ML20211K914

Discusses Insp Repts 50-369/97-13 & 50-370/97-13 on 970721-24 & Forwards Nov.Violations of Concern Because of Failure to Control Access of Individuals No Longer Authorized Entry Into Protected & Vital Areas of Plant

ML20211K914
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	09/26/1997
From:	Reyes L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	Barron B DUKE POWER CO.
Shared Package
ML20211K917	List: ML20211K914 ML20211K943
References
50-369-97-13, 50-370-97-13, NUDOCS 9710100066
Download: ML20211K914 (5)

See also: IR 05000369/1997013

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September 26, 1997

EA 97 411

Duke Energy Corporation

ATTN: Mr. B. Barron

Vice President

McGuire Site

1270J Hagers Ferry Road

Huntersville.-NC 28078 8985

SUBJECT: NOTICE OF VIOLATION

(NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50 369/97 13 AND 50 370/97 13)

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Dear Mr. Barron:

This letter refers to an NRC security inspection conducted at Duke Energy

Corporation's (DEC) McGuire Nuclear Station between July 21 and 24,1997. The

results of the inspection were formally transmitted to you by letter dated

August 22, 1997. The apparent violations identified were discussed with

members of your staff during an inspection exit conducted by telephone on

August 28, 1997, and were provided to you in our letter dated September 11,

1997. ~An open predecisional enforcement conference was conducted in the

Region II office on-September 19, 1997, to discuss the apparent violations,

the root causes, and your corrective actions to preclude recurrence. A list

of conference attendees, NRC slides, and a copy of your presentation materials

.are enclosed.

Based on the information developed during the ins)ections and the information

that you provided during the conference, the NRC 1as determined that

violations of NRC requirements occurred. The violations are cited in the

enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice), and the circumstances surrounding them

are described in detail in the subject inspection report and our letter to you

dated September 11, 1997,

Violation A involves the failure to notify McGuire security officers promptly

of the termination of seven contractor employees, which resulted in a failure

to remove their security badges from the badge rack. An April 19, 1996, event

involved inadequate control of the access badges of three involuntarily

terminated contractor employees. On April 8, 1997, a more serious event

occurred.- Two individuals, both with protected and vital area access, were i

terminated (one involuntarily). They subsequently retrieved their security

badges and gained access to the protected area and could have accessed vital

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. areas. The two individuals were located and escorted offsite within

10 minutes of their entry.' In July 1997, two other contractor employees were -

terminated and McGuire security was not notified to ensure their security _

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badges were restricted. The .oot cause of these events was the failure of the

responsible contractor man *,er to make a timely notification to McGuire

security officers such t' the security badges were removed from the plant

badge rack.

Violation B includes two xamples of the failure to remove the security badges

of individuals from the bi ge storage rack upon notification of their

favorable termination or ex)iration of a temporary clearance, As a result,

one individual, who should lave been denied access due to an expired temporary

clearance, entered the protected area on July 3, 7 and 8,1997. This

individual was subsequently granted a clearance and access to the site,

Although these access control problems were licensee identified, the

violations are of significant regulatory concern because the failure to

l control access of individuals no longer authorized entry into protected and

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vital areas of the plant could compromise overall plant security. The NRC is

also concerned that the examples identified in Violations A and B indicate

weaknesses in the area of access control for contractor employees. Stringent

measures to control badges are critical for an effective Security Plan. Based

on the 6bove, Violations A and B have been classified in the aggregate in

accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC

Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG 1600, as a Severity Level III

problem.

In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount

of $55,000 is considered for a Severity Level III problem. Because your

facility pas been the sub ect of escalated enforcement actions within the last

two years , the NRC consi ered whether credit was warranted for

Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty

assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Because you

identified the access control events included in Violations A and B, the NRC

determined that credit for the factor of Identification was appropriate. Your

corrective actions for the two violations, as described at the predecisional

enforcement conference anJ provided in detail in your handout, included review

of each event, promat correction of the discrepent condition, and counseling

and retraining of tie individuals involved to address individual performance

failures and re emphasize procedural requirements. In addition: (1) after the

April 1997 event, you initiated formal training for site access control

saonsors which was initiated on July 31, 1997: (2) in May 1997, you revised

t1e contract employee termination checklist to add security notification

requirements; and, (3) in June 1997, you established a more formal badge

termination process including site wide notification of the process and a

dedicated security phone line for reporting employee terminations. You also

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A severity Level III violation was issued on August 22, 1995, concerning inadequate

emergency diesel generator (EDG) turbocharger design control (EA 95 156). Two severity Level 111

violations were issued on May 9,1996 for inadequate procedures for monitoring of freeze

i protection equipment and design problems with the EDG (EA 96 080 and 96100).

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improved centrols on' computer monitoring of access authorization. Based on

these facts -the NRC determined that credit was warranted for the factor of

Corrective Action, resulting in no civil penalty for the Severity Level III

problem.

Therefore, to encourage prompt identification and comprehensive corre: tion of

violations, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Office of

Enforcement, not to propose a civil penalty in this case. However,

significant violations in the future could result in a civil penalty.

Violation C involved ten examples of the loss of- control of protected area

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badges. The bad

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protected area. The ges NRC

were-taken offsite

is concerned that bythese

the badge

events holders

were alsowhen exiting the

re atitive

and could have been prevented by appropriate corrective action for tie initial

occurrences. The safety significance of this violation was low because no

, unauthorized use of the badges occurred: therefore, Violation C has been

characterized as a Severity Level IV violation.

At the conference, an additional example of Violation B was discussed

regarding an April 11, 1997, failure of security to properly remove an access

badge from the storage rack following notification of a favorable termination.

After consideration of the information you presented at the conference and

documented in an event review, the example is being withdrawn. Specifically,

although the badge was available fer issuance to the individual, security

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immediately deleted the individual's access authorization in the security

computer upon notification of the termination. This action restricted the

individual's access to the station via the security badge.

You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions

specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response, In your

response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional

actions you plan to prevent recurrence. After reviewing your response to this

Notice, including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future-

inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is

necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice." a co]y of

this letter, its enclosures, and your response will- be placed in the NRC

Public Document Room (PDR). To the extent possible, your response should not '

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include any personal 3rivacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that

it can be placed in tie PDR without redaction.

Sincerely.

Luis A. Reyes

Regional Administrator

Docket Nos. 50 369. 50 370

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License Nos. NPF 9, NPF 17

Enclosures: 1. Notice of Violation

2. List of Attendees

3. NRC Slides

4. Licensee Presentation Material

ec w/encis: (See page 5)

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DPC 5

Distribution w/encls:

EJulian, SECY

BKeeling, CA

LJCallan, EDO

AThadani, DEDE

JLieberman, OE

LReyes, RII

SCollins, NRR

RZimmerman, NRR

LChandler, OGC

JGoldberg, OGC

Enfortement Coordinators

RI, RII, RIII, RIV

WBeecher OPA

HBell, OIG

TMartin, AEOD

GCaputo. 01

NDudley, OEDO

VNerses, NRR

C0gle, RII

RCarroll, RII

OE:EA File (BSummers, OE)(2 letterhead)

VNerses, NRR

SRudisail, RII

Buryc, RII

CJulian, RII (IFS Action Required)

CPayne, Rll

PUBLIC

NRC Resident Inspector

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

12700 Hagers Ferry Road

Huntersville, NC 28078 8985

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12itribution w/encis:

IJu ian, SECY

BKeeling, CA

LJCallan EDO

AThadani, DEDE

JLieberman, OE

LReyes, RII

SCollins, NRR

RZimmerman, NRR

LChandler, OGC

JGoldberg, OGC

Enforcement Coordinators

RI, RII, RIII, RIV

WBeecher. OPA

HBell 0!G

l TMartin, AE00 '

GCaputo, 01

NDudley, OEDO

VNerses, NRR

C0gle, RII

RCarroll, RII

OE:EA File (BSummers, OE)(2 letterhead)

VNerses, NRR  :

SRudisail, RII

BVryc, TII

CJulian, RII (IFS Action Required)

CPayne, RII

PUBLIC

NRC Resident Inspector

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

12700 Hagers Ferry Road

Huntersv111e, NC 28078 8985

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