ML20246N920

Summary of Operating Reactors Events Meeting 89-010 on 890308.List of Attendees,Significant Events Identified for Input to NRC Performance Indicator Program & Summary of Reactor Scrams for Wk Ending 890305 Encl

ML20246N920
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs, Palo Verde, Diablo Canyon, San Onofre, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000
Issue date:	03/16/1989
From:	Lanning W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
OREM-89-010, OREM-89-10, NUDOCS 8903280069
Download: ML20246N920 (23)

Text

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1&AR 161990 2

MEMORANDUM FOR: Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment FROM: Wayne D. Lanning, Chief-Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment-

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SUBJECT:

THE OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS MEETING-March 8, 1989 - MEETING 89-10 On March 8, 1989,-an Operating Reactors Events meeting (89-10) was held to i brief senior managers from NRR, RES, Commission Staff, and Regional Offices on events which occurred since our last meeting on March 1, 1989. The list of attendees is included as Enclosure 1. .

The events discussed and the significant elements of these events are presented in Enclosure 2.. Enclosure 3 includes one significant event identified for input to NRC's performance indicator program and a summary of reactor scrams for the week ending 03/05/89. .4'

..3 Wayne D. Lanning, Chief.

Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment

Enclosures:

As stated cc w/ Encl.:

See Next Page 1

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T. Murley, NRR . S. McNeil, NRR F. Miraglia, NRR- R.:Capra, NRR J. Sniezek, NRR P. Shemanski, NRR E. Jordan, AEOD D. Muller, NRR

'J. Taylor, EDO T. Chan, NRR E. Beckjord, RES G. Knighton, NRR.

o W. Russell R1 C. : Triannell, NRR M. Ernst, R11- 'H. Rood, NRR B. Davis, RIII -D. Hood, NRR R. D. Martin, RIV D. Matthews, NRR J. B. Martin, RV W. Kane, RI L. Reyes, RII i E. Greenman, RIII L. Callan,'RIV D. Kirsch, PV

'S. Varga,-NRR . _

D. Crutchfield, NRR B. Boger, NRR-

'G. Lainas,-IIRR G. Holahan,itRR

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WASHINGTON, D, C. 20555 .

K.:.w...j jeJ. t 1980 MEMORANDUM F0P: Charles E. Rossi. Director Division of Operational Events Assessment FROM: Wayne'D. Lanning, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment

SUBJECT:

< THE OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS MEETING March E, 1989 - MEETING 89-10 On ftarch 8,1989, an Operating Reactors Events ineeting (89-10) was held to brief senior managers from NRR,.RES,_ Commission Staff, and Regional Offices on events which occurred since our 17.st meeting on March 1, 1989. The list of attendees is included as Enclosu'e 1.

The events discussed and the significant elements of these events are presented in Enclosure 2. Enclosure 3_ includes one significant event identified for input to i:PC's performance indicetor proaram and a summary of reactor scrams for the week ending 03/05/89.

i ay . Lanning, C ,f Events Assessment B(an Divisior, of OperatioY Events Assessmer,t

Enclosures:

As stated cc w/ Encl.:

See Next Pact

________________m_ - _ _ _ _ _ . _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . - _ . - . . - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . - . _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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• ENCLOSURE 1 1 .

I LIST OF ATTENDEES l OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING (89-10) 1 March 8, 1989 HAME. ORGANIZATION NAME ORGANIZATION ET Capra NRR/PDI-1 57 RcNeil NRR/PDI-2 M. Johnson OEDO- J. Dyer NRR/DRIS

.F. Rosa NRR/SELB J. Wiggins NRR/PDI-3 D. Muller NRR/PD3-2 L. Zerr NRR/DRSP P. Shamanski NRR/PD3-2 R. Lobel NRR/00EA' W. Lanning NRR/D0EA P. Baranowsky NRR/DOEA M. Virgilio llRR/DRP C. Possi NRR/DOEA W. Hodges HRR/ DEST A. Gilbert NRR/DOEA

-T. Chan NRR/ DEST G. Knighton NRR/DRSP D. Notley -NRR/ DEST J. Flack RES/SAIB W. Troskoski OE M. Fields NRR/CPPD T. Daniels NRR/TVAP C. Trammell .NRR/DRSP M. Reardon NRR/DOEA -

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ENCLOSURE 2 r n: .

e OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING 89-10.

. EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRA _HQi

LDfATION: 12B-11, WhlTE FLINT WEDNESDAY, MARCH 8, 1989, 11:00 A.M.

i CALVERT CLIFFS UNIT 2 FIRE IN CONTROL ROOM PANEL-l .LASALLE.UhlTS 1 AND : UNIT 2 TRANSFORMER FAULT.

RESULTS IN UNIT 1 TRIP ANL e ECUIPMENT MALFUNCTION (AIT).

PALO VERDE-UNIT 3 MULTIPLE EQUIPMENT FAILURES-FOLLOWING LOAD REJECT.(AIT)

SAN ONOFRE UNIT ] MULTIPLE DESIGN DEFICIENCIES DIALLO. CANYON UNITS 1 AND 2 UNRECOGNIZED INOPERABILITY OF TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP MCGUIRE UNIT 1 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK (AIT) (VERBAL PRESENTATION -

NO SLIDES)

89 '

CALVERT CLIFFS UNIT 2 FIRE IN-CONTROL ROOM PANEL MARCH 1, 1989 PROBLEM FIRE'IN AN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM TRIP THROTTLE VALVE HAND SWITCH-LCCATED IN A CONTROL ROOM PANEL.

o flUlf o MAINTENANCE INADEQUACIES o POSSIBLE DESIGN DEFICIENCIES, SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE POTENTIAL FOR DAMAGE AND FAILURE OF MULTIPLE SAFETY SYSTEMS IN THE SAME CONTROL PANEL, DISCUSSION o ON MARCH 1, 1989, THE LINKAGE FOR THE THROTTLE TRIP VALVE ON THE NO. 22' TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW) PUMP WAS DISASSEMBLED TO PERFORM MAINTENANCE TO CORRECT A SLIPPAGE PCCSLEM.

o DURING POST MAINTENANCE TESTING OF THE TRIP VALVE, OPERATORS ENGAGEC THE SPRING LOADED HAND SWITCH USED TO TRIP THE TURBINE

. THROTTLE VALVE FROM THE CONTROL ROOM AND THE HAND SWITCH CAUGHT FIRE.

o WIRING FOR THE AFW INLET PRECCURE TRAt'SMITTERS IN PROXIMITY TO THE FIRE WAS ALSO DAMAGED.

o THE THROTTLE TRIP VALVE IS MOUNTED TO THE TURBINE AND CLOSES AUTOMATICALLY ON AN OVERSPEED CONDITION OR MANUALLY AT THE VALVE OR FROM THE CONTROL ROOM, o REMOTE CLOSING ENTAILS ENGAGING THE CONTACTS OF THE CONTROL ROOM HAND 3 WITCH THEREBY ENERGlZING THE SOLEN 0ID OPERATOR MOUNTED AT THE VALVE, c THE SOLEN 0lb OPERATOR HAS TWO WINDINGS, A TRIP WlhLING OF 3 OHM RESISTANCE AND A HOLD WINDING OF 500 OHMS, CONTACT: N. FIELDS SIGEVENT: YES REFERENCE. 10 CFR 50.72 EVENT 14593

. CALVERT CllFFS UNIT 2 89-10 C CURING NORMAL ACTUATIONS, THE TRIP WINDING ALLOWS A M0MENTARY NOMINAL CURRENT OF 40 AMPERES TO FLOW CAUSING THE LINKAGE ASSOCIATED WITH A TRAVELLING SLUG TO UNLATCH THE THROTTLE I TRIP VALVE. THE FOLLOWING VALVE CLOSURE THE LINKAGE IS ALSO DESIGNED:TC DISENGAGE A SHUNT PLATE ACROSS THE HOLD WINDING.

THIS INTRODUCES THE 500 OHM C0ll TO THE CIRCulT AND CAUSES  :

CIRCUIT CURRENT TO BE REDUCED TO ABOUT .25 AMPERES.

c LICENSEE'S PRELIMINARY FINDINGS INDICATE THAT EVEN THOUGH THE

-VALVE WAS TRIPPED, IMPROPER REASSEMBLY OF'THE SOLEN 0ID LINKAGE DUE T; INADEQUATE VENDOR TECHNICAL GUIDANCE RESULTED IN A FAILURE OF THE LINKAGE 10 blSENGAGE THE HOLDING C0ll'S SHUNT PLATF.

o WHEN THE OPERATOR RELEASED THE HAND SWITCH, IT RETURNED TO ITS MlE-POSITION. H0kEVER, THE DISCHARGE FROM THE 3 OHM TRIP C0lt CAUSED ARCILG OF THE CONTACTS OF THE HAND SWITCH RESULTING IN CChTINUED CURRENT FLOW.

c THIS ARCING CAUSED THE SWITCH CONTACTS TO FUSE THEREEY MAINTAINING THE CIRCulT CONDUCTIVITY AND EXPOSING THE HAND SWITCH TO A FORTY AMPERE CURRENT FOR A RELATIVELY LONG PERIOD (THE HAhL SWITCH 15 RA1ED 125VDL AND 2.5 AMPERES),

o E!EN THOUGH THE CURRENT MAGNITUDE WAS DECAYING EXPONENTIALLY, sHIS CbhRENT COUPLEE WITH THE INCREASED RESISTANCE OF THE SWITCH'S CONTACTS RESULTED IN SUFFICIENT HEAT GENERATION TO IGNITE THE SWITCH AND THE TRIP C0ll, e lhE Clhtuli IS PROTECiED BY A 125VDC, 10 AMF FUSE WITH TIME /

CURRENT CHARACTERISTICS WHICH RENDERED IT INEFFECTIVE DURING THIS EVENT (G0ULD-SHAWMULT, CLASS K5).

l o OPERATORS EXTINGUISHED THE PANEL FIRE USING PORTABLE HALON FlhE ECulPhENT THE SOLEN 0lL FIRE WAS EXTINGUISHED AUTOMATICALLY.

L EDLLGEUf l u LICENSEE IS CONTINUING A ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS.

0 EAb JS CONTEMPL AllhG A GENERIC COMMUNICATION CONCERNING THE l IMPCFTANCF 0F PECFER ASSEMDlY OF THE LINKAGE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS VALVE.

o LICENSEE IS EVALUATING lHE ADEQUACY OF FUSE PROTECTION IN THIS CIECUlTRY.

e THE REGlck IS FOLLOWINC LICENSEE'S ACTIONS.

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E9-10

. LASALLE UNITS 1 AND 2 DNIT TRANSFORMER' FAULT RESULTS IN UNIT 1 TRIP AND ECUIPMENT MALFUNCTION MARCH 2, 1989 PROBLEM FAULT ON UNIT 2 SYSTEM AUXILIARY TRANFORMER (SAT) RESULTED IN TURBINE GENERATOR LOCK 0UT AND' REACTOR TRIP IN UNIT 1. SEVERAL ECUIPMENT MALFUNCTIONS SUBSEQUENTLY. OCCURRED AT BOTH UNITS.

LESE CAUSES OF THE EVENT AND SUBSEQUENT ECUIPMENT MALFUNCTIONS ARE:

UNIT 2 SAT FAULT DUE TO AN INTERNAL FAILURE OF A LIGHTNING' ARRESTOR.

UNIT 1 REACTOR TRIP DN MAIN GENERATOR TRIP DUE TO UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY AT ITS LOWER TOLERANCE LIMIT ON 1 0F 3 GENERATOR PHASES..

RESULTING EQUIPMENT FAILURES DUE TO UNDERVOLTAGE (UV)

CONDIT10hS CAUSED BY THE EVENT.

fAFETY_flf0XIEJfANCf THIS EVENT RESULTED IN MULTIPLE EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTIONS WHICd COULD HAVE COMPLICATED AND HAMPERED THE MITIGATION OF AN ACCIDEt'T.

DISCUSSION o ON MARfH .7, 19E9, AT 23 02 HRS, GROUND ALARMS WERE RECEIVED AT BCTH UNITS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY A DIFFERENTIAL TRIP 0F THE UNIT 2 SAT.

c A BRIGHT FLASH FROM THE SWITCHYARD WAS REPORTED BY AN OPERATOR LEAVING THE SITE.

o THE UNIT 2 SAT FAULT INITIATED A FAST AUT0-TRANSFER TO THE UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER (UAT).

AIT: YES CONTI,C1: J. RALEIGH SIGEVENT: YES

REFERENCES:

10 CFR 50.72 #s 14910, 14923, AND 14932. MORNING REPORTS 03/03/09 AND 03/07/89 AND PNO-III-89-16

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. :lASALL[ UNITS 1. At:0 2 - .89-10 P

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0. THE AUTC-TRANSFER TOOK 8 CYCLES (APPROX 135 MILLISECOND) DURING WHICH VARIOUS SIGNALS WERE GENERATED AT-UNIT 2:

OIL CONTROL BREAKER (OCB) AND UAT TROUBLE ALARMS.

kWCU ISOLATION..

DIVISION lil'EDG START.

MULTIPLE OCB AND AIR CONTROL BREAKER'(ACB) TRIPS.

SGTS PRIMARY FAN LOW FLOW.

CONTROL'R00M HVAC RAD MONITOR Hl.

SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM-(SPDS) COMPUTER TRIP.

STATION AIR COMPRESSOR TRIP.

o :PROMFT ACTIONS BY THE UNIT'2 REACTOR OPERATORS PREVENTED'A REACTOR TRIP.

FEEDWATER CONTROL PROBLEMS AND LEVEL SWINGS ON PERSONNEL E.ROR.

.e DURING THE UNIT 2. AUTO TRANSFER VARIOUS SIGNALS WERE RECEIVED AT UNIT 1 INCLUDING:

- -GENERATOR DIFFERENTIAL TRIP AND LOCK 0UT.

STATION AIR' COMPRESSOR TRIP.

TUkBINE CONTROL VALVE FAST CLOSURES.

REACTOR.AUiG SCRAM.

SPDS. COMPUTER TRIP.

- REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE HIGH, c EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS RESOLVED BY 00:00 HRS MARCH 3, 1989, o UNIT 2 DIV 111 ED6 REMAINED IN OPERATION TO ENSURE AVAILABILITY OF THE HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY (HFCS) SYSTEM.

o FAULT OF THE UNIT 2 SAT LUE TO THE IIITERNAL FAILURE OF A LIGHTNING ARREST 0R. >

LIGHTNING NOT OBSERVED ALTHOUGH IT HAD RAINED AND WAS MISTY.

- PERFORMED MEGGAR ANP HI POT TESTS ON TRANSFORMER, APPEARS UkDAMAGED.

LIGHTNING ARRESTOR SENT TO GE FOR ANALYSIS.

o UNIT 1 MAIN GEhERATOR TRIP APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CAUSEC BY UV CONDITION DURlhG UNIT 2 AUTO TRANSFER TO THE UAT AS SEEN BY A j l

DIFFERENTIAL RELAY WHICH HAD A LOVER SETPOINT THAN THE OTHER TWO.

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LASALLE' UNITS 1-AND 2 89-10 t

c 'THE-11ULTIPLE ECUIPMENT FAILURES WERE CAUSED BY UV CONDITIONS CAUSED BY.THE-EVENT. .

O THIS EVENT CAUSED PERTURBATIONS ON THE.0FFSITE POWER GRID WHICH LED-TO A MOMENTARY LOSS ~0F POWER (LESS.THAN.1 SEC) RESULTING IN AN EVENT AT THE BRAIDWOOD UNIT 1.AND 2 FACILITY,

' FDLLOWUP-AN AIT WAS DISPATCHED TO THE SITE MARCH 3, 1989 AND CONCLUDED ITS

. WORI' MARCH' 6,1989. A DRAFT OF THEIR REPORT WILL BE AVAILABLE THE

- ::EK OF 03/CC/SS.

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PALO VERDE UNIT 3~

MULTIPLE ECulPMENT FAILURES FOLLOWING LOAD REJECT

MARCHL3,11989.

"PROLLEM' UNIT 3 EY.PERIENCED A: FULL LOAD REJECTION FOLLOWED BY-A REACTOR TRIP.3 SUBSECUENT MULTIPLELFAILURES11NCLUDED:

L(1)l' MALFUNCTION OF TEE! STEAM. BYPASS SYSTEM,-

(2)- LOSS OF' REACTOR'C00LANT PUMPS,

-(3)- FAILURE 0F ATMOSPHERIC DUMP VALVES (ADVs) TO ACTUATE'FROM:THE-C0hTROL ROOM AND REMOTE S/D PANEL,

.(4). FAILURE OF SAFETY: EQUIPMENT STATUS PANEL TOLVERIFY THE FACT THAT SEVERAL DAMPEPS-AND VALVES'HAD~ REACHED THEIR DESIRED.

POSITION,-AND (5) INDICATIONS OF PRIMARY LEAKAGE (ABOUT 2 GPM).

fAllSE-

.THE' INITIATING EVENT WAS THE SEPARATION OF PALO VERDE SWITCHYARD FROM A' FAULTED CFFSITELLINE AND SUBSECUENT OPENING OF THE GENERATOR:0UTPUT EREAKERS IN THE SWITCHYARC.

SAFETY ElChiFICAhEE THE NUMBER OF MALFUNCTIONS THAT AROSE DURING THIS EVENT COMPLICATED

' RECOVERY AND COULD.POTENTIALLY CONFUSE AN OPERATCR AND DELAY-EVENT-

. MITIGATION.

LISfUSSION o UNIT 3 WAS OPERATING AT 100% POWER.

o ALL 3 UNITS WERE ON-LINE WHEN THEY LOST THE DEVERS OFFSITE LINE; HOWEVER, UNIT 3 WAS THE ONLY UNIT AFFECTED.

c LhlT 3 525KV GENERATOR OUTPUT BREAKERS OPENED UNEXPECTEDLY - REASONS UNKNOWN.

o LOAD REJECT RESULTEL IN A POWER CUTBACK AND RESULTED IN A CUICK "0 PEN" SIGNAL TO ALL 8 STEAM BYPASS CONTROL SYSTEM VALVES. STEAM BYPASS CONThCL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONED, 4 0F 8 VALVES CYCLED FROM 10%

TO 100% 9 TIFIS. ,

AIT: _1ES_

CONTACT: A. GILEEP.T SIGEVENT: _YES_ i REFERENCL: 10 CFR 50.72 #s 14912, 14927, 14938 AND PNO-V-89-07A

1 PALO VERL1 UhlT 3 89-10 1

c FEACTOR TRIPFED ON LOW STEAM GENERATOR (SG) PRESSURE, INITIATING l

A TURBINE TRIP. j c hAIN STEAF. LINE 130LAT10h VALVES JSOLATED ON LOW STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE, o ONE MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVE LIFTED BRIEFLY AT LEAST TWICE. ,

c ALV5 DID NOT ACTUATE FRCM THE CONTROL ROOM. UPON LCSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR, NITROGEN ACCUMULATORS SHOLLL PROVIDE REMOTE OPERATION OF ADVs  ;

FROM CONTROL ROOM. ADVs WERE LOCALLY OPERATED VIA HANDWHEEL. CAUSE OF PROBLEM NOT YET KNOWN.

c SAFETY INJECTION ANL CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INITIATED ON AN RCS PRESSURE OF ABOUT 1837 PSIA.

o LOST S01 AND S02 BUSES FOR UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMERS WHICH SUPPLY POWER TO THE RCPs ON TURBINE TRIP, MAIN GENERATOR C0ASTED DOWN BEFORE FAST-TRM SFER COULD TAKE PLACE. WHEN FAST-TRANSFER WAS ATTEMPTED, THE CENERATOR AND GRID WERE OUT-0F-PHASE AND AT DIFFERENT FREQUENCIES. THEREFORE, THE FAST-TRANSFER, APPROPRIATELY, DID NOT TAKE PLACE. NATURAL CIRCULATION WAS INITIATED WHEN RCPS WERE LOST. l PFINAFY HEAT REMOVED VIA 2 NON-CLASS STEAM BYPASS CONTROL VALVES WHICH VENT TO ATMOSPHERE.

O DIESEL GENERATORS CAME ON WITh SI SIGNAL, BUT DID NOT LOAD SINCE OFFSITE POWER SUPPLY MAINTAINED ESF BUSES. l 0 SEVERAL LAMPER ANL ERAIN VALVE POSIT 10h5 COULD NOT BE VERIFIED BY THE INDICATIONS 10 1PF CONTP01 R00F, POWEVER, OPERATORS FOUNT DAMPER ANP VALVE POSITIONS TO BE APPROPRIATE UPON INSPECTION, EXCEPT FOR THE ONE DAMPER WHOSE POSITION HAS NOT YET BEEN VERIFIED.

c PRIMARY LEAKAGE WAS FOUND FROM RCP (IB) SEAL LEAKAGE. OPERATOR THCUGHT THAT SEAL INJECTION AND NUCLEAR COOLANT WATER WERE LCST.

SO HE SECURED SEAL LEAK 0FF, WITil0UT ISOLATING THE RELIEF VALVE DISCHARCE TO THE PCLT AS RECUlRED BY PROCEDURES. RCP (IB) SEAL WAS LAMAGED. RATE OF SEAL LEAKAGE TO CONTAINMENT SUMP WAS ABOUT 2 6f E.

0 EVENT RECOVERY INCLUDED RE-ENERG1 ZING EUSES S01 AND S02, RESETTING f.AIN STEAM ISCLAT10h, SAFETY INJECTION, AND CONTAINMENT ISCLATION SIGNALS, AND RESTARTINC TWO 5 cps.

c UNIT 31S IN COLL SUL'TDOWN F0P FURTHER INVESTIGATION.

9 PALC VERL1 UNIT 3 89-10 FOLLOWUP o AIT IS AT SITE.

O PRELIMINARY NOTIFICAT101: HAS BEEN ISSUED.

e EAE WILL TAKE APPROPRI ATE FOLLOWUP ACTIONS IN /CCORDANCE WITil AIT FINDINGS.

4

89-10 SAN ONOFRE UNIT 1 MULTIPLE DESLGN PROBLEMS MARCH 2 AND 3, 1989 PROBLEMS RECEkTLY IDENTIFIED ISSUES RESULTING FROM AN ONG0ING LESIGN REVIEW.

1, DESIGN LEFICIENCY WITH THE EDG LOAD SEQUENCER LOGIC.

2. A SINGLE-FAILURE PROBLEM WITH A CROSS-TIE ISOLATION VALVE EETWEEN THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM AND FIRE PROTECTION SPRAY HEADER.

3. DESIGN LEFICIENCY WITH THE RCP LOCKED ROTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE RELAY TRIP SEiPOINT.

MLSES DESIGN DEFICIENCIES.

SAFETY SIGNIElCAh'ffS

1. EDG LOAD SEQUENCER LOGIC - THE DEFICIENCY WOULD PREVENT THE SECOND OF THE TWO EDG's TO BE AUTO-LOADEL ONTO THE BUS.

2. A SINGLE FAILURE OF THE ISOLATION VALVE CONNECTING THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND FIRE PROTECTION SPRAY HEADER COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTAINMENT SPRAY DURING THE S1 RECIRC PHASE OF A LOCA, RESULTING IN CONTAINMENT PRESSURE EXCEELlkG ITS DESIGN BASIS.

3, A LOCKED RCP ROTOR ACCIDENT WOULD NOT TRIP THE REACTOR IN THE RECUIRED PERIOD OF TIME ASSUMED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS AND COULD EXCEED THE FUEL CLAD TEMPERATURE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA.

h1SLUSS10N o A CAL WAS ISSUED BY THE REGION ON 01/31/89 REGARDING MULTIPLE SAFETY ISSUES ON SAN ONOFRE UNIT 1. LICENSEE WILL NOT RESTART THE UNIT UNTil ALL ISSUES ARE RESOLVED.

PROBLEM 1 - EDG LOGIC - FOLLOWING A LOOP WITH S1, A LOOP SIGNAL IS GENERATED CAUSING ONE OF THE TWO EDGs TO CLOSE ITS OUTPUT BREALER ONTO THE BUS. WHEN THIS HAPPENS, THE LOOP SIGNAL IS l CLEARED, SUCH THAT THE OTHER EDG WILL NO LONGER AUT0-LOAD ONTO i ITS BUS AND OPERATOR ACTION WILL BE REQUIRED.,

SIGEVENT: NO I CONTACT: J. THOMPSON REiERENCES: 10 CFR 50.72 ;!s 145C4, 14921 AND MORNING REPORT 03/03/89 i

- +

4 RSAN ON'FRE C Uf;1T11 80-10 PF0ELEM 2 --CONTAINMENT SPRAY Ai4D FIRE- PROTECTION ISOLATION CROSS-TIE VALVE - THIS MANUALLY-0PERATED VALVE FAILS CLOSED Oil

, LOSS OF POVER AND IS'l10RMALLY CLOSED. IF THE VALVE FAILS OPEN,-

WATER WOULD.BE DIVERTED TO THE FIRE PROTECTION HEADER AND COULD RESULT'IN A LOSS CF.CONTAll1 MENT SPRAY DURING THE SI RECIRC PHASE OF A LOCA, WHICH.COULD COMPROMISE C0f;TAINMENT INTEGRITY.-

PF0ELEM 3 LOCKED RCP ROTOR OVERCURRENT RELAY' TRIP SETPOINT --

THE EXISTING CVERCURRENT PROTECTION WAS INCORRECTLY SET AT A 24 SECOND DELAY (T0 ALLOW FOR THE 20 SEC RCP STARTING CURRENT).

THERE WAS.NC PROVISICI FOR THE RCP BREAKER TO OPEN (AT APPR0X-4 SEC) FOR THE LOCKED ROTOR EVENT. THE LICENSEE WILL PROVIDE AN ADDITIONAL CURREt;T RELAY FOR EACH RCP, WHICH WILL TRIP THE REACTOR WITHIN THE REQUIRED TIME'FOR THE LOCKED ROTOR CURRENT.

0 THE OTHER.TWO DEFICIENCIES WILL BE CORRECTED (AL0f4G WITH THE OVERCURRENT RELAY TRIP SETPOINT) BEFORE THE UNIT IS RESTARTED.

0 THE REGION AhD Fil ARE CLOSELY MONITORING AlD FOLLOWING THE LICENSEE'S  ;

PLANKED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.

FOLLOWUP NO FURlHER-EAL FOLLOWUP IS PLAN!4ED.

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. 89-10 DIABIO CANYCN UNITS 1 AND 2 UNRECOGNIZED INOPERABILITY OF TUREINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUNP JANUARY 17, 1989 EROBLEM,

'INOPERABILITY OF TURBINE DRIVEN FEEDWATER PUMP h0T RECOGNI2ED.

MLSE

-UNRECOGNIZED IN0PERABILITY CONDITION CAUSED BY CLOSURE OF ONE OF TWO, PARALLEL STEAM SUPPLY VALVES.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE PLANT OPERATING IN AN UNANALYZED CONDITION - SINGLE AFW PUMP FAILURE DURlhG STEAh.LINE-BREAK COULD RESULT IN INADECUATE AFW.  !

DISCUSSION o ON JANUARY 17, 1989, LICENSEE CLOSE ONE OF TWO REDUNDANT PARALLEL STEAM SLPPLY VALVES.T0 THE TURblNE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW)-

PUMP AND DID NOT CECLARE THE PUMP INOPERABLE.

o LICENSEE EELIEVED lhE FLOW PATH THROUGH THE SECOND PUMP SATISFIED l THE SYSTEh'S OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS, c IN THE SCENARIO DEPICTEE ON THE ATTACHED DIAGRAM, THE-AFW SYSTEM l COULD NOT MEET IT CHAPTER 15, FSAR REQUIREMENT TO SUPPLY " FLOW TO AT LEAST TWO 0F THE FOUR INTACT STEAM GENERATORS."

i EDLLDEUE o LICENSEE WILL REVISE OPERATING / SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES AND TS BASES TO REFLECT THAT THE TURLINE DRIVEN PUMP IS IN0PERABLE WITH EITHER OF ITS STEAM SUPPLY VALVES CLOSED.

o PLANT SYSTEMS BRANCH HAS DETERMINED THAT THIS POTENTIAL PROBLEM  !

HAS GENERIC IMPLICATIONS AND HAS DRAFTED AN INFORMATION NOTICE DESCRIBING THIS EVENT.

CONTACT: N. FIELDS SIGEVENT: _YES_  !

REFEi,ENCE: DRAFT INFORMATION NOTICE

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__Fage N:, 1 C/14/29 FEEFORr.AN:E IN31CATORS SIBh!FICANT EVENTS. ENCLOSURE 3.

l PLANTh:ME EVE 47 EVENT'IES:RIFi!ON DTR SIGNIFICANCE ATE CALVERT CLIFFS : 03/01/29 TURBINE DRIVEN AUIILIARY FEED PUMF THRDTTLE TRIP VALVE 0 PCTENTIAL FOR OR ACTUAL DEGRADATION FAILDRE N!TH RESULTING CONTROL PCOP. FIRE. OF SAFETY-RELATED EQUlFMENT,

4EACTOR SCRAM SUMMADY NEEK ENDINS 03/05/B9

1. PLANT SPECIFIC CATA DATE Slif UNIT POWED SIShAL CAUSE COMPLI- YTD YTD VTD CATIONS APOVE PELON TOTAL 151 151.

02/20/09 I CIAN P0lki 2 100 A EGUIPMENT ND 1 0 1 02/2S/89 pat!SA!!S 1 0A PERSCNNEL ND 0 1 1 03/02/29 LASALLE 1 B6 A EQUIPMENT N0 1 0 1 03/02/B9 LASALLE 2 89 A EDUIPMENT NO 1 0 1 03/03/B9 PALC VERIE 3 109 A EQUIPMENT YES 1 0 1 03/03/89 MCSUIRE 2 100 A EDUIPMENT_ , NO 1. -0 1 03/04/09 DRESIO 2 92 A PERSONNEL NO 1 0 1 03/04/89 PILSEIM i 17 A EDUIPMENT NO 1 0. 1 03/0$'!9 DL'A C A N J  ! 100 A - EGl!D.Ehi h0 3 0 3 13/05/B9 FALD JEEDE . 1 100 A EQUIPMEhi ND 1 0 1 03/05/89 CATAdA 1 - 100 A - PERSONNEL ND 1 0 1 l

SUMMARY

OF CDMPLICAilDNS Slii UN11 COMPLICAil0NS Fid VEUT 3 ATM0!rHERIC DLV VLVES FAliEI TO DPEN -LOSS Dr RCPs DUE TO LCSS OF AUI TR. BUS.

hi $/6 SL0bMW SAMPLE ISOL.YLVE , AUI ILDS IRL. MMPERS ,H2 SAMPLE LINE ISOL.

VLVE ,AND MAlW STER LINE DPAIN YLVE FAILED TD INDICATE CLOSE IN CONTROL R00M

fl0TES

1. PLANT. SPECIFIC DATA BASED ON-INITIAL REVIEW 0F 50.72 REPORTS FOR THE WEEK OF INTEREST. PERIOD IS MIDNIGHT SUNDAY THROUGH MIDNIGHT SUNDAY. SCRAMS ARE DEFIllED AS REACTOR PROTECTIVE

.ACTUATIONS WHICH. RESULT IN R0D MOTI0ft, AND EXCLUDE PLANNED TESTS OR SCRAMS AS PART OF PLANNED SHUTDOWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PLANT PROCEDURE. - THERE ARE 111 REACTORS HOLDING All OPERATING LICENSE.

2. COMPLICATIONS: RECOVERY COMPLICATED BY EQUIPMENT FAILURES OR PERSONNEL ERRORS UNRELATED TO CAUSE OF SCRAM..

3. PERSONNEL RELATED PROBLEMS INCLUDE HUMAN ERROR, PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES, AND MANUAL STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CONTROL PROBLElts.

4. "0THER" INCLUDES AUTOMATIC SCRAMS ATTRIBUTED TO ENVIRONMENTAL CAUSES(LIGHTNIEC),SYSTE!! DESIGN,ORUNKNOWNCAUSE.

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