IR 05000213/1989001

Insp Rept 50-213/89-01 on 890104-0221.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Radiation Protection, Fire Protection,Security,Maint,Surveillance Testing,Noble Gas Source Investigation & Reactor Containment Temp

ML20246H517
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	03/10/1989
From:	Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20246H507	List: IR 05000213/1989001 ML20246H502
References
50-213-89-01, 50-213-89-1, NUDOCS 8903200246
Download: ML20246H517 (11)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION Report N /89-01 Docket N '50-213 License N DPR-61 Licensee: Connecticut ankee Atomic Power Company P. 0.. Box 27J Hartford, CT 06101

' Facil i t'y : Haddam Neck Plant, Haddam Neck, Connecticut Inspection at: Haddam Neck Plant-Inspection dates: January 4 through February 21, 1989 j Inspectors: .Andra A. Asars, Resident Inspector John T. Shedlosky, Senior Resident Inspector Approved by: $ C. b M , h 3//o/87 E. C. McCabe, Chief.. Reactor Projects Section 1B

. Date Summary: Inspection 50-213/89-01 (1/4/89 - 2/21/89)

Areas Inspected: Routine safety inspection of plant operations, radiation protec-  !

tion, fire protection, security, maintenance, surveillance testing, events. occur- i ring during the inspection period, noble gas source investigation, reactor contain-

. ment. temperature calculations, and control' room construction activitie Results: No violations or unacceptable conditions were identified. ' Mislabeling of plant components was referred to the licensee for respons DR 890310 ADOCK 05000213 l PNU

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TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE i i Summary of Facility Activities......................................, 1 Review of Plant 0perations........................................... 1 2.1 Construction Activities in the Control Room..................... 2 i

x 2.2 Safety System Wa1kdown.......................................... 2 Plant Operations Review Committee.................................... 4

! Maintenance and Surveillance......................................... 4 4.1 Steam Flow Transmi tter Tubi ng Leak Repai r. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 i 4.2 Functional Testing of the No. 28 Emergency Diesel Generator..... 5 l Events Occurring During the Inspection............................... 5 l 5.1 Licensee Event Reports and Safeguards Event Reports............. 5 5.2 Feedwater Excursion During Troubleshooting...................... 6 5.3 Unplanned Release of Gaseous Radioactive Material.. ............ 6 Review of Periodic and Special Reports............................... 7 Insuf ficient Diesel Fuel Oil During Design Basis Flood. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Primary Auxiliary Building Noble Gas Source Investigation. . . . . . . . . . . 8 Study of Reactor Containment Temperatures............ .... .......... 9 10. Exit Interview....................................................... 10  !

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-DETAILS Summary of Facility Activities (71707)

The station operated at full power throughout'the inspection period with the exception of four minor power reductions in support of feedwater control sys-cten troubleshooting and repai )

. Review of Plant Operations (71707, 71710)

The . inspector observed plant operation during regular tours of the following-plant areas:

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. Control Room --

Primary Access Point

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Primary Auxiliary Building --

Fence Line (Protected Area)

Vital Switchgear Room

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Yard Areas

-- Di,esel Generator Rooms ---

Turbine Building

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Radiation Control Point --

Intake Structure

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Appendix R Switchgear Building Control room instruments were observed for correlation between channels and for conformance with Technical Specificat_ ion requirements. The inspector observed various alarm conditions which had been received and acknowledge Operator awareness and response to these conditions were reviewed. Control room and shift manning were compared to regulatory requirements. Posting and control of radiation and high radiation areas was' inspected. Compliance with Radiation Work Permits and use of appropriate personnel monitoring devices were checked. Plant housekeeping controls were observed, including control-

.and storage of flammable material and other potential safety hazards. The inspector also examined the condition of various fire protection system During plant tours, logs and records were reviewed to determine if_ entries were properly-made and communicated equipment status / deficiencie These records included operating logs, turnover sheets, tagout and jumper logs, process computer printouts, and Plant Information Reports. The inspector observed selected aspects of plant security including access control, physical ,

barriers, and personnel monitorin In addition to normal utility working hours (7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.), the review of plant operations was routinely conducted during portions of the midnight and evening shifts. Extended coverage was provided on the following days: l

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January 19, 1989 until 9:45 l

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February 4, 1989 11:00 a.m. through 4:00 t

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February 15, 1989 until 8:00 February 20. 1989 12 noon through 7:00 i No unacceptable conditions were identifie Operators were alert and dis- I played no signs of inattention to duty or fatigu _ -- - i

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2.1 Construction Activities in the Control Room (71707)

Construction of the new Appendix R Switchgear Building has progressed to the point of installation of-conduits and their associated supports' '

-and cable in the control room for eventual' tie-in to the main. control-l _ board. .This_ effort has necessitated an increased construction presence l in the control room, including relatively noisy activities and the erec- 1 tion of scaffoldin ;

i Since initiation of the work, the licensee has been sensitive to the I effects on _ security and fire protection and the potential for distraction of the control _ room operators. The shift supervisors.have effectively maintained positive control over control room activitie Construction personnel have been observed to maintain proper control room protoco ;

On several occasions the inspectors have witnessed work stoppage by the i shift supervisor when construction work activities interfered with con- i

. trol room operations, j 1 During this inspection period, seismically designed scaffolding was I erected inside the control room " sacred zone" (the area immediately in front of the main control board). These activities were carefully and deliberately performed and had minimal impact on plant operation Operations personnel provided recommendations for scaffolding positioning to minimize obstruction. The scaffolding was constructed without inci-dent. The inspectors verified that the view of the control panels' for operators, specifically the shift supervisor, is not significantly de-creased. All indicators and alarms can be easily seen from each positio Current construction schedules place removal of scaffolding in the '

" sacred zone" at the end of April following completion of. cable pull The inspectors will continue to observe control room activities during j routine inspection .2 Safety System Walkdown (71710)

In addition to routine observations made during regular plant tours, the inspectors conducted walkdowns of the accessible portions of safety re-lated systems. The inspectors verified system operability including reviews of vahe lineups, c'ontrol room system prints, equipment condi-tions, instrument calibrations, surveillance test frequencies and results, and control room indications. During this inspection period, walkdowns of the following systems were conducted:

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Service Water '

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Low Head Safety Injection

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Emergency Diesel Generator 28

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The inspectors identified the following system conditions which warranted  ;

licensee evaluation and corrective. action: i

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On February 20, during surveillance testing of No. 2B Emergency Diesel- Generator (EDG), the inspector noted a small leak (about one-drop per second) from the diesel fuel oil filter assembly. This was brought to the shift supervisor's attention. The leak was re-paired prior to completion of the surveillance tes During verification of valve lineups in .the Service Water (SW) sys-tem, the o spector identified mislabeling of nine components.associ-ated~with a 2B EDG cooling water heat exchangers. The plastic equipment Sels were incorrectly placed on both heat exchanger in-let.and outlet pressure indicators and their associated root valves and also on several drain valves. The labels appeared to have been randomly placed; for example, a channel head drain valve was-labeled a pressure indicator and a valve label was hung on a heat exchanger support. The inspector brought this to the shift supervisor's at-tention. A complete valve lineup and label verification was per-formed on the SW lines for both EDG's. No valves were'found mis-aligned and the label placement was correcte Preventive Maintenance Procedure.PMP 9.5-43, EDG Cooling Water Heat Exchangers, had been performed on the 2B EDG on December 5, 198 !

This semiannual PMP provider for cleaning of the heat exchanger- 1 tubes and channel heads and inspection for corrosion. Performance i of this PMP requires disassembly of the heat exchangers and there- I fore removal of the equipment labels. Through discussions with '

operations and maintenance personnel the inspector determined that-personnel were unfamiliar with the guidance provided by ACP 1.0-57, l Plant Labeling Procedure, which states that operations personnel l are responsible for verifying appropriate label placement. This  !

was discussed with the Operations Superviso The inspectors were ;

informed that this matter will be discussed with the plant staff '

emphasizing that, if difficulties are encountered when replacing labels, Operations should be contacted for assistanc The inspector identified a minor, isolated discrepancy in the con-trol room copy of the operations critical drawings. The SW to EDG cooling water heat exchangers inlet and outlet cross tie isolation valves (SW-V-146 and 147) are incorrectly shown as open. In fact, these valves are required by procedure to be locked closed. The inspector verified correct valve position in the plan The licen- !

see plans to incorporate the necessary change into the next drawing revision, j l

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Slight leaks on the Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) pumps' j discharge pressure gauge fittings (SI-PI-110A and 110B) were iden-tified. A bag had been placed around the 110B fitting to limit the l

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' spread of boric acid. -The inspector noted that no Trouble Report or Automated Work Order had been initiated. This was brought'the the Shift Supervisor's attention. The leaks were promptly repaired and the bag on the 110B gauge remove No conditions adverse to' system operability were identifie . Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) (40500)

The inspector attended several Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) meet-ings. Technical Specification 6.5 requirements for required member attendance were verified. The meeting agendas included procedural changes, proposed changes to the Technical Specifications and field changes to design change packages. The meetings were characterized by frank discussions and question-ing of the proposed changes. In particular, consideration was given to assure claritytand consistency among procedures. Items for which adequate review I time was not available were postponed to allow committee members time to re-view and comment. Dissenting opinions were encouraged and promptly addresse The inspector had no further comment . Maintenance and Surveillance (61726, 62703) i The inspector observed various maintenance and troubleshooting activities for I compliance with requirements and applicable codes and standards, QSD (Quality Services Department) involvement, safety tags, equipment alignment and use of jumpers, personnel qualifications, radiological controls, fire protection, ;

retest, and deportability. Also, the inspector witnessed selected survei1-

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lance tests to determine whether properly approved procedures were in use, i test instrumentation was properly calibrated and used, technical specifica-tions were satisfied, testing was performed by qualified personnel, procedure details were adequate, and test results satisfied acceptance criteria or were properly dispositioned. The following activities were r^ viewed:

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CMP 8.2-18, Repair or Replacement of Feedwater Valve Positioner

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Repair of No. 3 Steam Flow Transmitter Tubing Leak

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Test of "A" Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Terry Turbine Overspeed Trip Mechanism

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SUR 5.2-4.3, Reactor Protection System Rack CF Periodic Surveillance

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SUR 5.1-178, Emergency Diesel Generator EG-2B Manual Starting and Load Test

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SUR 5.2-24, Safeguards Equipment Timer Test

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SPL 10.5-213, Service Test of New Station Battery BT-1B i i

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4~ 1 Steam Flow Transmitter Tubing Lkak

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On January 23, a steam leak in the No. 3 steam flow transmitter tubing worsene This caused a No. 3 Steam Generator Steam Line Break alarm .I in the control room. A trip signal was inserte Repair was' initiate l The leak was in a carbon-to-stainless steel transition fitting immedi-ately downstream of the transmitter's root _ valve (MS-V-1202-32). Earlier, the licensee had. experienced difficulties in operating this root valv l For this reason, the transmitter was not isolated for repair of the fit- ,

tin Instead, the licensee elected to install a two piece _ casing, over '!

the fitting, to bs fil_ led with Furmanite compoun !

Design of the casing and specifications for injection of the Furmanit I were identified in Nonconformance Report 89-23. The inspector observe installation of the casing and Furmanite under Automated Work Order 89-72 i The repair stopped _the steam leak. Control. room indications returned  !

to normal and the trip signal was remove )

4.2 Functional Testing of the No. 28 Emergency Diesel Generator l

Functional testing of-the No. 2B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was observed on February 21. As discussed in paragraph 2.2 of-this report, l the i_nspector identified a one drop per second fuel oil leak on the EDG l fuel filter assembly. The licensee repaired the leak before completion j of the diesel tes ;

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No unacceptable conditions were identifie . Events Occurring During the Inspection-(71707, 92700, 93702)

5.1 Licensee Event Reports (LERs) and Safeguards Event Reports (SERs) -l The following LERs and SERs were reviewed for clarity, accuracy of the description of cause, and adequacy of corrective action. The inspector determined whether further information was required and whether there were generic implications. The inspector also verified that the report-  ;

ing requirements of 10 CFR 50.73, 10 CFR 73.71, and Station Administra- l tive and Operating, and Security Procedures had been met, that appro-priate corrective action had been taken, and that the continued operation of the facility was conducted within Technical Specification Limit Post Accident Sampling System Out of Service  !

89-01 Inoperable Fire Barrier Seal Due to Procedural Deficiencies89-501 Safeguards Event Report No unacceptable conditions were identified.

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l 5.2 Feedwater Excursion During Troubleshooting .i During recent months, the plant has been experiencing ~ erratic feedwater I regulating valve (FRV) behavior, particularly with the No. 3 FR i

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On January 25, Instrument and Controls (I&C) technicians were investigat- i ing erratic behavior of the No. 3 FRV. When technicians removed the j Hagen level controller drawer from the control board, the FRV unexpectedly went to the full open position (the FRV controls were in automatic at the time). This resulted in a sudden increase in No. 3 Steam Generator level to about 58% before operators could take manual control of the feedwater controls. The plant was stabilized without inciden I i

This. response of the FRV was unexpecte I&C technicians removed the I controller drawer to visually verify integrity of electrical connection After the event, it was discovered that the " dog ears" which hold the drawer in place touch the soldered contacts on a pot inside the drawer when the drawer is remove Had the FRV controls been in manual, this apparent design defect would not have been identifie As an interim measure, until the drawers can be either modified or re-placed, the licensee has inserted a tape barrier between the " dog ears" and the soldered contacts in the drawer. The remaining seven drawers had caution stickers affixed to the drawer front This approach was chosen to avoid possible and unnecessary feedwater transients during removal of the drawers for barrier installatio The licensee is currently conducting a deportability evaluation due to possible generic implications with the controller drawer aesign. The controllers are Hagen Model 62 Proportion Plus Reset Controllers Without a Manual Statio The FRV erratic behavior has been nearly arrested. Several of the valve positioner pilot valves and position cams have been replaced. This seems l to have stabilized valve position l 5.3 Unplanned Release of Gaseous Radioactive Material The licensee reported a short unplanned release of noble gases on Febru-ary 18. Slightly increased radiation levels were recorded by the plant stack radiation monitors at Instrumentation and Controls technicians were repairing an instrument controlling a back pressure regulator for the valve stem leak off subsystem. Reactor coolant leakage within the con-l tainment is collected, cooled and directed to the radioactive waste sys-tem in the Primary Auxiliary Building. During the repair, induced pres- I sure changes in the collection system led to the increased gaseous re-  !

lease rate. Additionally, temporary instrumentation was connected to  !

l the system. Both of these evolutions probably resulted in the observed l changes in plant vent stack release rat ]

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Control Room operators observed the stack release rate increase from its nominal 130 micrccuries per second to about 6,500. The licensee later calculated a ten minute, weighted average release rate of 1,650 micro-curies per second, with a total of 5.08 Curies release The release was 5% of the Operating License Technical Specification whole body limit; the calculated total radiation exposure potential at the site boundary was 1.5E-04 millire The personnel involved were working in a well ventilated area and were wearing protective clothing and respirators. They did not experience any difficulties upon exiting the radiologically controlled area. Whole body counts were performed with satisfactory result There were no unacceptable conditions identifie a Review of Periodic and Special Repoits (90712) J

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Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted pursuant to Technical l Specification 6.9 were reviewed. This review verified that the reported information was valid and included the NRC required data; that test results ,

and supporting information were consistent with design predictions and per-  !

formance specifications; and that planned corrective actions were adequate for resolution of the proble The inspector also ascertained whether any reported information should be classified as an abnormal occurrence. The following reports were reviewe Haddam Neck Plant Monthly Operating Report No. 88-12, for the period December 1, 1988 through December 31, 198 Haddam Neck Plant Monthly Operating Report No. 89-01, for the period i January 1, 1989 through January 31, 198 !

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Haddam Neck Plant Oil Spill Report, dated January 20, 198 Haddam Neck Plant Control Room Fire Protection and Detection Special Report, Dated January 27, 198 ;

No discrepancies were identifie . Insufficient Diesel Fuel Oil During Design Basis Flood (71707)

The licensee has determined that the safe shutdown requirements could not be met during the maximum probable flood due to the inability to supply fuel oil to the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) for the maximum flood duration of i 166 hour0.00192 days <br />0.0461 hours <br />2.744709e-4 weeks <br />6.3163e-5 months <br /> During the biennial review of Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 3.2-24, Flooding of the Connecticut River, operations personnel identified that, if '

the diesel fuel oil supply from the site fuel oil storage tank (at grade level in the south yard) to the EDGs were isolated in accordance with the procedure, t - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ i

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the only fuel supply to the EDGs would be the underground storage tank These tanks hold 5000 gallons each and are required by administrative controls to contain at least 3250 gallons of fuel oil. This amount of oil would be  !

insufficient to power one EDG for the maximum flood duratio ;

The licensee evaluated the option of leaving the south yard storage tank un-isolated during flood conditions. The review concluded that this is not vi- i

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able. If, during a flood above site grade level, the tank remains a source of fuel oil and tank level decreases, the tank could become buoyant and cause the associated fuel lires to break. That would introduce water into the EDG fuel oil syste The system does contain manual isolation valves and air-operated level control valves. However, these cannot be relied upon because they would be submerged; manual valves would be difficult to locate and oper-ate under water and the air operated valves are not qualified to operate in these conditions. It was concluded that the only course of action would be to isolate the south yard tank as currently required by the A0 The licensee then determined that this condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72~, in that this condition could prevent the fulfillment of the EDG's safety function during shutdown of the reactor and in maintaining a safe shutdown condition. Notifications were made to NRC and the State of Connecticu The proposed compensatory measures include the following:

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Arrangements to be made with a local oil company for fuel oil trucks to be dispatched to the site as an additional fuel supply;

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Incorporation of a design change to the EDG underground fuel oil storage tanks to add a standpipe for fuel addition; and '

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Changes made to the appropriate A0Ps to initiate compensatory measures if flood waters reach 19 fee The deportability determination and the proposed compensatory measures were  ;

reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) on January 25, 198 PORC determined that continued plant operations are acceptable because, his- )

torically, the probability of a flood of this severity at this time of year i is remot The maximum flood occurs during a spring thaw after heavy, re-tained winter snowfall. That has not been the case this yea Nonetheless, a completion date of February 28, 1989 was established for the compensatory-measures discusse No unacceptable conditions were identifie i 8. Primary Auxiliary Building Noble Gas Source Investigation (71707)

Over the last several months, the licensee has experienced increased levels of noble gases in the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB). These increased levels were attributed to minor valve packing leaks. However, in December

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l 1988, two unplanned releases of noble gases exceeded the licensee's admini-l strative deportability limit These releases were discussed in NRC Inspec-tion Report 50-213/88-23, Detail During the current inspection, the root cause determination for the first unplanned release was completed and the investigation into the source of the noble gases has continue Nuclear Safety Engineering (NSE) issued their report detailing their deter- !

mination of the root cause of the unplanned release on December 26, 1988 and their recommendations to prevent similar events. The evaluation concluded that the source of the unplanned release was two leaking valves in the pres-surizer steam space sample line. This conclusion supports initial theories of the gas source. However, the report also noted that Chemistry personnel had known about the leaky valves and had not submitted a Trouble Report for valve repairs. NSE recommended that a periodic inspection of sample sink valves be initiated, communications during sampling between the control room and chemistry technicians be improved, and the importance of utilizing the existing Trouble Reporting system be emphasized by station managemen During this inspection period, the licensee has continued efforts to identify and decrease noble gas sources in the PAB. These efforts have included valve ,

bagging and repairs and continuous area monitoring. The area affected has l been reduced to the pipe chase below the Blowdown Room. Monitoring of gas !

levels in these areas has indicated that levels increase during makeup evolu- l tions to the Reactor Coolant System. Ventilation in the lower levels of the !

PAB has been increased. Valve leak identification and repairs are continuin ;

However, it has become apparent that there is no single source of noble gases '

but an accumulation of small valve packing leaks. This condition has become evident due to more sensitive radiation monitoring capabilitie The inspectors will continue to monitor the licensee's efforts in addressing this matter during routine inspection . Study of Reactor Containment Temperatures (71707)

In response to exce;sive containment / dry well temperatures experienced by several plants during the summer months of 1988, the resident inspectors were requested to review the daily average containment temperatures and evaluate temperature sensor locations. The review of containment temperatures and ,

locations of temperature detectors is discussed in NRC Inspection Report 1 50-213/88-2 During this inspection period, the inspectors completed this study with a review of the containment weighted average temperature calculations performed by the process computer j The process computer calculates an hourly average weighted containment tem-perature using indications from ten permanently installed resistance tempera-ture detectors (RTDs) and predetermined volume fractions for the area moni-tored by each RT l

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The original calculations for the volume fraction determinations were not'

.readily available for revie Using the containment volume calculations for the Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test, the inspector verified several of-the volume fraction constants. No discrepancies were identifie Based on these reviews, the inspectors concluded that the calculated weighted average containment temperature is adequately representative of containment temperature The inspectors noted that, currently, there is not a Technical Specification (TS) for Containment Temperatur However, containment temperature will be specified in the Standard TS, when adopted. .At that time, the. utility wil need to have the calculations for the volume fraction determination availabl . Exit Interview During this inspection, meetings were held with plant management.to discuss the findings. No proprietary information related to this inspection was identifie i i

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