ML20206M489
| ML20206M489 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/13/1987 |
| From: | Bachmann R NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | Kline J, Margulies M, Shon F Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#287-3132 OL-3, NUDOCS 8704200120 | |
| Download: ML20206M489 (38) | |
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UNITED STATES LetATEDGORg 3g,ggggy,@
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Morton B. Margulies, Chairman Frederick J. Sh8k "E d[1[iG Administrative Jud e Administrative Judge F
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555 Dr. Jerry R. Kline Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licendag Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Coamission Washington, DC 20555 In the Matter of LONG ISLAND LIGIITING COMPANY (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1)
Docket No. 50-322-OL-3 (Emergency Planning)
Dear Administrative Judges:
Enclosed herewith is the Staff's prefiled testimony on the issue of reception center monitoring.
Sincerely, Richard G. Bachmann Counsel for NRC Staff ec W/ enclosure:
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGITLATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMTC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
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Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
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(Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
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TESTIMONY OF FALK KANTOR ON MONITORING OF EVACUEES Q1.
Please state your name and position at the NRC.
A1.
My name is Falk Kanter.
I am employed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a Section Chief in the Emergency Preparedness Branch, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
A copy of my professional qualifications is attached.
Q2 What is the purpose of your testimony?
A2.
The purpose of my testimony is to address the planning basis for the number of evacuees to be monitored at relocation centers (also referred to as reception centers).
Q3 Where was this issue raised?
A 3.
The Shoreham OL-3 Licensing Board found (in LB P-85-31, August 26, 1985) that LILCO's emergency plan contains provisions for monitoring only evacuees who may seek shelter in the event of an emergency at Shoreham. The Board further stated that LILCO must plan for the monitoring of all evacuees from the emergency
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planning zone (EPZ) who seek monitoring, whether or not these evacuees seek shelter.
04.
What Commission rcFrulations are applicable to the evaluation of this issue?
A4.
The applicable portion of the regulations is 10 C.F.R.
5 50.47(b)(10) which provides that emergency response plans for nuclear power reactors must meet the following standard:
A range of protective actions have been developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public.
Guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in place, and protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ appropriate to the locale have been developed.
Q5.
What guidance supports this planning standard and is to be used by reviewers in evaluating the adequacy of emergency preparedness at nuclear power reactor sites?
A5.
Guidance for
- this, standard is found in the document NUREG-0654 /FEh1A -REP-1, Rev. 1, issued in November 1980, in particular evaluation criterion J.12 which states:
Each organization shall describe the means for registering and monitoring of evacuees at relocation centers in host areas.
The personnel and equipment available should be capable of monitoring within about a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 4
period all residents and transients in the plume exposure EPZ arriving at relocation centers.
As indicated in NUREG-0654, criterion J.12 is one of the evaluation criteria applicable to the development of offsite
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cmergency plans and thus is an area of emergency preparedness which is reviewed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
Q6.
What considerations led to the development of Criterion J.12 in NUREG-0654?
AG.
The considerations expressed in NUREG-0396, the report of a joint NRC-EPA task force on emergency planning issued in 1978, and the lessons learned during and after the accident at Three Pfile Island led to the development of the planning criteria in NUREG-0654 including J.12.
The radiological characteristics of potential releases show that materials which could lead to contamination of members of the public, although less likely to be released than other gaseous and volatile fission products, should not be neglected in planning.
Considering the experience at TPfT which indicated a concern regarding contamination among some members of the public, the NRC and FEMA staff developers of NUREC-0654 concluded that the planning basis for emergency response at nuclear nower plants should include a capability at relocation centers to monitor evacuees from the EPZ for contamination.
NRC views evaluation criterion J.12 to be a means of assuring that offsite response organizations have provisions included in their emergency plans and procedures for monitoring members of the public evacuated from the plume exposure EPZ, including evacuees requesting shelter and those requesting monitoring only.
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No specific number or percentage of the EPZ population to be monitored is given in NUREG-0654.
Based on planning concepts that included (1) the potential consequences, timing and release characteristics of a spectrum of accidents rather than a single worst-case accident, (2) predetermined protective actions based on plant conditions, and (3) protective actions that initially would be taken over part rather than the whole of the EPZ (the keyhole concept), it was the judgment of the staff that local offsite response organizations need not possess the capability for monitoring the entire or even the majority of the EPZ population for contamination.
The intent was for offsite organizations to have sufficient capability to monitor a reasonable number of evacuees to determine the existence and extent of a contamination situation and to allay public concerns.
The intent of the 12-hour period in J.12 was to provide a recommended objective for planning purposes and for evaluating monitoring capacity (i.e., personnel and equipment).
Consistent with the planning basis expressed in NUREG-0654 and NUREG-0396 that for the worst possible accidents protective actions would need to be expanded and that detailed planning for the EPZs would provide a substantial base for expansion of response efforts in the event this proved necessary, it was recognized that for a serious core damage accident resulting in a large release of radioactive materials offsite, the monitoring d
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s capabilities of offsite agencies would need to be supplemented by other industry and governmental resources including the Federal capability.
The objective in this case would be to expand the monitoring capability to provide monitoring services to all members of the public within and beyond the EPZ who needed or wanted to be monitored.
The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> period in evaluation criterion J.12 is not considered to be applicable in this extraordinary situation as these other industry and governmental resources would be expected to respond on a best effort basis.
Q.7 What additional guidance is available regarding evaluation criterion J.12?
A7.
During the course of its review of monitoring capabilities at relocation centers in offsite emergency response plans, FEBIA developed additional guidance for its staff reviewers in a FEMA memorandum from Richard W.
Krimm dated December 24, 1985.
The guidance is as follows:
The State and local radiological emer-gency preparedness plans should include provisions at relocation center (s) in the form of trained personnel and equipment to monitor a minimum of 20 percent of the estimated population to be evacuated.
5 For highly improbable radiological releases involving high levels of radiation encompassing a relatively large area, it may be necessary to monitor a greater number of evacuees beyond 20 percent of the population.
In such a situation, State and local governments would be expected to develop and implement ad hoc response measures, supplemented, if needed, by Federal and private sector resources.
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Q8.
What are the NRC views regarding this guidance?
A8.
The NRC supports the guidance in the FEMA December 24, 1985 memorandum as being an appropriate interpretation of evaluation criterion J.12.
As indicated in the memorandum, FEMA's estimate that 20% of the evacuees will arrive at relocation centers for monitoring is based on an examination of responses to a variety of natural and technological emergencies (including the TMI accident) with an allowance for uncertainties associated with radiological emergencies.
The 20% guideline value is considered to equate to, as an upper limit for planning purposes, 20% of the population of the plume exposure EPZ and to include evacuees from the EPZ requesting sheltering and those who desire monitoring only.
The NRC is also in agreement with the second part of the FEMA guidance, namely that for highly improbable radiological releases involving high levels of radiation encompassing a relatively large ares, it may be necessary to monitor a greater number of evacuees beyond 20% of the population of the EPZ.
Offsite emergency plans should contain provisions for expanding the monitoring effort if needed including the use of industry and government resources.
The NRC believes that any serious accident involving core damage and offsite releases would most likely result in the activation of the Federal response capability as described in the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (50 FR 46542, November 8, 1985).
Federal resources as well as other industry and government resources would be expected to l
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Q9.
Has the PRC evaluated the reasonableness of the 20% EPZ population figure as guidance for planning for the number of evacuecs to be monitored at relocation centers for Shoreham?
A9.
Yes, the reasonableness of the 20% EPZ population figure as guidance for planning for the number of evacuees to be monitored at relocation centers for Shoreham based on the projected number of people who could potentially be affected by a release is addressed in the testimony of NRC witness Lewis G. Hulman. His study indicates that even for a significant release in which no protective actions (i.e., shelter and/or evacuation) are taken, monitoring for 20% of the population within the EPZ appears to be an adcquate planning basis.
Q10.
What guidance applies to the development of plans for decontamination?
A10.
NUREG-0654 does not contain any specific guidance regarding the decontamination capability which should be included in offsite response plans.
Staff developers of NUREG-0654 assumed that if offsite agencies were required to plan to monitor evacuees then it was to be expected that a capability to decontaminate any evacuees found to be contaminated would be included in the offsite response plans.
This area of offsite emergency preparedness is reviewed by FEPfA.
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Q11.
Ilave you reviewed the information provided by LILCO regarding the.fssue of monitoring evacuees?
All.
During the course of this proceeding, I have examined the information on this issue provided by LILCO.
LILCO submitted information on mordtoring evacuees in the testimony of B! arch 30, 1987. This information indicates that LILCO is planning to monitor 20% of the plume exposure EPZ population and has developed provisions for expanding the response capability, if necessary, through the use of additional company, industry and Federal government resources.
This area of offsite emerFency preparedness for Shoreham is being reviewed by FEBfA.
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EMERGEf!CY PREPAREDNESS LICENSING BRANCH DIVISION OF EMERGENCY PREPARrDNESS AND ENGINEERING RESPONSR OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATION 8 i
I am employed as a Section Chief in the Emergency Preparedness Branch, Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I have responsibility for supervising the review and evaluation of radiological emergency plans submitted by reactor applicants and licensees to assure proposed plans meet the regulatory requirements and guidance of the Commission.
I also funMion as a Team Member on Emergency Preparedness Inspection Teams engaged in the observation of nuclear power plant emergency drills and exercises.
I received a BG degree in Industrial Engineering in 1958 from the Pennsylvania State University.
Upon graduation I entered the U.S. Air Force where I attended the Basic Meteorology Pmgram at St. Louis University in St. Louis, Missouri.
Following the completion.of this program in 1959, I served as a weather officer in the U.S. Air Force.
In 1063, I began employment with the Westinghouse Electric Corporation at the Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
My duties included the design of radiation shielding for nuclear power reactors for both landbased and shipboard applicants.
I participated in field tests at Federal reactor facilities to evaluate the effectiveness of shield design features on operating reactors.
I entered graduate school in 1967 at the University of Pittsburgh on a U.S. Public Health Service Fellowship and received a MS degree in 1968 in Radiation Health (Health Physics).
Following graduation I was employed by the NUS Corporation in Rockville, Maryland, an engineering and environmental consulting organization.
At NUS I was involved in the l
environmental aspects of siting both nuclear and fossil power plants.
I have been a member of the NRC (AEC) Staff since January 1973. From that time until June 1980 I held the position of Site Analyst in the Accident Analysis Branch.
My dutien included the review and evaluation of the radiological consequences of postulated design basis accidents, the effectiveness of proposed engineered safety features, the population density and growth characteristics in the site environs, and the possible adverse effects on plant safety of nearby industrial, transportation and military facilities.
From September 1980 until March 1981 I was a member of the NRC's onsite technical support section at the Three Mile Island facility.
I have participated in the detailed review of over thirty nuclear power plant sites with the primary objective being to ensure public health and safety through the application of Commission regulatory requirements and guidance on reactor siting.
I have presented testimony on siting and emergency preparedness issues at public hearings on licensing of nuclear
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facilities and have appeared before the Advisory Committee on Reactor Fafeguards.
In addition to my formal education, I have attended training courses sponsored by the NRC on reactor systems and operation and emergency preparedness.
In May of 1979 I attended the course titled " Planning for NucIcar Emergencies" at Harvard University and in September 1980 I participated in the Radiological Emergency Response Operations Training course at the Nevada Test Site.
I am a professional member of the Health Physics Society and the American Fleteorological Society.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE TIIE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
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LONG ISLAND LIGIITING COMPANY
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Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
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(Emergency Planning)
(Shorcham Nuclear Power Station,
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l Unit 1)
)
TESTIMONY OF LEWIS G. HULMAN ON MONITORING OF EVACUEES Q1.
Please state your name and position at the NRC.
A1.
My name is Lewis G.
Hulman.
I am employed by the U. S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as Chief of the Plant Systems B ranch, Division of Boiling Water Reactors, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
A copy of my professional qualifications is attached to my testimony.
Q2.
What evaluation have you performed with respect to the Intervenors' contention insofar as it relates to monitoring of evacuees from the Shoreham 10 mile EPZ?
A2.
My evaluation consisted of estimating the conditional probability of the number of people within the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) which could be within the plume of an accidental release of radioactivity from Shoreham.
I refer to this evaluation as a footprint assessment.
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Q3.
In your footprint assessment, what basic data and assumptions did you use?
A3.
I used projected population estimates made by the licensee for the summer of the year 2020.
These estimates are summarized in Figure 2.1.3-5 of the licensee's Updated Safety Analysis Report, dated December 1986.
The total 10 mile population estimate is 230,646 people.
Population estimates were made for 16 pie shaped wedger, radiating out from the Shoreham reactor at one mile intervals.
Summer estimates for the year 2020 were used since they represented the greatest population expected within the 10 mile EPZ.
Two kinds of meteorological data were used.
The first set of data is the number of hours that each of si:: atmospheric stability 1
classes were determined for the Shoreham site during the period from October 1, 1973 to September 30, 1974.
The numbers of hours were available for the 16 directions which were 180o out of phase with the directional population estimates, i.e., the wind directions recorded are the directions from which the wind was blowing, while the population is distributed according to the direction the wind would be blowing toward.
The second set of data are number of hours the wind blew in each of the 16 sectors.
The data were obtained from Table 2.3.2-7 through Table 2.3.2-14 of the Shoreham Final Safety Analysis Report.
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t Atmospheric stability is a measure of the capability. of the atmosphere to diffuse and dilute contaminants.
The atmospheric stability is often determined by the temperature gradient of the atmosphero.
The other key meteorological parameters which govern the diffusion and transport of containment plumes are wind speed and wind direction.
Based upon many diffusion studies performed throughout the world, a relationship between temperature gradient with height and atmospheric stability has been established.
The atmospheric stability ranges from very good diffusion conditions, termed unstable, through very poor diffusion conditions, termed stable.
Historically, six or seven stability classes (A through F or G, the G class being a subset of the F class when only six are considered are used to define dispersion) are used to define dispersion.
Test data, in turn, have been used to establish the parameters necessary to describe dispersion.
I used a typical Gaussian dispersion model of the form X =
e-H8/2a 2 where; Q
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X = the downwind contaminant concentration in grams / meter cubed; Q = the concentration of contaminant released in grams /second; 4 = the wind speed in meters per second; o, = the crosswind dispersion parameter in meters; o, = the vertical dispersion parameter in meters; and H = the release height in meters.
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The values of o and o, have been estimated experimentally as y
fun.ctions of stability class and distance from the release point.
Based upon a theoretical evaluation of a Gaussian concentration distribution, 1 some 99.73 percent of the concentration of contaminant may be ernected in a plume i3 o wide. I used 3 o y
y to def!ne my plume width.
I also used wind direction data without regard to stability for the Shoreham site.
These data were obtained from Table 2.3.2-14 of the Final Safety Evaluation Report.
Q4.
I note that your calculations were computer generated.
What computer code did you tise?
A4.
I used a commercially available code called LOTUS to perform my calculations, record the sources of the data I used, and to identify the assumptions I made.
Q5.
Ilow would you characterize your footprint assessment?
A5.
I have estimated the likelihood of the number of people within the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone that could be within a rsdioactive plume should an accident happen at Shoreham.
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Air Pollution Meteorology; U.S. EPA Air Pollution Training Institute;
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Research Triangle Park; North Carolina; August 1973.
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is, given an accident at Shoreham that results in an atmospheric release, I have estimated the likelihood of various numbers of people being effected by a radioactive cloud.
No consideration was given in this analysis to the likelihood of such accidents, to the amounts of various radionuclides that could be released, nor to protective actions such as sheltering and evacuation.
J Q6.
What assumptions did vou use to estimate the population in an accident plume?
A6.
I made three assumptions.
First, I estimated the population in l
eac14 of 16 directions between 2 and 10 miles based upon estimates of plume size.
Plume sizes were, in turn, estimated for each of 6 stability classes (A through F). Each plume size at 10 miles was estimated i
hssed on staff practice for assessing doses for design basis accidents.
This practice in effect limits the horizontal growth of a plume at distances less than 10 miles for stability classes A, B and C.
This practice is a conservative one when used to estimate doses to people in the path of a plume since the concentration of i
contaminant at any location would be greater than if the plume were allowed to spread without limit.
4 I then estimated the population under a plume within each of the 16 sectors.
This was done by taking the ratio of a plume width six o wide at 10 miles to the width of one of the 16 pie shaped y
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I wedges at 10 miles times the population estimate in that wedge.
To.this weighted population, the number of people out to 2 miles in all directions not under the plume was added. The purpose of this addition was solely to conservatively estimate the number of people that could be within a plume.
The result of the addition wss to create a keyhole shaped footprint.
This resulted in a distribution of 16 sector population estimates for each of 6 stability classes, or a total of 96 values.
The population values were then ordered from the largest to the smallest, and the corresponding number of hours for each stability class in each direction were paired with each corresponding population value.
The number of hours were then summed, and the percent of the total time was calculated for each population value.
A curve of the " footprint" population as a function of the percent of time was then drawn.
This weighted population as a function of the percent of time was then used to draw conclusions.
(See Figure 1).
Q7.
Did you also make additional calculations?
A7.
Yes.
I made two additional calculations because of the nature of two assumptions in the first calculation.
Q8.
Please describe the other two calculations.
A8.
The calculation described above was called Case 1.
The other two were called Case 2 and Case 3, respectively.
Three cases or calculations were made to test the sensitivity of various
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assumptions to estimates of the numbers of people within the effe. cts of an accidental release.
All three cases were used in drawing my conclusions.
In Case 2, I made the same calculations as for Case 1 with one change in assumption.
For this Case I assumed a radioactive plume would continue to grow horizontally, or broaden, rather than be limited to the 3,000 meters in Case 1.
In effect, this assumption would put significantly more people in a plume.
(See Figure 2).
In Case 3. I assumed that all people from 2 to 10 miles in each of the 16 221 degree sectors, plus all those within 2 miles, could be within a plume.
I then weighted each of the 16 population estimates by the percent of time the wind could be expected to blow in that direction.
In effect, this case assumes no difference in plume growth, or differences in plume size, for different atmospheric stability assumptions, and assumes everyone in a 22) degree sector, plus everyone within 2 miles would be influenced by a release.
(See Figure 3).
QD.
What do your curves of weighted population represent?
A9.
They may be considered estimates of the likelihood of numbers of people in an accidentally released plume.
That is, given an accidental release of radioactivity, they can be viewed as a 5
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probabilistic estimate of the number of people that may be contaminated if no protective actions are taken.
Stated another way, given an accidental release of radioactivity of s,ufficient magnitude to be measured out to the 10 mile EPZ, the curves represent estimates of the likelihood of the number of people that could be contaminated if the people did not move.
Q10.
h' hen you indicated people do not move; what do you mean?
A10.
I mean I assumed that all people within 2 miles of Shoreham, and people from 2 to 10 miles within a plume, could be contaminated without regard to such emergency response actions as evacuation before the plume reaches them.
I consider this assumption a significant conservatism.
Q11.
What do you consider the primary limitations of your evaluation?
All.
My assessment does not account for either wind direction changes during an accident, nor does it account for the effects of i
precipitation.
In both cases, the numbers of people exposed to a plume could be greater than the " footprint" I used.
However, by assuming everyone within 2 miles, and everyone under a plume from 2 to 10 miles, to be within the plume influence without regard to emergency response, I believe I have more than offset these limitations.
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What do your footprint estimates show?
A12.
The.y show the range of the number of people who could be in a plume in the event of an accident.
For example, 20 percent of the year 2020 10 mile EPZ population is some 46,000 people. From each of the graphs, an estimate of the percent of time 46,000 people or less may be within a plume may be determined. Even in the most conservative of the three cases, the planning basis 20% would be a conservative estimate of the number of people who might be within a plume.
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LEWIS G. I!ULMAN PROFESSIONAI. QUALIFICATIONS g
I am the Chief of the Plant Systems Branch, Division of Dolling Water Reactors, in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regult; tion. I was formerly the Chief of the Accident Analysis B ranch, Chief of Systems Interaction Branch and Chief of the Hydrology-Meteorology Branch, also both in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
My formal education consists of study in Engineering at the University of Iowa where I received a BS in 1958, and an MS in Engineering Mechanics and Hydraulics in 1967.
In addition, I have taken postgraduate courses at the University of Nebraska, MIT, Colorado State University, and the University of California, and numerous management, technical and computer utilization courses sponsored by the government.
My employment with NRC (formerly AEC) dates from February 1971 with both the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and the former Office of
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Reactor Safeguards, and for consultation on the siting of materials utilizction facilities.
I have been responsible for the assessment of the potential for accidents 2 esulting from natural phenomena, accident analysess, system performance under accident conditions, the generation
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and transport of fission and activation products within and outside j
nuc! car power plants, fire protection, health physics, plant systems, and the radiological consequences of accidental releases.
4 A, scheduled reorganization of NRC has identified me as Chief of the Severe Accident Issues Branch in the Office of Research. This reorgant-zation is scheduled for implementation on April 12,'1987.
My responsi-bilities under this reorganization will include resolution of severe accident i
issues, assessment of severe accident phenomenology, implementation of the Commission's Severe Accident Policy, accident consequences and source terms and analysis techniques, Safety Goal evaluation and l
implementations,
the develop!nent and implementation of containment performance design objections, accident management analysis, and the I
agency technical focal point on emergency preparedness and siting i
rulemakings.
J From November, 1985 until the reorganization. I have been Chief of the Plant Systems Branch, Division of Bolling V.'ater Reactor Licensing, MRR.
In this position I have been responsible for review of plant t
systems and environmental assessments.
Included in the scope of responsibilities has been activities associated with fire protection, contain-ment and penetration leak
- testing, feedwater
- systems, radwaste occupational and offsite exposures, fuel hcndling, flood protection, water supply
- adequacy, accident
- analyses, generators,
- turbines, water chemistry and environmental assessments of licensee proposals,. I have also been a participant in a staff initiative to identify potential improvements in bo!!!ng water reactor containments to improve their ability to mitigate the consequeaces of severe accidents.
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.From December, 1981 through November 1, 1985 I supervised the preparation of all the accident sections for draft and final Environmental, Impact Statements, Safety Evaluation Reports; and participated in the staff's evaluation of Zion, Indian Point and Limerick and GESSAR standard plant design PR A's.
In addition, I participated in the development of the technical bases for safety guides and standards, and in rescarch assessments.
From !Lfarch 1980 through mid-April 1981 I was employed in private industry. as a Vice President with Tetra Tech. Inc. in Pasadena, California.
During this period I
was responsible for business development, and for managing several contracts involving various engineering studies, including several contracts for government and industry.
Of note were studies of a nuclear power plant in Yugoslavia for the International Atomic Energy Agency, risk and risk aversion studies in the Dominican Republic, a refinery intake design in Indonesia, 4
and Hurricane risk assessments in Texas, North Carolina, Florida, and New Jersey.
From 1968 to 1971 I was a hydraulic Engineer with the Corps of Engineers' Hydrologic Engineering Center in Davis, California, where I worked as a consultant for most Corps' offices, participated as an j
instructor in training courses, and conducted research.
1 From 1963 to 1968, I was a Supervisory Ilydraulic Engineer with the Philadelphia District, Corps of Engineers.
As Assistant Chief of the IlydroloFy Branch, I was responsible for design aspects of multi-purpose i
dams, navigation projects, coastal engineering development and special studies on mitteling of dams, inlets, water supply, and shoaling, salt water intrusion, and the effects of dredging.
From 1958 to Ifl63, I was a Ilydraulic Engineer with the Omaha District of the Corps of Engineers.
I was responsible for the hydraulic design of flood control channels, hydraulic design of structurce for large dams and i
several flood control projects.
I also received training in, probabilistic assessments, hydrologic engineering, structural engineering, sedimentation, river training studies and design, and water resource i
project formulation.
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I have published in journals or periodicals of the American Society of j
Civil Engineers, the American Water Works Association, the Journal of Marine Geodesy, the National Society of Professional Engineers, the American Geophysical Union, Physics Magazine, the American Nuclear Society and in internal technical papers and seminar proceedings of the l
Corps of Engineers, the AEC, and the NRC.
I am a registered Professional Engineer in the States of Nebraska and California.
I am a member of the American Society of Civil Engineers, the American Meteorological Society, and the American Geophysical Union.
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- j UNITED STATES OF APfERICA NUCLEAR REGUT.ATORY COMMISSION 1
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
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Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
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(Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
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Unit 1)
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TESTIMONY OF DR. TIIOMAS URBANIK II ON BEHALF OF THE NRC STAFF ON CAPACITY ANALYSIS IN THE VICIMITY OF RECEPTION CENTERS Q1.
State your name and occupation.
A1.
My name is Thomas Urbanik II.
I am an Associate Research Engineer associated with the Texas Transportation Institute of the Texas A&M University System, College Station Texas.
02.
Have you prepared c statement of your professional qualifications?
A2.
Yes.
A statement of my professional qualifications is attached to this testimony.
Q3.
In what capacity are you testifying in this proceeding?
A3.
I am testifying on behalf of the NRC staff, for which I serve as a consultant through the Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories.
Battelle is responsible under contract to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for reviewing evacuation time estimates for nuclear
>: r' facilities and related emergency planning issues.
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Q4.
Briefly summarize your experience with emergency planning for nuclear facilities.
A4.
I was principal author of NUREG/CR-1745,
" Analysis of Techniques for Estimating Evacuation Times for Emergency Planning Zones" (November 1980), which described the limitations of several methodologies and some alternatives for determining evacuation time estimates.
- Also, I provided input to the development of the current guidance for evacuation time estimate studies which appears in Appendix 4 to NUREG-9654, Revision 1,
" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluttion of Radiological Emergency Response Plans for Prepa:'edness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, llev.1, November 1980).
In addition. I reviewed for the NRC the initial evacuation time estimate submittals of approximately U2 operating and near term nuclear facilities against the guidaace of NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, Revision 0, the results of which are published in NUREG/CR-1856.
I am a coauthor of the CLEAR computer model which is published in MUREG/CR-2054.
I also was a coauthor of an independent assessment of the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station Evacuation Times which is published in NUREG/CR-2903.
I have appeared on behalf of the NRC staff at a number of licensing hearings including Shoreham concerning evacuation time estimates.
l Q5.
What is the purpose of this testimony?
A5.
The purpose of this testimony is to address the Contention on j
"the adequacy of evacuation routes to the three LILCO facilities
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t proposed as reception centers, including the effects of traffic congestion on' the way to and in the vicinity of the facilities, and LILCO's Revision 8 proposal to employ traffic guides on Nassau County roadways."
A6.
What is the relevant guidance concerning the contention?
A6.
There is no specific guidance concerning traffic control at reception centers.
Q7.
What was the scope of your review of Long Island Lighting Company's evaluation of the adequacy of evacuation routes to reception centers for Evacuees from the Shoreham Emergency Planning Zone?
A7.
I have reviewed the report prepared for LILCO entitled " Capacity Analysis of Highways in the Vicinity of Reception Centers for Evacuees from within the Shoreham Station Emergency Planning Zone" (KLD TR-192) prepared by KLD Associates, Inc.,
Huntington Station, N.Y., September 26, 1986.
I have also reviewed another report prepared by KLD Associates, Inc. for LILCO entitled "Canscity Analysis on Approach Routes to the l
SNPS Reception Centers" (KLD TE-201), dated March 28, 1987.
KLD TR-192 is an expansion and update of kLD TR-192.
I have also reviewed some hand calculations which were used in i
preparation of KLD TR-192, and some computer disks which I
contained the data used in the capacity analysis in KLD TR-201.
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What is your professionni opinion concerning the adequacy of the methodology used by KLD Associates, Inc. in the analysis of the adequacy of access to the reception centers.
A8.
The analysis follows a very traditional traffic engineering approach of estimating traffic demand and capacity in order to ascertain the magnitude of potential problems.
The analysis uses standard traffic engineering analysis procedures and the approach meets a simple test of reasonableness.
09.
What is the appropricte planning basis for the amount of traffic to be accommodated at reception centers and what were the traffic numbers used in KLD TR-2017 A9.
It is my understanding that FEMA has suggested that 20 percent of the evacuees would be the appropriate planning basis for reception centers.
The KLD TR-201 study used 30% of the EPZ 4
population as evacuation traffic to the reception centers and 100%
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background (i.e., traffic normally using the roadways during the time periods being evaluated) in evaluating the capability of reception centers and nearby roadways.
Q10.
Is the use of 100% background traffic appropriate?
A10.
Yes.
Analysis of traffic conditions using 100% background traffic indicates intersections where the addition of evacuation traffic to normal background traffic causes traffic congestion.
Appropriate traffic control plans, such as those in KLD TR-192, can then be developed to determine whether adequate capacity can be achieved l
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consistent with the previously described planning basis.
I also concur with the recommendation in KLD TR-201 that additional attention be given to designing control tactics beyond those in KLD TB-192.
Q11.
Vihat would be the effect of any backup traffic at the reception centers on the evacuating traffic from the 10 mile EPZ?
All.
There would be no effect on the evacuating EPZ traffic because of the distance from the 10 mile EPZ to the reception centers.
012.
Is " evacuation shadow" traffic an issue relative to reception centers?
A12.
No.
Evacuation shadow traffic was not considered separately in the KLD analysis.
The issue of evacuation shadow traffic in general has been previously considered as a part of the evacuation time estimate study.
The issue at the reception centers is different from evacuation time estimate studies in j
general.
Reception center traffic is a concern because a portien of the evacuating traffic is being focused on a few points.
The i
key issues are the appropriate number of persons to be processed, the background taffic, the capacity of reception centers, and the capacity of. nearby streets.
Traffic congestion associated with the general evacuation, including " shadow" traffic l
has already been evaluated as a part of the evacuation time l
estimate study.
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Q13.
What is the 1985 HIFhway Capacity Manual and how appropriate is it to the analysis performed?
A13.
The Highway Capacity Manual is the standard traffic engineering reference for computing highway capacity.
Use of the Highway capacity Manual is appropriate for calculating capacities of the roadways.
Roadway capacity is simply the maximum number of vehicles that have a reasonable expectation of passing over a given section of roadway, typically expressed as vehicles per lane per hour.
Q14.
Is it appropriate to consider traffic growth in the analysis of reception center traffic?
A14.
No. Planning for nuclear power plants is an ongoing process.
The current plan should be developed on the best available current data.
If conditions change substantially in the future, it would then be appropriate to revise the analysis and plans if necessary.
Q15.
Has reception center processing time been considered in the KLD cnalysis of reception centers.
A15.
Yes.
KLD TR-201 indicates that reception center processing time is the controlling factor in the analysis.
Q16.
What is your conclusion regarding the adequacy of evacuation routes to the three LILCO facilities proposed as reception centers, including the effects of traffic congestion on the way to
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and in the vicinity of the facilities, and LILCO's Rev. 8 proposal to employ traffic guides on Nassau County roadways?
A16.
Based on my analyses of the information presented for my review, I find nothing with respect to the adequacy of evacuation routes to the three reception centers, including the effects of traffic congestion on the way to and in the vicinity of the facilities, which would preclude processing 30 percent of the Shoreham EPZ population in accordance with NRC/ FEMA guidance, provided that traffic control measures are implemented at critical locations.
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'4 i CURRICULtM VITAE a
URBANIK II Thomas P.E., Ph.D.
OFFICE PHOE :
409/845-1535 HOME ADDRESS: '12 Post Oak Bend Rd.
HOME PHONE:
409/690-6795 College Station, Texas 77840 Birthdate: February 15, 1946 Citizenship:
U.S.
S.S. No.:
079-36-0185 Marital Status: Married, 2 Sons PROFESSIONAL INTERESTS: Traffic Engineering Transportation Planning Evacuation Planning Highway Design / Safety Public Transportation EDUCATION:
Ph.D., Civil Engineering, Texas A&M University,1982 M.S., Transportation Engineering, Purdue University,1971 l
i B.S., Civil Engineering Syracuse University, 1969 B.S., Forest Engineering, New York State College of Environmental Science and Forestry, 1968 PROFESSIONAL LICENSES:
Registered Professional Engineer, Michigan No. 22008 Registered Professional Engineer, Texas No. 42384 EXPERIENCE:
1982-1986 Department of Civil Engineering
- Lecturer Civil Systems Group Texas A&M University College Station, Texas 77843-3136 Undergraduate instruction in transportation engineering and planning, traffic engineering, and highway design.
Transport Operations Program Manager Texas Transportation Institute Texas A&M University College Station, Texas 77843-3135 Duties and responsibilities are to provide specific direction to program in its conduct of transportation research projects for fed-i eral, state, and local transportation agencies.
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.i The range of transportation projects include: traffic engineering, transportation planning, highway safety, public transportation, and s
transportation systems management.
sManagement responsibilities are to identify and pursue research opportunities, locate and recommend staff, monitor research activities to meet budget and project objectives, develop overall program funding, provide an annual staff review (15 personnel),
supervise preparation of proposals, develop writing and communica-tion skills of the program staff, review and allocate work, coor-dinate equipment and staffing needs, recommend and approve perti-nent expenditures for annual budget of approximately $600,000.
1976-1982 Assistant Research Engineer Conducted research, prepared proposals, and provided project super-vision on research activities.
Responsible for final report preparation and presentation.
Research areas included traffic engineering, transportation planning, public transportation and evaluation planning.
1972-1976 Traffic Engineer City of Ann Arbor Department of Streets, Traffic and Parking Ann Arbor, Michigan Responsible to Director of Streets. Traffic and Parking Ann Arbor, Michigan.
Responsible supervisory and professional traffic engi-neering work in directing the traffic engineering function of the department.
Work involved responsibility for the application of professional engineering skill and knowledge to difficult traffic engineering problems in traffic regulation and control, street use, street lighting, geometrics, parking, school safety, curb cuts, and related traffic engineering activities.
Was directly responsible for the supervision of the traffic signal and traffic sign mainte-nance personnel.
1971-1972 Transportation Planning Engineer City of Ann Arbor Traffic Engineering and Transportation Department Ann Arbor, Michigan Responsible to Director of Traffic Engineering and Transportation, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
Reviewed transportation aspects of all plans y,
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s be for development in the city.
Staff member to the Ann Arbor Trans-portation Authority responsible for budget and union negotiations.
Staff Coordinator for the planning, design, implementation, and op-eration of the Dial-A-Ride demand-responsive demonstration project.
1970-1971 Research Assistant Joint Highway Research Project Purdue University West Lafayette, Indiana Conducted research concerning high-way related grade crossings.
Designed attitudinal questionnaire concerning public transportation for a home interview survey in Lafayette, Indiana.
Also analyzed survey results for inclusion in a report on public transportation in Lafayette, Indiana SOCIETY MEMBERSHIP:
Transportation Research Board Institute of Transportation Engineers American Society of Civil Engineers American Society for Engineering Education HONUR SOCIETIES Chi Epsilon CURRENT COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP Chairman, Institute of Traffic Engineers, Texas Section, Committee on Continuing Education Member, Transportation Research Board, Ccmmittee on Intercity Bus Transportation PUBLIC SERVICE Member., Wellborn Community Center, Board of Directors CONTINUING EDUCATION / PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT Association of Oil Pipelines, Educators Tour, July 1984 The University of Michigan, Bureau of Industrial Relations, Graduate School of Business Administration, Principles of Effective Supervisory Management U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration, Digit-al Computer-Urban Traffic Control / Bus Priority System (UTCS/ BPS)
Course.
'S Michigan Department of Civil Service, Principles of Public Sector Labor Relations.
CURRENT RESEARCH
" Cost-Effectiveness Analysis for Ranking New Interchanges and Highway Railroad Grade Separations" Texas State Department of Highways and Public Transportation
" Automated Transit Ridership Data Collection" Texas State Department of Highways and Public Transportation.
" Computerized Dispatch Aids for Small Public Transportation Providers".
Texas State Department of Highways and Public Transportation.
" Safety and Operational Evaluation of Shoulders on Urban Freeways,"
Texas State Department of Highways and Public Transportation.
" Traffic Engineering / Transportation Planning Relative to Evacuation-Time Estimates", Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories.
" Evaluation of Transportation Analysis Techniques Used for Estimating Evacuation Timer at Nuclear Power Plant Sites", Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories.
PUBLICATIONS AND PAPERS Traffic Engineering Understanding Forced Flow, ITE Journal, Institute of Transportation Engineers, Washington, D.C., October 1986.
Safety and Operational Evaluation of Shoulders on Urban Freeways, With Carlos R. Bonilla, Texas State Department of Highways and Public Transportation, Research Report Number 395-1. Austin, Texas, August 1986.
The Effectiveness of Using Freeway Shoulders for Traffic, With Wes Lum, District 6-District 7 Joint Annual Meeting, Institute.of Transportation Engineers, Vancouver, B.C., Canada, July 1986.
Effects of Shoulder Reductions on Highway Safety With Wes Lum, American Society cf Civil Engineers, Specialty Conference on Effectiveness of Highway Safety Improvements, Nashville, Tennessee, March 1986.
Speed / Volume Relationships on Texas Highways, State Department of Highways and Public Transportation, Research Report 327-2F, Austin, Texas, October 1983.
Priority Treatment of Buses at Tra f fic Signals, Transportation Engineering, November 1977.
Priority Treatment of High-Occupancy Vehicles on Arterial Streets..
t State Department of Highways and Public Transportation, Report 205-5, 1977.
Evaluation of Alternative Concepts for Priority Use of Urban Freeways in Texas. State Department of Highways and Public Transportation, Report 205-1, 1977.
Driver Information Systems for Highway-Railway Grade Crossings, with K.W. Heathington, Highway Research Record Number 414, 1972, i
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Evacuation Planning Transportation Analysis for Evacuation:
State-of-the-Art. ITE Journal.
Institute of Transportation Engineers, Washington, D.C.,
March 1986.
An I.ndependent Assessment of Evacuation Times For a Peak Population Scenario in the Emergency Planning Zone of the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station, with others, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-2903, 1982.
CLEAR (Calculates Logical Evacuation And Response). A Generic Transpor-tation Network Model for the Calculation of Evacuation Times Esti-mates, with others, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion NUREG/CR-2504 October 1981.
Analysis of Techniques for Estimating Evacuation Times for Emergency Planning Zones, with others U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG/CR-1745, 1980.
Analysis of Evaucation Times Around 52 Nuclear Power Plant Sites, with others, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-1856 Volume 1, 1980.
Texas Hurricane Evacuation Study. The Coastal and Marine Council,1978.
Public Transportation Analysis of Rural Public Transportation in Texas, with others State Department of Highways and Public Transportation, Technical Report 1069-1F, August 1982.
Intercity Bus Riders in Texas Transportation Research Record 887, 1982.
The Intercity Bus Industry in the U.S. and Texas, with others, State Department of Highways and Public Transportation. Technical Report 0965-1 F, 1981.
Bryan-College Station Energy Contingency Study, L*
Metropolitan Planning Organization of Bryan-College Station,1980.
Bryan-College Station Transit Improvement Plan, with others Metro-politan P1anning Organization,1979.
Ann Arbor Dial-A-Ride Project Final Report, Ann Arbor Transportation Authority, 1973.
Ann Arbor Dial-A-Ride Operations, Highway Research Board Special Report 136, 1973.
The Greater Lafayette Area Bus Transit Study, with others, Joint Highway Research Project, Purdue University,1971.
Elderly and Handicapped Transportation Guidelines for Evaluation of Human Services Transportation Programs, with others, State Department of Highways and Public Transportation, Report 1065-2F, 1981.
Evaluation of Selected Human Services Transportation Providers, with Diane Bullard, State Department of Highways and Public 4
Transportation, 1980.
Cost-Effectiveness of Accessible Fixed-Route Buses in Texas, with Jose Soegard, Technical Report 1061-1F,1979.
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Transportation of the Elderly and Handicapped in Texas: A Case Study.
with Jose A. Soegard, State Department of Highways and Publ ic Transportation. Technical Report 1056-2F,1979.
Total Accessibility Versus Equivalent Mobility of the Handicapped.
Institute of Transportation Engineers, Compendium of Technical Papers, 49th Annual Heeting,1979.
Survey of Vehicles and Equipment for Elderly and Handicapped Trans-portation.
State Department of Highways and Public Transpor-tation.
Technical Report.1056-1,1978.
Corpus Christi Elderly and Handicapped Transportation Study, with R.W.
Holder, City of Corpus Christi Texas,1978.
PRESENTATIONS Presentation entitled Shoulder Reductions on Urban Freeway, ASCE Specialty Conference, " Shaping the Future of American Highways", San Diego, CA. April 15-17, 1985.
Presented seminar on transportation analysis at Emergency Preparedness Plans and Programs Workshop Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, j-Williamsburg, VA.
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Presentation on Evacuation. Transportation, and Traffic Control, National Emergency Training Center Emergency Management Institute Evacuation Planning and Response Actions Simulation Course.
Emmitsburg, Maryland, July 8-12, 1985.
1 EXTENSION:
Texas Engineering Extension Service Instructor on various courses
-including basic traffic engineering, geometric design of highways and highway capacity.
University of California at Berkely, Institute of Transportation Studies, Extension Programs, Guest Lecturer, highway capacity courses presented to California Department of Transportation.
EXPERT WITNESS i
Presented expert testimony before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, 4
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, concerning evacuation times at several j
nuclear power plant sites including Three-Mile Island, Diablo Canyon. Indian Point, Seabrook and Shoreham.
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