JKramer JGroom DProulx DCylkowski RFretz
SIGNATURE /RA/ E /RA/ E /RA/ E /RA/ E /RA/ E /RA/ E
DATE 09/10/20 09/11/20 09/11/20 09/11/20 09/17/20 09/24/20
OFFICE OGC DD:DRP
NAME LBaer MHay
SIGNATURE /NLO/ E /RA/ E
DATE 09/24/20 09/29/20
NOTICE OF VIOLATION
Entergy Operations, Inc. Docket No. 50-458
River Bend Station License No. NPF-47
During an NRC investigation completed on April 19, 2020, a violation of NRC requirements
was identified. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the violation is listed
below:
10 CFR 50.9 requires, in part, that information required by statute or the Commissions
regulations to be maintained by the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all
material respects.
10 CFR 50.120 requires, in part, that each holder of an operating license shall establish,
implement, and maintain a training program that meets the requirements of paragraph
(b)(3) of 10 CFR 50.120.
10 CFR 50.120(b)(3) requires, in part, that sufficient records must be maintained by the
licensee to maintain training program integrity and kept available for NRC inspection to
verify the adequacy of the program.
Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to maintain information required by the
Commissions regulations that was complete and accurate in all material
respects. Specifically, on December 13, 2015, and March 25, 2016, respectively,
two non-licensed operators signed a qualification card, which indicated that the
non-licensed operators had properly documented a trainees completion of
training and that they had maintained control over the actions of the trainee. The
signed qualification card was not complete and accurate in all material respects
because, by allowing the trainee to perform portions of the required tour alone,
the non-licensed operators did not maintain control over the actions of the trainee
and thus did not properly document the trainees completion of training. The
information was material to the NRC because the NRC relies on the information
to ensure that licensee personnel are qualified to perform safety-related activities.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (NRC Enforcement Policy Section 2.2.1.d).
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Entergy Operations, Inc., is hereby required to
submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001 with a copy to the Regional
Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 1600 East Lamar Blvd.,
Arlington, Texas 760114511, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the River Bend
Station, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This
reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation; EA-20-058" and should
include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing
the violation or severity level, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results
achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken, and (4) the date when full compliance will
be achieved.
Enclosure 1
Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if the
correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not
received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be
issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other
action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will
be given to extending the response time.
If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with
the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
Because your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC
Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the
NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html, to the extent possible, it should not
include any personal privacy or proprietary information so that it can be made available to the
public without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide
an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies
the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such
information. If you request withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the
portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your
claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a
request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information).
In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within two
working days of receipt.
Dated this 29th day of September 2020
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FACTUAL SUMMARY
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 4-2019-013
On April 19, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (OI)
initiated an investigation to determine whether non-licensed operators (NLOs) at the River Bend
Station willfully failed to appropriately supervise qualifying trainees; if qualification cards for
trainees were willfully falsified by NLOs; and if NLOs willfully failed to ensure that operator
rounds for their watchstations were completed. The NRC completed its investigation on
April 20, 2020.
Security and badge access records and testimonial evidence were evaluated for events that
occurred on various dates between December 2015 through November 2016 and showed that
four NLOs failed to enter one or more plant areas required as part of their rounds. Documentary
and testimonial evidence developed during the investigation identified deliberate falsification of
the trainee qualification cards by two of the four NLOs and deliberate failure to complete the
operator rounds for their watchstations by three of the four NLOs.
NLO-1, failure to complete operator rounds:
Documentary evidence indicates that the operator was assigned the Control Building
watchstanding rounds on November 10 and 11, 2016, and failed to tour all required areas of the
watchstation. The operator allowed an unqualified trainee to independently perform the
operator rounds, and the trainee did not tour all required areas. During the OI interview, the
operator stated that he knew the trainee was not qualified, but the operator allowed him to
complete the rounds independently. The operator also stated to OI that because the trainee
missed a reading, he (the operator) was ultimately responsible for the error.
NLO-2, failure to complete operator rounds and falsification of trainee qualification card:
Documentary evidence indicates that the operator was assigned the Control Building
watchstanding round on December 13, 2015, and failed to tour all required areas of the
watchstation. The operator allowed an unqualified trainee to independently perform the
operator rounds, and the trainee did not tour all required areas. During the OI interview, the
operator explained that he would give the trainees the handheld eSOMS (log recording device)
so that the trainee could get the hands-on experience, but he would not necessarily be over
their shoulder at all times. He also spoke knowledgably about site procedures and performing
rounds, and admitted that he was responsible for the watch that night. In addition to not
performing his assigned operator rounds, the operator did not maintain control of the trainee
during the training session but signed the trainee qualification card indicating that he had.
NLO-3, falsification of trainee qualification card:
Documentary evidence indicates that the operator was assigned the control building
watchstanding round on March 25, 2016, and failed to tour all required areas of the
watchstation. The operator allowed an unqualified trainee to independently perform the
operator rounds, and the trainee did not tour all required areas. During the OI interview,
although he knew he was responsible for ensuring that the trainee completed the rounds
correctly, when confronted with door access and eSOMS records, the operator admitted that he
failed to maintain control over the trainee. Although the operator admitted that he did not
Enclosure 2
maintain control of the trainee during the training session, he signed the trainee qualification
card indicating that he had.
NLO-4, failure to complete operator rounds:
Documentary evidence indicates that the operator was assigned the Control Building
watchstanding round on April 29, 2016, and failed to tour all required areas of the watchstation.
The operator allowed an unqualified trainee to independently perform the operator rounds.
During the OI interview, the operator spoke knowledgeably about the NLO responsibilities for
conducting rounds and admitted that he and the trainee split up the rounds that night.
Based on the evidence, two NLOs deliberately signed trainee qualification cards indicating that
they had properly documented a trainees completion of training and that they had maintained
control over the actions of the trainee. This caused the licensee to be in violation of
10 CFR 50.9. In addition, three NLOs deliberately failed to tour all required areas of their
watchstation. This caused the licensee to be in violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,
Criterion V.
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers: 05000458
License Numbers: NPF-47
Report Numbers: 05000458/2020012
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-012-0024
Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility: River Bend Station
Location: St Francisville, Louisiana
Inspection Dates: June 26, 2020, to September 1, 2020
Inspector: C. Young, Senior Project Engineer
Approved By: David L. Proulx
Acting Chief, Project Branch C
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure 3
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees
performance by conducting an inspection at River Bend Station in accordance with the Reactor
Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the
safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to
https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Falsification of Operator Qualification Cards
Cornerstone Severity Cross-cutting Report
Aspect Section
Not Severity Level IV Not Not
Applicable NOV 05000458/2020012-01 Applicable Applicable
Open
Based on the information developed in Investigation 4-2019-013, the NRC identified that the
licensee failed to maintain information required by the Commissions regulations that was
complete and accurate in all material respects, in violation of 10 CFR 50.9. Specifically,
two non-licensed operators falsified completion of on-the-job training on training records
(qualification cards) for an operator trainee. The non-licensed operators signed qualification
cards for completion of on-the-job training for trainee tours of plant areas which the trainee had
not entered.
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MISCELLANEOUS - TRADITIONAL ENFORCEMENT
In April 2019, based on the information developed in the NRC Office of Investigations (OI)
case 4-2017-025, the NRC issued Severity Level III violations to River Bend Station in NRC
Inspection Report 05000458/2019014 (EA-18-174). These violations involved non-licensed
operators that willfully failed to ensure that operator rounds were appropriately completed in
accordance with station procedures and the falsification of associated operator rounds records.
During the review of OI case 4-2019-013, the NRC identified additional concerns involving
non-licensed operators failure to ensure that operator rounds for their watchstations were
completed as well as the falsification of operator trainee qualification cards.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Falsification of Operator Qualification Cards
Cornerstone Severity Cross-cutting Report Section
Aspect
Not Applicable Severity Level IV Not Applicable Not Applicable
Open
Based on the information developed in Investigation 4-2019-013, the NRC identified that the
licensee failed to maintain information required by the Commissions regulations that was
complete and accurate in all material respects, in violation of 10 CFR 50.9. Specifically, two non-
licensed operators signed completion of on-the-job training on training records (qualification
cards) for an operator trainee, indicating that the trainee had toured plant areas that the trainee
had not entered.
Description:
In April 2019, OI investigation 4-2019-013 was initiated to explore possible willful aspects of
concerns identified by the NRC involving potential falsification of operator trainee qualification
cards by non-licensed operators. This investigation was completed in April 2020. Based on the
evidence developed during this investigation, the NRC concluded that two instances occurred in
December 2015 and March 2016 in which two non-licensed operators documented completion of
on-the-job training on an operator trainee qualification card that included trainee tours of plant
areas which the trainee had not actually performed. These instances were determined to be a
violation of 10 CFR 50.9 as documented below and in the Notice of Violation (Enclosure 1). The
NRC determined that these violations involved willfulness on the part of the non-licensed
operators.
Corrective Actions: Corrective actions will be developed by the licensee in conjunction with the
condition report referenced below, which has been entered in the licensees corrective action
program.
Corrective Action References: CR-RBS-2020-03599
Performance Assessment:
The NRC determined this violation was associated with a minor performance deficiency.
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Enforcement:
The ROPs significance determination process does not specifically consider willfulness in its
assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation, which
involves willfulness, using traditional enforcement to adequately deter non-compliance.
Severity: Including consideration of the willful aspects of this violation, it was determined to be a
Severity Level IV violation in accordance with Section 2.2.1.d of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
This determination included consideration that actions taken in violation of NRC requirements
were deliberate, and that all individuals were experienced Senior Nuclear Equipment Operators,
which are non-licensed, non-supervisory operations positions.
Violation:
10 CFR 50.9 requires, in part, that information required by statute or the Commissions
regulations to be maintained by the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material
respects.
10 CFR 50.120 requires, in part, that each holder of an operating license shall establish,
implement, and maintain a training program that meets the requirements of paragraph (b)(3) of
10 CFR 50.120(b)(3) requires, in part, that sufficient records must be maintained by the licensee
to maintain training program integrity and kept available for NRC inspection to verify the
adequacy of the program.
Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to maintain information required by the Commissions
regulations that was complete and accurate in all material respects. Specifically, on
December 13, 2015, and March 25, 2016, respectively, two non-licensed operators signed a
qualification card, which indicated that the non-licensed operators had properly documented a
trainees completion of training and that they had maintained control over the actions of the
trainee. The signed qualification card was not complete and accurate in all material respects
because, by allowing the trainee to perform portions of the required tour alone, the non-licensed
operators did not maintain control over the actions of the trainee and thus did not properly
document the trainees completion of training. The information was material to the NRC because
the NRC uses the information to ensure that licensee personnel are qualified to perform safety-
related activities.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being cited because the violation was willful and not
identified by the licensee.
Observation: Additional example of a previously cited violation Report Section:
N/A
In April 2019, OI investigation 4-2019-013 was initiated to explore possible willful aspects of
concerns identified by the NRC involving failures of non-licensed operators to ensure that
operator rounds were appropriately completed in accordance with station procedures. This
investigation was completed in April 2020. Based on the evidence developed during this
investigation, the NRC concluded that from December 2015 to November 2016 three
non-licensed operators deliberately failed to ensure that operator rounds were completed in
accordance with Procedure EN-OP-115-01, Operator Rounds. These instances were
determined to be a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, as described below.
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10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be
accomplished in accordance with documented instructions or procedures of a type appropriate to
the circumstances. Entergy Procedure EN-OP-115-01, Operator Rounds, Revision 1, a quality-
related procedure intended to meet this requirement for non-licensed operators performing
watchstanding rounds, Step 5.1.7, requires, in part, that watchstanders tour all required areas of
their watchstation.
Contrary to the above, from December 2015 to November 2016, watchstanders failed to tour all
required areas of their watchstation. Specifically, three non-licensed operators allowed trainees
to perform portions of their assigned rounds and did not verify appropriate completion of the
control building rounds for which they were responsible. As a result, areas required to be toured
were missed.
The NRC determined that this violation constitutes an additional example of the previously cited
Severity Level III violation NOV 05000458/2019014-01 (EA-18-174) and is not being cited
individually. Because the additional example occurred during the same time period as the
example cited in the previous violation and were similar in nature, and because no broad
additional corrective actions are warranted, no new enforcement action is being issued consistent
with NRC Enforcement Manual, Section 1.3.6, Documenting Examples of Violations Previously
Cited. No additional response to violation NOV 05000458/2019014-01 (EA-18-174) is required.
Further corrective actions for this additional example are expected to be taken in conjunction with
corrective actions for the previously cited violation.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
On September 1, 2020, the NRC staff presented the inspection results to Mr. S. Vercelli, Site Vice
President, and other members of the licensee staff in a telephonic exit meeting. The NRC staff
verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
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