ML20235G009

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Forwards Util Response to Allegations Received by Safeteam Re Potential Weaknesses Associated W/Plant Design in Areas of Industrial Safety,Plant Maint & Alara.Alleger Made Concerns Public as Possible Attempt to Ensure Job
ML20235G009
Person / Time
Site: South Texas, 05000000
Issue date: 01/28/1987
From: Goldberg J
HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
To: Martin R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
Shared Package
ML20235F817 List:
References
FOIA-87-413 NUDOCS 8709290404
Download: ML20235G009 (28)
v • d • e


Text

_ -

. [ d Stello Roe

The Light -

!L comPuy Houston Lighting & Power P.O. Box 1700 Housson. Texa 770 M2289211 Murray EDO 2482 January 28, 1987

.r Mr Robert D Martin i Regional Director, Region IV '

j Nuclear Regulatory Commission l 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 '

Arlington, Texas 76011 l Re: South Texas Project Electric' Generating Station Allegations Received By SAFETEAM

Dear Mr Martin:

As you are aware, HL&P is maintaining a SAFETEAM program to receive, . investigate, and undertake corrective action where warranted of matters brought to our attention through concerns voiced by employees working at the South Texas Nuclear Project either past or present.

Last fall, the Bechtel Energy Corporation advised one of its field engineers that he was earmarked for layoff as part of an overall reduction in force program. This employee sub-sequently brought a number of concerns to the attention of Bechtel management which he alleged were related to potential weaknesses associated with the design of the South Texas Nuclear Project in the areas of industrial safety, plant maintenance, and ALARA. .Upon that employee's official notification of layoff, the employee did exit with SAFETEAM, thereupon, he identified similar but not necessarily identical concerns with the SAFETEAM interviewer. SAFETEAM in accordance with its normal practice undertook to investigate these concerns.

The alleger of these particular concerns has undertaken to make the concerns which he brought to the attention of SAFETEAM, public. This came about when the alleger provided a rather wide distribution of his particular allegations to various members in the public sector at well as a number of officials within the government. In view of the fact that the alltiger has undertaken to reveal his identity, which is routinely safeguarded by SAFETEAM, I have attached herewith a copy of our B709290404 870924

.l

. l Houuon Lighting & Power Company 2-Mr R D Martin January 28, 1987 response to the alleger to enable the NRC to perform whatever follow-up review it deems appropriate. I have also taken the  !

liberty to provide copies of this response to the various members {

within the public sector who had received copies of the j allegations which were supplied by the alleger. l I

As a matter of record, SAFETEAM does not concern itself with the motives that inspire individuals to call to the attention of SAFETEAM their particular concerns. Wnether or not the individual is concerned about real problems or whether, owing to a lack of information, perhaps they are concerned about problems that are not necessarily real, makes no particular difference to SAFETEAM. As a matter of fact, certain persons who might elect to use SAFETEAM for some selfish and potentially unworthy purpose in no way influence the manner in which SAFETEAM will undertake to thoroughly investigate and subsequently address the issues. We have information in this particular case that suggests that these particular allegations may well have been raised as part of a strategy to protect the individual's continued employment.

The details of our investigations of these particular concerns are on file in SAFETEAM and are available for the NRC's, inspection and consideration.

ry truly yours, J H Goldberg Group Vice-P esident, Nuclear JHG/aks Enclosure i

e

3

  • N <

'- Houston Lighting & Power Company Mr R D Martin January 2 8, 1987 cc: Edward J. Baier, Director Directorate of Technical Support United States Department of Labor Lloyd Bentsen, Texas Senator United States Senate Waldon A. Boecker, Manager Power Plant Engineering Public Utility Commission of Texas Billie P. Garde, Director Government Accountability Project Geoffrey Gay, Attorney' Office of Public Utility Counsel - State of Texas John Harris, Reporter Austin American Statesmen Edward J. Markey, Chairman Subcommitt'ee on Energy Conservation & Power United States House of Representatives Peggy Rosson, Chairman Public Utility Commission of Texas Mark Sanders, Reporter The Houston Post Victor Stallo, Executive Director for Operations Nuclear Regulatory Commission l

Jeff Wolff, Attorney Fulbright - Jaworski l Lando Zech, Chairman Nuclear Regulatory Commission

3 kh PROJECT SAFETEAM* p.o. s.x 40s w.6,. orth, Tex.i 774sa . 840s (si2)s72 7 ion January 27, 1987

Dear Concern No. 11227:

SAFETEAM has completed its investigation of the items in your concern which you expressed 'to us on November 10 and 11, 1986, as well as those items which were forwarded to us by your previous employer.

SAFETEAM assembled a multi-discipline team led by Houston Lighting & Power (HL&P) to perform the analysis of your concerns. The results of that analysis are summarized on Enclosure I.

Enclosure I identifies that 12 of the 137 items of your ,

concerns were determined by the team to require appropriate corrective action. A number of the verified concerns had also been, independent of your concern, identified and scheduled for correction during the conduct of a planned review and verification effort by the project. All of the for planned example, reviews have walkdowns to not verifyyet been ALARAcompleted considerations, and include,ing Flood and Spray Effects, Egress Pathways, and Fire Protection Programs. These activities on Unit 2 will be enhanced by including the results of our evaluation of the items in your concern.

The evaluation of the items in your concern determined that none of them would have had an effect upon safe operation of the plant, the health and safety or the public, nor cause abnormal radiation exposure to plant personnel.

Based upon the results of our evaluation of your concerns and the on-going planned review and verification '

activities by project personnel, we believe further meetings with yourself are not warranted.

Thank you for your interest in the south Texas Project.

Y,our efforts in helping to assure that the South Texas Project operates safely and reliably are appreciated.

Should you have any further questions about your concerns or any other concerns you wish to identify, please write or call SAFETEAM. The toll free telephone numbers for SAFETEAM are 1-800-292-5123 if you are in Texas, or 1-800-231-5922 if 1

l e

South Texas Project SAFETEAM'"

..- Concern No. 1122i Page 2 you are outside of Texas. You will reach our answering machine, so please leave your code number and telephone number so we can get back to you. i

(

i Very' rul ours, I. L. rie Manager, SAFETEAN Program e

lp .

PCse No..

1 01/28/87 c SOUTH TEXAS 1:UCLEAR PROJECT SAFETEAM CONCERN WALKDOWN

SUMMARY

ENGINEERING DISPOSITION ITEM INSTALLATION CORRECTIVE ACTION NUMB SAFETEAM ITEM UNDER CCHSIDERATION ACCEPTABLE lWIILBEUNDERTAKEN

    • A A000 Locations of violations of minimun bend radius on flexible electrical conduit.

l A001 RCB I /E1. 6'+ / Room #103 \ Tag # on X conduit - NIXC2BRS853 tas # on junction box which conduit runs into - ESC 3655 1

A002 RCB I / E1. 11' \ Tag # on conduit - 1 N1XC1DBX286 tag # adjacent to conduit -

XD-LT-7811 - Adjacent to secondary Sump 1A.

A003 MEAB I / E1. 31' / Room #106A \0n conduit X i

leading to limitorque motor operated valve '

in passageway on CCP return Ib o Q2 657-CC-85.

I A004 MEAR I / B1.10' / Room 6035 \ Flexible I conduit too short on instrument 31CV-TSH-00243.

A005 MEAR I / E1.10' / Room #035 \ Flexible X conduit on instrument #C1CV-TSH-00238 violates bend radius.

A006 MEAB I / E1.19' / Room #0795 \ Flexible X conduit to limit switch #NICV-ESC-0201 violates bend radius.

A007 MEAR 1 / II.19' / Room #079A \ Flexible X conduit to micro switch #CV02 N1CV-FCV-202 violates bend radius.

CO 3 B000 Locations / Identity of inaccessible items.

B001 RCB I / E1. 6'+ / Room #103 \The control X valving on the level control tank is located 12' off the floor out over a drop-off. There is no access ladder.

X q B002 RCB I / E1.11' / Room #007 \ Access to the valve gallery in room #007 is obstructed by the stairway in the hallway outside room

  1. 007. The steps should be moved out to
  • provide access & reduce exposure to radiation.

Pcgo no.* 2 01/28/47

  • SOUTH TEXAS NUCLEAR PROJECT SAFETEAM CONCERN VALKDOWN SUMMART ENGINEERING DISPOSITION INSTALLATION CORRECTIVE ACTION ITEN SAFETEAN ITEM UNDER CONSIDERATION ACCEPTABLE l WIIL BE UNDERTAKEN NUMB

/ Ring Duct Plenum Chamber X B003 RCE I / E1. -2'

\The hand rail around the fan platform is welded in place. It should be attached with slip joints to provide mono-rail ~ ,

access.

/ Room #109 / RHR Pump #1A X 3004 RCS I / E1. -2'

\The pressure indicator is inaccessible.

It should be outside roca #109 in the access roce.

X 5005 RCS I / E1. -2' / Room #109 \There is no access to pump packing gland for inspection and maintenance.

/ Roca #109 \The pump drain X B006 RCB I / E1. -2' suction line is inaccessible on the far side of the room from door opening. .

i

-2' / Room #109 \ Electrical X 3007 RCS I / El.

conduit between the motor and the access hatch would interfere with motor or pump removal.

5004 RCB I / E1. -2' / Room #110 \The pressure X monitoring gauge is inaccessible and should be in the access room.

I X j B009 RCS I / El. -2' / Room #110 \The drain line is inaccessible on the back side of the j Pump.

X 5010 RCS I / E1. -2' / Room #110 \An instrument and line mounted on the pump between the pump and the access hatch blocks pump removal access.

B011 RCB I / Room #104 / RHR Pump #1C \The X l

location of the drainage valve would impede l

motor or pump removal.

3012 RCB I / E1.19' / Room #202 \The process X flow orifice manifold is inaccessible. The f manifold is near flange ICV 03F02 S.P.1.11.

M I

I l

l j

Pego No. 3

, 01/28/87 SOUTH TEXAS NUCLEAR PROJECT ( ,

SAFETEAN CONCERN WALKDOWN

SUMMARY

J ENGINEERING DISPOSITION f INSTALLATION CORRECTIVE ACTION -l ITEW NUMB SATETEAM ITEM UNDER CONSIDERATION ACCEPTABLE lVIILBEUNDERTAKEN l

l B013 ItCB I / E1.19' / Rove #202 \The air X  !

operated solenoid / control instrument should be in the entry way. It is directly in Room #202; -

I 3014 RCE I / E1. 19' / RCP Loop 3 - Suction Side X

\Yalve #1R141T-RC-00588 is installed too close to a concrete pillar base, & allows very limited access for maintenance &

repair. (azimuth 225 degrees) 3015 RCB I / E1.19' / ItCF Loop 5 \ Valve X

  1. 2R141T-RC-00593 is installed too close to j guide conduit for sa instrument line to '

instrument #B1RCFT0429. There is no accessibility to valve. (asinuth 230 degrees) 3016'RC3 I / E1. 19' / At column 'C/23' \ Valve X

  1. 1R141T-RC-0057D is located too close to i concrete pillar base to allow maintenance access.

3017 RCB I / E1.19' / Asinuth 45 degrees X

\ Hanger #RC-1321-BS5001 interferes with removal of valve seat and manual operation of let down isolation valve #RC-085 CV CF.

Additional valve d's 2R171XCY254A, t

1R141X-RC-0085.

3018 RCB I / El. 26' / Near Cont. Penetration X M75 \ Containment isolation valve

  1. 2R371T-PO-0217 is located too close to an I-beam for accessibility and operation.

(azimuth 40 deErees)

B019 MEAR I / E1.10' / Room #053C X

\ Instrumentation is hidden behind the tank.

The pressure gauge should be outside of Room #053C.

X 3020 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #053C \The inclation valve to the strainer is  ;

inaccessible. 1 i

. q

h ..

Pago,No. 4 01/28/87

  • SOUTH TEXAS NUCLEAR PROJECT SAFETEAM CONCERN VALKDOWN

SUMMARY

l ENGINEERING DISPOSITION INSTALLATION CORRECTIVE ACTION XT&M NUMB SAFETEAN ITEM UND3R CONSIDERATION ACCEPTABLE l WIIL BE UNDERTAKEN 3021 MEAB I / Room #053C \ Access to the strainer I screen is difficult due to tank supports.

3022 MEAB I / Room #053C \A valve handle oa's ,

I one inch line hits against the concrete wall.

3023 MEAB I / Room #053C \The packing gland and I coupling on the pump next to the wall are inaccessible.

E024 MEAR I / Room #053C \The thermal indicator I on the tank faces the wall and is inaccessible.

3025 MEAB I / Room #053C \The flow indicators I are inaccessible.  !

3026 MEAS I / Room #053C \The isolation valve I for the tank level indicating instrument is too close to the tube rack.

8027 MEAS I / Room #053C \The drain valve 1 downstream of the orifice on the discharge side of pump #7R301NPA111A is inaccessible.

3028 MEAR I / Room #053C \The tank vent is I inaccessible and would require a ladder.

3029 MEAB I / E1.10' / Adjacent to Room #025 K

\The strainer manifold and valve under the Fisher control valve is inaccessible and will be more inaccessible after it is insulated. (PPM tag #V-15410) 3030 MEAB I / E1.10' / Adjacent to Room #025 I

\The instrument blowdown is not accessible to a drain.

B031 NEAB I / El.10' / ' Adjacent to Room #025 I

\ Instrument #A1AS-TSH-8838A should be out in the hallway. (#14926-4335 item 16.0) l B032 NEAB I / 9 II. 22' / Opposite Room #078 I

\Above stairway a 2' gate valve against the wall is inaccessible for operation or ,

maintenance.

1 Pego No.. 5 01/2s/a7 SOUTH TEXAS NUCLEAR PROJECT SAFETEAM CONCERN VALKDOWN

SUMMARY

l ENGINEERING DISPOSITION  !

ITg INSTALLATItal CORRECTIVE ACTION NUMB SAFETEAM ITEM UNDER CONSIDERATION ACCEPTABLE lWIILBEUNDERTAKEN 1

3033 MEAB I / Room #077 \A l' angle valve off of I hanger #3R 1041 MF 5001 is inaccessible in an extremely hot area. j B034 MEAS I / E1. 10'/ Room #023 \An instrument I primary valve, a process valve, and vent valves (all small bore) are inaccessible in an extremely hot radiation area.

B035 MEAR I / E1.10' / At Columns C and 31 \An X 8" fire main valve is inaccessible for maintenance and operations. A hanger obstructs the valve operation.

5036 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #067A \A l' x  ;

l stainless steel angle valve on a 1' process

. line is hard against an 4' fire main and laaecessible for operation or maintenance.

3037 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #052 \A bearing X cooling water supply line to pump #7R321 MPA1145 blocks access to pump and valve operation and maintenance in a very hot area.

5038 MEAR I / E1.10' / Outside Room #052 \The I walving and pumps behind LWPS seal water panel #9R301EI2710/N1VLELP710 are lasccessible for operation and maintenance.

B039 MEAS I / E1.10' / Room #0585 \The room is X congested and instruments, valving, and an electrical panel are inaccessible.

B040 MEAR I / E1.10' / Room #057 \Six valves on X la lines near the ceiling are inaccessible.

B041 MEAR I / E1.10' / Room #056A \The pump X suction drain valve is inaccessible. i B042 MEAS I / E1.10' / Room #059 \The X instrument gauges are inaccessible.

B043 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #0595 \Yalve 1 J j

  1. P30-1-FY-4035 and the strainer next to it j are inaccessible (off hanger #WL1140 HF
  • 5002)

Fagy No. 6 J i

01/24/47 SOUTH TIEAS NUCLEAR PROJECT j i

SAFETEAM C(30CERN VALXDOWN SUNHART I ....... ................ ....

ENGINEERING DISPOSITION. j 1

.ITEN .

INSTALLATION CORRECTIVE ACTION NUMB SAFITEAN ITEN UNDER CONSIDERATION ACCEPTABLE lVIILBEUNDERTAMN l 3044 MEAR I / E1.10' / Room #061 \Am instrument X l' blocks access to filter #7R301TULO644.

3045 MEAR I / E1.10' / Room #061 \ Conduit out X j of terminal box #N1WLTB0441 blocks passageway access to filter #7R301T VL 0664. The contents of the filter could be hot.

3046 MEAR I / E1.10' / Room #061 \There is no X mccess to valving on top of tanks. l 8047 MEAR I / E1.10' / Room #071 \There is no X occess to valving on top of the tank. Some 3 of the valves are remote operated.

I 3044 MEAR I / E1.10' / Room #050 \The valve X station for the let down' heat exchanger, serial #2312-1A, is inaccessible and on the wrong side of the heat exchanger.

2049 MEAR I / E1.10' / Room #050 \The service X valve station in the back of the room is inaccessible.

2050 MEA 3 I / E1.10' / Room #044 \The service X station valve in the corner of the room is fasccessible. l 3051 MEAR I / E1.10' / Room #044 \A root valve X and process Yalve #1-1A-0803 are terminated in the corner and are inaccessible.

2052 NEAR I / E1.10' / Room #044 \A temperature X indicator and valve off the HVAC chiller are not accessible. The temperature indicator faces the wall.

3053 MEAR I / 31.10'/ Room #044 \The detector X on the ceiling is in a difficult location.

X 3054 MEAR I / E1.10' / Room #044 \ Instrument tubing vent valves are inaccessible behind the HVAC chiller.

. l

F:ga No. 7 01/28/87 SOUTH TEXAS NUCLEAR PROJECT SAFETEAM CONCERN WALKDOWN SUMKARY ENGINEERING DISPOSITICH INSTALLATION CORRECTIVE ACTION ITEM ACCEPTA3LE lWIILBEUNDERTAKEN SAFETEAN ITEM UNDER CONSIDERATION NUMB I

3055 MEAR I / E1.10' / Room #041 \ Terminal box YIB NCH C CHGR FF IBPRDR / N1VMBMTZ0011 blocks access to the back half of the room.

I 3056 MEAS I / E1.10' / Room #041 \ Instrument

  1. M1HH-11-9372 is obstructed by flexible electrical conduit.

I 3057 MEAB I / E1.10' / Roos #041 \A l' teolation valve to the 6'/4" pump suction is in an awkward location.

l X B058 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #041 \0ne 1/2" and one l' bleed of f valves to the lef t of Westinghouse motor are inaccessible for proper connection. They are located below the base of the motor.

I 3059 MEAR I / E1.10' / Room #041 \The motor and pump are in an extremely difficult position for setting and alignment.

X 3060 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #037 \The valve off the pump head is f acing the wrong direction for operation due to a poor piping arrangement at the north and of the pump.

3061 MEAR I / E1.10' / Room #037 \ Hanger I

  1. CV7516 HF-5001 off of the pump drain is a stupid design and causes access obstruction.

I 3062 NEAR I /11.10'/ Room #035 \The service station is in the wrong location and 'olocks instrument #C1CV-TSH-00238.

I 3063 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #035 \The instrument vent tubing valve in the f ar upper right hand corner of the room is inaccessible.

I B064 MEAR X / E1.19' / Roon #079C \ Solenoid valve #V-15169 in the back of the room is in the wrong location for maintenance. The valve should be relocated to the f ront lef t wall. ,

ycgo No.' 8

, 01/24/87 SOUTH TEXAS NDC12AR PROJECT SAFETEAN CONCERN WALKDOWN

SUMMARY

ENGINEERING DISPOSITION INSTALLATION CORRECTIVE ACTION ITIN magl 'SAFETEAN ITEM UNDER CONSIDERATION ACCEPTABLE lVIILBEUNDERTAKEN 3065 MEAS I / E1. 19' / Room #079C \The upstrema X double drain valves to control valve

  1. C1CV-HCV-0218 are inaccessible. .

3066 MEAS I / E1.19' / Roca #079C \A valve X extension brace attaches to the wrong wall for room accessibility.

3067 MEAB I / E1.19' / Roca #079C \The service I station is poorly located in the back of the roca, and a blow down valve is jaaned against the wall.

3064 MEAR I / E1.19' / Room #079A \An I lastrument transmitter and a solenoid velve

' located in the back of the room are inaccessible.

3069 MEAB I / E1.19' / Room #079A \4* orifice X flanges are inaccessible.

3070 MEAR I / E1.10' / Roca #031 \The service X station in the far right-hand corner of the room is totally inaccessible.

3071 MEAS I / E1.10' / Roca #031 \The X transducer and solenoid valve to control valve #CV-0381A are inaccessible.

3072 MEAS I / El.10' / Roca #031 \The anglo X walve at the primary instrument point off control valve #HCV-0387 is inaccessible.

The angle valve is on the floor next to the floor drain, off a 4' line.

1

    • C C000 Locations of air operated control valves  !

which could endanger personal safety.

I C001 RCS I / E1. -11'/ Room #007 \1 air operated X control valve with exposed lugs.

C002 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #0588 \1 air X j operated control valve with exposed lugs.

o ,, ,

Pegs 50. .' 9 SOUTN TEXAS NDCLEAR PROJECT SAFITEAM CONCERN VALXDOWN SthetARY ENGINEERING DISPOSITION INSTALLATION CORRECTIVE ACTION ITEM NUMB .SAFETEAM ITEM UNDER CONSIDERATION ACCEPTABLE lVIILBEUNDERTAKEN C003 MEAS I / E1.10' / Room #059 \9 air I operated control valves with exposed lugs.

. C004 MEAR I / E1.10' / Room #061 \16 air

~

, I operated control valves with exposed lugs.

C005 MEAS I / E1.10' / Room #071 \9 air X operated control valves with exposed lugs.

C006 MEAS I / E1.10' / Room #0533 \1 air I operated control valve with exposed lugs.

    • D D000 Becations of mono-rail installations with interferences in paths of travel.

D001 BCS I / E1. -1' / Ring Duct Plenum Chamber X

\The mono-rail crane is too low to have clearance over the fan.

D002 BCB I / Room #109 / RHR Pump #1A \There is X a mono-rail to disassemble the motor but no

- usono-rail to remove the motor through the access hatch.

D003 MEAR I / E1.10' / Room #058A \ Hanger X fvL1032 H 5001 blocks the mono-rail access in this very hot room.

~

D004 MEAS I / E1.10' / Room #059 \An electrical I conduit support blocks mono-rail access.

D005 MEAR I / E1.10' / Room #059A \ Piping I blocks mono-rail access for pump removal.

X D006 MEAR I / E1.10' / Room #041 \Wono-rail is off center of equipment and access is blocked by supports.

Aa X E000 Locations of drainage problems in Unit I.

E001 RCS I / E1. -2' / Ring Duct Plenum Chamber X

\ Drainage for ring duct plenum AC coil is

  • inadequate. The ability to monitor drain stoppage is required.

I i . . - .

Fcgo No ' 10 SOUTH TEXAS NUCLEAR PROJECT SAFETEAN CONCERN WALKDOWN

SUMMARY

ENGINEERING DISPOSITION ITEM INSTALLATION CORRECTIVE ACTION NUMB SAFETEAM ITEN UNDER CONSIDERATION ACCEPTABLE lVIILBEUNDERTAKEN E002 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #053C \The room X threshold is higher than the pump motors.

If the floor 6 in plugs up, the pumps, and j motor will be under water sad will short -

)

i out. 1 i l

    • F F00014 cations of poorly supported or improperly i supported items. l l

F001' MEAR I / E1.10' / Room #053A \ Air X

{

operators #FV4306 and #FY4306A are supported only with baling wire.

F002 MEAR I / E1.10' / Room #059A \There are X insdequate supports on the piping, filter, I and pump in this room. (temporary hangers I only)

F003 MEAS I / E1.10' / Room #061 \Three air I operated valves are supported only with rope and are vulnerable to damage.

F004 MEAR I / E1,10' / Room #070 \The drain line X and valva need support.

F005 MEAS I/ E1.10' / Room #71 \1 1/2" line to I breathing air etation No. 45 is unsupported and needs support.

F006 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #071 \Two air I operated valves are supported only by rope and are vulnerable to damage.

F007 NEAB I / E1.10' / Room #044 \The X temperature indicator and valve off the HVAC chiller are temporarily supported with wire.

60 G I

G000 Locations of 2" pipe nozr.le connections to tanks which require reinforcement.

Faga No.- 11 01/28/87 SOUTH TEXAS NDCLEAR PROJECT SAFETEAM CONCERN WALKDOWN

SUMMARY

ENGINKiIRINC DISPOSITION i ITEM INSTALLATION CORRECTIVE ACTION NONB SATETEAM ITEM UNDER CONSIDERATION ACCEPTABLE lVIILBEUNDERTAKEN G001 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #057 \A 2* line X into the bottom of vaste hold tank #1A requires reinforcement at point of entry -

into tank. (PPM #0645-16) ,

G002 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #059 \A 2* pipe X mozzle into the bottom of the check tank requires reinforcement at point of entry into tank.

G003 MEAR I / E1.10' / Room #059B \A 2" piping X mozzle connection into the base of the tank-requires reinforcement at the point of entry into tank.

G004 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #061 \A 2' pipe X mozz?e into the bottom of the tank requires reinforcement at point of entry into tanke G005 MEAR I / E1.10' / Room #071 \A 2" pipe X mossle into the base of the tank har ,

partial reinforcement. The nossle requires additional reinforcement. i H000 RCB I/El 19'/ Azimuth 30 das\ Rigid har IVR l 1 F3245-SI-1320-HF5001 located near press ]

release viv N1SI-PSV-3977/N12-1-PSY-3977 j doesn't allow seismic action. Hgr, located at top of safety inject accum tnk ,

  1. 2H121NRC101X, needs to have seismic motion l capability H001 X ch E 1000 Locations of cleanliness barrier (coating) violations.

1001 NEAB I / E1.10' / Room #053C \The pump X motor grounding violates the cleanliness barrier at the point where it is anchored to the floor.

~

Pcge.No. 12 01/28/87 SOUTH TEXAS NUCLEAR PROJECT SAFETEAM CONCERN WALKDOWN

SUMMARY

ENGIMIERING DISPOSITION ITEM INSTALLATION CORRECTIVE ACTION NUMB SAFETEAM ITEM UNDER CONSIDERATION ACCEPTABLE lWIILBEUNDERTAKEN 1001 MEAB I / E1. 10 ' / Room 0588 \ Electrical I conduit is fastened to the floor.

2003 MIAB I / E1.10' / Room #059B \ Grounding -

I conduit f astened to the floor inside the doorway violates the cleanliness barrier.

1004 MEAS I / E1.10' / Room #061 \ Electrical I conduit is fastened to the f1:or inside the doorway.

1005 MEAR I / E1.10' / Room #070 \ Grounding I conduit is attached to the floor in this very hot area.

I006 MEAR I / El.10' / Room #050 \ Grounding I conduit is f astened to the floor.

1007 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #049 \ Conduit is I f aster.ed to the floor in three locations.

1004 MEAR I / El.10' / Room #041 \ Conduit is I fastened to the floor.

1009 MIAR I / E1.10' / Room #037 \ Grounding I conduit is attached to the floor.

I 1010 MEAB I / E1.19' / Room #079A \ conduit I -

fastened to the floor violates the cleanliness barrier.

1011 NEAR I / E1.19' / Room #060 \ Conduit to X '

transducer #N1CC-TY-4494 is f astened to the floor.

1011 NEAR I / E1.10' / Outside Room #031 1

\ Grounding conduit to MAB ventilation anonitor #1/#N1RA-RT-8014 is attached to the floor.

1013 NEAB I / El.10' / Room #0535 \ Grounding I conduit attached to floor violates cleanliness barrier.

1014 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #026 \ Grounding I conduit to tank is attached to the floor .

and violates the cleanliness barrier.

Page No.' 13

. 01/28/87 SOUTH TEXAS NUCLEAR PROJECT SAFETEAM CONCERN WALKDOWN

SUMMARY

ENGINEERING DISPOSITICBI ITEM INSTALLATION CORRECTIVE ACTION 3r0K$ SAFETEAN ITEM UNDER CONSIDERATION ACCEPTABLE lWIILBEUNDERTAKEN j

    • J J000 m individual believen room #031 on elevation 10' in NEAR Unit I has no -

permanent lighting.

J001 The individual believes room #031 on X elevation 10' in MEAR Unit I has no permanent lighting.

    • E E000 m individual believes a rubber hose attached to control valve #CV-0381A will be affected by radiation. The hose is located la Room #031 on elevation 10' in MEAR Unit
1. ,

K001 1

    • L L000 The individual believes two runs of rigid conduit to junction box #NIEN1GESP57 are routed too low. Conduit is located in Room
  1. 080 on elevation 19' in NEAB 1.

L001 1

    • M N000 Locations of remote valve extensions in contact with other items.

M001 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #049 \The extension 1 on the valve operator on valve

  1. 1-CD-0092/TCV-0381B hits against hanger
  1. CV-1011-RH05.

M002 NEAB I/ E1.19' / Room #079A \The extension I on valve #1/CV-0254A hits against conduit

  1. A1XM1GRU025.

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P g3 N). 14 SOUTH TEXAS NUCLEAR PROJECT SAFETEAM CONCERN WALKDOWN SUkMARY ENGINEERING DISPOSITION ITEN INSTALLATION CORRECTIVE ACTION SAFETEAM ITEN UNDER CONSIDERATION ACCEPTABLg lWIILBEUNDERTAXEN NUMB

    • N N000 The individual believes the primary valves for the instruments on the section of loop between the steam generators and the -

Reactor Coolant Pumps should have a double valve configuration in lieu of the installed single valve configuration.

N001 I

    • 0 0000 The individual believes there is no oil reserveir drain valve for draining the system when working on the oil transfer pump in room #041 on elevation .10' et HEAB I.

0001 X

    • P P000 The individual believes a removable spool is required in lieu of the installed permanent spool in room #035 en elevation 10' in MEAR I. The installed permanent spool blocks mono-rail access to the tube '

bundle shell and piping.

P001 1

    • Q Q000 The individual believes the gearing mechanism of a remote valve extension is excessive. The valve is located in room
  1. 079C on elevation 19' in HEAB Unit I.

Q001 1 (4 R R000 The individual believes lines coming off an LWPS Seal Water Panel will contain radioactive water and require additional protection. Panel #9R301ZLP 710/N1WLZLP .

710 is located outside room #052 on elevation 10' in MEAB Unit I.

1 F:gg.ND.* 15 SOUTH TEXAS NUCLEAR PROJECT SAFETEAM CONCERN WALXDOWN

SUMMARY

...... ...u.....................

11 ENGINEERING DISPOSITION ITEM INSTALLATION CORRECTIVE ACTION .

SAFETEAM' ITEM UNDER. CONSIDERATION ACCEPTABLE j NUM3 lWIILBEUNDERTAKEN 1

R001 X

    • 3 ,

5000 Locations of items which obstruct walkways and constitute trip hasards.

8001 NEAR I / E1.10' / Room #053C \ Drainpipes I constitute a trip hazard.

8002 MEAR I / E1.10' / Room #057 \ Instrument X i line obstructs walkway. i 8003 MEAR I / E1.10' / Room #072 \3/4" I stainless steel tubing to liquid waste >

pror.assing system #N1RAPCC8038 constitutes a trip hasard and is vulnerable to breakage.

S004 MEAB I / E1.13' / Room #049 \The sway X strut to valve #1CT-HCY0133 on the 4" line obstructs the passageway.

S005 MEAS I / E1.10' / Outside Boom #031 X

\ Grounding conduit to MAB ventilation monitor #1/N1RA-RT-8014 constitutes a trip hazard.

    • T T000 Locations of poorly routed flexible electrical conduit which are subject to damage.

T001 RCB I / E1.19' / Azimuth 30 degrees X

\ Flexible electrical conduit from Rosemount flow transmitter #C1-CC-FT-4570 is poorly routed and subject to damage. Conduit is located next to safety injection accumulator tank #2N121NRC101C.

T002 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #041 \ Electrical X flexible conduits block access to valves located on back side or motor. Conduits are subject to damage.

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. March 26, 1987 N March 13, 1987 February 25, 1987 February 4, 1987 DATE: January 28, 1987 TO: M. J. Gavin, Contract Administrator, SAFETEAM FROM: Mike Porsche,F1 E 3-M ~87 SAFETEAM Investigator Bubject: Report for Concern #6269 E CONCERN The basement of the Turbine building has concrete with cracks in it permitting dripping and leaking lime on critical QA Level 1 piping.

I REPORT SAFETEAM obtained the following information from Supervisor, Mechanical / Civil . Project & Plant Engineering (P&PE) to address this concern. P&PE determined the QA Level 1 piping in this area is the 16" diameter HPCI/RCIC line shown on Drawings j 6M721-3226-1, 6M721-3163-1, and 6M721-2006. The line is a  !

schedule 10S ASTM A358TP304 stainless steel pipe with j approximately 3 inches of metal clad insulation on its exterior, j SAFETEAM and engineering inspected this piping system to determine if the condition described in this concern existed.

One area was observed to have dried residue on the pipe insulation. This was determined by engineering to be caused from )

water seepage coming from the ceiling. j Engineering explained the existing buildup of calcium (lime) )

resulting from seepage will have no ill effect on the pipe or j insulation. j MP/dle NB Gavin comments incorporated into report.

NB Steering Committee comments incorporated into report.

NB Steering Committee comments incorporated from 3/11/87 review meeting.

NB Steering Committee comments incorporated f rom 3/26/87 review meeting.

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March 27,1987 SAFETEAM March 25, 1987 1

DATE: January 29, 1987 TO: M. J. Gavin, Contract Administrator, SAFETEAM FROM: Joe Grohal,{fo s 27 s7 BAFETEAM Investigator

Subject:

Report.for Concern #G269 BB SQHCEEN concernee expressed, there was frequent harassment and intimidation of inspectors and auditors who attempted to identify problems and nonconforming conditions. {

REPORT The investigator substantiates above concern was l addressed by Concern #28 (4/13/83).

The NRC conducted an assessment of contractors on Fermi site, e.g., QC inspectors in PQA, LKC, RCI, W/B and T/B regarding management support, training, stop work authority, inspector harassment or intimidation, adequacy of inspection procedures and I checklists, and organizational interfaces. j The NRC expressed, QC inspectors in PQA, LKC, RCI and T/B reported having good management support of QC activities. They felt that QC supervision supported and encouraged the identification and reporting of QC concerns and nonconformances, and believed QC was adequately independent to carry out effective QC program.

The NRC did note some problems in August of 1982 within the Wismer and Becker QC organization. They stated that the problems were considered action items for the Fermi project to resolve, with the resolution and written formal documentation to be submitted to the NRC.

Based on the results of an investigation performed by NRC-OI and I action taken by the Detroit Edison Project Management and Wismer l

& Becker, the NRC expressed satisfaction with the resolution taken.

JG/dle HB Steering Committee comments incorporated from 3/11/87 review meeting.

NB Steering Committee comments incorporated from 3/26/87 review meeting.

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t March 26, 1987 * ""

March 23, 1987 February 4, 1987 DATE: January 29, 1987 .

TO: M. J. Gavin,  ;

Contract Administrator, SAFETEAM FROM: Joe Grohal,% S-2*"87 BAFETEAM Investigator Bub.iect : Report'for Concern #6209 L CONCERN Conc ~ernee expressed, Quality Control inspectors for specific contractors, Comstock and Wismer-Becker, were not permitted to write Honconformance Reports on identified ,

deficiencies.

REPORT The investigator substantiates above concern was addressed by Concern #28 (4/13/83).  !

The NRC conducted an assessment of contractors on Fermi site, e.g., QC inspectors in PQA, LKC, RCI, W/B and T/B regarding -

management support, training, stop work authority, inspector harassment or intimidation, adequacy of inspection procedures and checklists, and organizational interfaces.

The NRC expressed, QC inspectors in PQA, LKC, RCI and T/B reported having good management support of QC activities. They felt that QC supervision supported and encouraged the identification and reporting of quality control concerns and nonconformances. The NRC 's belief is that QC was adequately independent to carry out an effective QC program.

The NRC did note some problems in August of 1982 within the .

Wismer and Becker QC organization. They stated that the problems were considered action items for the Fermi project to resolve, with the resolution and written formal documentation to be submitted to the NRC.

Based on the results of an investigation performed by NRC-OI and action taken by the Detroit Edison Project Management and Wismer i

& Becker, the NRC expressed satisf action with the resolution taken.

l JG/dic NB Gavin comments incorporated into report.

NB Steering Committee comments incorporated into report.

NB Steering Committee comments incorporated from 3/26/87 review meeting.

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March 13, 1987 sarrnuun -

February 10, 1987 ~ ~

February 4, 1987 DATE: January 29, 1987 TO: M. J. Gavin, Contract Administrator, SAFETEAM FROM: Phillip N. Cagle,4%3 n.u SAFETEAM Investigator Sub.iect : Report for Concern #6269 M CONCERN. Design changes were frequently made in the field without the actual review by design engineers. This was particularly true during startup testing.

REPORT - Project Engineering had an approved process by which revisions could be made to field installations before final design review and approval was obtained. FMR's and DCN's were j used in this type of situation. l These documents had a verbal approval block which had to be signed by project engineering. When the verbal had been obtained {

and the appropriate block signed, a copy of the original docut:ent  ;'

was sent to the field so construction activities could continue.

The signature in the verbal approval block only represented an ,

interim approval. The original copy of the document was i processed through the required approval cycle. These documents {

were not considered Design Documents until the final approval had l

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been obtained from Project Engineering. All design disciplines and system engineers as appropriate. In addition, several other organizations would be involved in reviewing the completeness of systems such as the Start-up organization, Systems Testing Group, Nuclear Operations and several other construction groups.

Procedures PPM 3.22 " Field Modification Request" and PPM 3.20,

" Design Change Notices" describe how to expedite construction I before these documents are officially approved. l PNC/dic l l

NB Gavin comments incorporated into report. l NB Steering Committee comments incorporated into report.

NB Steering Committee comments incorporated f rom 3/11/87 review meeting.

NB Steering Committee comments incorporated f rom 3/26/87 review l meeting.

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E. h.DSEN -

DATE: January 29, 1987 MAR 3 h7 r ,

TO: M. J. Gavin, - -

Contract Administrator, SAFETEAM FROM: Joe Grohal,% 3 u-97 ,

SAFETEAM Investigator .

k NoN2o

Subject:

Report for Concern 186269 A h

CONCERN Concernee expressed, at Penetration X16A the bellows >

were seriously damaged but are being used "as is."

REPORT The investigator reviewed documentation package for penetration X16A. The condition as expressed by Concernee was addressed by Deviation Disposition Request (DDR) #2228, i Revision C. The damage was repaired, inspected and verified bf Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI). Engineering, and Quality Control (QC) as being acceptable (4/12/83).

JG/dic i

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. March 13. 1987 m February 26, 1987 February 4, 1987 -

DATE: January 29, 1987 TO: M. J. Gavin, Contract Administrator, SAFETEliM FROM: Mike Porsche,M E 3-26~#'

SAFETEAM Investigator SubMeet: Report for Concert 3 #6269 D CONCERN In the Emergency Diesel Generator Room the load bearing wall is. cracked all the way through. (If the wall would fall the main electrical gears will be destroyed.)

REPORT SAFETEAM obtained the following information to address this concern from Supervisor, Mechanical / Civil, Project & Plant Elmineering (P&PE). SAFETEAM and engineering went to the Diesel Generator Room to make an observation of the load bearing wall.

Several areas on this wall were observed to contain normal shrinkage er.ecks of less than 1/16 an inch in width. No cracks were observed that went through .the entire cross-section of this wall. Based on this observation engineering determined these cracks to be acceptable.

Engineering explained, according to ACI 303-72 building code and Detroit Edison specification 3071-17 shrinkage cracks up to and including 1/16 of an inch in width are acceptable. This type of discontinuity is normal and can be expected in massive high-strength structures such as the concrete walls in the RRR building.

MP/dle

. NB Gavin comments incorporated into report.

NB Steering Committee comments incorporated into report NB Steering Committee comments incorporated from 3/11/87 review meeting.

. March 13, 1987 SAFETEAnt February 25, 1987 February 4, 1987 DATE: January 29, 1987 TO: M. J. Gavin, Contract Administrator, SAFETEAM FROM: Mike Porsche,m.R 3-24-F7 SAFETEAM Investigator Sub3ect: Report for Concern 96269 C CONCERS In the RHR building west of the Reactor there is a longitude crack in column 7 or B.

'e REPORT SAFETEAM obtained the following information from Supervisor, Hechanical/ Civil, Project & Plant Engineering (P&PE) to address this concern. The columns in question are 4'X4' in dimension with vertical rebar and stirrup reinforcements.

BAFETEAM and engineering went to the RER building to make an observation of these columns. Normal shrinkage cracks of less than 1/16 of an inch in width were observed. Based on this observation engineering has determined there is no evidenze of longitudinal cracking in these concrete columns.

Engineering explained, according to ACI 301-72 building code and Detroit Edison specification 3071-17 shrinkage cracks up to and including 1/16 of an inch in width are acceptable. This type of discontinuity is normal and can be expected in massive high-strength structures such as the columns in the RHR building.

MP/dle NB Gavin comments incorporated into report.

NB Steering Committee comments incorporated into report.

NB Steering Committee comments incorporated from 3/11/87  !

review meeting.

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' j March 26, 1987 SAFETEAM March 19, 1987 '

February 4, 1987

'DATE: January 31, 1987 ,

TO: M. J. Gavin, Contract Administrator, SAFETEAM FROM: Phillip N. Cagle, ( s.a6- 87 SAFETEAM Investigator l Subiect: Recort_'for Concern WB269 X l

i CONCERN The Detroit Edison Radwaste System has never passed the l procedural requirements. The procedures do not provide for proper monitoring of the loading of the radioactive waste drums which may result in significant hazards during shipping. ,

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REPORT SAFETEAM contacted the General Supervisor of the l Radwaste Department at Fermi 2. The temporary systems have {

passed testing requirements. The permanent systems are still j under preoperational testing by project maintenance groups. I Detroit Edison has a commitment to the NRC that all testing will be completed prior to the Warranty Run test series.

The preoperational test will provide the basis for the procedural requirement for documentation of drum radioactivity concentrations. The procedures will be modified / revised appropriately before the system is used to process radioactive waste. It should be noted that no solid radioactive waste has been processed at this time.

PNC/dle NB Gavin comments incorporated into report.

NB Steering Committee comments incorporated from 3/11/87 review meeting.

NB Steering Committee comments incorporated from 3/26/87 review meeting.

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