ML20244D549
Text
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'. ' November 1,1985 .
MEMORANDUM FOR: Vincent S. Noonan, Director Comanche Peak Project Division of Licensing FROM: James M. Taylor, Director i Office of Inspection and Enforcement l
SUBJECT:
FUTURE REVIEW OF SAFETEAM FOR COMANCHE PEAK As requested in your memorandum dated October 10, 1985, enclosed is our recomended position for future reviews of the SAFETEAM program and its imple-mentation for the Comanche Peak facility.
Original $1 w e4 hs M. . ,.a James M. Taylor, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement ,
Enclosure:
Proposed Position ec:
R. Martin, RIV B. Hayes, OI Distribution:
g Haass RH Vollmer 85-473 JM Taylor
- SEE PREVIOUS COPY FOR CONCURRENCE to VPB:00AVT 4 l'D/ W .0!E Ofh
- WHaass: sam R)f511mer JMyylbr 10/29/85 414/f /85
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usmito STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIQN g wAmmeorow.o. c. mass
%*..../ flovember 1,1985 MEMORANDUM FOR: Vincent S. Noonan. Director Comanche Peak Project Division of Licensing FROM: James M. Taylor, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement
SUBJECT:
FUTURE REVIEW 0F SAFETEAM FOR COMANCHE PEAK As requested in your memorandum dated October 10, 1985, enclosed is our recommended position for future reviews of the SAFETEAM program and its imple '
mentation for the Comanche Peak facility.
Jame ta 'or, Director Office of' Inspection and Enforcement
Enclosure:
Proposed Position ec:
R. Martin. RIV B. Hayes. O!
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PROPOSED POSITION FOR FUTURE REVIEW OF 5AFETEAM AT COMANCHE PEAK Review Performed:
Region IV with assistance from IE and NRR conducted an inspection of the SAFETEAM program and its implementation at Comanche Peak on August 26-29, 1985. Also inspected was the predecessor Ombudsman program. The results of that inspection will be reported in NRC Inspection Report 50-445/85-12 and 50-466/85-08.
The general conclusions of that inspection can be susunarized as follows:
- 1. Under the Ombudsman program, 53 allegation files were established and 51 had been closed. The NRC inspectors reviewed 22 of the closed files. .
- 2. Observations from review of the Ombudsman program included:
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- a. Information from the alleger was somewhat sketchy and incomplete.
- b. The program was administered by QA and therefore lacked proper independence.
- c. Some allegations were not fully addressed. l
- d. Contacts with the alleger to verify the resolution of the concern was limited.
- 3. Under the successor SAFETEAM program, 641 allegations (from 506 individuals) )'
were received and 295 technical allegations were investigated. Of the latter group, the NRC inspectors reviewed 62.s
- 4. Major observations from review of the SAFETEAM program included:
- a. The SAFETEAM program is organizationally independent and is being implemented as planned.
- b. Classification of concerns was performed in a conservative manner and confidentiality was appropriately protected,
- c. Weaknesses in the program were:
(1) Interviewers lacked technical expertise and as a result the concerns often lacked specifics.
Some recontracting was performed.
i (2) Some files indicated a lack of aggressiveness by the investigator in establishing specificity of the allegation.
(3) Resolution of the allegation was not performed by SAFETEAM; rather, this task was assigned to other organizational elements and no feedback of the results was provided to SAFETEAM or to the alleger.
(4) Resolution provided corrective action for the present and future, but impact on the past was not clearly addressed.
(5) Investigators made no reconsnendation regardin potential deportability under 10 CFR 50.55(e)g .
Deportability identification and evaluation was -
left conspletely to other organizational elements.
Reconenendation for Future:
Future review of the SAFETEAM program and its implementation should focus on the following:
- 1. Since no exit meeting was held following the abeve described inspection, it is important that the results nevertheless be conveyed to TUEC to provide'an opportunity for programmatic modifica-4ons to eliminate the weaknesses identified. It is understood that Region IV is planning this exit meeting.
- 2. Review of additional completed files should be performed, preferably on at least 2 or 3 occasions over the next 10 to 12 months, to verify the adequacy of allegation resolution and to determine the extent to which programmatic weaknesses have been corrected. These reviews should focus on files of high interest to safety. Our goal should be to review at least 60 to 70 percent of all high interest files !
with goal modifications dependent upon conclusions drawn by our inspectors.
Preliminary plans for accomplishing the above consist of the following:
- a. The next inspection activity should be performed in approximately early December 1985 to review additional !
files. It can also include a followup exit meeting to l formally close-out the earlier inspection.
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- b. Another inspection, depending on the results.of a. above, should be performed in the May-June period to verify prograsenatic corrective action and review additional '
files.
- c. A final inspection:should be performed toward the end of 1986 (prior to a licensing decision) to review additional files and draw final conclusions,
- d. Region IV should be assigned lead responsibility for the above action with assistance from IE, 01, and NRR as necessary.
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UNITED STATES
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a j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION D OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Washington, D.C. 20665
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INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT MANUAL DI TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION 2512/15 INSPECTION OF WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PROGRAM 2512/15-01 PURPOSE The purpose of this Temporary Instruction (TI) is to provide guidance for performing inspections of the Employee Response Team (ERT) program pre-sently being conducted at TVA's Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBNP). ,
2512/15-02 OBJECTIVE ,
The objec'tive of this inspection program is to gather sufficient informa-tion to make a determination as to whether or not TVA's ERT program has satisfactorily addressed employee concerns for nuclear safety that were identified during the employee interviews and that these concern's have been
' satisfactorily resolved.
2512/15-03 RESPONSIBILITIES The inspection will utilize personnel from Region II, NRR, IE, and OI.
Office responsibilities in terms of team leadership, inspection scheduling, report preparation, etc., will be determined through ' discussions with Region II, IE and NRR management.
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2512/15-04 BACKGROUND 04.01 TVA has implemented the ERT program at WBNP b systematically collect and investigate employee concerns relating to the design and construction of WBNP specifically and the TVrnuclear power program in general. TVA's independent Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) has been assigned the responsibility for the ERT program. An independent contractor, Quality Technology Corpora-tion (QTC), has been hired by TVA to perform employee interviews and investigate concerns in accordance with procedures approved by MSRS.
The ERT program provides for QTC to interview approximately 5,000 employees, including those at the Watts Bar site and TVA Office of Engineering employees assigned to the Watts Bar Issue Date: 11/18/85 g
INSPECTION OF WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT 2512/15-04.01 EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PROGRAM Project. Concerns raised by the employees during interviews or via a special telephone hotline are documented by QTC. Docu-ments transmitted by QTC to NSRS are only those from dich all items identifying the employee (s) raising the concern have been deleted. Potentially safety related concerns are generally investigated by either QTC or NSRS. Concerns involving intimi-dation and harressment of employees are refered to TVA's Office of the General Council (OGC). ERT Investigation Reports are for-warded to the TVA line organizations for evaluation and correc-tive action.
QTC maintains a confidential file, for each concern, which con-tains information that could be used to identify the person expressing the concern. TVA, including NSRS, has no access to these files. ERT Investigation Reports prepared by QTC are summaries of the investigation which have been purged.of all information which QTC believes could be used to identify the person expressing the concern. It is possible that the summari-zation or purging could result in an ERT Investigation Report, I which does not adequately represent the specific concern or '
reflect its relationship to the entire design and construction process.
Extreme care is being taken by QTC to protect the anonymity of the employees raising concerns. NRC personnel should handle this information as required by NRC procedures defining methods to be used to protect confidential sources during investiga-tions.
04.02 The completed ERT Investigation Reports are forwarded by ItSRS to the appropriate TVA line organization. The line organization evaluates the deficiency (cies) for specific corrective action, generic implications, applicability to other TVA nuclear plants, and required action (s) to prevent recurrence, etc. The line organization reports the results of their evaluation, and (ny necessary3orrective actions, back to NSRS, and throup ItSRS to QTC. Either NSRS or QTC can request further review or changes to the proposed corrective action. After NSRS and QTC are sat-isfied with the TVA line organization response, QTC notifies the employee who raised the concern of the corrective action.
l 04.03 An initial inspection of the ERT program was performed July 15-187BBF by Reaion II. IE _and NRR nersonnel. ERT procedures were reviewed, QTC and NSRS personnel were interviewed, and a limited number of reports for completed investigations were re-viewed (see IR 50-390/85-49). The inspection concluded that the implementing procedures, documentation of results, qualifica-tions of personnel, and program independence were generally
'q adequate.
I s s ue Da te; ____11/_1_8/_85 ______ _ __ _ ______
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l INSPECTION OF WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PROGRAM 2512/15-05 2512/15-05 INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS 05.01 An inspection plan should be developed which includes both moni-toring of the ERT program and periodic inspections of ERT program activities and results. (An initial inspection of the ERT program and adequacy of its initial procedures and implemen-tation has been performed. See Section 04.03 above.)-
05.02 At le3Lt two additianal in<aar tions should be made, one when acceptable TVA line organization responses have been received by NSRS for about 4Dercent of the concerns, and one when accept-able TVA line organization responses have been received by NSRS for the majority of the concerns. The first inspection will provide the bases for any necessary recommendations for changes-in the program, and the second insoection_ will provide a basis for final evaluation of the ERT program. Other, inspections involving an increased sample size may be necessary as indicated by the results of the monitoring program.
05.03 The following actions should be accomplished, as necessary, during inspection of the ERT program:
- a. Review ERT procedures.-
- b. Review statements of concerns (Employee Concern Assignment Requests). 2
- c. Review ERT Investigation Reports.
- d. Review potentially reportable concerns (Requests for Re-portable Evaluation). ,,
- e. InterviewQTCandNSRSsupervisorsandmanaged.
- f. Interview QTC interviewers. y,,
- g. Interview QTC and NSRS investigators. .,
- h. Review QTC files.
- i. Review QTC trending of concerns.
- j. Perform independent confirmatory inspectiorik to verify ERT Investigation Reports. ,
- k. Review proposed TVA corrective actions. ..'
- 1. Interview TVA line organization supervisors and managers.
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- m. Perform independent inspections to verify implementation of corrective actioris.
l Issue Date: 11/18/85
INSPECTION OF WATTS BAR NOCLEAR PLANT EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PROGRAM 2512/15-05.04' 05.04 Personnel participating in development and implementation of the inspection plan should be familiar with the ERT program and procedures. (A previous inspection has found these procedures to be generally adequate. See Section 04.03 above.)
05.05 Through execution of the two (or more) inspections described in Section 05.02, above, a sub_stantial sample of the_ final . ERT Investjaa_t. im Reports should J e reviewed--approximately 20 $
percent for potentially safety-related concerns and a troxi-mately 5 oercent for nonsafety-related concerns. The reports for nonsafety-related concerns should be evaluated for whether their classification as nonsafety-related appears appropriate.
The reports for potentJ. ally. taf.ety-r_ elated concerns should be evalugted, for such 11ams a.s;
- a. Was the investigation adequate to establish the facts?
- b. ' Had the deficiency identified by the concerns been pre-viously identified and corrected if required (i.e. unsatis-factory inspection reports, nonconformance reports, design change requests, corrective action plans, etc.)?
- c. - Was potential deportability per 10 CFR 50.55(e) and 10 CFR 21 correctly determined?
- d. - Is the concern sufficiently specific for NRC inspectors to verify through inspection that the description of the discrepancy (ies) is correct?
A subset (about half) of thisymple of fM1-fnT investigation Reports, selected _as most .significant to safety, shal_1_he_iden-ed . _fo r in-depth review. The QTC files for this subset shou d be requested and reviewed. Where appropriate, interviews should be held with QTC interviewers and investigators and NSRS investigators.
05.06 A sample (about_20peent) of reports completed by the TVA line organization should be reviewed for such items as:
- a. Was the evaluation by the line organization adequate?
- b. Is the planned corrective action appropriate?
A subset (approximately half) of this sample, selected as most significant to safety, shall be reviewed in detail to verify that the corrective action has been implemented. The review shall include interviews with the TVA line personnel who evalu-ated the concern (s) and performed inspection of the corrective actions, and independent NRC inspection of the completed work.
Issue Date: 11/18/85
!* ' INSPECTION OF WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PROGRAM 2512/15-05.07 05.07 In general, the samples selected in Sections 05.05 and 05.06, above, should include concerns which cover the spectrum of disciplines, i.e. , design, procurement, construction (electri-cal, instrumentation, mechanical, civil, structural, welding and NDE), quality assurance and quality control.
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The selection of subsets of concerns for in-depth review should be based - on evaluation of individual technical significance,
, possible generic implications, trends of discrepancies and apparently inadequate corrective action programs.
05.08 Review TVA Quality Assurance Audit Reports (and associated records) pertaining to the ERT program.
2512/15-06 EXPIRATION This TI will remaig in effect until the close of FY 86 or the above described inspection is completed, whichever occurs earlier.
2512/15-07 IE CONTACT Questions regarding this TI should be addressed to K. Hooks, IE/DI/RCPB, phone number 301-492-4143.
2512/15-08 MODULE TRACKING SYSTEM INPUT The hours expended in performing the above inspection should be reported under module 2512/15 on NRC Form 766.
END s
Issue Date: 11/18/85 _ - __- -
6 January 30,.1986 o .
NRC AUDIT OF SAFETEAM l
'*. PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION
( 1. INVESTIGATOR FUNCTION: Reorganise to provide closer '
supervision of day-to-day activities of investigators.
A. Establish a second investigator coordinator to
' reduce-the number of investigators-per coordinator so that.the. training program can be better imple-mented. ,
B. Retain one lead investigator reporting to each coordinator whose primary responsibility will be to monitor and assure the adequacy of each investigative report with respect to:
- 1. Correct statement of concern.
- 2. dbmpleteness of response to concerns.
- 3. Completeness of file.
- 4. Completeness of the notes .in the file as an accurate record of the investigation.
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- 11. JOB DESCRIPTION A. Prepare management approved job description in the IPC format.. ,
- M B. Familiarize investigators with.. content of job description.
III. INVESTIGATOR TRAINING A. Provide specific. supervisory training for Investigator Coordinators to assist them in' properly directing the activities of the investigators.
B. Provide training' in the' proper performance of an investigation for all investigators and Invesci-gator Coordinator, ,
- 1. Use of interview capes.
- 2. Determining root causes of concerns.
- 3. Identifying wrongdoing concerns.
- 4. Proper conduct of* investigation.
5 Completeness of files.
C. Fully document all training activities.
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IV. WRONCDOINC CONCERNS qA.- Identify sil concerns classified as wrongdoing. *
- 8. Have IPC, legal counsel review all wrongdoing concern files to determine the need for further
,_ investigation. ,
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... C. After the spope of required additional investigation is. determined, get management direction on the conduct of.the additional investigation,. ,
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V. CONCERNS WHICH ARE NO LONCER CONCERNS A. Identify al.1 concerns which are no longer considered (
to be concegps. .
B. Classify these concerns: -
- 1. liardware
- 2. Wrong (ping *
- 3. Other. "
C. Evaluate and determine if further investigation is reqdTred.
- 1. IPC legal counsel to evaluate wrongdoing concerns. ~
- 2. SAFETEAM to evaluate remained of concerns..
D. Investigate concerns as required.
- 1.
- IV-C above to apply on wrongdoing poncerna.
- 2. SAFETEAM to do any required additional investi.
gation on the remainder of the concerns..
VI. " CONCERN FILES
- f'fl A. Review files that the NRC say do not address all of'the ,ggncerns and evaluate. ,
B. Do further[ review of files from July 1, 1985 to present to determine deficiencies.
- c. -
C. Correct def(ciencies.
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- C. D. Glenn
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,217 935 6562
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-ILLINDIS POWER COMPANY l ., , , j 2
(2 ? sm souin 27tH stats 1. occatus. ittiNois 67tarcious March 13, 1986 T. P. Gwynn V-690 SAFETEAM Processing Potential ~ Wrongdoing Issues In a recent telephone conversation you asked for, and I agreed to submit, an action plan for handling concerns received by SAFETEAM that represent a potential for wrongdoing. Attached to this letter is a procedure to be implemented immediately by SAFETEAM in the handling of these type concerns.
We trust this corrective action procedure responds adequately to the issue you raised during your review of the SAFETEAM operation.
W .m Larry D. Haab Attachment .
(w/o Attach.)
cc: W. C. Gerstner D. P. Hall W. Connell S. F. Bakunas C. D. Glenn S. Zabel (OPIC 79. 7 M M'2V'
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.;217 935 6562
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t ILLINOIS POWER COMPANY-HANDLING POTENTIAL WRONCDOING CONCERNS RECEIVED BY SAFETEAM l
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- 1. Purpose - The purpose of this instruction is to assure that those- concerns received by SafeTeam which represent a poten-tial for wrongdoing are processed in a manner which will e receive appropriate managerial and legal actions. .
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- 2. Scope - This instruction has been developed to assist in the resolution of those concerns which have been determined to involve potential wrongdoing. This instruction is in no way intended to impode, interfere or subvert the independence of SafeTeam at Clinton Power Station. This instruction is to be used by SafeTeam during any activities where the potential for wrongdoing exists.
- 3. Definitions t Wrongdoing - Those willful actions which kmy cause damage to the nuclear facility or action that may result in a decrease in the Quality Assurance Program at CPS.
Examples, a) Intimidation / Harassment b) Adverse Personnel Actions c) Willful and intentional damage d) Willful and intentional actions which could result in damage or destruction In many cases the determination of wrongdoing can only be made after review by legal counsel and/or initial investigation.
Intimidation / Harassment - An action that discourages, inhib-its or prevents an employee from performing a quality-related function. These actions subvert, limit or modify'the work i such that' quality can be reduced to an unacceptable level.
These actions can include, but are not limited to, verbal abuse, physical abuse, threats and adverse personnel action. I Adverse Personnel Actions - Actions taken against an employee I I with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges l of coployment either to adversely affect the proper perfor-mance of the employee's duties or as a result of his proper performance of those duties. !
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217'VJD bb62 Appropriate Illinois Power Management - Management within the 1111nols Power organization. In this regard, appropriate Illinois Power. organizational elements are responsible for contract personnel performing work on or for the Clinton Nuclear Sta tion. i
- 4. Instructions 4.1 In accordance with the Illinois Power Quality Anwur-ance/SafeTeam a6reement dated October 30,1984, an initial evaluation is made to determine the potential -i existence of wrongdoing.
NOTE: This does not inhibit SafeTeam from initiation of this process at any time prior to or during any SafeTeam investigation. 1 4.2 Once established that a potential for wrongdoing exists, s the following steps will be taken concurrently:
4.2.a. Legal counsel will be' notified of the issue, !
All information related to the incident will be transmitted to legal counsel for their review.
4.2.b. SafeTeam will initiate an initial investigation of the issue. The intent of this initial investigation will be to determine the potential of the issue being substantiated.
4.3 Legal counsel will make an initial assessment with respect to the potential for wrongdoing, this will be done in close cooperation with appropriate Illinois Power Management and SafeTeam.
&& if legal councol hse dotorminod that tha (saua L. uuL wrongdoing, then SafeTeam will continue their investi-gation utilizing the normal SafeTeam investigation process.
4.4.a. If SafeTaan has established that the concern is not substantiated and concurrence has been received from legal counsel, SafeTeam will continue the investigation utilizing the normal ;
SafeTeam process.
4.4.b. If it has been determined that the potential for wrongdoing exists by legal counsel and SafeTeam has determined that the concern is likely to be substantiated,
-,-----n-~_ noc-the investigation is refGeged S@
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217L935 6562 L L . .. .-
4.5 When a concern of potential wrongdoing has been received from SafeTeam by the appropriate Illinois Power Manage-
. ment, management will evaluate the concern with respect to the following:
4.5.a. The' attent to which personnel involved will be prevented from performing activities that may jeopardize the investigation or prevent the continuation of adverse conditions.
4.5.b. Consideration 'for the extent of external assis-tance will be made on a case-b'-case y basis. The need for external assistance may be made at any I
point prior to or during the investigation.
This decision will be based on the following considerations:
l 4.5.b.1 Criminal acts which have been commit-L ted. ;
4.5.b.2 Hostility of the personnel involved.
4.5.b.3 Involvement of the concern with respect to off-site personnel.
4.5.h.4 Technical expertise that may be in-volved or needed.
4.5.b.5 A required degree of independence.
4.5.c. If a contract for external assistance is re-quired, it will be accomplished under the-purview of Illinois Power Management. The results of any such investigation shall become the exclusive property of Illinois Power Company.
'4.6 All completed investigations will be reviewed by legal counsel.
4.7 Appropriate Federal authorities, including the NRC, will be notified of investigation results by Illinois Power Management, when necessory to fulfill applicable legal and regulatory requirements. The investigation results will be maintained on site for review by NRC.
21f9356562 4.8 The actions taken as a result of substantiated concerns will be as determined by ' Illinois Power Management with concurrence from legal counsel and approval of the Vice President or more senior Illinois Power Management.
March 13, 1986 4
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l ', 217:935 6562 ILLINDIS POWER COMPANY Handling of Potential Urong Doing SafeTeam Concerns ,
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y Initial Review IPQA h 1r_ i t Overview i
Legal
, SafeTeam Perform (
Initial Investigation l
i krongdoing i NO ^
3 YES i P May be U (
g YES -
Substantiated NC Investigation '
and Wrongdoing Normal Prograu Ir Appropriate l
_IP Management 1r Identify & Control- )
Personnel j
)
Evaluat Need for Management External Assistance NO _ Investigation YS
_ _ _ - U contract for External Assistance if p Investigation Investigation Complete Complete l
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[ _ Review by Legal la- J l
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jr Notify Appropriate Federal Authorities j
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