IR 05000267/1988016

Insp Rept 50-267/88-16 on 880701-31.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Ler Review,Monthly Maint Observation,Monthly Surveillance & Monthly Security Observation

ML20153F407
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Saint Vrain
Issue date:	08/26/1988
From:	Farrell R, Michaud P, Westerman T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20153F394	List: IR 05000267/1988016 ML20153F390
References
50-267-88-16, NUDOCS 8809070274
Download: ML20153F407 (10)

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APPENDIX U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION-

REGION IV

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NRC Inspection Report: 50-267/88-16 License: DPR-34 Docket: 50-267 Licensee: Public Service Company of Colorado (PSC)

l Facility Name: Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station Inspection At: Fort St._ Vrain (FSV) Nuclear Generating Statio '

l Platteville, Colorado l Inspection Conducted: J y 1-31, 1988 Inspector: /

R. E.'Farrell, SeifTor Resident inspector (SRI)

d Date

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. E-/S-PE I P. W. Michaud, Resident inspector (RI) Date i '

Approved: 8- o _ / - 7Ce T V

! T. F. Westerman, Chief Date Reactor Projects Section B

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8809070274 880829 PDR ADOCK 05000267 G pm

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in,spection Summary Inspection Conducted July 1-31, 1988 (Report 50-267/88-16)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of operational safety verification, licensee event report review, monthly maintenance observation, monthly surveillance observation, radiological protection, and monthly security observatio !

Results: Within the six areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie i

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DETAILS Person: Contacted pSC

D. Alps, Supervisor. Security '

• F. Borst, Nuclear Training Manager

• L. Brey, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Resources M. Block System Engineering Manager

• M. Cappello, Central Planning and Scheduling Manager l R. Craun, Manager, Nuclear Site Engineering -

• H. Deniston, Superintendent. Operations l D. Evans, Operations Manager -

C. Fuller, Manager, Nuclear Production

• J. Gramling, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing Operations

• J. Hak Superintender.t. Maincenance M. Holmes, Manager, Nuclear Licensing

• F. Novachek, Manager Nuclear Support

• H O'Hagan, Outage Manager

• L. Scott, QA Services Manager

• T. Staley, Supervisor, Systems Engineering

• L. Sutton, Supervisor, QA Auditing

• P. Tomlinson, Manager QA R. Walker, Chainnan of the Board and CEO

• D. Warembourg, Manager, Nuclear Engineering R. Williams Jr., Vice President, Nuclear Operations t The NRC inspectors also contacted other licensee and contractor personnel during the inspectio * Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted August 9,1987.

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i Plant Status The plant was shut down on July 6, 1988, beginning a planned 99 day circulator maintenance outage. The planned work involves replacing secondt.ry-side helium circulator bolting which has been identified as being susceptible to stress-assisted corrosion crackin Reactor restart was planned for October 7,1988, uith electrical production to resume October 12, 1988. At the end of the inspection period, the reactor restart date had slipped rpproximately one week. Due to moisture ingress, as a result of a Helium circulator buffer upset, the electrical production resumption date has slipped three to four weeks to allow for drying out of the prin.ary system following restar _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _

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3. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The NRC inspectors reviewed licensee activities to ascertain that the facility is being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements and that the licensee's management control system is effectively discharging its responsibilities for continued cafe operatio The NRC inspectors toured the control room on a daily basis during normal working hours and weekly during backs 51ft hours. The reactor operator and shift supervisor logs and Technical Specification compliance logs were reviewed daily. The NRC inspectors o) served proper control room staffing at all times and verified that operators were attentive and adhered to approved procedures. Control room instrumentation was observed by the NRC inspectors and the operability of the plant protective system and nuclear instrumentation system were verified by the NRC inspectors on each control room tour. Operator awareness and understanding of abnormal or alarm conditions was verified. The NRC inspectors reviewed the operations order book, operadons deviation report (00R) log, clearance log, and temporary configuration report (TCR) log to note any out-of-service, safety-related systems and to verify compliance with Technical Specification requirement Shift turnovers were observed at least weekly by the NRC resident inspectors. The infonnation flow appeared to be good, with the shift supervisors routinely soliciting coments or concerns from reactor operators, equipment operators, and auiliary tender On July 6, 1988, with the reactor shut down and in the process of depressurizing the PCRV for outage work, the control room operators did not observe an expected increase in core support floor vent flow. An equipment operator was dispatched to check the valve lineu Valve V-111063 is a bellows sealed globe valve operated by a reach rod through a concrete wall. The operators ioticed flow increased and decreased when the valve was moved in the open direction, indicating a malfunction with.a the valv On July 12, 1988, radiography was performed on Valve V-111063, and the results indicated the stem had separated from the valve disc. The licensee rsmoved the valve and found a set screw had loosened and allowed the stem and disc to separate. The valve vendor was contacted and indicated that this was not an uncommon occurrence in this type of valv The valve vendor recocinended tack welding the assembly before reinstallation. The licensee is also looking into replacing the valve with a diaphragm-sealed valve. The NRC inspectors will continue to monitor the licensee's activities on this valv At 8:30 a.m. on July 9, 1988, with the reactor shut down and depressurized to less than 50 psia, the licensee interrupted forced circulation (primary flow) in order to perform work on the Loop 2 Main Steam Isolation Valve HV-2224 Loop 1 was cleared out and thus unavailable. The Loop 2 helium circulators were brought to self-turbining. The condensate pumps, which were supplying both secondary flow and the motive power to drive the

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helium circulators, were then shut off and the interruption of forced circulation was commenced. The allowable time before forced circulation was required was 5.74 hours8.564815e-4 days <br />0.0206 hours <br />1.223545e-4 weeks <br />2.8157e-5 months <br /> according to calculations performed in accordance with Technical Specification 4.0.4 and Procedure CMG-4. This calculation was based on data obtained on July 7, 1988. Since the duration of the work to be performed on HV-2224 was short, the licensee did not recalculate the allowable time based on the actual interruption of forced circulation since the previous calculation was conservative and provided more time than the operators thought would be require ,

At 9:07 a.m., on July 9,1988, C and 0 Helium Circulators automatically shut down due to a low bearing water surge tank level. The condensate system normally provides makeup to the bearing water system during shutdown operations. The licensee failed to realize that securing the condensate system would result in no makeup to the bearing water surge tank and subsequent circulator trips. Had the licensee considered this, i the circulators could have been manually shut down at the outse At 12:37 p.m., the condensate system was returned to service and flow was restored to the Loop 2 steam generators. Auxiliaries were placed on i C Helium Circulator but would not work properly. Auxiliaries were then placed on D Helium Circulator, but it would not self turbine. Several attempts were made to get 0 Helium Circulator to roll, but all were unsuccessful. At 1:15 p.m. the limit of the 5.74 hours8.564815e-4 days <br />0.0206 hours <br />1.223545e-4 weeks <br />2.8157e-5 months <br /> per the CMG-4 calculation was exceeded without having restored forced circulation. This placed this plant in LCO 4.1.9 and LCO 4.2.18. These LCO's required depressurization within 191/2 hours, a condition the plant was already in. The control room operators were making every attempt to get C or 0 ,

"*lium Circulator in service while a prallel effort, directed by the snift supervisor, was in process to ren, ave the clearance on A Helium  ;

Circulato i At 4:45 p.m., forced circulation was restored when C Helium Circulator was placed in service. A problem with its main drain valve was found and '

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repaired prior to placing the circulator in service. Average core outlet temperature peaked at 568'F with a calculated maximum average fuel temperature of 332*F. This was significantly below the limit of 760*F <

l bulk core temperature which is the b e & T @ n W Specification 4. The situation during these events was somewhat unique due to the fact that ,

actions required by the Technical Specifications had been performed prior j to entering the interruption of forced circulation. The applicable i Technical Specification was LCO 4.0.4, which provided time limit for the l interruption of forced circulation. When this time limit was exceede l LCO 4.1.9 became applicable. Since the minimum flow requirements of l LC0 4.1.9 could not be met, the action statement required depressurization

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of the PCRV per LC0 4.2.18. LC0 4.2.18 allowed an additional 19 1/2 hours to start depressurization of the primary system to less than 50 psi The

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r primary system pressure was at 43 psia at the start of the interruption of ,

forced circulation. In addition, forced circulation was restored before r the time period in the TS action statement elapse [

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Although within the requirements of the Technical Specifications, these events indicate a lack of proper planning or in-depth review of a maintenance activity prior to its initiation. Thecondensatepump(s)

could have remained in service and the maintenance on Valve HV-2224 could i

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have been performed by shutting Valve HV-2238, emergency condensate supply to the Loop 2 steam generators, to remove secondary flow. The helium  :

circulators could have remained in operation and restoration, following :

th: maintenance, couh %sve been made by opening Valve HV-2238, thus avoiding any challenge to the helium circulator's operation. The NRC  !

inspectors will closely monitor licensee activities in the review of .

maintenance planning and initiatio No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program area, t Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) (90712) ,

I (0 pen)LER88-010: Wide Range Nuclear Channel Upscaled from Noise Source i and Actuated Scram Channel. This LER reported two scram actuations while the reactor was shut down with all rods fully inserted. In each case, a j scram channel was tripped for surveillance testing when another channel ,

was tripped by electronic noise satisfying the two out of three logic for r scram actuatio ,

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This has been a continuing problem at Fort St. Vrain and has received  !

i considerable licensee and NRC attention. ine events described do not '

require additional attention outside the ongoing licensee program to  !

reduce electronic noise. However, in the LER, it appears that the licensee has not specifically determined whether or not a scran actuation !

actually occurred on May 10, 1988. The licensee has indicated that they !

will clarify the ambiguity with regard to the scram actuatio (

f The licensed reactor operators on duty logged a scram actuation. The NRC [

inspectors are satisfied that the equipment in the plant protection system ,

functicned as designe The remaining questions involve licensee t investigation, followup, and generation of LER f i

No vic,latior.s or deviations were identified in this program are ;

i l Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

With the reactor in cold shutdown for an extended maintenance outage, the majority of the NRC inspection effort was in the area of maintenance. The [

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licensee's plan for the outage included refurbishment of three helium i l

circulators, replacement of one helium circulator, addition of one helium l

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circulator turbine water removal pump (a comitment to the NRC), and extensive secondary side work including replacement of the station batteries and expansion of the auxiliary boiler The NRC inspectors observed preparation for and removal of the auxiliary piping and lower assemblies of A and B Helium Circulator The NpC inspectors observed work being performed in accordance with Controlled Work Procedure (CWP)-880173 that implementing Change Notice (CN)-2715. "S/N 2004 Steam Inlet & Water Piping Modification."

Step 1 of the CWP required the measurement of a boltNg detail and included acceptance criteria. The CWP specified notification of the cognizant engineer if as-found conditions are out of tolerance. The NRC inspector observed the licensee's engineer evaluating an out-of-tolerance measurement as required by the procedur The NRC inspectors witnessed the inspection and removal of the internals from the Core Support Floor Vent Valve V-111063 discusseo in paragraph 3 of this report. The NRC inspectors reviewed Station Service Request (SSR) 88504746, the authorizing document which incorporated Procedure MP-1077, Issue 1. "Velan Bellows Sealed Valve Maintenance." The licensee's welders followed their fire prevention procedures and obtained fire Prevention Work Pemit 88-07-44 prior to grinding away the bonnet welds. Health physics was present as required by the SSR prior to removal of the valve internals. The area had previously been checked and found radiologically clean. Health physics monitoring was required to prevent valve internal contamination from spreadin The NRC inspectors observed electrical tests done on the new turbine water renoval pump motor as part of the initial installation. This system removes water f.om the helium circulator water turbine drives. A third pump is being installed to meet an Appendix R c)mitment to the NRC as the two existing turbine water removal purps are adjacent to each other. The pump is being installed under CN-2006 and CWP-88-07. Procedure PE-1904, Issue 5. "Megger Testing of Electrical Components," and Procedure MPE-1900. Issue 2. "Disconnecting, Reconnecting, and Cleaning Non EQ Motors (600 volt or less)" were incorporated in the CWP by reference. The new pump motor, P-21035X, was meggered in accordance with Procedure MPE-1904, Issue The NRC inspectors observed portions of maintenance activities on the 8 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) under SSR 88504683. This SSR required the perfomance of annual preventive maintenance per Procedure MP-7090, Issue 2. "Emergency Diesel Generator Preventive Maintenance." The NRC inspectors verified a controlled copy of the procedure was being used and that all required reviews and authorizations were obtained prior to conmencing work. The clearance associated with this work was independently verified by the NRC inspector Work on the EDG began July 9, 1988, and included lubrication adjustments, general inspections, and postmaintenance testing. On July 26, 1988, the

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a engines were reassembled and a cylinder leakdown test was performed on Engine K-9204-X in accordance with Step 5.17 of Procedure MP-709 Thc licensee's preventive maintenance program for the EDGs was recently revised to include a cylinder leakdown test as part of the annual preventive maintenance activities. This test checks the integrity of the valves and rings for each cylinder. The results of this test on the No. I cylinder of Engine K-9204-X indicated some degradation. Work under Procedure MP-7090 was suspended and SSR 88504683 was revised to determine the cause of the high cylinder leakage. The cylinder head for cylinders 1 and 3 was removed and the valves appeared to be in satisfactory conditio The No.1 piston was then removed and was found to have the second (middle) piston ring broken into three pieces and a piece approximately 2 1/2 inches long bicken out of the side of the 31ston. The licensee has not experienced any problems of this type in tie past and had no indication or reason to suspect this type of problem. The engine vendor was called for assistance and the licensee was awaiting resolution of this problem at the end of this report perio It should be noted that this problem could have remained undetected except for the licensee's expanded testing in their revised preventive maintenance program for the EDGs. The inspectors will monitor the licensee's activities to restore the "B" EDG to service and the subsequent preventive maintenance on the "A" ED No violations or deviations were identified in this program are . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

At the beginning of the outage, the NRC inspectors ob.arved a pair of non-Technical Specification surveillances of interest. These were the turbine generator overspeed trip test and backup overspeed trip tes These tests were satisfactorily gerformed in accordance with licensee G. E. Turbine Generator," and SR-0P-3-A, Procedures SR-0P-6 SA, Issue 7 Issue 11. "GE Turbine Generator."

The NRC inspectors observed technicians performing SR 5.4.6-R, Issue 14

"Core Delta P Indicator Calibration." The NRC inspector observed a technician interrupt work when an unmarked valve was encountered. The technician was sure which valve the unmarked valve was, but chose to verify this with a drawing before proceeding. The unmarked valve was an instrument valve located inside a reactor vessel instrument penetratio The NRC inspector also noted the use of and compliance with a radiation work permit for this calibratio During this inspection period, the NRC inspector had the opportunity to make a tael storage building entry. The entry was made while the licensee perforred a Security Program Surveillance, SR-SE-16-W, Issue 10. "Fuel Storage Building Alarm System and 4 Key / Core Inventory."

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The NRC inspectors also observed a special "surveillance type" test done under a temporary change, TCR-88-071 This test was done to verify

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whether the static seal actuation hardware on the B Helium Circulator was leaking purified helium. If the test confirmed that the leak was in the circulator hardware, the circulator would be removed from the reacto This test was performed as a temporary change because it involved a temporary hardware change of installed plant equipment. The purified helium supply line to the static seal mechanism was removed and a fitting

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was installed on the circulator end of the line. A helium supply boctie

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isolat en valve and pressure gauge were installed. The static seal

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mechanism was then pressurized to 450 psia and isolated. The rate of I pressure decay was measured to determine the integrity of the seal

, actuation mechanism. The NRC inspectors observed performance of the test

and noted that the circulator hardware was leaking purified helium. The circulator was subsequently removed from the reacto The NRC inspectors also monitored the Technical Specification surveillance logs to assure that Technical Specification required surveillances were cu rrent.

! No violations or deviations were identified in this program area, J

{ 7. Radiological protection (71709)

1 The NRC inspectors verified that required area surveys of exposure rates were made and posted at entrances to radiation areas and in other l appropriate areas. The NRC resident inspectors observed health physics l professionals on duty on all shifts including backshifts. The NRC l inspectors observed the health physics technicians checking area radiation i monitors, air samplers, and doing area surveys for radioactive

! contaminatio The NRC inspectors observed that when workers are required to enter areas where radiation exposure is possible or contamination ex15ts. the health l

physics technicians are present and available to provide assistance, l

During this inspection period, the NRC inspectors had several l opportunities to observe workers in contaminated or potentially

contaminated areas, in all cases health physics technicians were present providing assistance to workers. The NRC inspectors observed that plant workers paid close attention to and heeded direr.tions and suggestions from

' the health physics technician No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program are . Monthly Securitj Observation (71881)

TheNRCinspectorsverifiedthattherewasaleadsecurityofficer(L50)

on duty as authorized by the facility security plan, to direct security

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activities on site for each shift. The LSO did not have duties assigned that would interfere with the direction of security activitie The NRC inspectors verified, randomly and on the backshift, that the minimum number of armed guards required by the facility's security plan were present. Search equipment, including the X-ray machine, metal detector, and explosive detector, were operational or a 100 percent hands-on search was being utilize The protected area barrier was surveyed by the NRC inspectors. The barrier was properly maintained and was not compromised by erosion;

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openings in the fence fabric or walls; or proximity of vehicles, crates,

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or other objects that could be used to scale the barrier. The NRC inspectors observed that the vital area barriers were well maintained and not compramised by obvious breaches or weaknesse The NRC inspectors

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observed that persons granted access to the site are badged indicating whether they had unescorted or escorted access 6uthorizatio No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program are i Exit Meeting (30703)

An exit meeting was conducted on August 9, 1988, attended by those identified in paragraph 1. At this time, the NRC inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the inspectio t i

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