ML20210J368

Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-186/99-201.Corrective Actions:Reactor Manager Reiterated That After Sample Handling & Prior to Reactor start-up That Upscale Switch Should Be in Normal Position

ML20210J368
Person / Time
Site:	University of Missouri-Columbia
Issue date:	07/30/1999
From:	Mckibben J, Schoone A MISSOURI, UNIV. OF, COLUMBIA, MO
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
50-186-99-201, NUDOCS 9908050013
Download: ML20210J368 (2)

Text

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. Research Reactor Center k m nh Park Columbia, A10 65211 University of Alissouri-Columbia g ,

s tu (573) 882-3443

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Date:

• July 30,1999 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Reference:

Docket No. 50-186 The Curators of the University of Missouri License No. R-103

Subject:

" Reply to a Notice of Violation"in Accordance with 10 CFR 2.201

Dear Sir:

This is a written statement required by 10 CFR 2.201 in response to the July 1,1999 US NRC Notice of Violation (NRC inspection Report No. 50-186/99-201) concerning events at the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR). l During the NRC inspection conducted during the period of June 7-11,1999, one severity level IV violation was identified requiring a written response. The violation is quoted below followed by the University of Missouri response to the four questions, which includes specific corrective actions taken.

Violation 50186/99-201-01 states:

Technical Specification 3.4.a requires that the reactor bridge area radiation monitor (ARM) be operable anytime the reactor is operated. Footnote 2 of that requirement permits temporarily setting the scram and building isolation setpoint at a higher level during maintenance and sample handling. The licensee's Standard Operating Procedure, SOP III " Reactor Control and Instrumentation System," revision 7/29/93, section III.9, requires that the setpoint be returned to the normal range when sample handling is finished. ,

1 Contrary to the above, on Monday June 7,1999, following maintenance and sample loading completion, final reactor precritical checks and reactor start-up to critical, the reactor bridge ARM remained in the high range position. This is a severity )

Reply LevelIV violation (Supplement I).

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1. Reason for the violation or basis for disputing the violation. g Leaving the reactor bridge ARM upscale switch in the high range or upscale position for hD I i significantly longer than was necessary was an operator error due to not explicitly following l existing procedures and insufficient training of the reactor operation staffin order to avoid i this error.

2. Corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved.

After the inspector raised his concern about the reactor bridge upscale switch being left in the upscale position, the Reactor Manager discussed the event with the operating crew

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, involved, it was reiterated that after sample handing and prior to reactor start-up that the

, upscale switch should be in the normal position. During the discussion with the crew the Standhrd Operating Procedure (SOP) III.9 was reviewed. Management reviewed this problem with all the operating crews and reiterated the need to follow procedures. Since the inspection, routine checks of the position of the Reactor Bridge ARM upscale switch indicated that the operators are operating the switch appropriately and according to SOP III.9.

A standing order was issued changing the following: SOP section III.9 Area Radiation Monitoring System; SOP section I.4.2.I Administrative Operating Policics; SOP section VIII.2.4 Handling ofIrradiated Samples; and the SOP appendix Reactor start-up check sheet.Section III.9 willinclude maintenance as well as samples. Footnote 2 from Technical Specification 3.4.a was added to the administrative and sample handling sections of the SOP.

The second to last step of the start-up check sheet now states to place the Bridge AIARA

. Upscale switch downscale. This is an initialed step to be signed off on by the operator conducting the check sheet and is reviewed by the lead senior reactor operator prior to conducting a reactor start-up.

3. The corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violation.

A SOP revision will be issued, which will include the Standing Order changes. A copy of this f response will be routed for crew review as has already been done witl1 the inspection and notice of violation. Management will continue to routinely check for the appropriate operation of this switch.

4. The date when full compliance will be achieved.

Full compliance was achieved the day the inspector pointed out the weakness, June 7,1999.

The issuance of the Standing Order provided the explicit procedural guidance required. The SOP revision will more formally incorporate this procedural guidance. The SOP revision will be issued by August 13,1999.

Sincerely, ENDORSEMENT:

Reviewed and Ap ro

( W osp)ckte.A.-- fg Anthony Schoone J. Charles McKibb n Reactor Manager Associated Director vit

[h 1Ak xc: Mr. Alexander Adams,Jr., USNNRC ssowl Mr. Tom Burdick, NRC Region III UM p g Boone Dr. Edward Deutsch pExpkas04/14/2003 Reactor Advisory Committee Reactor Safety Subcommittee

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