ML20207P728
| ML20207P728 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/13/1987 |
| From: | Bordenick B NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | Frye J, Kline J, Margulies M, Paris O, Shon F Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#187-2190 OL-3, OL-5, NUDOCS 8701200135 | |
| Download: ML20207P728 (27) | |
Text
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8 o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION U $ WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 UQVEiu
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SOCKET,h,x 1re Morton B. Margulies, Chairman John H. Frye III, Chairman BR/ NC '5~ y;cr Administrative Judge , Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555 Dr. Jerry R. Kline Dr. Oscar H. Paris Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555 Frederick J. Shon Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 In the Matter of
- LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1)
Docket No. 50-322-OL-3 (Emergency Planning)
Docket No. 50-322-OL-5 (EP Exercise)
Dear Administrative Judges:
Enclosed for your information are copies of the following document:
United States General Accounting Office - Report to the Honorable Alfonse M. D'Amato - United States Senate - Nuclear Regulation - Unique Features of Shoreham Nuclear Plant Emergency Planning t
Sincerely, M O t
Bernard M. Bordenick Counsel for NRC Staff cc: With enclosures Balance of Service List i
0701200135 870113 PDR G ADOCK 05000322 PDR
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NUCLEAR REGULATIOX
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Unique Features of Shoreham Nuclear P:. ant Emergency ~
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United States General Accounting Office r Washington, D.C. 20648 Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division
' E 228108.2 3
December 2,1986 Th6 Honorable Alfons'e M. D'Amato United States Senate
Dear Senator D'Amato:
As requested by your May 2,1986, letter and subsequent discussions with your office, we reviewed the procedures followed to date in pre-paring, assessing, and testing off-site emergency response planning around the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station in Suffolk County, Iong Island, New York. Our objective was to determine whether the proce-dures being followed at Shoreham are different from those at other com-mercial nuclear plants.
Emergency plans for commercial nuclear power plants are intended to protect public safety in the event of plant accidents resulting in releases of radioactive materials to the environment. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NBC) licenses and regulates these plants. Two prerequisites for an operating license are adequate on- and off-site emergency plans.
NRC requires that a utility seeking an operating license submit an on-site emergency plan for its review. In contrast, off-site emergency plans are
[ usually prepared by affected state and local governments and submitted
! to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FDtA) for review. NRC l then considers the results of FDtA's review of an off-site plan and its own review of an on-site plan in making its overall licensing decision.
Although the cooperation of state and local governments is important to the development of off-site emergency plans, neither NRC nor FD(A Can require state and local governments to participate.
The state of New York and Suffolk County have declined to prepare off-site emergency plans for the Shoreham nuclear plant. For this reason, the Long Island Lighting Company (Luro), which owns the Shoreham plant and has applied to NRC for & license to operate it, prepared an off-site emergency plan and submitted it to NRC for review and approval.
Although the lack of state and local plans is unprecedented in recent nuclear plant licensing proceedings, the Congress has specifically autho-rized NRC to consider an off-site emergency plan submitted by a utility in s the absence of state and local plans.
In summary, we found that NRC has made no final decision on the ade-
- quacy of the Shoreham off site emergency plan, but this unique case has resulted in several significant differences from earlier nuclear plant.
Pase 1 GAo/ECIDeT-80 Emergency Papandness
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licensing proceedings. For example, the exercise testing the effective-ness of the off-site plan was carried out by Laro personnel without state and local participation. Also, NRO and FEMA agreed that the latter agency would provide NRC with the deficiencies found in its review of Luro's off-site plan, but would not make an overall finding on the plan's ade-quacy. FEMA usually makes such a finding when it has reviewed off-site plans submitted by state and local governments. NRC's licensing board will be conducting hearings in 1987 to try to resolve several outstanding issu. s relating to the state and local decisions not to participate in off-site planning.
LH4 applied for a license to operate its Shoreham plant from NRC in Perspective on 1975. Plant construction was essentially completed in 1983. When Luro EInergency Planning applied for its operating license, NRC required it to prepare an on-site emergency plan. Although NRC also assisted state and local governments in developing off-site emergency plans, it did not require such plans until after the March 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant.
The accident at Three Mile Island stimulated major changes in federal regulatory requirements and institutional arrangements pertaining to emergency planning. For example, the President transferred federal responsibility for coordinating off-site emergency planning from NRC to FDIA. NRC, however, retained responsibility for licensing nuclear plants, including making final determinations on the adequacy of overall emer-gency plans. In NRC's 1980 and subsequent authorization acts, the Con-gress permitted NRC to license operation of any nuclear plant only if it determined
. in consultation with FEMA, that there exists a state or local emergency l preparedness plan that provides for responding to accidents at the spe-l cific plant and complies with NRC guidelines for such plans or
. In the absence of such a plan, there exists a state, local, or utility emer-gency plan providing " reasonable assurance" that public health and safety are not endangered by the plant's operation.
The Congress also directed NRC to establish, in consultation with FEMA, standards for radiological emergency plans.
The more than 30 nuclear power plants licensed for commercial opera- '
tion since these requirements were implemented have been licensed Page 2 GAO/RCED4750 Emergency Preparedness
V B 225103.2 e
under the first of the two procedures listed above. This general proce-dure involved (1) FDtA's review and testing of off-site emergency plans submitted to it by state and local governments, (2) NRC's review of utili-ties' on-site emergency plans, and (3) favorable NRC findings on the overall adequacy of emergency plans and other issues considered in licensing proceedings.
The Shoreham operating license proceeding differs from these earlier Emerbenc7 Planninb at cases. The state of New York and Suffolk County did not develop and Shoreham submit off-site emergency plans to rDtA for its review. The county's -
decision was based on its determination that unique local conditions on Long Island make effective emergency response impossible. Subse-quently, the state decided not to impose a state plan on the county. As a result, Luro prepared an off-site emergency plan and submitted it directly to NRC for review.
. Thus, NRC and FDtA are addressing emergency planning around the Shoreham plant under the alternative procedure the Congress autho-rized in the absence of a state and local emergency plan adhering to fed-eral planning standards. In this case, NRC requested FDtA to review the utility's off-site emergency plan to assist NRC in determining whether the plan provides reasonable assurance that the Shoreham plant's operation will not endanger public safety.8 FDtA has reviewed and tested the effectiveness of Luro's off-site emer-gency plan, including six revisions of the plan, using joint FFM and NRC criteria. All but 5 of the 34 technical deficiencies that FDtA initially iden-tified in the plan, such as the absence of agreements between Luro and bus and ambulance companies, have been corrected. The test of uLCo's plan revealed 5 deficiencies and 38 areas of lesser importance requiring corrective action. The unique circumstances of the Shoreham case-NRC's requesting FD!A's review of a utility's off-site emergency plan in the absence of state and local plans submitted to FntA-have led to ,
three major differences in the review of the Luro plan when compared with other nuclear powerplants:
. . The exercise testing the effectiveness of the plan was carried out by utility personnel without state and local participation.
3
, 1n a separate report (GAo/RCED-87-45) we address FDIA act1ons leading to a decision not to make overall Andings on its review ofIllfo's emergency plan.
Page 3 GAO/RCED47 50 Emergency Preparedness c% 8 T_".' : $$M Ei-DG re " B " v ' ~~ -
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. FEMA did not require the utility to hold a formal public meeting following the test of its plan to inform citizens of test results and obtain their com-ments-something FEMA requires of state and local governments after they have exercised their off-site emergency plans.
. Because Luro's legal authorit.' to carry out its off-site emergency plan ,
has been challenged, NRC and IEMA agreed that FEMA Would not provide overall findings on the adequacy of the plan or the utility's ability to effectively implement the plan.
Since May 1983, an NRC licensing board has been conducting public hear-l ings on off-site emergency preparedness around the Shoreh'am plant as a
'part of the agency's operating license proceeding These hearings will continue in 1987 on a number of issues, including the test of the Luro
, plan. In addition, at NRC's request FEMA continues to review revisions to the Lnro plan. Three basic issues (listed below) to be addressed in future hearmgs all relate to state and county decisions not to develop off-site plans or help the utility execute its plan: ,
- . Does Luro have legal authority to assume governmental functions essen-tial to implementing its emergency plan? A New York State lower court and an NRC licensing board have ruled that Luro does not have the req-uisite authority. Luro's appeal of the state court decision was pending at the close of our review.
. Can the Luro plan be adequately implemented, even if the legal issue is resolved in its favor, given lack of participation by the state and local
! governments?
. Assuming that both the state and local g:vernments, in the event of an accident, provide "best efforts" to respond in accordance with Luro's plan, can the plan then meet the test of " reasonable assurance" that public health and safety would be protected?
We conducted our review at FEMA's Region II offices in New York City and at NRC headquarters and its Region I office located, respectively, in Bethesda, Maryland, and King of Prussia, Pennsylvani,a. We also met with Luro officials and toured the Shoreham nuclear plant. Our objec-l tives, scope, and methodology are N-d in more detailin appendix I II.
1 -
We discussed the report's contents with FEMA and NRC officials as it Was being developed and incorporated their views as appropriate. However, as requested by your office, we did not obtain official agency comments l
Fage 4 GAo/ECED47 50 Emwrgency Preparedness 7 _ _ . ., m., ,.._. ~_ . . ,.,_. __ , ,. _ , _ . . , - , _ - . ,
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5 226108.2 l
l on a draft of this report. Unless you publicly announce its contents ear-lier, we do not plan to distribute this report until 30 days from its issu-ance date. At that time, we will send copies to the Chairman, NRc; the Director, FEMA; appropriate congressional Committees; and to other interested parties.
Sincerely yours,
- /
J. Dexter Peach Assistant Comptroller General Fase 5 GAO/BCED47-50 Emergency Preparedness
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COnTIES Letter i AppendixI s Einergency Planning Historical Perspective on Emergency Planning 8 Around the Shoreham NRC " ^ ^ 8
- a Sh ham Nuclear Power Station observations 22 Appendix II 24 Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Figure Figure 1.1: cenerallocation Map ,
14
'e Abbreviations EPA Environmental Protection Agency FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency GAO General Accounting office Luro Long Island Lighting Company P.L PublicI2w
- NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission TMI Three Mile Island Page 6 GAO/RCED47 50 Emergency Preparedness
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e Appendix I Emergency P: anning Around f ae Shoreham Nuc' ear Power Station The Mar h 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island (nu) nuclear power Historical Perspective plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, demonstrated the need for commu-On EInergency Planning nities near nuclear plants to be prepared for accident-related emergen-cies and pointed out major deficiencies in the general state of emergency planning and preparedness at all governmental levels. Before the acci-dent, off-site emergency plans were not a prerequisite for licensing nuclear power plants. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, which sets out the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) basic authority for regulating nuclear power, did not require state and local government off-site emergency plans or require NRC to review such plans in the licensing process. NRC did, however, require utilities to pre-
. pare on-site emergency plans, including establishing links to off-site state and local authorities.
NRC assisted state and local governments in preparing and maintainmg off-site emergency plans, and provided guidance and traming to assist them in preparing such plans. Nevertheless, until the nu accident, NRC's
. basic position was that state and local emergency plans were not required for it to determine whether a nuclear plant could be operated without undue risk to public health and safety.
In a report issued about the same time as the nu accident, we pointed out that although 41 states had some type of nuclear emergency plan, there was considerable doubt as to the preparedness of state and local governments.i Therefore, we recommended that
. the newly created Federal Emergency Management Agency (FDtA) assume responsibility for making policy and coordinating emergency response planmng around nuclear facilities,
. NRC allow nuclear plants to begin operation only where state and local emergency response plans adequately address NRC plannmg guidance for off-site emergency plans, and
. NRC establish an emergency planning zone of about 10 miles around all
- nuclear plants as recommended by an NRC/ Environmental Protection l Agency (EPA) task force.
Under the statutory, executive, and administrative policies established since the nu accident, each of these recommendations has largely been implemented. .
IAreas Around Nuclear Facilities Should Be Better Prepared for Radiolog2 cal Emergencies (EM&78 110. Mar. 30,1979).
Page 8 GAo/RCED8740 Emergency Preparednese
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Appendix I
- Euwesency *lammins Aroemd the shoreham Nuclear Power Staden FEMA's Role Established Under the President's Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978, mu was established to serve as a single point of contact for state and local gov-ernments regarding federal emergency planning and preparedness activ-ities. The President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island recommended that federal authority and responsibility for off-site .'
nuclear power plant emergency planning and preparedness be consoli-dated in FEMA. In response to that recommendation, on December 7, {
1979, the President directed FEMA to lead all federal off-site emergency activities. By June 1980, FEMA was directed to thoroughly review off-site emergency plans in all states with operating nuclear plants and to com-plete a review of state plans related to plants nearing completion as soon as possible. To implement the President's directive, in January 1980, NRC and FEMA entered into a memorandum of understCading, sub- b sequently amended in November 1980, establishing that
. FEMA will coordinate all federal planniry; for the off-site impact of radio. -
logicalemergencies; _
0
. FEMA will take the lead in assessing off-site plans and preparedness,-
i make findings and determinations as to the adequacy and capability of implementing off-site plans, and communicate its findings to v1.c;
. NRC will review H:MA findings and determinations, in cordunction with its own findings on a utility's on-site emergency plans, and make deter-minations on the overall state of emergency preparedness; and
. NRC will use its overall findings and determinations to make radiological health and safety decisions in the issuance of nuclear power plant licenses and the continued operation of licensed plants.
In November 1980, FEMA and NRC also published federal criteria for
- assessing nuclear emergency planning and preparedness called Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emeragp_syRtap9.Dat Plans and Preparedness in Suoport of Nuclear Power Plants. NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1--commonly referred to as NUREG-0654.
The criteria include 16 planning standards-15 related to both on-site and off-site safety and 1 related to just on-site safety. These standards are further broken down into 196 elements, or criteria, that generally describe the intent of the standard. NRC's regulations and the joint cri-teria require that emergency plans be prepared covering each commu-nity within a 10-mile radius of a commercial nuclear power plant. In addition, state plans are required to address measures necessary to deal with the potential for ingestion of radioactively contaminated foods and.
water out to a distance of 50 miles.
Page9 GAo/BCED4760 Faergemey 7._
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l Appendix !
Emergency Pla==ian Aroemd the shoewham Nuclear Power Station J
- y ,
As part of NRC's licensing process, FEMA reviews and makes findings and
. determinations on the adequacy of off-site emergency preparedness -
under the provisions of its regulations for reviewing and approving
-i" state and local radiological plans and preparedness. (44 C.F.R. 350.)
This process is initiated when a Governor or designee submits state and local plans for FEMA's review. The review process includes (1) an evalua-tion of the plans for compliance with NUREG-0654 standards and cri-teria by a Regional Assistance Committee chaired by FEMA and Composed of representatives of other federal agencies,(2) at least one federally V. observed exercise that tests the state and local governments' ability to implement major portions of their plans, and (3) a public meeting held
- by the state and local governments (and attended by FEMA) that pro-vides citizens an opportunity to learn about and comment on the plan -
l and the exercise.
. Under its agreement with NRC, FEMA will furnish NRC, upon request, its
- Interim findings and determinations on off-site emergency preparedness i ~> 7 issues if the formal review has not been completed. The agreement also allows NRC to request FEMA's review of emergency plans prepared by
! states, local governments, or utilities and submitted directly to NBC.
Off-Site Emergency Plans In 1980 the Congress established a requirement for off-site emergency Required planning around nuclear power plants. Section 109 of the NRC Authoriza-tion Act for Fiscal Year 1980 (PL 96-295), approved by the President on June 30,1980, allows NRC to issue a nuclear plant operating license only
- if it determines that there exists either a
- . related state or local emergency preparedness plan that provides for responding to accidents at the specific plant and complies with NRC
.. emergency planning guidelines or in the absence of such a plan, a state, local, or utility plan which pro-L~ vides reasonable assurance that public health and safety are not endan-gered by the plant's operation.
The act also directed NRC to establish standards for state radiological emergency plans. Furthermore, the act required NRC to establish stan-dards and to make the first determination in consultation with FEMA and l other appropriate agencies. The act did not require such consultation in. .
l making the alternative, or second, determination. In NRC's authorization acts for fiscal years 1982 and 1983 (PL 97-415, Section 5) and fiscal years 1984 and 1985 (PL 98-553, Section 108), the Congress continued .
NRC's authority to issue an operating license, in the absense of a FEMA-Page 10 GAO/ECED47-80 F _g..-
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Nuclear Power station approved state or local emergency plan, if NRC determined that a state, local, or utility plan provided reasonable assurance that public health and safety would not be endangered by the plant's operation.
- Until the current review of off-site emergency response planning around the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, all NRC nuclear plant operating license proceedings' subsequent to the 1980 NRC authorization act have
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involved NRC consideration, in consultation with FEMA, of off-site nuclear i .
plans prepared by state and local governments. Although in some i instances local governments have not participated in developing plans, on these occasions, state governments have developed and demonstrated compensatory plans. This procedure basically involves e a FEMA review of off-site plans submitted directly to it by a state, an exercise testing the effectiveness of the plans,^ and transmittal of FEMA's ,
. findings on the adequacy of the plans to NRC; a an NRC review of a utility's on-site emergency plan;
.. an NRC determination on the overall adequacy of emergency response planning, takmg into account FEMA's review and interim or final find-ings; and .
. an NRC licensing decision on the basis of all appropriate radiological health and safety factors, including emergency preparedness.
The adequacy of off-site emergency planning around the Shoreham plant is being addressed by NRC under the second basic procedure per-mitted in its recent authorization acts. This procedure involves, in the absence of a state or local plan that addresses FEMA's off-Site planning
!- standards, NRC consideration of any other state, local, or utility plan submitted to it. Under this procedure, the basic test of the adequacy of the plan is whether it provides " reasonable assurance" that public l
health and safety are not endangered by the plant's operation.
Under either of the two basic procedures, the final decision on the ade-quacy of overall emergency response planning, as well as other radiolog-l ical health and safety issues, rests with NRC. NRC regulations require
. that-except for loading fuel and operating a plant at low power for -
testing purposes-no operating license for a nuclear power reactor will be issued unless NRC can be reasonably assured that adequate protective l measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological accident.
l (10 C.F.R. 50.47.)
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Fase 11 GAo/RCED47 50 Esmergency Preparedness
7 :. App as.I
, e Emergency Flamaing Aroemd the shosehaan
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- Nectear Posser station Emergency Planning Zones In 1976 state emergency planners asked NRc to determine the most severe accident basis for which off-site planning should be developed. In Established response, NRC and DA formed ajoint task force to develop a technical basis for emergency plannmg. A key principle adopted by the task force was that emergency plans should be designed to permit predetermined
^
protective actions if projected radiation exposure doses from accidents appeared to meet or etceed established FA " Protective Action Guides."
These guides represent the projected doses to individuals in the general population which warrant specific protective actions such as sheltering or evacuation. For example, DA's existing guides stated that populations within the predetermined area should be evacuated when radiation
- exposure doses to the whole body or the thyroid are projected to be at or above 5 rem 2 and 25 rem, respectively. For purposes of comparison, NRC regulations require that no member of the general ~public be subject to more than 0.5 rem of whole body radiation exposure per year from normal nuclear plant operations.
- . The task force issued its report in December 1978.8 The major conclusion was that planning zones should be established at distances out to about 10 and 50 miles from a nuclear power plant. The area within the 10-mile radius was intended as the zone for which emergency actions such as evacuation or sheltering would be taken to protect the population from direct radiation exposure to the plume, or radioactive cloud, released as a result of a nuclear power plant accident. The actual size and shape of the zone would depend on site-specific characteristics. The 50-mile radius represented the planning zone in which protective actions would be taken to preclude radiation exposure resulting from ingestion of radioactively contaminated water or foods such as milk and fresh
[ vegetables.
- The rationale considered in recommending these planning zones was pri-marily based on analyses of the expected consequences of a wide range of potential accidents. The task force also gave some consideration to the likely occurrence of accidents involving loss of the reactor's coolant.
' Such accidents are typically the most severe potential accidents that NRC i
considers from a design safety standpoint in licensing nuclear power i
plants. The task force concluded that a level of exposure of 5 rems to
! the whole body, the level at which DA guides called for evacuation, l
2A rem is one measure of the dose of radiation to body tissues.
8P!anning Basis for the Develooment of State and local Government Radiologien! Emersey ,
noe Plans in Support of I, tant Water Nuclear Pr'wer Reactors (NURECr4396f EPA-520/1/78/
i Page is GAO/ECED8740 Emergency Preparednese
Appendix I .
Emergency Planning Aroemd the shoeuhaan
- Neeleer Power station would not be exceeded beyond 10 miles for loss of-coolant accidents analyzed for sites included in the study. In addition, the task force con-sidered severe accidents involving melting of the reactor fuel that have >
the potential for causing serious irQuries and deaths. According to the task force report, earlier studies indicate that actions such as sheltering or evacuation within about 10 miles of a plant would result in "signifi-cant savings" of early irduries or deaths from even the most severe acci-dent related atmospheric releases for those accidents studied.
In october 1979 and January 1980, respectively, NRC and EPA adopted the guidance contained in the joint task force report. That report remains as the principal technical basis for the current requirement of basing off-site emergency planning in areas generally within 10 miles for direct exposure to radioactive plumes, and 50 miles for indirect exposures from ingestion of contaminated foods and water. Recently, however, NRc has indicated that it will reassess its emergency planning requirements in light of new insights gained from research on severe '
accidents and any pertinent information from the April 1986 Chernobyl
- nuclear plant accident in the Soviet Union. At present, NRC's reassess-ment has riot progressed far en'ough to develop a position on whether the size of the 10-mile plume exposure zone should be changed.
,m The Shoreham nuclear plant is located in Suffolk County, Long Island, NRC and FEMA New York, about 55 miles east of New York City. (See fig. I.1.) NRC Review of Off-Site issued the Iong Island Lighting Company (1.uro), owner of the plant, a Emergency Planning at mnstruction permit in April 1973.1.nro applied for an NRC operating license in September 1975, and NRc began reviewing the license applica-Shoreham tion in January 1976. Plant construction was essentially completed in l
~
1983, but NRc had not completed its review of the operating license application at that time. The plant has the potential to generate 809 megawatts of electricity, which represents about 30 percent of yearly 1.aro system requirements. In July 1985, NRC licensed 1.nfo to conduct low-power (less than 5 percent) testing of the Shoreham plant, which
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has been completed. Full-power operations cannot begm, however, without an NRc license to operate at full powdr. Through July 1986, taco had expended about $4.6 billion on Shoreham, including plant con-struction, personnel training costs, and operating costs incurred while
- awaiting a full-power license from NRc.1.nro estimates that it is paying about $1.3 million per day in debt service on Shoreham.
- Page 13 GAo/ ACED 47-50 Emergency Preparedness
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Appendix I Emergency Planning Amund the Shoreham Nuclear Power station Figure 1.1: General Location Map ,
y Bnegeport fBlock Island Sound
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C necticut p shelter Garciners New York \ Islano Island t, Stamford. Long Island Sound
- Shoreham Montauk 8$ M g m,,$"*"
i[ Mt. Vernon
- g Port Jenerson '
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< Bronx 2
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lslip NOU tf8ntIO COIO Queens B31 \s\S"d New York JFK International .- 3;e8 Airport' Ten-Mde Radius Brooktyn p renam Site
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\ l Tong tstand D9"Y Airport Y
Source: FEMA.
New York State and Suffolk Suffolk County initially participated in emergency planning around County Are Not Shoreham and, in September 1981, the county legislature agreed to Lur 's request that the county develop a radiological emergency
. Participating in Emergency response plan. The utility provided funds to develop the plan; however, Planning in 1982 the county returned the funds and decided to independently l develop a plan. A draft of the plan, which cost the county nearly l $600,000, was completed in December 1982. In light of the plan's find-ings, the Suffolk County Executive stated in February 1983 that the -
unique local conditions of Long Island make it impossible to protect the l public safety if a serious accident occurred at the Shoreham plant. The executive cited the difficulty of evacuating large numbers of people,
- Page 14 GAO/ECED87 50 Emergency Preparednese l
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e Appendix I Emergency P'a==Ine Aroemd the shorehasm
. Nuclear Power station s
including both those who might be instructed to evacuate and those who
- would evacuate on their own initiative, on a limited number of roads running through a narrow island (i.e., Iong Island). Shortly thereafter, the county legislature resolved not to adopt or implement any radiolog-ical emergency plan for Shoreham and asked NRC to terminate the Shoreham operating license proceeding. NRC denied the county's petition.
In addition, the Governor of New York announced that he would not impose a state plan on the county. This represented the first instance in the United States in which both state and local governments have refused to panicipate in emergency preparedness planning around a nuclear power plant.
In the absence of state and local off-site emergency plans, Luro sub-mitted its own off-site emergency plan directly to NRC in May 1983.
Some members of Congress, NRC commissioners, and FEMA officials, as well as local communities and public interest groups, have questioned whether a utility plan could be effectively implemented if rejected by state and local authorities. On the other hand, the House Appropriations Committee, in approving fiscal year 1984 funding for FEMA, stated that the fact that a governmental entity cannot or will not perform a partic-ular role or roles in preparing, submitting, or implementing off-site emergency preparedness plans should not, by itself, constitute a suffi-cient basis for FEMA to determine that the plans-or portions of them-are inadequate. For its part, NRc determined that it was required by statute to evaluate the plan prepared by Luco. Therefore, in May 1983, NRC appointed an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
- to conduct public hearings on off-site emergency planning at Shoreham.
NRC Requested FEMA to In the summer of 1983, NRC invoked the provisions of its memorandum Review LILCO's Plan f understanding with FEMA and requested FEMA to evaluate the Lnro plan and provide findings and determinations as to whether the Laco emergency response plan for Shoreham was adequate and capable of implementation. NRC requested FEMA's findings and determinations
, within 3 weeks because it then believed that if FEMA's review could be completed by then, and following FEMA's review, if all off-site emergency preparedness issues could be addressed in public hearings and resolved in favor of Luro, a license permitting full-power operations at Shoreham could be issued in November 1983
- Atomic safety and !) censing Boards, comprised of one person qualtfled to conduct admisustrative e
pmceedings and two persons with technical qualifications, conduct such hearings as directed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and make such intermediate or final agency decisions in licensing and enforcement proceedmgs as the Commission may authortae.
Page 16 GAO/ECED47-50 Emergency Preparednese c_ _ - .-- . - - . .. -
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Appendix!
Esmergency Planning Ascend the Shorehamn Nuclear Power station The utro plan--called the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Offsite ,
Radiological Emergencyjgponse Plan-was submitted to NRC without the endorsement of Suffolk County or New York State. The plan pro- -
posed to deploy an orgamzation composed prunarily of uLco employees and outside parties, such as the Red Cross, to carry out all off-site aspects of the plan, including functions normally carriui out by state and local personnel, in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham. The plan estimated that about 160,000 persons resided within the 10-mile planning zone during the summer and that about 139,000 persons resided there during the winter. According to FEMA offi-cials, the plan did not rely on the assistance of state and county per-sonnelin the event of an accident at Shoreham but did provide for the participation of either or both levels of government if they elected to participate. ,
FEMA reviewed the tECo plan in accordance with the joint NRC/ FEMA Cri-teria listed in NUREG-0654 and transmitted the results of its initial review to NRC on June 23,1983. For this initial review; FEMA used the resources of the Department of Energy's Argonne National Laboratory
- rather than a Regional Assistance Committee. In terms of these criteria, FEMA found that the uu:0 plan had 34 inadequacies. FEMA also identified two preconditions that had to be met for a rmding as to whethe,r the plan is capable of being implemented and whether Iaco has the ability to implement the plan:
. A determination of whether utro has the appropriate legal authority to assume management and implementation of r.n off-site emergency response plan.
. A demonstration through a full-scale exercise, that utro has the ability l
to implement an off-site plan that has been found to be adequate.
Finally, FEMA established a position that a nongovernment off-site emer-gency plan could be considered adequate if the plan has no inadequacies when evaluated against FEMA /NRC criteria.
l i
Between September and December 1983, NRC submitted revisions 1,2, and 3 of the uLco plan to FEMA and requested a Regional Assistance Committee review of those revisions. While the review was in process, the Governor of New York announced that the state opposed approval '
of IAco's plan because, in its opinion, the utility lacked the legal authority to implement the plan. Shortly thereafter, FEMA asked NRC whether the review of the plan should continue, be modified, or be ter- ,
minated in view of the state's position. NRC requested that miA Continue Page 16 GAo/ECED4740 FJaa t.tmy rreparednees t _- - -- _
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Appendix I
, Emergency Planning Around the shoreham Nuclear Power Station i
f f
to review the plan, stating that FEMA's review would be an essential ingredient in the licensing board's determination on the adequacy of uIro's plan and the utility's ability to implement it.
In March 1984, FEMA transmitted to NRc the Regional Assistance Com-mittee's review of revision 3 of utro's plan. The committee was chaired by a staff person from FEMA's Region II office and included representa-
- tives from the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, Health and Human Services, the Interior, and Transportation; EPA; and NRC. The committee rated 109 elements of the amended plan and found 32 inadequacies. In
. addition, the legal authority issue affected 24 elements. Inadequacies the committee found in the plan included the following:
'l
. No discussion took place of alternate evacuation routes to be used by nonessential Shoreham plant personnel in the event of inclement weather and certain specific radiological conditions.
. Not all reception centers identified in the plan were at least 5 miles
. beyond the 10-mile zone as. required by NUREG-0654.
. No letters of agreement with bus and ambulance companies had been written; only letters of intent to enter into contracts are contained in the plan. '
3
- The plan needed revision with regard to protective actions to be fol-lowed within the 50-mile ingestion pathway.
. It was questionable whether the monitoring equipment listed in the plan would be sufficient to process all evacuees within the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> time limit required by NUREG-0654.
. The plan did not indicate whether cited medical facilities and personnel have the capability to evaluate and treat radiation exposure.
Subsequently, as requested by NRc, between November 1984 and Feb-ruary 1986, FEMA reported on U140 plan revisions 4,5, and 6. Identified
- inadequacies decreased from the 32 in revision 3, to 5 in revision 6. Con- ,
i cerns related to Iaco's authority to assume responsibility for a number of activities in the plan, however, continued to affect 24 elements. These concerns included the following:
. Making command and control decisions.
. Coordinating with state and local govermnents in New York and contig-uous states.
Seeking a declaration of a state of emergency and requesting state and
. federal assistance.
. Alerting and notifying the public.
I Page 17 GAO/ ACED 47 50 Emergency Preparedness
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Emergency Planning Around the shorehasa Neelear Power station
.. Arranging for agreements with organizations like bus companies, schools, and hospitals.
Regarding the legal authority issues, in February 1985 the New York State Supreme Court
- ruled that utco does not have the legal authority to exercise governmental functions included in its off-site emergency plan. utro's appeal of that decision is pending. In a related matter, a
- U.S. District Court in New York ruled in March 1985 that the state and county could not be forced to participate in emergency planning. Finally, in August of 1985, NRC's licensing board responsible for making initial NRC decisions on emergency preparedness issues stated that, although it had seen no demographic, geographic, or other evidence on which to
' conclude that an effective off-site emergency plan'would be impossible to develop and implement for the Shoreham plant, a serious defect in the utro plan is the opposition of the state and county. The licensing board found that it would be unlawful for utro to undertake certain functions-such as controlling traffic and instnicting the public during o an emergency--that are routinely performed by law enforgement per-sonnel or state and local officials, and that utro's lack of legal authority to implement its off41te plan precluded a finding of reasonable assur-ance that the public health and safety would be protected in the. event of a radiological emergency. As discussed later, Lnco's authority to imple-
'. ment its plan without state and local government participation remains a major issue in the NRC operating license proceeding.
In November 1984, utro requested NRC to ask FEMA to begin planning for I FEMA Exercised the LILCO an exercise of the emergency plan for Shoreham. FEMA was initially Plan reluctant to exercise the utro plan because not all previously identified planning deficiencies had been resolved. In addition, as discussed above, the courts and an NRC licensing board issued decisions related to the l
legal authority issue. In June 1985, however, NPC determined that despite the legal authority issue, there was no reason why utro should
- not be allowed to exercise those parts of the plan that it could legally exercise and that the exercise could yield meaningful results. Later in June, NRC requested that FEMA schedule as full an exercise of the utro
- plan as feasible, emphasizing response capabilities within the 10-mile plume exposure zone. ,
i j . sin the state of New York, the highest court is the Court of Appeals. IAwer courts include the Appel-I
- late Division of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court.
l Page 18 GAO/BCED47-50 Emergency Preparedness
i Appendix I Emergency Planning Aroemd the shoreham
. Nuclear Power station On October 29,1985, FEMA informed NRC that the inadequacies identified -
during its review of revision 5 of utro's plan did not preclude the con-duct of an exercise. FEMA pointed out, however, that the reluctance of county and state officials to participate and the legal authority issue would place special parameters on the conduct of the exercise. Such an exercise, FEMA went on, Would be dramatically different from typical exercises at other nuclear plant sites and would not allow it to reach a finding of reasonable assurance. FEMA also concluded that conducting an exercise could provide information to NRC as to ulro's on-site and off-site emergency response capabilities. FEMA presented NRC with two exer-cise options:
. Qptlngn 1. Set aside all functions and exercise objectives related to issues of utro's legal authority and state and local government participation.
Only functions outlined for uIro would be exercised.
. Qpggp_2. Include all functions and normal exercise objectives. Federal personnel would simulate the roles of key state or local officials unable or unwilling to participate.
In November 1985, NRC requested FEMA to Conduct as full an exercise as feasible at Shoreham consistent with the approach outlined in the second option. Such an exercise, NRC noted, would be useful in the licensing process Opposition to the proposed exercise was expressed by Suffolk County and New York State government officials and various members of Con-gress. Other members, however, were in favor of the exercise, indicating that state and local governments should not be permitted to veto the operation of a commercial nuclear plant simply by refusing to partici-pate in preparing, exercising, or implementing emergency preparedness plans. FEMA testified before a congressional subcommittee in November 1985 that since NRC requested an exercise, FEMA was obligated to Con-duct one both under its memorandum of understanding and as NRC's off-site preparedness consultant.
, The principal difference between the proposed exercise of the utro plan and those at other nuclear plants was that the planning and conduct of the off-site portion would be done by the utility instead of by state and local personnel.
, A full-scale exercise was conducted on February 13,1986, and was assessed using evaluation criteria contained in NUREG-0654, as well as standard objectives used in other exercises. The exercise involved Page 19 GAo/BCED4740 Emergency Preparedness
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- Appendix!
Emergency Planning Around the shoreham Nuclear Power station approximately 1,300 participants, not including about 65 representa-tives of federal agencies who directed and evaluated the exercise and simulated the roles of state and local officials. These simulations were limited to testing whether 1.nro personnel could accommodate and respond to state and local officials during an emergency. The exercise evaluated the following operations:
. Local Emergency Response Organization Emergency Operation Center.
. Emergency Operation Facility.
. Brookhaven Area Office.
. Emergency News Center.
. Patchogue, Port Jefferson, and Riverhead Staging Areas.
. Emergency Worker Decontammation Facility.
. Reception Center.
. Congregate Care Centers.
. Medical drill.
. Bus evacuation of school children and general population. -
. Evacuation of the mobility-impaired.
. Traffic control points.
. Route alerting.
. Impediments to evacuation.
. Radiological field monitoring.
The FEMA exercise assessment report noted 5 deficiencies and 38 areas requiring corrective action. The five deficiencies follow:
. Responding to a traffic impediment was not done in a timely manner.
. Copying capability at the Emergency News Center was insufficient.
. Dispatching of bus drivers was untimely.
. Wrong bus routes were followed.
. Dispatching of traffic guides was untimely.
FutA defines deficiencies as inadequacies that would result in a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate. Areas requiring corrective action are also inadequacies but are not considered to affect public health and safety.
!. At a briefing on the exercise held for participants, the public, and the e
media, FEMA's Region II Director said that because the plan cannot be implemented without state and local participation, FDIA cannot deter-mine that there is reasonable assurance that the public's health and safety can be protected. FEMA headquarters, however, had agreed with NRC to make no overall finding with respect to the exercise assessment.
l l
Page 20 GAo/ECED4740 Emergency Preparedness i
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o, Appendix I
.. Eniersency Fianning Around the shoreham Nuclear Power stados Therefore, it requested the Regional Director to delete this overall finding from the draft post-exercise assessment report. He refused and subsequently resigned because of the issue.
~ The post-exercise assessment report was submitted to NRC on April 17, 1986, with neither a positive nor negative finding of reasonable assur-ance. The report did point out, however, that the exercise was limited without state and local government pardeipation and, therefore, FEMA could not measure the capabilities and preparedness af state and local governments if they were to be called on to respond. The report also indicated that demonstration of more than one third of the official ex cise objectives was affected by the legal authority issue.
FEMA did not require 1.nCo to Conduct a formal POblic meeting after the exercise of 1.nco's plan, although FEMA requires state and local govern-ments to hold such meetings after their emergency plans are exercised.
- FEMA's position on this matter was that the public meeting requirement only pertains to its reviews of state and local emergency plans con-ducted in accordance with its regulations for such reviews. FEMA's exer-cise report, however, will be the subject of hearings open to the public before an NRC licensing board. On June 6,1986, NRc ordered immediate hearings on 1.uro's exercise of the emergency plan for Shoreham t.uro submitted revision 7 of its off-site emergency plan to NRc on June 20, 1986. The purpose of this revision was to resolve deficiencies identified by the FEMA exercise assessment requiring plan and/or procedure changes. According to FEMA offlClais, utro has also submitted revision 8 of its plan. As of October 1,1986, FEMA had not begun its review of either of these revisions. According to FEMA and NRC officials, the public hearings are not likely to begin until early 1987. FEMA Could also be
' called upon to conduct a remedial exercise of the plan at some time in the future.
l With respect to the lack of state and county participation and the
' resulting legal authority issue, NRC's Commissioners issued a decision on July 24,1986, stating that in evaluating the utro plan, NRC can reason-ably be assumed that some "best effort" state and county response in the event of an actual accident would be made. The decision also held that the "best efforts" would utilize the utro plan as the best source for I
- emergency plamdng information and procedures because the utro plan
- is clearly superior to no plan at all. The Commission was unwilling to assume, however, that this kind of best effort government response would necessarily be adequate. Given questions on such matters as the familiarity of state and county officials with the utro plan and how GAo/ ACED.87 50 Emergency Frew _
Page 21
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AppendiaI Emergency sw ,r Plan.ning .,w Around the shoreham
. r
. The exercise testing the effectiveness of Laro's plan was carried out by LILco personnel without state and local participation.
. FEMA did not require LHfo to hold a formal public meeting following the
~
exercise to inform citizens of test results and obtain their comments-something FEMA requires of state and local governments after they have exercised their off-site emergency plans.
. In providing NRc with the results of its review and exercise of Luro's plan, FEMA did not provide NRC with overall findings on the adequacy of Ln40's plan or the utility's ability to implement the plan.
The NRc and FEMA review of Off-site emergency preparedness at Shoreham is on-going, and no final NRc decisions have been made.
Clearly, NRc is breaking nev/ ground as the Shoreham proceeding is the first case in which NRc is attempting to determine, in the absence of state and local plans, whether an off-site emergency plan prepared by a utility reasonably assures that public health and safety will not be endangered by the plant's operation.
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. Appendix II Objectives, Scope, and Methodology in light of the April 1986 accident at the Soviet Union's Chernobyl nuclear power plant, on May 2,1986, Senator Alfonse D'Amato asked us
- for a report addressing several aspects of the regulation of commercial nuclear power plants and nuclear reactors under the jurisdiction of the Department of Energy. This report addresses that pan of the Senator's request pertaining to federal procedures for reviewing, testing, and approving emergency response plans around commercial nuclear power plants, with particular emphasis on the Shoreham Nuclear Power Sta-tion on Iong Island, New York.
As agreed with Senator D'Amato's office, our objectives were to examine the procedures followed to date in preparing, reviewing, and testing the off-si.te emergency response plan for the Shoreham plant and to determine whether and how the procedures differed from those used at other commercial nuclear power plants.
We reviewed pertinent federal statutes, regulations, and criteria for pre-paring and evaluating radiological emergency response plans. We also reviewed the memorandum of understanding between NRC and H:MA dealing with off-site emergency planning issues. At ITMA Region II(New York, N.Y.), we reviewed files detailing how the Shoreham plan was pre-pared, reviewed, and tested, and the reactions of organizations and indi-viduals to how the process was carried out. Documents in these files originated from NRc, TEMA, FEMA's Regional Assistance Committee, the state of New York, Suffolk County, uwo, members of Congress, and others. We discussed the process of preparing, reviewing, and testing the Shoreham plan with FEMA Region II officials in New York, N.Y.,
including the former Chairman of the Regional Assistance Committee l that evaluated it.
! We also discussed general aspects of off-site emergency planning and the specifics of the review of emergency planning at the Shoreham plant with officials of NRC's Office of Inspection and Enforcement (Bethesda, Md.) and NRC's Region I(King of Prussia, Pa.). In addition, we met with uwo officials and toured the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.
We discussed the contents of this report with agency officials as it was being developed and incorporated their views where appropriate. How-ever, as requested by your office, we did not obtain official comments on the report.
l Page 24 GAo/RCED87 50 Emergency Preparedness L
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Appenda E
- Objectives.5 cope.and Methodolosr Our review was conducted between July and October 1986 and was per-formed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing Standards.
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i (301738) Fese SS GAO/ECED4740 Emergency Preparedness j
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