ML20235G304
Text
_ _ _ _ __ - _-_ - - ___ __ _ _ _ _
3,..
. 4 :,
6:6
.5.
. c.
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF l
THE.ENRICO FERMI II~ NUCLEAR POWER PLANT s
l-l' l
l GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT Mid-West Office 3424 N. Marcos Lane Appleton, Wisconsin 54911 i
(414)730-8533
[
t l
l 8709290553 870924
t t
4; 1
1 1
4 D
CONFIDEtJTIAL REPORT 9
4 4
e 9
f
- i-f l'IELililiJAlW lir, Hi t 1Gn i t uH 01-II E F Elt!11 J.,1, RCACT0lt Confidential Summaiy
'On May 6, 1986, the Gover nnient Ac countabili ty Proj e ct (GAP) announced a preliminary investigation into the Fermi 11 reactor.
~ GAP established a local telephone number and trained a local citizen to handle calls from local current or former workers who had' safety related concerns that they did not believe were.being l
properly hand' led.
Additionally, GAP investigators contacted employees with whom they had. established relationships at other plants and who had personal e':: pe r i e n c e wi t h t h e Fe rmi plant as craft employees, technicians, quality control inspectors, and-I engineers.
GAP also filed several Freedom of Information Act Request with the Nut. lose Regulatory Commission (NHC) seeking the release of an audit done by the NRC's Office of Investigations into the SAFETEAM woriter allegation program at the plant.
Finally, we undertook a saajor records review of the regulatory j
record at the Fermi plant.
GAP investigators completed the majority of the work in early fall of 1986.
This report is a summary of'the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the GAP staff personnel who worked on this case.
i The report is being providad to SEColi privately.
It is the l
decision of that organization whether or not to release any part.
or all of the report publicly.
The report does not contain all of the informtaion which GAP has learned about the Fermi 11 3
l I
pl ant.
Inf ormation r cccived fiom persooc, in the NRC and/or w Lhin the industry, whv requested complete anonymity and condition that it be used for provided information only on the background is not detailed, but did contribute to our conclusions l
and recommendations.
Our overall view of the Fermi investigation is that the type of effort which would properly utilize worker information in demonstrating a quality control / quality assurance breakdown is virtually impossible to devel'op at the stage the workforce has disseminated as much as the Fermi workforce has.
That does not l
mean that the problems at the plant have been resolved or that j
there were no probleins to begin with.
To the contrary, the is the same type of information w9 received from all sources information we received at other plants which later turned out to have enormous problems.
However, in todays regulatory climate it l
I i
this worker information directly to the NRC is impossible to take for an honest and thorough review.
This is harause the policy that the NRC staff has in regards to " tate filed" allegations essentially puts the burden of proof on the worker to prove his concern has safety significance and has not been resolved.
Of course, since the worker cannot prove that his specific concern has not been corrected since he left the site it is virtually impossible to get th,e NRC to look at the concerns.
The result of the NRC is that giving the construction and design allegations to sources are subjected to harassment and personal pressurc by the the NRC, whi ch atteinpt c to discredit and undermine the 4
i
a
. al l e g s t'i d ns.
Notwithstanding the anticipated failure of the agency to adequately-' respond-to any worker allegations we could produce at
.this point, we'believe that there is.a unique' situation at Fermi 4
' that should be pursued.
That situation involves utilizing the s
SAFETEAM files to provide the type of raw information that GAP would have developed if it had been able to investigate the problems at Fermi beginning in 1983.
The NRC, for its part, has refused to process the allegations under NRC requirements.
It is GAP's posititon that the NRC must take regulatory control of thouc allegations and fully investigate them just as if each of I
Lhe allegations bad been given to the NRC seperately by the individual workers.
If the agency can be made to ac. cept responsibility for those allegations either directly or through the courts i t would have a phenomenal impact on the public's knowledge about ths plant as well as require the NRC to broaden'its own view of the problems at the plant.
1 1
9 5
r; g
a l
h
' 1 '.
The Fei!ur'c of t h e SAFC'I EAll P r o g r am
+
1 41n 1983 the Detroit Edison Company (DECO) began the first
" employee concern" program.
The prog' ram was instituted to avoid the last minute " flood" of allegations that was presenting serious difficulties for.two other Region III projects, the Zimmer. nuclear power plant in Ohio and.the Midland nuclear pow e.r plant in Midland, Michigan.
(Both plants have since been cancelled when skyrocketing costs made the price of continued cons.truction prohibitive.)
Since the~ inception of the SAFETEAM both SECOM and GAP have received numerous' allegations from workers that felt they were betrayed by the SAFETEAM and that their allegations were turned over to management officials, after which they were harassed, pressured and often forced to quit or were fired.
After concluding our investigation of SAFETEAM's practices and policies at Fermi (as well as at other plants) it is the opinion of the Government Accountability Project that the SAFETEAM is a tool,of management.
We believe, that it is used to compromise workers by attracting them with promises of anonymity and an independent investigation of their concerns, while never intending to do either.
The NRC has taken the position that employee allegation programs are " company-initiated" projects which the NRC should i
not interfore with because such interference could discourage 6
1 1.
l industry initiatives.
llo we v e r, GAP believes such a position in motivated by industry iubbyists and loyalists, and has no basis in regulatory logic.
11o r e importantly, the NRC's position is an abdication of its regulatory responsibilities and, based on our analysis and research, is in violation of the laws and regulatio.ns which set forth the NRC's duties to regulate the nuclear industry.
The most detailed analysis of the SAFETEAM program at Fermi was done by the NRC's Office of Investigation (01) during the summer and fall of 1985.
The investigative effort undertaken by 01 was substantial.
Numerous interviews were conducted and SAFETEAM files reviewcd by the investigators. The results of the investigation indicated that the SAFETEAM program was not being properly implemented and, in fact, was improperly processing the allegations of wrongdoing.
We first obtained a copy of the NRC's Report of Investigation audit into' the SAFETEAM program in July 1986. The report documented the NRC's review of the SAFETEAM at FERMI.
That history is summarized below:
On June 10, 1985, James G.
Hoppler, Regional Administrator for Region III of the NRC requested the Office of Inves'tigations (01) to conduct a programmatic review of the SAFETEAM operation at Fermi II.
The objective, as outlined in a June 13, 1985 memorandum confirming the Region III request, was "to essess the 7
sdequacj and offectivem e4 o f the CAFE 1EAll pi ogram and its
)
iiaplication'in the identification, dispositioning, and rer.olution of both technical and wrongdoing issues."
The memorandum also stated that the review "must be completed by June 21, 1985" in order to act on findings before the scheduled July 1985 i
Commission hearing on a full power license.
(See, memorandum from James Keppler to Ben Hayes, June 13, 1985) l The review did not moot;its deadline.
i l
l On October 4, 1985 01 forwarded its report to the staff.
After its programmatic review of the SAFETEAM program the staff concluded that:
l
...(I)t was determined that the Fermi Safeteam Program was not staffed or supervised by experienced investigative personnel.
It was also discovered that interviews, in many cases, lacked sufficient information because of this apparent inexperience.
01 bases this conclusion on the fact that the interviews which were reviewed in the investigative files could not provide information concerning basic questions such as who, what, where, when, how and why.
- The, Fermi Safeteam Program therefore did not enhibit the characteristics normally attributed to an investigative activity.
In fact, the 01 investigators who prepared the report itself had a stronger conclusion.
They concluded that the SAFETEAM was "an audit program which failed as an effective investigatory program."
(01 Report at
)
More important than wi.at 01 concluded about the-SAFETEAM is 8
'hnt 01 did not even c:n ides.
U1 gj,d ou t analy:o the sarcty significance of the investigative shottcominjs of the GAFETEAM r
program (See report, at 2).
The safety implications of failure of the SAFETEAM was only 0
l analyzed, to the extent that such analysis was undertaken; by Region III and headquarters personnel who overviewed 01's work.
Although the documents provided in response to the FOIA requests did not include the audits, r:eviews, and inspections by the I
regulatory staff, an August 16, 1985 memorar.dum from James M.-
Taylor states that the staff reviews noted "no significant safety problems."
(Memo r anduni from James M.
Taylor to B.J. Youngblood 4
and Walter Haass, August 16, 1985)
It is not clear if the staff reviewed more than the 01 report and supporting documentation or not.
The documents which formed the basis of the staffs position were not released.
Additionally, three Region III inspection reports address the SAFETAM in some manner.
i The first report was issued July 29, 1985, IER No. 50-341/85029 (DRP) addressed findings of the SAFETEAM on pages 7-8.
The report confirms that there was an 01 audit of the SAFETEAM, and a task force investigation of some of the SAFETEAM' concerns which was undertaken for the purpose of determining the technical merit of the SAFETEAM program findings and a comparison of the progtam with another utility.
9
b l
l lhe inspection reto;t states that the task force looked at I
I the safety related concerns n in.i the SAFETEAM files.
No other
}
information is provided, e :< c e p t for the statement that no j
i violation.or deviation were identified in the review'or program area.
The finding does not, of course, make any statement about 1
the'tochnical adequacy of the SAFETEAM investiagtions or of the j
i resolutions of safety-related problems.
No further information on the task force's efforts have over been released, though the information was requested under F01A.
The report also describes an investigation undertaken by.
Deco into the same program, and a sampling audit that was done jointly by the NRC and DECO.
No specife results of that investigation have ever been made public on these efforts either.
IER No. 50-341/85037, issued November 9, 1985, reported that NRC inspector,s_ reviewed over 10% of the total hardware and software safety-related concerns identified to the SAFETEAM.
The report also indicates that DECO did a major review of over half '
i of the safety-related concerns and half of the non-safety related i
concerns.
As a result of this overview effort the SAFETEAM system was determined to have some programmatic deficiencies which are listed in the inspection report as:
l
\\
I
-Inadequate intervoiws ( unable to channel the problems vague generic concerns) 1 1
10
-P a c k a g e *., did not >ddress the whole concern
-Packages i n c om pi c l. c (inadcquate documentation)
-Packages should have been provided with additional closure information (
i.e. 50.55(c)'s, NRC Inspection reports, Duke Inspection Reports, DECO reports)
-Investigators unable to receive engineering support.
The inspection report maintains that, with alot of effort, the Regional staff was able to reach the same conclusions as the SAFETEAM originally did regarding some allegations.
(Presumably that means that the NRC ultimately agreed with the SAFETEAM's conclusion that there were no problems with the resolution of identified failures to meet original commitments.
This is not surprising since both the NRC and the utility wanted to resolve this matter as soon as possibic.)
IER No. 50-341/85042, issued December 31, 1985, also addresses the SAFETEAM program on pages 2-3.
This report briefly mentions a review of 53 SAFETEAM interviews made since February 5,
1985.
(The choice of interviews is less than forthright, the interviews reviewed were done two years after the program began and after the majority of significant allegations had been made and dispositioned.)
The IE report also addresses one specific concern (No. 694).
I Finally, IER No. 50-341/U5048, was issued January 28, 1986.
It addresses the confrontation between the NRC SRI and SAFETEAM 11
mruagcment about why L!.. EthETEAttwai,not following its own
( -
pr o cedures regarding the notification of the NRC when presented with a serious concern. The NRC. report states that the Corporate General Auditor had initiated an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the reported failure to follow instructions.
The results of that investigation has never been publicly released.
Notwithstanding the NRC's reported acceptance of the SAFETEAM program after its regulatory overview, GAP investigators have no such confidence in the implementation of the program or the resolution of safety-related concerns.
Almost every employee we interviewed about the SAFETEAM program had negative comments about their experience, and about the program's intentions and capabilities to do an independent and competent investigation of technical safety concerns. The majority of the employees we interviewed had been to SAFETEAM at least once, and some had a long history of interaction with SAFETEAM over their concerns.
Not one of the employees we have interveiwed believed that SAFETEAM had adequately understood their allegation to begin with or had properly investigated the concerns.
In short the SAFETEAM system fails because, investigations into worker allegations stop when management provides any explanation for the concern, even if cenerally, the management 12
tsuplanation appears to
- f. a c::act1/ the same -explanation th_it was 1
o iginally given to the employee in the first place and that he/she.found so inadequate as to necessitate a complaint to the SAFETEAM.
Another basic problem with the SAFETEAM system, results from the-SAFETEAM interviewers not be'ing trained as investigators or being familiar with the requirements and regulations for the construction of a nuclear power plant.
1herefore, the only real expertise for. evaluating concerns continues to lie with the utility.
As a result, it is not surprising that the SAFETEAM probes stop at the explanations provided by the utility. This is even more understandable when one considers that whatever e::planations are provided to a concerned employee must pass through an edit by a senior staff attorney who is responsible for getting the plant licensed, as well as a senior public relations official who is worried about having to face the SAFETEAM letter in the next days newspaper.
The following excerpt from the manual regarding the preparation of responses to allegations is illustrative of the attitude toward the resolution of the workers genuine safety concerns.
The editorial writer writes a response to the interviewee, without using the interviewee's name, eliminating the technical details in the report and using language as close to 10th grade level as possible.
There are two-reasons for doing this.
The first being that the interviewee in unknown and may be someone with limited knowledge of the s u bj e ct.
13 1
1he cocond, and pr :1 ably the most i.ie r o r t a n t, being that the Irtter could show vp in tomorro# s newspaper and cuyone may read _it,'so it should be plainly understandabic. (See UTS manual, pg.0)
The SAFETEAM is not honest with the work force about what it can or will do with their allegations.
A11egers are not informed i
thet corporate officials will investigate many categories of concerns.
The SAFETEAM dati nat investigate allegations of l
harassment and intimidation at all.
Those allegations are
-supposed to be immediately turned over to corporate security.
The empicyees are not informed that their allegations and the responses to them will be reviewed by a senior corporate management review team prior to issuance.
In short, the SAFETEAM program is not a company initiative to determine the existance of unreco1ved safety concerns by workers.
It is instead a program,which is designed and operates to recruit safety concerns from the work force, eliminate those problems by explanation and reliance on the very. personnel or procedures that permitted the problems to begin with, and identify to senior management those employees who,are potential public whistleblowers so they can be terminated, laid off or otherwise compromised.
GAP does not believe the SAFETEAM program has earned or is entitled to the protection it has been given by the NRC.
The NRC's position, that it wishes to encourge industry initiatives, has no basis here.
The SAFETEAt1 pr ogram has been f ound 14
inimlequate, ated worse, both Feru.i and Comanche Feah, its n,
per f orinatice mar red by isolatu.es where utility of ficialu ref used tu acknowledge the seriousness of either safety or wrongdoing issues.
Furthermore at Fermi, a plant that has been plagued with the manifestation of previously unknown safety-related problems, there is no justification for ignoring any clues to the problems which are contained in the reports and complaints of the workforce from the beginning of the SAFETEAM program.
The NRC has provided the SAFETEAM a mechanism to avoid regulatory accountability for violations of federal requirements.
The program does not even attempt to comply with 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B criteria.
That is, the deficiencies reported to SAFETEAM are not recorded on non-conformance reports or other site controlled deficiency paper.
The problems are therefore not evaluated by the site quality assurance / quality control staff.
l This loophole allows large numbers of safety-related deficiencies to exist in the files of the utility without compliance to federal regulations. If these deficiencies were controlled throug'h the site GA/GC program a completely different result might ensue from the workers reporting their safety allegations.
As a result of the SAFETEAM's operational inadequceies GAP believes that the NRC has made serious error in judgeme'ut by providing the SAFETEAM program regulatory immunity.
Our review of the law ccnvinces us that the NRC has enceeded its authority in establishing this loophole in accountability.
We strongly I
15 1
\\
I
\\
r r t:omme nd Lleat UCC011 ch llenge the IJRU's posi tion a t Fen mi, and recommend.the following specific actions:
1.
File a petition pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206' requesting that the NRC take possession of all SAFETEAM files, review the allegations for all potential safety-related deficiencies, determine which allegations were originally or now are inadequately dispositioned pursuant to the original commitments of the site procedures and federal regulations, and conduct thorough independent investigations into those allegations.
(Independence in this context means hiring a company with integrity and credibility to review the allegations, as opposed to the NRC or the utility.)
2.
Include in the petition a request that the NRC require this and all employee allegation programs to be subjected to the requirements of 10 CFR 50' Appendix B.
l 3.
Require that employees are given full disclosure about I
the SAFETEAM program before they make a choice between giving information to the NRC or the SAFETEAM.
This disclosure must include informing workers that their allegations will be given to a senior management review team and investigated by contacting the workers' supervisors f-or "their side'of the story."
If SECOM decides to pursue this course of action GAP will 16
9 pr.paic ttin 2.206 petii..so aiw! fully i3c etop t, tic researcti n.2cessary to supperL t tie legal punitiets suthmari:cd below.
R e
1 1
e 6
e d
/
s t
y
}
i'//
17
. g 1
s m #--
Specific Deficiencies in the SVETEAM Program 1.
The SAFETEAM progr am does not comply with 10 CFR 50 Appendin B.
The Code of Federal Regulations governing the regulation of
,the nuclear industry sets f orth 'certain quality assura'nce requirements for nucicar power plants.
These are set out in 10 CFR 50, Appendin B, Criteria.1-XVIII.
The introduction to this section states that:
The pertinent requirements of the appendin apply to all activities affecting the safety related functions of those structures, s y s t etu s, and components...
The introduction goes on to state that the term " quality assurance comprises all those planned and systematic actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that a structure, system l
or component will perform satisfactorily in service." (emphasis l
)
added) 1 i
l The SAFETEAM program actively recruits information from I
workers on whether or not they have knowledge that there is confidence that a specif structure, system, or component will perform satisfactorily in service.
A (tionally, worke.rs report instances of deliberate wrongdoing and of harassment and I
intimidation which have an impact on the assurance of the safety of the plant.
By receiving these allegations the utility 18
__-__a
l-believes that it in addi.,g an entra a.easure of' assurance of safety to the proj ect.
.f. n f a c t, the professed intent of the I
L program is'to add an entra measure of assurance about the plant.
(See SAFETEAM brochure, page 1.)
llowever, in practice, the SAFETEAM sets up a program of immunity. The SAFETEAM is not required to' operate under federal regulations which require reporting of certain types of allegations of nuclear safety related deficiencies to the NRC.
As a result the SAFETEAM allegations are not processed under any i
federal requirements or site standards.
There is no quality check of the SAFETEAM program, nor accountability of the actions of the SAFETAM investigators or interviewers to site specifications or federal requirements.
The SAFETEAM manual spells that out as a benefit.
Freedom To Act-The SAFETEAM operation is a function outside d the license g the grl.E Ath[ concerns m f(g investigated without procedures tgviewed jg ihg NRC.
No reports to the NRC are required until and unless investigation shows a violation of procedures, etc.
However, wrongdoing must be reported to the resident NRC inspector as soon as reported-stamped "2.790(d) material withheld from public disclosure."
(emphasis added.)
The consequences of this loophole is that allegations, such as the over 2,000 worker concerns contained in DECO's SAFETEAM files, are never subj ected to the requirements of allegations er findings which would have occurred had the deficiency been processed pursuant to normal channels.
Therefore there is no way to ever determine ir, for e::am p l e, all of the information known 19 a
l' tr t h t, won it f orte. and i o pur ted ou t.:ide of the not mal GA/90 c' anncis has been incar purcled into the site records.
This is particularly dangerous when.the issues that are being buried are those that workers felt strongly enough about to report to l
someone.
At the Tennessee Valley Authority's Watts Bar plant the i
I worker. allegation program determined that over 50% of the worker allegations had merit and required some type of corrective l
action.
At Comanche Peak the worker allegations given to GAP and l
the NRC prior to'the beginning of the SAFETEAM program had between 30 and 50 percent verification rate.
At Fermi, one of the most troubled reactors in the country right now, the SAFETEAM program would have us to believe that virtually none of the 2,000 worker allegations had any serious implications.
Such an explanation is simply not credible.
The NRC has given its. blessings to this loophole by its continued, refusal to require worker allegation programs to be subject to the requirements o'f f ederal regulations.
The Commission articulated that position as a closed meeting last year regarding the Wolf Creek nuclear power plant allegations, and again regarding the TVA programt and Mr. Keppler has continued that position in regards to the SAFE, TEAM program (see statement of Mr. Keppler at public meeting in July 1986 regarding Fermi Restart.)
~
However, it is GAP's position that the NRC has exceeded its legal authority by pero.itting utilities to run "in house" worker 20
alleg 2 Lion progi as wh
.h f alsely ad.ortise confidentiality and I
thorough investigation'of worker ioncerns by not requiring the allegations to be governed by and implemented under 10 CFR 50 l
Appendin B requirements.
The Commissions refusal to enforce the regulations requiring all construction and inspection indicates that the NRC and it's staff have abdicated and perverted their statutory enforcement duty.
Their action or inaction, is an agency decision which GAP believes is improper and must be challerged.
k Of course,
"(an)**# administration may not refuse to enforce laws of which !t does not approve, or to ignore statutory (or CFR) standards in carrying out its regulatory functions."
Motor Vehicle Mfas. 611
- 3. State Farm Mut., 463 U.S.29, 59 *
(Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)r Chevron U.S.G.
v.
Natural Rgi. Def.
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-843, n.
9 (1984):
"The j udi c iary ***
must reject administrative constructions lincluding non-enforcement policies 4 which are contrary to clear congressional intent" (citations omitted); Marshall v.
Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S.
238,249 (1980): Sunstein, Reviewina Aaency Inaction Af ter Heckl er
- v. Chaney,. 52 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 653, 675, nn. 125 and 126, and accompanying tent, 677 (review of claims that an agency has enercised its enforcement powers in a manner inconsiste'nt with-I l
the unambiguously enpressed intent of Congress is "(t)he most 1
1 I
important enception in Chanev", 678 agencies abdicated their statutory obligations by failing to undertake enforcement 21 l
j
action"), 679-680,n. 144 and accompanying text 1985; lhe Impact of Heckler v.
Chanev on Judicial Review of Aaency Decisions, 86 Colum. 1 Rev. 1247, 1250,
- n. 20 (citing articles) (Oct. 1986).
The abdication of regulatory responsibilility that has accompanied the SAFETEAtt program must be challenged.
2.
The SAFETEAM progtam actively misleads workers by failing to inform them of the limits of the SAFETEAM's independence.
The SAFETEAM program represents itself to the workforce as-an "outside" concern.
IL emphas i::e s that the interviewers and investigators are independent consultants.
The program includes repeated promises of confidentiality.
Yet under this facade is the reality that the utility i
manages the SAFETEAM proj ect, that the SAFETEAM director is a utility employee, that many categories of concerns are immediately forwarded to the company for investigation, and that each and every SAFETEAM allegation and report is reviewed by a management team made up of corporate officials from the legal department, public relations department, and the site quality I
assurance staff.
i
)
If workers were aware of those facts from the outset it is entremcly unlikely that they would inform the SAFETEAM of 22
-_____.____.___________________________-_m_
t s g. e ci f i c -al l e gat i ons.
According-to-the SAFETEAM manual the interviewers are instructed to solicit cath and every concern that they have about the project by promising anonymity and thorough investigations
'into-those concerns.
Reassurance: Anonymous' investigation Reply-After the film, anyone in the audience who has a safety concern is invited to request an inter. view.
Reassurance is given that the process keeps them comp 1.etely anonymous - and their concerns will.be identified only by coded numbers?- and.that they need not fear retribution.
They are.also. promised that
'their concerns will be thoroughly investigated and that they will receive a reply as to what action has been taken.
(Manual at 27)
GAP believes that'the SAFETEAM program actively misleads workers into trusting the program, not informing the workers of the procedures and accountabilities that the SAFETEAM has to the utility owner.
3.
The SAFETEAM Program does not and cannot maintain confidentiality of employees.
The SAFETEAM program is not based on a serious commitment to confidentiality.
Each allegation.is, in fact, investigated by
, contacting the very supervisors and management personnel who a
inadequately resolved the original concerns.
This action identifies the concernoe to anyone who has the ability to think beyond the intelligence of a five year qld and has mastered the skill of simple deduction.
It does not require that the SAFETEAM 23
Llip and use the person. name to identify the source or
.'.a c'.legat' ion.
More impo r'Laut ly. t hos e allegations which are not investigated by the SAFETEAM but are turned over to the utility For: investigation have no protection from identification.
Finally, each and every allegation is given to the utility owner review committee.
This committee consists of a representative from the Public Relations department, a senior licensing attorney, and the Manager of Quality Assurance.
These individuals have access to the identity of each.concernee.
Since it is undisputed that confidentiality is th'e cornerstone to an effective program (SAFETEAM Brochure at 1-2) it is critical that confidentiality in any program be strictly adhered to by the employee allegation program. This must be more than lip. service to a principal, it must be an honest commitment i
to protecting those employees who have a reason to need anonymity in exchange for the disclosure.
Once the program has a reputation that there is no real protection the credibility of the program evaporates.
This has apparently happenend at Fermi, and at Comanche Peak and at the South Texas Project.
The program cannot guarantee confidentiality because the program is not truly dedicated to a resolution of concerns instead of identification.
It is a deceptive program that does not enplain to the employee just how a concern is investigated, who investigates it, who reviews it, and the procedures by which his/her identity will be pr otected.
El 4
4.
The EAFETEAM pincess ilo c s not ptovide intesviewetn or iw.estigators which are trained to prabo the becadth and scope of
.the specific safety-related concerns given to the project.
The reports of the Office of Investigations and Inspection and Enforcement staff for the SAFETEAM program at both Comanche Peak and Fermi confirm that a programmatic defect in the program is that interviewers are unqualified.
They are generally untrained individuals hired for their public impression of sincerity instead of their knowledge and understanding of the nuclear industry and the quality assurance and quality control requirements.
Since the interviewer is usually the,only face-to-face contact with the employee it is critical that the interviewer fully debrief a workers knowledge and concerns about safety problems.
GAP's experience after working with hundreds of nuclear workers at sites across the country is that it is almost impossible to adequately debrief any worker at one sitting.
Further, it is impossible to do a thorough debriefing of a worker who has safety related concerns or has information that some i
i I
process is corrupted or flawed by following a canned interview i
dialogue such as is provided by the SAFETEAM manual. (Manual at i
27 )
Instead trained interviewers must be able to anal ~yze the-i
)
information being provided by the worker as it is to be given to 25
fluub out the real :oni ' n; th.it h e.'
h o has, and the f ro'luency 1
with which those concerns occur red cud the ar ea or cystem which would have been infected by the reported deficiency.
The success of a relationship between a concernee and an interveiwer and investigator lies in the ability of the person who must do the investigating to " walk in the shoes" of the worker and understand the procedures, and their implementation, and requirements of the program.
The SAFETEAM program does not provide that level of commitment by either interviewers or investigators.
The program is designed only to provide the utility with a ready explanation for allegations which make their way to the NRC or a licensing Board or a newspaper.
SAFETEAM personnel treat each reported concern seriously, investigate it thoroughly and prepare the written response thoughtfully and carefully.
They must always be aware that an expressed concern may give forewarning of a later allegation to the NRC or another regulatory body and that
]
the r.esponse the SAFETEAM makes now may either preclude it or provide a better case for the owner if an allegation is j
made. (Manual at 2) 5.
The SAFETEAM program is designed to " flush out" employees who are concerned about safety problems on the basis of their level of agitation.
l An interesting feature of the SAFETEAM program whi,ch belies its intention to identify workers who are potential "whistleblowers" is the intensity grading scale.
According to the manual, at the end of the interview the interviewer will 26 4
4 ceus the " intensity" o; the intesview.
A "scose" of 1 - 5 i s, then assigned'to the interviewer uheet.
The 5 indictaes that the individual is " greatly agitated or aggrieved" and a score of 1 indicates that the interview is casual.
The manual does not, state what action is taken as a result of the recording of the intensity level, but it seem logical to assume that the information is recorded for use by management in reviewing the concerns.
6.
The SAFETEAM program does not investigate all reported concerns, only those related to nuclear safety.
The SAFETEAM only investigates those concerns which are in some way nuclear safety-related.
This excludes all concerns of potential wrongdoing, i.e. harassment and intimidation, falsification of records, destruction of records, pressure to approve faulty work, etc.
Those concerns are to be forwarded to the Nuclear Security force of DECO.
Nonetheless, according to the 01. investigation only 3 allegations of wrongdoing were forwarded to Nuclear Security for investigation by the SAFETEAM.
The remaining " wrongdoing" allegations were retained in 1
the SAFETEAM files.
The 01 investigators concluded that thero-I was a completely unreliable effort made to determine the extent of the wrongdoing reported by various workers, and virtually no effort to determine the scope of the problems or the cause of 27 I
L__ _ _ __ _ _
them.
liais _ convinced th:t 01 teoin ' hat the SAFETEAtt pr ogr am hed
)
Iciled as an investigatory progrom t,ubstitute.
This conclusion is not surprising.
The program has no independence from the utility it serves.
The program is supposed to be a tool of the utlity to ease the licensing path, not to identify problems that have the potential of slowing down the process and exposing actual wrongdoers.
Additionally the SAFETEA'M collects, but does not investigate the concerns relating to the following areas:
industrial safety, security, harassment and intimidation, and miscellaneous personnel matters.- Eacle of these areas are also directly referred to the utility for investigation and resolution by in house personnel.
I 28
l 1
t 1.1, WUHIIH ALLEGA11'NJS l'
l 1
1 1
GAP investigative personnel interviewed 47 current and former employees of the Fermi proj e c t.
Those contacts came from a number of sources; the GAP installed local telephone, referrals from workers, former workers who GAP contacted at other sites, and contract personnel or consul.tants involved with the Fermi I
proj e c t.
Of those 47 contacts 8 of the employees had complaints or concerns which were not nuclear safety-related or had any implications for the safety of the Fermi p r oj e c t.
These individuals were referred to other agencies or entities which could more appropriately assist them.
Of the remaining 39 employees whom we interviewed there was a wide range of conerns about the Fermi proj e ct.
The concerns covered many different aspects of the construction and operation of the Fermi plant.
A list of most of the allegations is provided below.
Based on recent pervious experience with the NRC Region III GAP does not believe that the Region is willing to thoroughly i
investigate any of the allegations, but will instead actively, j
I work to minimze or ignore those allegations and their j
l implications.
Because of this problem GAP interviewed the l
workers, listened to their concerns and encourged them to provide l
27
E L
l.
the>;c item:, whi>.h they briieved ha1 itnine d ia t e s s f e l, iin pl i ca t i o n s diecctly'to the NRC.
(in soma casos we know that employees contacted the NRC and in other cases workers felt such an effort was futile.)
l The list of allegations provided here is not comprehensive, however, it will give you some idea of the type of allegations GAP received from employees about the Fermi project.
Alloaction Summarv i
.Allecation 1.
At Penetration X-IcA the bellows were seriously damaged but are being used "as is."
4 2.
The anchor bo'lts and cable tray supports in the G and N cable tray rooms are severely damagedt however, the problem was improperly dispositioned, "use as is."
3.
In the RHR building west of the reactor there is a longitude crack in column 7 or 8.
i i
4.
In the Emergency Diesel generator Room the load bearing i
wall is cracked all the way through.
(if the wall would fall..the main electrical gears will be destroyed.)
5.
The basement of the turbine building has concrete with 30 l
citchs in il permittity. ripping and Icaking linc on critical GA l o.' c 1 1 piping.
- 16..
The: number of cut or severed rebar resulting from the anchor bolt placements throughout the plant indicates that FSAR commitments are not met.
7.
The access to the turbine crane and' movement of the crane is unrestricted from a radiological perspective.
8.
The vent monitor system in the on-site storage facility roof was not properly installed or connected.
i 9.
Calibration and certification of certain pieces of health physics test equipment was not done properly, but no corrective 8
action was taken:
a._ electronic pulsers (E-line) MP-1 serial No. 478, HP-1 serial No 588 b.~ electronic pulsers (LUD), L-SOO serial No. 18477, L-500 Serial No. 14803 1
L
- c. Multimeter ( TEl( ), 501A Serial No.B029542 1
l l
l
- d. Main frame (TER)
TM 504 Serial No.80344 I
l e.
Power Supply (1ER) PS 501-1 Serial No. bod 6021 31 L______._.______._____________
i
- f. Vacuum Tube *.'o.tmoter ( Balt ) Vtil 177 Sr r ial 140.21160
- h. Flukes 8021 B Serial No.2775316, 8021 B Serial -
No.3045323
- 1. Oscilloscope (TEl( ) 455 Serial No.BO72395 10.
Document control and protection measures were consistently ignored during the final stages of construction resulting in large amounts of missing, lost, or destroyed documentation.
11.
Documentation which was rej ected f rom the vault because of missing signatures and other defects was being falsified by personnel who would sign other peoples names and/or their own name withcut verifying the work was completed.
12.
Quality control inspectors for specific contractors, Comstock and Wismer-Becker, were not permitted to write nonconformance reports on identified deficiencies.
13.
Design changes wete frequently made in the field without.thr.
(
actual review by design engineers.
This was particularly true i
during start up testing.
22 i
L
{
M.
Mter t up tuiti ng
'.a donc in a inanner which ignot ud the s,c p -by-s t e p pro c edurera r ine.luding hold points, did not comply with quality requirements, and did not record the system' failures on contr'lled documentation (NCR's, etc.)
o i
15.
There are numerous material traceability deficiencies that were impr operly resolved in the ' field and not recorded on non-conformance reports.for resolution.
16.
Significant amounts of t'ho electrical cable pulling work was done using unapproved design drawings, resulting in seperation violations and other indeterminate conditions in the electrical are.
17.
Numerous rejectable welds in and around the penetration
, seals were accepted by GC.inspecters under pressure and protest.-
Later NDE." doctored" up X-Rays of the welds so that document inspection and reviews wou5d show acceptable welds.
18.
Welding practices (i.e. downhill welding, arc strikes, improper repair techniques) were common place.
19.
Automatic Radiation Moniters (ARMS) and Portable Radiation Monitors (ARMS) were not located in the correct locations.
20.
Detection instruments do not function in numerous areas, in 1
l 33 1
L i
l i
l l
some iiis tanuu s, ircult?og ffom poot e ngineer liig design on i
1: cation.
21.
Rad'ioactive material have not been handled according to the i
NRC's requirements of 10 CFR 20.205.
22.
Employees in the health physical area were are not trained adequately or not trained at all. (Benchnork corp was contracted-1 l
to help DECO with training problems but quit.because the programs j
they wished'to institute were rej e cted. )
l 23.
Radioactive waste systems and/or the waste disposal systems were not built to procedur es.
24.
The DECO radwaste system has never passed the procedural requirements.
The krecedures do not provide for' proper
' monitoring of the loading of the radioactive waste drums which may result insignificant hazards during shipping.
25.
Floor drains around the containment are faulty, allowing for leaks of radioactive water into Lake Erie.
No orginal blue prints of the floor drainsystem could be located.
26.
Management and operation / construction of the Fermi 11 facility shows little managorial integrity and consistently shown signs of breakdown.
i 34 m________Am_--____s_ _ _
i l
27 T het c was f rcquent. cheatinij on qualification tests by quality control inspectors.
28.
The're was frequent harassment and intimidation of inspectors i
and auditors who attempted to identify problems and non-conforming conditions.
)
These allegations were received from workers who formerly worked at the plant, some as early as the mid-seventies and up to j
and including the present time.
All of the.allegors had either reported their concerns to the SAFETEAM, or were advised to contact the NRC anonymously if they believed that their concerns could impact the safety of the reactor.
i CONCLUSION l
The Fermi project has been built on a history of deception.
Until 1985, it prided itself on accordance of regulatory confrontations.
Since'1985 the plant management has allegedly been. attempting to understand and address both the substantive problems at the plant and the management problems.
However, GAP's analysis of.the efforts taken by Detroit Edison management show that these efforts are less than convincing.
For example, DECO has hired B. Ralph Sylvia as the Vice 35 I
j
l' Fe esident; o f-llucica Ogu"ationa.
At.the William H.
Zimmer' plant in Ohio Mr. Slyvia was vice
~ president of nuclear. operations at Cincinnati' Gas'and Electric.
Many of the whistleblowers at the Zimmer' plant came into direct contact with Mr. Sylvia.
He was regarded as a ruthless manager who demanded complete loyalty and unquestioning obedience to-
~ management directives, regardless of whether or not the management directives were in compliance with the' federal regulations.
He was specifically named by.midlevel managers at l
the Zimmer facility for ordering the termination of managers who raised safety and/or regulatory concerns.
Mr. Sylvia has also been named by.personnal, GAP has interviewed at Ferm) as having an authoritarian approach to management and being intolerant of' dissent.
For the reasons stated in this report as well as those that GAP has about the management of the Fermi reactor we believe that there,is no assurance that the Fermi plant meets regulatory standards and requirements.
Our investigation did not include a comprehensive analysis of the adequacy or inadequacy of the independent Overview Committees however, based on the continued failures of the plant systems' and the inability of the current management to recognize the' seriousness of the deficiencies it is our opinion that the NRC must pursue every possible lead to
' determine the entent of the problems at the plant.
l 36
_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _