IR 05000267/1989010

Insp Rept 50-267/89-10 on 890501-31.No Violations Noted. Major Areas inspected:follow-up of Ler,Licensee Action on Previously Identified Insp Findings,Operational Safety Verification & Monthly Surveillance Observation

ML20245A232
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Saint Vrain
Issue date:	06/15/1989
From:	Westerman T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20245A221	List: IR 05000267/1989010 ML20245A220
References
50-267-89-10, NUDOCS 8906210162
Download: ML20245A232 (9)

Text

--

. .

.

.

.

.

APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION-IV NRC Inspection Report: 50-267/89-10 Operating License: DPR-34 Docket: 50-267 Licensee: Public Service Company of Colorado (PSC)

P.O. Box 840 Denver, Colorado 80201-0840 Facility Name: Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station (FSV)

Inspection At: FSV, Platteville, Colorado Inspection Conducted: May 1-31, 1989 Inspectors: R. E. Farrell, Senior Resident Inspector P. W. Michaud, Resident Inspector i

Approved: 2) M4 6NS F7 l T. F. Westerman, Chief, Project Section B Date

~

Division of Reactor Projects Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted May 1-31, 1989 (Report 50-267/89-10)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspect):n of onsite followup of

.

licensee event reports (LERs), licensee-action on previously identified, inspection findings, operational safety verification, monthly surveillance observation, and monthly maintenance observatio Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were' ^

identified. During this inspection period, the following occurred:

The licensee successfully replaced two control rod drive assemblies in the reacto The electronic and mechanical governor were replaced on the alternate cooling method (ACM) diesel generato The reactor was returned to power operatio Primary coolant oxidant levels returned to below LCO 4.2.10 limit <

~

8906210162 090615 PDR ADOCK 05000267 O PNU

_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - -- - - _ _ _ _ __ -

. _ _ _ - - _ ,

_. - _

. .

l q

'

<

.

.

-2- l DETAILS Persons Contacted D. Alps,. Supervisor, Security

• L. Brey, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Resources

• P. Burck, Supervisor, QA Engineering

• M. Cappello, Central Planning & Scheduling Manager

• R. Craun, Nuclear Site Engineering Manager

• Crawford, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

• J. Eggebroten, Technical Projects Manager

• D. Evans, Operations Manager

• Ferris, QA Operations Manager

• C. Fuller, Manager, Nuclear Production

• J. Gramling, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing Operations M.' Holmes, Nuclear Licensing Manager

• T. McIntire, Superintendent, Material Management M. Niehoff, Nuclear Design Manager F. Novachek, Nuclear Support Manager

• W. Rodgers, Nuclear Comp. Services Manager

• R. Schenderlein, NED Special Projects

• D. Scott, QA Services Manager

• N. Snyder, Maintenance Department Manager

• P. Tomlinson, Manager, Quality Assurance

• D. Warembourg, Manager, Nuclear Engineering

• S. Willford, Nuclear Training The NRC inspectors also contacted other licensee and contractor personnel during the inspectio * Denotes those attending the exit-interview conducted June 7, 198 . Plant Status The replacement of control rod drive (CRD) assemblies for, Regions 3 and 7 was completed on May 2, 198 This was performed due to the inability of Rod 3 to scram and Rod 7's operation at higher-than-normal temperature The reactor was brought critical on May 5, 1989, and the turbine generator was synchronized to the grid on May 7, 1989. Power level was then raised slowly while surveillance testing was performed. A steam leak from a hot reheat steam drain line was discovered on May 19, 1989. The leak was from a 1-inch drain line socket weld which had a crack around approximately 1/3 of the circumference. A leak repair contractor was utilized to install a collar and sealant on the pipe to stop the steam leak. This was completed on May 28, 1989, after which time the licensee continued the power ascension. In consideration of the 82 percent license limitation, 80 percent power was established by the licensee's station manager as the operating power level. The plant achieved 80 percent power on May 30, j 1969, and remained at this level at the end of this report period.

_

_. _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _

. .

.

.

.

-

-3- Onsite Followup of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) (92700).

The NRC inspectors reviewed selected LERs to determine whether corrective actions, as stated in the Leks, are appropriate to correct the cause of the event and to verify that these corrective actions have been implemente (Closed) LER 87-019, " Damage in Helium Circulator S/N C-2101 Resulted in Excessive Shaft Wobble." The licensee performed substantial engineering evaluations and metallurgical tests of the failed bolting involved. As a result of these tests and studies, the subject bolts were changed in all four circulators during an extended maintenance outage in 1988. This matter is close (Closed) LER 87-024, " Reactor Scraa on Neutron Flux Rate of Change High,"

and LER 88-018, " Wide Range Nuclear Channel Upscaled From Noise Source and Actuated Scram."

The scrams described in LERs87-024 and 88-018 occurred with the plant shut down and all rods fully inserted. The licensee has an ongoing program for reducing electronic noise as sources of this noise are identified. This noise reduction program has been previously inspocted and found satisfactory. These items are close . Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (92701 and 92702)

(Closed) Violation 8708-03, " Inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 Review of Modification." The licensee installed a modification to an instrument circuit which did not meet Technical Specifications (TS) requirement There was no safety significance and the TS requirement was deleted through a formal TS amendment. The licensee reemphasized the importance of detail and thoroughness in safety reviews and has shown increased sensitivity and high quality in 10 CFR 50.59 reviews performed since this violation was issued. This item is close (Closed) Violation 8717-02, " Excessive Overtime for Licensed Operators."

Two licensed reactor operators worked hours in excess of TS AC 7.1.1. limit The licensee subsequently implemented a comprehensive program reviewing the hours worked by all nuclear production performance level employees, including contract security personnel. The NRC inspect't- have observed implementation of this progrcm and found it effective. This item is close (Closed) Open Item 8714-002, " Temporary Changes are Several Years Old,"

and Violation 8717-04, " Temporary Changes Lef t for Years as Permanent Changes." The licensee modified the temporary change program requiring a maximum life of 90 days for temporary changes, enhancing required engineering reviews prior to implementation of a temporary change, and defining management level and information requirements for extending a temporary chang Additionally, the licensee has carried out an extensive

. - - _ -

_ _ - -

. .

.

.

.

-4-program to eliminate the long standing " temporary" changes in the plan These items are close (Closed) Violation 8725-001, " Failure to Follow the FSV Medical Emergency Plan." Management notifications required by the licensee's medical emergency procedure were not made when a contractor employee was injure The injured worker received prompt medical attention. The violation involved only management notifications. The licensee revised the procedure, retrained the shift supervisors, and emphasized the requirements of the procedure to inform management of medical emergencie The NRC inspectors have observed good licensee performance in this are This item is close (Closed) Violation 8734-01, " Inadequate Procedural Controls."' In a 2 week period, the new emergency lighting batteries became permanently inoperative and, separately, the site suffered a loss of offsite power due to inadequate procedure Additionally, during this time, a reactor scram signal with the reactor shut down was caused by incorrect termination of relay leads in violation of a procedure. In response to this violation, the licensee has reemphasized the importance of quality work in all activities. Additionally, an independent operations review of postmaintenance testing is required to preclude adverse impacts on the plan The licensee has formalized the program for controlling lifted leads and jumpers to better assure correct termination. Licensee performance observed by the NRC inspectors has been satisfactory. Thi item is close (Closed) Open Item 8812-001, " Method for Verifying CRD Purge Flow is Inadequate." The licensee has modified the reactor equipment operator's log sheet to require logging of both subheader and individual CRD purge flow daily. The log sheet includes minimum values for these flows. This item is close . Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The NRC inspectors made daily tours of the control room during normal working hours and at least once per week during backshif t hours. Control room staffing was verified to be at the proper level for the plant conditions at all times. Control room operators were observed to be attentive and aware of plant status and reasons why annunciators were li The NRC inspectors observed the operators using and adhering to approved procedures in the performance of their dutie A sampling of these procedures by the NRC inspectors verified current revisions and legible copies. During control room tours, the NRC inspectors verified that the required number of nuclear instrumentation and plant protective system channels were operable. The operability of emergency AC and DC electrical power and meteorological and fire protection systems was also verified by the NRC inspectors. The reactor operators and shift supervisor logs were reviewed daily along with the TS compliance log, clearance log, operations deviation report (00R) log, temporary configuration report (TCR) log, and operations order book. Shif t turnovers were observed at least once per

C , aw .

+ *

c

'

,

. ..

.

.

-5-week by the.NRC inspector Information' flow was' consistently ~ good, with the shift supervisors soliciting comments or concerns from the reactor, operators, equipment _' operators, auxiliary tenders,-and health physics technicians. The licensee's station manager,-operations manager, an superintendent of operations were observed to make routine tours of'the control room /-

The NRC inspectors made tours of all accessible areas of the plant to? ,

assess the overall conditions and verify the adequacy of plant equipment',-

radiological controls ~, and security. During these tours, particular attention was paid to the licensee'sl fire' protection program,' including; fire extinguishers, firefighting equipment, fire barriers, control of-flammable materials-, and other fire. hazard .

A walkdown of the nuclear instrumentation, prestressed concrete reactor vessel (PCRV) moisture monitoring, liquid waste, and portions of th reactor plant cooling ~ water system was performed by the NRC inspector Valve and breaker positions were verified where possible. When affected by a clearance, the valves or breakers were verified to be positioned in accordance.with the clearance requirements... Power supplies for components in these systems were verified, but were also subject to clearances'.in

~

some cases. During these system walkdowns, the NRC inspectors. verified the operability of standby or backup equipment when components or portions of systems were inoperable due;to clearance The NRC inspectors observe.d health physics technicians performing surveys:

and checking air samplers and area radiation ~ monitors. Contamination levels and exposure rates were posted at_. entrances to radiologically controlled areas and in other appropriate areas-and were verified to be u to date by the NRC inspectors. Health physics technicians were present to-provide assistance when workers were required to enter radiologic &lly-controlled areas. .The NRC inspectors observed workers following the . 2 instructions on radiation work permits concerning protective clothing and'

dosimetry and using proper procedures for contamination control, including proper removal of protective clothing and whole body frisking, upon exiting a radiologically' controlled. area; The NRC inspectors observed what appeared to.be QA documentation'inside a contaminated area. Specifically, the controlled work procedures including-sign off sheets for the refurbishment of the fuel handling machine.were:

sitting on a table with the contaminated. fuel grapple a'nd mast.-

Interviews with the health physics supervisor'and the maintenance manage ascertained that the observed documentation was~a working copy and.that all data including signatures was maintained in a record copy of the documentation'outside the contaminated area boundary.

l TheNRCinspectorsrandomlyverifiedthatthenumberofarmed'secuhity officers required by the security plan were present.* A lead security officer was on duty to direct security activities <on each shift. The NRC, inspectors verified that search equipment, including an x ray machine,- 4

- _ _ - _ - - - _ - _-_ _ . _ _ _

,- r

~

..: .

-

.

--

6--

,

explosive detector, and metal detector, was operational-or a 100' percent hands-on search was conducte ,

The protected' area barrier was surveyed by the NRChinspectors to ensurelit s

~

was not compr-omised by erosion or other' objects. The NRC inspectors observed. that vital area barriers were well' maintained and not -

compromised. The NRC inspectors also~ observed that personsTgranted access; to the site'were badged and visitorsiwere; properly escorted; The licensee placed'.the backup bearing water; system in partial. service on May 10, 198 The system'was, aligned to-supply makeup water to'the:

bearing water surge tanks and for the accumulator purge, flow. The' *

isolation valves on_the backup bearing water _ supply to each helium circulator remained shut. -The system.,is not safety.related but;is described in the Final Safety Analysis 1 Report (FSAR)., The. licensee

'

decided to run without the backup _ bearing water system'in service to the helium, circulators because, historically, the' system has resulted~in aL lesswreliable configuration. The' normal bearing water _ system and- the'

helium circulator auxiliaries are operating satisfactorily and more consistently than when the backup bearing water system has been in service. The= licensee plans to continue operation with this system alignmen The NRC1 inspectors monitored'the licensee's compliance with'1TS LC0 4.2.11,

" Loop Impurity: Levels, Low Temperatures," and LC0 4.2.10, " Loop Impurity Levels, High Temperatures." At' low temperatures (less than.1200 f core .

outlet), moisture levels in the reactor coolant system caused entry into- <!

the " limited acceptable" region of'LC0 4.2.10. When core outlet j temperature reached 1200 F, with increasing power, on May, 11, 1989, LCO 4.2.10 became applicable and the limiting condition became__ total oxidants (H 0, CO, and C0 ) in the reactor coolant system. The NRC inspectorsbailymonitorebthelicensee'soperation_whilelusing" PPM-days" grace periods in accordance with LCO'4.2.10. At the end of this report -

period, the licensee had accumulated approximately 650 of an allowable l 2700 " PPM-days." The NRC inspectors will continue:to monitor the -

.)

licensee's compliance with these LCO i On May 11,.1989, the temperature of the control rod-drive -for. Region 30  ;

exceeded 215 F. In accordance with TS Surveillance. Requirement 4.1.1.A.1, j the licensee performed a daily partial. scram test of_this control rod )

drive. The NRC inspectors verified these' tests were performed ')

successfully once every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />,_ as required.- 1

.i The licensee experienced problems with'the. flux controller, which j automatically positions.the Region 1 regulating control rod in response to an. integrated control signal. On May 18, 1989, the regulating rod began driving in for no apparent reason. The control room operators immediately i took manual control and restored the control rod to its ' proper positio j Troubleshooting efforts determined'that temporary instrumentation j installed under TCR.89-04-01 appeared to be causing circuit impedance

'

matching problems. This instrumentation had been installed to monitor the

i i i

_i__.i___ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _.____m_i__.__._.- _ _ _ . _ , . _ _ . _-- _ _ _ _ J

- _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _

- .

.

-

-7-flux controller's performance and was removed upon discovering this proble On May 19, 1989, the licensee's reactor side equipment operator discovered a steam leak from a drain line on the Loop 2 hot reheat steam header. The leak was due to a cracked weld on a 1-inch drain line, which is physically located on Level 2 of the reactor building. A leak repair. service was called in by the licensee, as described in paragraph 7 below. The NRC inspectors verified the licensee actions to protect personnel, both from the existing steam leak and from the potential of an increased leak. The NRC inspectors also reviewed the licensee's evaluation of the effect of'

the increased heat load in the area of the steam leak. The licensee performed temperature surveys in the area and performed walkdowns to determine if any EQ-related equipment was operating in an elevated temperature environment. There was no equipment in the elevated temperature area that was adversely affected by this environmen No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program are . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

During the inspection period, the NRC inspectors reviewed the licensee's preparation for startup, including precritical surveillanc The inspectors monitored daily primary chemistry results for compliance with LCOs 4.2.10 and 4.2.11 as verified by Surveillance SR 5.2.12, " Primary Reactor Coolant Chemical Surveillance."

The NRC inspectors observed several performances of Surveillance SR 5.2.20, "ACM Diesel Driven Generator Surveillance," as the licensee pursued the cause of random load fluctuations. The licensee replaced the mechanical and electronic portions of the diesel governo i The ACM diesel generator passed its surveillance and should perform its design function, if required. The licensee has not yet been able to identify the cause of random, sporadic load swings of several hundred ,

kilowatts when connected to the licensee's grid. The swings are not '

reproducible and no pattern or cause has as yet been identified. The licensee is pursuing the source of these fluctuations and is considering a substantial design change to the diesel generator control circuitry in an attempt to eliminate the load fluctuation This design change would eliminate large unused portions of the existing " standard product" control ,

circuitr ]i The NRC inspectors also witnessed performance of portions of J Surveillance SR 5.2.16a, "PCRV Closure Leakage Determination," and l reviewed documentation from several performances of this surveillance during the inspection period. This is normally a quarterly surveillance but is performed any time purified helium ~ flows to reactor vessel penetrations indicate a possible penetration seal lea No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program i are _-_-- _ -

'-

, $ 1

....: ,

, n

. -8- ,

-

, - s

'

?

,

.

_Q s Monthly Maintenance _ Observation (62703)' ,

The. licensee replaced CRD and orifice assemblies'for Regions 3 and 7.' .[ ^

This was doneLiriiresponse to ~the Region 3 control rod found unscrambled 3 during silrveillance; testing on April 27,"1989, and because the Region 7 ,

control rod had been operating above 250 F-as discussed'in NRC'Iaspectio ? Report 50-267/89-07. The NRC_ inspectors observed; portions _ of various '

,

activities in support of this' effor Station Service-Request (SSR) 89502231 was reviewed'by the NRC inspectors to. Wrify th proper administrative. approvals and controls and the general 4dequacy'of~ ,

~ controls over the activities. This SSR~ addressed the reinoval of the ~

-Region 3 CR0 to the. hot service facility for examination and the installation of a spare CRD into Region 3. The NRC inspectors verified'

that appropriate caution statements were included >1n the procedures to verify TS LCO compliance prior to' performing certain steps. The CRD was installed in Region 3 and postmaintenance testing completed satisfactorily on May 1, 198 .

SSR 89502242 provided instructions for the removal of the CRD-from Regicen 7 to an equipment storage well and its replacement with a spare .

CR Excore testing of the replacement CRD found the shim motor acting _

erraticall Nonconformance Report (NCR)89-081 was issued and a hold tag attached to the CRD. The NRC inspectors reviewed the disposition of-this

.NCR, which was to replace. the shim motor < This action was complete satisfactoril The CRD for Region 7 was installed and tested satisfactorily on May 2, 198 The ACM diesel generator developed load swings during surveillance testing on May 3, 1989, and was declared inoperable by the licensee. The governor assembly was replaced and. adjusted on May 4, 1989. .The postmaintenance verification test was to consist of three~ complete startup-run-shutdown cycles followed by *.he weekly 2-hour' surveillance test. .These. tests were completed satisfact Jrily and the ACM was considered operable'.on May 5, 1989. The ACM devt loped similar load swing problems on May 30,1989, an troubleshooting wa- in progress at the end of this. inspection period. Th NRC inspectors wil continue:to monitor the licensee's. actions to

' determine the caus! of and eliminate.the loadLswing problem' .

On May 12, 1989, tie control room operators- identified' purified helium flow to PCRV penet ration interspaces exceeding TS LC0 4.2.9 limit Surveillance SR 5.2.46a-Q, Issue'35, "PCRV Closure Leakage Determination,"

was performed to identify the leak location. The surveilla; a identified the leak as the B Helium Circulator. After retorquing'the olts on the closure to this penetration, the leak was sealed as verified by a successful retest of SR 5.2.16a-Q. The NRC inspectors reviewed SSR 89502475 and 89502483 under which the work was performe s

, / 1 e

---

.--a-u_--w_---- - - _ _ __l

7 _

,

A

, . . , . : 1

. . . . g

.

.

-9-l

, During' a routine tour of tne reactor building on May 19,.1989l the- .L >

licensee's equipment operator discovered a' steam' leak'from a drain line on the Loop 2 Hot Reheat Steam Heade NCR 89-108 was written to document'

'

this=and cause action to be taken. -The interim' disposition for this NCR; *

.was for a leak ' repair contractor to instal 1 Tan enclosure'and sealant toL

~

stop the' leak, which was from a cracked socket weld where a 1-inch drain

~

I line ties into the 11-inch hot reheat header. The NRC inspectors twiewed

'

l

'

the disposition-of this NCR.and the associated engineering and safety . . .!

evaluations. These evaluations included analysis of the enclosure,1which i is designed to ASME VIII requirements,-and considered the possibility of- j the.1-inch line rupturing or separating at the cracked. socket wel Pressure and thermal stresses were evaluated as well,as deadweight and-seismic loads to verify-the adequacy of existing pipe supports. The sealant material was evaluated for compatibility with system component The.NRC inspectors' review of the evaluation, associated with the interim' .

disposition of NCR 89-108,1showed a thorough and complete analysis of all- ,

H appropriate considerations. The final disposition for this NCR is to perform permanent weld repair during a future shutdow The enclosure to contain this steam leak and sealant was fabricated by the a contractor and arrived onsite on May 26, 1989. Because of the location of '

the steam leak and the physical size and arrangement of the enclosure,'the contractors had a great deal of difficulty installing the enclosur The leak was sealed on May. 28, 1989, but began' leaking again on May 29,.198 . According to the contractor, this is not uncommon, and tt is type of repair q often requires two or three applications'of sealant. The contractor- .g returned to the site on May 31,~1989, and injected additional-sealant, "

which proved successfu No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this. program are ,

, Exit Meeting (30703)

An exit meeting was conducted on June 7,1989,; attended by those .

identified in paragraph 1. At this meeting, the NRC inspectors reviewed l the scope and findings of the inspectio j

.i l

l

'

'

.:

I l

!

i

.

'

\

l

I 1 ,

.; ,, i

.