IR 05000333/2014009
| ML14157A023 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 06/05/2014 |
| From: | Burritt A L Reactor Projects Branch 2 |
| To: | Coyle L Entergy Nuclear Northeast |
| Burritt A L | |
| References | |
| IR 14-009 | |
| Download: ML14157A023 (18) | |
Text
June 5, 2014
Mr. Lawrence Coyle Site Vice President Entergy Nuclear Northeast James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant P.O. Box 110 Lycoming, NY 13093
SUBJECT: JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000333/2014009
Dear Mr. Coyle:
On May 1, 2014, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (FitzPatrick). The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on May 1, 2014, with Mr. Brian Sullivan, General Manager of Plant Operations, and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to identification and resolution of problems and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.
Based on the samples selected for review, the inspectors concluded that Entergy was generally effective in identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems. Entergy personnel identified problems and entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold. Entergy prioritized and evaluated issues commensurate with the safety significance of the problems and corrective actions were generally implemented in a timely manner. Entergy appropriately considered industry operating experience information for applicability, and used the information for corrective and preventive actions to identify and prevent similar issues when appropriate. The inspectors determined that the self-assessments reviewed were generally thorough, critical, and effective in identifying issues and improvement opportunities. Finally, the team found no evidence of significant challenges to FitzPatrick's safety conscious work environment. Based on the team's observations, FitzPatrick staff are willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available. Based on the results of the inspection, the inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance.
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390 of the NRCs "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC's Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA/ Arthur L. Burritt, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-333 License No. DPR-59
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000333/2014009
w/Attachment:
Supplementary Information
cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ
ML14157A023 SUNSI Review Non-Sensitive Sensitive Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available OFFICE RI/DRP RI/DRP RI/DRP NAME CBickett/CAB RPowell/RJP per telecon ABurritt/ALB DATE 5/19/14 5/19/14 6/5/14 1 Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I Docket No. 50-333
License No. DPR-59 Report No. 05000333/2014009
Licensee: Entergy Nuclear Northeast (Entergy)
Facility: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Location: Scriba, NY
Dates: April 14 through May 1, 2014 Team Leader: Carey Bickett, Senior Project Engineer
Inspectors: Mark Draxton, Project Engineer Aaron Dugandzic, Project Engineer Beth Sienel, Resident Inspector, FitzPatrick
Approved by: Arthur L. Burritt, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects
2 Enclosure
SUMMARY
IR 05000333/2014009; 04/14/2014 - 05/01/2014; James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (FitzPatrick); Biennial Baseline Inspection of Problem Identification and Resolution.
This NRC team inspection was performed by three regional inspectors and one resident inspector. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 5. Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors concluded that Entergy was generally effective in identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems. Entergy personnel identified problems, entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold, and prioritized issues commensurate with their safety significance. Entergy staff appropriately screened issues for operability and reportability, and performed causal analyses that appropriately considered extent of condition, generic issues, and previous occurrences. The inspectors also determined that Entergy typically implemented corrective actions to address the problems identified in the corrective action program in a timely manner. The inspectors concluded that, in general, Entergy staff adequately identified, reviewed, and applied relevant industry operating experience to FitzPatrick operations. In addition, based on those items selected for review, the inspectors determined that Entergy's self-assessments and audits were thorough.
Based on the interviews the inspectors conducted over the course of the inspection, observations of plant activities, and reviews of individual corrective action program and employee concerns program issues, the inspectors did not identify any indications that site personnel were unwilling to raise safety issues nor did they identify any conditions that could have had a negative impact on the site's safety conscious work environment. No findings were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
This inspection constitutes one biennial sample of problem identification and resolution as defined by Inspection Procedure 71152. All documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.
.1 Assessment of Corrective Action Program Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the procedures that described Entergy's corrective action program at FitzPatrick. To assess the effectiveness of the corrective action program, the inspectors reviewed performance in three primary areas: problem identification, prioritization and evaluation of issues, and corrective action implementation. The inspectors compared performance in these areas to the requirements and standards contained in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," and Entergy procedure EN-LI-102, "Corrective Action Process." For each of these areas, the inspectors considered risk insights from the station's risk analysis and reviewed condition reports selected across the seven cornerstones of safety in the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process. Additionally, the inspectors attended Condition Review Group, Condition Review Group Pre-Screening, Plant Health Committee, and Operations Focus meetings. The inspectors selected items from the following functional areas for review: engineering, operations, maintenance, emergency preparedness, radiation protection, chemistry, physical security, and quality assurance programs.
(1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification In addition to the items described above, the inspectors reviewed system health reports, a sample of completed corrective and preventative maintenance work orders, completed surveillance test procedures, and periodic trend reports. The inspectors also completed field walkdowns of portions of various systems on site, including the residual heat removal service water, instrument air, primary containment atmosphere control and dilution, and emergency diesel generator systems. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of condition reports written to document issues identified through internal self-assessments, audits, emergency preparedness drills, and the operating experience program. The inspectors completed this review to verify that Entergy entered conditions adverse to quality into their corrective action program as appropriate. (2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues The inspectors reviewed the evaluation and prioritization of a sample of condition reports issued since the last NRC biennial Problem Identification and Resolution inspection completed in March 2012. The inspectors also reviewed condition reports that were assigned lower levels of significance that did not include formal cause evaluations to ensure that they were properly classified. The inspectors' review included the
4 Enclosure appropriateness of the assigned significance, the scope and depth of the causal analysis, and the timeliness of resolution. The inspectors assessed whether the evaluations identified likely causes for the issues and developed appropriate corrective actions to address the identified causes. Further, the inspectors reviewed equipment operability determinations, reportability assessments, and extent-of-condition reviews for selected problems to verify these processes adequately addressed equipment operability, reporting of issues to the NRC, and the extent of the issues.
(3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions The inspectors reviewed Entergy's completed corrective actions through documentation review and, in some cases, field walkdowns to determine whether the actions addressed the identified causes of the problems. The inspectors also reviewed condition reports for adverse trends and repetitive problems to determine whether corrective actions were effective in addressing the broader issues. The inspectors reviewed Entergy's timeliness in implementing corrective actions and effectiveness in precluding recurrence for significant conditions adverse to quality. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of condition reports associated with selected non-cited violations and findings to verify that Entergy personnel properly evaluated and resolved these issues. In addition, the inspectors expanded the corrective action review to five years to evaluate Entergy's actions related to feedwater pump issues. b. Assessment (1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification Based on the selected samples, plant walkdowns, and interviews of site personnel in multiple functional areas, the inspectors determined that Entergy staff identified problems and entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold. The inspectors observed supervisors at the various meetings appropriately questioning and challenging condition reports to ensure clarification of the issues. Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that Entergy trended equipment and programmatic issues, and appropriately identified problems in condition reports. The inspectors verified that conditions adverse to quality identified through this review were entered into the corrective action program as appropriate. Additionally, inspectors concluded that personnel were identifying trends at low levels. In general, inspectors did not identify any issues or concerns that had not been appropriately entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. In response to several questions and minor equipment observations identified by the inspectors during plant walkdowns, Entergy personnel promptly initiated condition reports and/or took immediate action to address the issues.
(2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues The inspectors determined that, in general, Entergy appropriately prioritized and evaluated issues commensurate with the safety significance of the identified problem. Entergy screened condition reports for operability and reportability, categorized the condition reports by significance, and assigned actions to the appropriate department for evaluation and resolution. The condition report screening process considered human
5 Enclosure performance issues, radiological safety concerns, repetitiveness, adverse trends, and potential impact on the safety conscious work environment.
Based on the sample of condition reports reviewed, the inspectors noted that the guidance provided by Entergy's corrective action program implementing procedures appeared sufficient to ensure consistency in categorization of issues. Operability and reportability determinations were generally performed when conditions warranted and the evaluations supported the conclusion. Causal analyses appropriately considered the extent of condition or problem, generic issues, and previous occurrences of the issue.
(3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions The inspectors concluded that corrective actions for identified deficiencies were generally timely and adequately implemented. For significant conditions adverse to quality, Entergy identified actions to prevent recurrence. The inspectors concluded that corrective actions to address the sample of NRC non-cited violations and findings since the last problem identification and resolution inspection were generally timely and effective. However, the inspectors did observe some weaknesses in Entergy's resolution of the following: Improper Closure of a Corrective Action for a Procedure Revision Entergy wrote condition report CR-JAF-2013-4410 to evaluate the cause of high vibrations on the 'B' reactor feedwater pump during power ascension on August 23, 2013. Entergy determined that the root cause of the issue was use of an inadequate maintenance procedure to reassemble the turbine to pump coupling following the Fall 2012 refueling outage. This resulted in the coupling disassembling during operation, causing the observed vibrations. Entergy issued a corrective action to preclude repetition to revise applicable sections of procedure MP-031.05, "Reactor Feed Pump Turbine Coupling," to provide a more robust coupling. On March 6, 2014, station staff closed out the corrective action. The inspectors subsequently identified that all applicable steps of the procedure had not been revised.
EN-LI-102, "Corrective Action Process," Section 5.9[4](d) requires that the "corrective action assigner-reviews each completed action and verifies that the required action is complete. This includes: ensuring that the response is adequate, answers all aspects of the assigned action, and the intent of the action is met." Contrary to this, Entergy closed the action in the corrective action program related to revising the procedure without completing the entire intended action. The inspectors determined this issue is of minor significance because although no longer being tracked by the corrective action program, a procedure revision to address applicable portions of the procedure was still in progress. Additionally, no maintenance had been performed on either of the feedwater pumps which would have required the use of this procedure, and related work orders were or have since been placed on hold. Entergy entered this issue into the corrective action process as condition report CR-JAF-2014-02159.
Failure to Implement a Corrective Action for Increased Frequency Low Voltage Testing On January 26, 2012, Entergy determined that a contactor associated with the east crescent area unit cooler fan motor failed the low voltage pick-up testing criteria per MP-056.01, "AC Motor Control Center Maintenance and Subcomponent Replacement."
Entergy cleaned, lubricated, and reused the contactor, and replaced the contactor coil.
6 Enclosure Post-maintenance testing of the contactor and new coil was satisfactory. Entergy documented this failure in condition report CR-JAF-2012-00584 and performed a high-tier apparent cause evaluation to assess the issue. Entergy staff determined that the apparent cause of the issue was higher contactor coil impedance which caused a lower current at a given voltage. This resulted in contactor pick-up at a voltage above the acceptance criteria. To test the effectiveness of the corrective actions already completed, Entergy developed an action to complete an increased frequency low voltage preventative maintenance test on a one year periodicity. Following three successful performances, the staff planned to return this preventative maintenance to its original seven year frequency. Entergy scheduled this work order and closed the associated corrective action.
Following review of condition report CR-JAF-2012-00584, inspectors questioned the status of the increased frequency preventative maintenance work order and discovered that it was inadvertently cancelled without completing the work. This is contrary to Entergy procedure EN-LI-102, "Corrective Action Process," Section 5.8[6](e)(3) which states, "before a work order which had a condition report or corrective action closed to it can be cancelled or closed with no work to be performed, the organization requesting the cancellation will present the condition report and work order to the Condition Review Group for discussion." By performing maintenance on the contactor, and replacing the contactor coil, Entergy completed actions to correct all of the probable causes of the failure, as identified in the apparent cause analysis. Additionally, the contactor and coil are currently within their seven year preventative maintenance frequency. The inspectors reviewed the basis for this seven year frequency and determined that it was reasonable. As such, the inspectors determined that this issue is minor. Entergy entered this issue into the corrective action process as condition report CR-JAF-2014-02016.
Failure to Properly Document Completion of Training The inspectors determined that station personnel were not always consistent in how they used corrective actions to track the completion of training. Entergy procedure EN-LI-102, "Corrective Action Process," Section 5.9[4](b)(1) states, "When training performance or modification to training material is identified as a corrective action in a condition report to address a cause or correct the identified condition, then the completion of the training or modification of training material must be documented in the condition report." Contrary to the above, Entergy closed two corrective actions associated with category 'B' condition report evaluations to training evaluation action requests, and did not document the required corrective actions to track the completion of the training or modification of the training material. Specifically, condition report CR-JAF-2012-06868, corrective action eight, and condition report CR-JAF-2013-06344, corrective action nine, were both closed on December 11, 2012, and February 13, 2014, respectively, solely upon the initiation of a training evaluation action request, and did not have follow-on corrective actions to track the training completion. Closing a corrective action upon the initiation of a training evaluation action request and failing to have follow-on corrective actions to track the completion of the training leaves the station vulnerable by not ensuring that all necessary actions are completed.
In this case, the inspectors determined this issue was minor because Entergy completed the necessary training and modifications to the training material even though the actions
7 Enclosure were not tracked in the corrective action program. The station entered the issue into their corrective action process as condition report CR-JAF-2014-02009.
Inspectors independently evaluated these three observations in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix B, "Issue Screening," and Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues." For the reasons discussed above, the inspectors determined that all of these issues were minor and not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy.
c. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a sample of condition reports associated with review of industry operating experience to determine whether Entergy appropriately evaluated the operating experience information for applicability to FitzPatrick and had taken appropriate actions, when warranted. The inspectors also reviewed evaluations of operating experience documents associated with a sample of NRC generic communications to ensure that Entergy staff adequately considered the underlying problems associated with the issues for resolution via their corrective action program. In addition, the inspectors observed various plant activities to determine if the station considered industry operating experience during the performance of routine and infrequently performed activities.
b. Assessment The inspectors determined that Entergy appropriately considered industry operating experience information for applicability, and used the information for corrective and preventive actions to identify and prevent similar issues when appropriate. The inspectors determined that Entergy appropriately applied operating experience and communicated and incorporated lessons learned into plant operations and procedures when applicable. The inspectors also observed that industry operating experience was routinely discussed and considered during the conduct of various meetings at the station.
c. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a sample of audits, including the most recent audit of the corrective action program, departmental self-assessments, and assessments performed by independent organizations. Inspectors performed these reviews to determine if
8 Enclosure Entergy staff entered problems identified through these assessments into the corrective action program, when appropriate, and whether the staff initiated corrective actions to address identified deficiencies. The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the audits and assessments by comparing audit and assessment results against self-revealing and NRC-identified observations made during the inspection.
b. Assessment The inspectors concluded that self-assessments, audits, and other internal Entergy assessments were generally critical, thorough, and effective in identifying issues. The inspectors observed that Entergy personnel knowledgeable in the subject completed these audits and self-assessments in a methodical manner. Entergy completed these audits and self-assessments to a sufficient depth to identify issues which were then entered into the corrective action program for evaluation. In general, the station implemented corrective actions associated with the identified issues commensurate with their safety significance.
c. Findings
No findings were identified.
.4 Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment
a. Inspection Scope
During interviews with station personnel, the inspectors assessed the safety conscious work environment at FitzPatrick. Specifically, the inspectors interviewed personnel to determine whether they were hesitant to raise safety concerns to their management and/or the NRC. The inspectors interviewed the station Employee Concerns Program coordinator to determine what actions are implemented to ensure employees are aware of the program and its availability with regards to raising safety concerns. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed Employee Concerns Program files and the results of the most recent site safety culture assessment to ensure that Entergy entered issues into the corrective action program when appropriate.
b. Assessment During interviews, FitzPatrick staff expressed a willingness to use the corrective action program to identify plant issues and deficiencies and stated that they were willing to raise safety issues. The inspectors noted that no one interviewed stated that they personally experienced or were aware of a situation in which an individual had been retaliated against for raising a safety issue. All persons interviewed demonstrated an adequate knowledge of the corrective action program and the Employee Concerns Program. Based on the team's observations, FitzPatrick staff are willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.
c. Findings
No findings were identified.
9 Enclosure
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On May 1, 2014, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Brian Sullivan, General Manager of Plant Operations, and other members of the FitzPatrick staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- B. Sullivan, General Manager of Plant Operations
- M. Baker, Maintenance Rule Coordinator
- A. Bratek, Containment Atmospheric Dilution System Engineer
- S. Chubon, Senior Emergency Planner
- M. Cook, Emergency Diesel Generator System Engineer
- M. Cronk, Maintenance and Scheduling
- J. Davis, Senior Corrective Action and Assessment Specialist
- B. Dempsey, Residual Heat Removal Service Water System Engineer
- R. Denbleyker, Employee Concerns Program Coordinator
- M. Hawes, Regulatory Assurance Specialist
- E. Hrbac, Project Manager for Projects
- D. Huwe, Quality Assurance Auditor
- S. Juravich, Engineering Fix-it-Now
- J. Krocke, Maintenance Coordinator/Scheduler
- M. Lamardo, Electrical Maintenance
- J. Lona, Electrical Outage Coordinator
- M. Newshan, Assistant Operations Manager Support
- R. Owen, Maintenance Specialist
- R. Perry, Instrument Air System Engineer
- D. Starczewski, Equipment Reliability Coordinator
- S. Tharrett, Design Engineering Technical Specialist
- P. Thingvoll, Chemistry Supervisor
NRC Personnel
- E. Knutson, Senior Resident Inspector
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED
None
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution
- Audits and Self-Assessments
- CEO2014-00048, Nuclear Oversight Fleet Trimester Report, November 2013 - February 2014
- JAFLO-2011-00169, Post Modification Testing & Return to Service Snapshot Self-Assessment Attachment
- JAFLO-2012-00117, Focused Self-Assessment - Conduct of Operations
- JAFLO-2013-00018, Focused Self-Assessment Report - Corrective Action Program Effectiveness
- LO-HQNLO-2013-00035, FitzPatrick Operating Experience Program
- QA-3-2013-JAF-1, Quality Assurance Audit - Corrective Action Program
- QA-7-2013-JAF-1, Quality Assurance Audit - Emergency Preparedness
- QA-8-2013-JAF-1, Quality Assurance Audit - Engineering Programs
- QA-10-2012-JAF-1, Maintenance, Planning Scheduling & Outage, Corrective Action & Assessment, June 11, 2012 - August 13, 2012
- QA-14-15-2013-JAF-1, Combined Radiation Protection and Radwaste (Radiation Protection, Training, Maintenance, Planning Scheduling & Outage, Industrial Safety/Human Performance, and Operations), September 9 - October 31, 2013
- QS-2014-JAF-002, Quality Assurance Surveillance Report, Oversight Follow-Up Review of Two Quality Assurance Findings and One Mid-Cycle Area for Improvement, January 14, 2014
Condition Reports
(* indicates that condition report was generated as a result of this inspection)
- Attachment
- CR-JAF-2014-02009*
- CR-JAF-2014-02016*
- CR-JAF-2014-02159*
Drawings
- Drawing 1.22-108, Revision 0
- Drawing 1.22-108, Revision 1
- Drawing 1.22-119, Revision 0
- Drawing 1.22-119, Revision 1
Operating Experience
- NRC Information Notice 2013-06, Corrosion in Fire Protection Piping due to Air and Water Interaction NRC Information Notice 2013-17, Premature Degradation of Spent Fuel Storage Cask Structures and Components from Environmental Moisture NRC
- IN 2012-11, Age-Related Capacitor Degradation NRC
- IN 2012-13, Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs and Corrective Actions in the Spent Fuel Pool Non-Cited Violations and Findings
- NCV 2012003-01, Failure to Follow Procedure During Removal From Service of Emergency Diesel Generator Ventilation
- NCV 2012003-02, Inadequate Procedure for Installation of Reactor Water Recirculation Motor-Generator Scoop Tube Positioners
- NCV 2012004-01, Untimely Corrective Action to Address Crescent Area Unit Cooler Operability
- NCV 2012005-02, Failure of 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator Output Breaker to Close Following Loss of Offsite Power
- NCV 2012404-01, Security Finding
- FIN 2013003-02, Inadequate Corrective Action for Decay Heat Removal System Degradation Results in Loss of Decay Heat Removal during R20 Generator Scoop Tube Positioners
- NCV 2013004-01, Inadequate Reactor Water Recirculation Digital Flow Control Modification Post Maintenance Test Procedure Results in Unexpected Power Increase
- NCV 2013007-01, Failure to Correctly Position Emergency Diesel Generator Room Ventilation Temperature Controllers in Automatic Attachment Procedures
- AP-12.06, Equipment Status Control, Revision 24
- AP-12.08, LCO Tracking and Safety Function Determination Program, Revision 17
- CHSO-02, Chemistry Notifications, Revision 2
- EN-DC-149, Acceptance of Vendor Documents, Revision 8
- EN-DC-153, Preventive Maintenance Component Classification, Revision 9
- EN-DC-203, Maintenance Rule Program, Revision 2
- EN-DC-205, Maintenance Rule Monitoring, Revision 5
- EN-DC-206, Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Process, Revision 3
- EN-DC-324, Preventive Maintenance Program, Revision 12
- EN-EC-100, Guidelines for Implementation of the Employee Concerns Program, Revision 7
- EN-FAP-LI-001, Condition Review Group (CRG), Revision 4
- EN-FAP-LI-003, Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) Process, Revision 13
- EN-HU-104, Engineering Task Risk and Rigor, Revision 4
- EN-LI-102, Corrective Action Process, Revision 23
- EN-LI-104, Self-Assessment and Benchmark Process, Revision 10
- EN-LI-118, Cause Evaluation Process, Revision 20
- EN-LI-121, Trending and Performance Review Process, Revision 15
- EN-MP-112, Shelf Life Program, Revision 5
- EN-OE-100, Operating Experience Program, Revision 20
- EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Revision 7
- EN-PL-190, Maintaining a Strong Safety Culture, Revision 2
- EN-QV-105, Nuclear Oversight Performance Reporting, Revision 10
- EN-RP-108, Radiation Protection Posting, Revision 13
- IMP-02-184.5A, 'A' Recirculation Motor Generator Scoop Tube Actuator Test and Calibration, Revision 2
- IMP-02-184.5B, 'B' Recirculation Motor Generator Scoop Tube Actuator Test and Calibration, Revision 0
- MP-046.02 Service Water Pump Maintenance, Revision 21
- MP-059.87, VIPER Motor Operated Valve Diagnostic Testing, Revision 14
- SIP-5.1.15, Security Equipment Tests, Revision 42
Action Requests
and Work Orders
- [[::JAF-04-37284|JAF-04-37284]]
- PMWO
- 52220993
- PMWO
- 52220994 PMWO
- 52301336
- Attachment
- JF-011039802
- Completed Surveillance Tests
- ST-24L, RCIC Vacuum Pump Discharge Stop Check Valve Functional Test, dated 10/07/2008
- ST-24L, RCIC Vacuum Pump Discharge Stop Check Valve Functional Test, dated 10/08/2010
- ST-24L, RCIC Vacuum Pump Discharge Stop Check Valve Functional Test, dated 10/06/2012
- SIP-5.1.15, Security Equipment Tests, Attachment 7, dated 01/08/2014
- SIP-5.1.15, Security Equipment Tests, Attachment 7, dated 01/14/2014
- SIP-5.1.15, Security Equipment Tests, Attachment 7, dated 01/21/2014
- SIP-5.1.15, Security Equipment Tests, Attachment 7, dated 01/28/2014
- SIP-5.1.15, Security Equipment Tests, Attachment 7, dated 02/04/2014
- SIP-5.1.15, Security Equipment Tests, Attachment 7, dated 02/11/2014
- SIP-5.1.15, Security Equipment Tests, Attachment 7, dated 02/18/2014
- SIP-5.1.15, Security Equipment Tests, Attachment 7, dated 02/25/2014
- SIP-5.1.15, Security Equipment Tests, Attachment 7, dated 03/04/2014
- SIP-5.1.15, Security Equipment Tests, Attachment 7, dated 03/11/2014
- SIP-5.1.15, Security Equipment Tests, Attachment 7, dated 03/18/2014
- SIP-5.1.15, Security Equipment Tests, Attachment 7, dated 03/25/2014
- SIP-5.1.15, Security Equipment Tests, Attachment 7, dated 04/01/2014
- SIP-5.1.15, Security Equipment Tests, Attachment 7, dated 04/08/2014
- SIP-5.1.15, Security Equipment Tests, Attachment 7, dated 04/15/2014
Miscellaneous
- Condition Review Group Pre-Screening Package for Wednesday April 16, 2014
- Corrective Action Summary for
- D1-95-108, Pump Component Material and Configuration Changes to Repair/Upgrade
- DBD-013, Design Basis Document for the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System, Revision 5
- DBD-034, Design Basis Document for the Condensate/Feedwater Control Systems, Revision 15 EC48365 Emergency Preparedness Plan/Procedure Revision Due Dates, April 3, 2014 Update Employee Concerns Program Brochure Entergy Emergency Planning Functional Area Performance Summary, February 2011 to January 2014 Entergy Ethics Program Brochure FitzPatrick Emergency Plan Procedure Matrix
- JAF-CALC-RHR-02878, Min Wall Calculation Update for the 10P-1(A-D) Skirt (EC 37363), Revision 1
- CA 59
- JAF-RPT-FWS-03079, Maintenance Rule Basis Document System 34 Feedwater, Revision 4
- JAF-RPT-MULTI-02294, Maintenance Rule Basis Document for Service Water Systems, Revision 10 James A. FitzPatrick Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
- JENG-13-0034, (a)(1) Evaluation of the RHRSW System Attachment
- JENG-14-0001, (a)(1) Evaluation of the 'B' RHR and RHRSW System
- JENG-APL-13-002, Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Action Plan, Revision 0
- JLG-OPS-4160, Rack in/out 4160Vac/600Vac Breakers Training, Revision 1
- RO-21 Just in time training for test writers Maintenance Rule Functional Failure Determination for
- Operator Continuing Training Cycle 1301 Operating Experience and Procedure Changes PM Basis Template: EN - I&C - Electronic Circuit Cards, Revision 5
- System Health Report, Emergency Diesel Generator Ventilation, Fourth Quarter 2013 System Health Report, Emergency Diesel Generator Ventilation, Third Quarter 2013 System Health Report, Emergency Diesel Generator, First Quarter 2013 System Health Report, Emergency Diesel Generator, Fourth Quarter 2013
- System Health Report, Emergency Diesel Generator, Second Quarter 2013 System Health Report, Emergency Diesel Generator, Third Quarter 2013
- System Health Report, Feedwater System, First Quarter 2012 System Health Report, Feedwater System, First Quarter 2013 System Health Report, Feedwater System, Fourth Quarter 2010 System Health Report, Feedwater System, Fourth Quarter 2011 System Health Report, Feedwater System, Fourth Quarter 2013
- System Health Report, Feedwater System, Second Quarter 2013 System Health Report, Feedwater System, Third Quarter 2012 System Health Report, Instrument Air Compressors, First Quarter 2013 System Health Report, Instrument Air Compressors, Fourth Quarter 2013
- System Health Report, Instrument Air Compressors, Second Quarter 2013
- System Health Report, Instrument Air Compressors, Third Quarter 2013
- System Health Report, Primary Containment Atmosphere Control and Dilution System, First Quarter 2014 System Health Report, Primary Containment Atmosphere Control and Dilution System, Fourth Quarter 2013 System Health Report, Primary Containment Atmosphere Control and Dilution System, Third Quarter 2013 System Health Report, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System, Fourth Quarter 2013 System Health Report, Residual Heat Removal Service Water, First Quarter 2013 System Health Report, Residual Heat Removal Service Water, Fourth Quarter 2013
- System Health Report, Residual Heat Removal Service Water, Second Quarter 2013
- System Health Report, Residual Heat Removal Service Water, Third Quarter 2013
- System Health Report: Residual Heat Removal Service Water, Fourth Quarter 2013
- TEAR-JAF-2012-1075 Temporary Change 12-00465 to
- OP-46A, 4160 V & 600 V Normal AC Power Distribution Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment, dated February 2012
- Condition Review Group Meeting Package for Tuesday April 15, 2014
- Operational Focus Meeting Agenda for Tuesday April 15, 2014 Condition Review Group Meeting Package for Monday April 21, 2014 Operational Focus Meeting Agenda for Monday April 21, 2014