IR 05000267/1990011
| ML20056B404 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Saint Vrain  |
| Issue date: | 08/15/1990 |
| From: | Baird J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20056B403 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-267-90-11, NUDOCS 9008280239 | |
| Download: ML20056B404 (7) | |
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APPENDIX
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION IV.
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- NRC Inspection Report:
50-267/90-11'
Operating License: DPR-34
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Docket:
50-267 Licensee: 'Public Service Company of Colorado (PSC)
P.O. Box 8404 n
- Denver, Colorado 80201-0840-
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Facility Na'"e:
Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station (FSV)
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' Inspection At:' FSV, Platteville, Colorado
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Inspection Conducted: June 1 through July 28, 1990
- Inspector
- . R. E. Farrell, Senior Resident Inspector LApproved:
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J.*B. Baird; Technical Assistant, Division
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Date of Reactor Projects Inspection Sumary
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' Inspection Conducted June 1 through July 28, 1990 (Report 50-267/90-11)
Areas Inspected:. Routine, unannounced inspection'of followup of items of
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noncompliance, onsite followup of a licensee event report, operational safety.
verification, monthly maintenance observation, and monthly surveillance -
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.Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were toentified.
m The event described in paragraph 6 of this report, concerning failure to close the shutters prior to lif ting of the fuel handling machine, continues to
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highlight the need for greater attention to detail by plant workers in the performance of site activities as documented in the previous NRC inspection report (50-267/90-07).
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9008290239 900820 _.
PDR ADOCK 0500026e o
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i DETAILS-1.
Persons Contacted D. Alps, Supervisor, Security
- F. Borst, Nuclear Training and Support Manager
- L. Brey, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and hesources
- M. Cappello, Defueling/ Decommissioning (D/D) Project Manager R. Craun, Nuclear Site Engineering Manager
- A. Crawford, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- M. Deniston, Superintendent of Operations
- D. Evans, Operations and Maintenance Manager M. Ferris, Quality Assurance (QA) Operations Manager
- C. Fuller, Manager, Nuclear Production
- J. Gramling, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing Operations
- P. Harrington, Supervisor, Materials Engineering
- M. Holmes, Nuclear Licensing Manager
- P. Moore, Supervisor, QA Technical Support M. Niehoff, Nuclear Design Manager i
- F. Novachek, Program Manager D/D
- H. O'Hagan, D/D Project Manager
- W. Rodgers, Nuclear Computer Services Manager
- N. Snyder, Fuel Deck Manager
- L. Sutton, Supervisor, QA Auditing
- P. Tomlinson, Manager..QA D. Warembourg, Manager, Nuclear Engineering NRC
- D. Garrison, Inspector, Region IV The NRC. inspectors also contacted other licensee and contractor personnel during the inspection.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted July 24, 1990.
'2.
Plant Status The plant was permanently shut down August 18, 1989. One third of the fuel has been removed from the core and placed in spent fuel storage wells.
The motor control center breakers for the control rod drives are.
open, racked out, and clearance tagged. The licensee awaits permission from the Department of Energy (00E) to continue shipment of irradiated fuel to the DOE Idaho National Laboratory tacility.
Irradiated fuel was previously shipped to DOE Idaho following each plant refueling.
An NRC confirmatory order prohibiting operation at eny power level was issued May 1, 1990.
On May 16, 1990, the Federal Register contained an
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announcement of' intent by the NRC to cmend the facility license to preclude operation at any power level.
The licensee has submitted a construction application for an independent
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spent fuel storage facility. This application is cuirently under review.
The fuel handling machine (FHM), which had_ been previously damaged during routine operation, was repaired and returned '.o service during the inspection period. Also, the licensee received concurrence from the
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Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to tegin disposing of spare or worn..
out components.
Additionally, removal of the "B" helium t.irculator which.
t developed a seal leak was authorized and preparation foi removal has
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begun. 'The circulator will be stored on site until a possession-only license is obtained.
3.
Followup on Items of Noncompliance (92702)
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_(Closed) Violation 267/9005-01:
Failure to Follow Procedure. Operations per;onnel performing a surveillance procedure, comunicating by radio.-
sh pped a procedure step. The licensee analyzed the procedure and determined that the skipped step was for personnel safety and did not invalidate the test. To address the weakness in comunication, operations crews were trained in radio comunications 'itilizing Institute of Nuclear
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Power Operations-(ItCO). material.
In addition, the vice president of nuclear operations issued a memorandum to all employees stressing the need for procedural compliance and stating that violation of procedures-could result in termination. This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation 267/9005-02: Handling Spent Fuel with a Procedure L Not Approved by Plant Operations Review Comittee (PORC). A spent fuel cask was moved as part of a maintenance activity. The work was done in accordance with a properly prepared controlled work instruction (CWI).
This would have been satisfactory if the cask had been empty. The cask
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was loaded with spent fuel making movements subject to a licensee Technical Specification (TS) requiring that spent fuel handling procedures be reviewed and approved by the PORC. The POR0 reviewed the CWI following the violation and found the CWI appropriate for the work. The licensee's fuel deck management personnel have been instructed to assure that all nonroutine CWis involving the handling of spent fuel be reviewed by the PORC. This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation 267/9007-01:
Failure to Make a 4-Hovr Nonemergency Report to NRC. The licensee's corporate office made a required
notification to the EPA and other agencies regarding chemical discharges at Fort St. Vrain.
Plant management was not informed of the notifications until the following day. Conseguntly, the required 4-hour nonemergency report to the NRC of notifications to other agencies was not tbely. The licensee has made the corporate office > responsible for these notifications aware of the NRC requirements resulting from such notifications. The licensee has made efforts to improve communications between the plant and supporting corporate offices. This item is close __
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Onsite~ Followup of Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
(92700)
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The inspector reviewed tne follt to determine whether corrective
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e fate to correct the cause of the actions, as stated in the LER, r
event and to verify that these tive actions have been implemented.
(Closed) LER 90-001:
Nonessential 4160/480 Volt Bus 5 Transformer Fault Due to Insulation Breakdown. This nonessential-transfomer faileo, apparently, due to age. The failure resulted in.a small fire of less than 10 minutes duration contained inside-the bus cabinet. The fire was extinguished by shift personnel with handheld fire extinguishers. A valve V
powered from this bus drifted closed and isolated secondary coolant flow
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for about 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. This was not a concern as the decay heat load is very low.. The licensee hed the failed transformer rewound. The licensee a
inspected and tested four similar nonessential transformers. The safety-related transformers are of different design and are routinely tested. This item is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program area.
5.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
Yhe inspector made tours of the control room during normal working. hours
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and during backshift hours.. Control room staffing was verified to be at the proper level for the plant condition. During control room tours, the inspector verified that the required number of nuclear instrumentation and plant protective system channels were operable. The operability of emergency AC and.DC electrical power, meteorological, and fire protection
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systems was also' verified by the inspector. The reactor operators and shif t supervisor logs were reviewed along with the TS compliance log, clearance log, operations deviation report (00R) log, temporary configurationreport(TCR) log,andoperationsorderbook.. Shift turnovers
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were also oburved.
The inspector made tours of all accessible areas of the plant to assess
the overall conditions and verify the idequacy of plant equipment, radiological controls, and security. During these tours, particular attention was paid to the licensee's fire protection program, including fire extinguishers, firefighting equipment, fire barriers, control of flamable materials, and other fire hazards.
The inspector observed health physics technicians performing surveys and checking air samplers and area radiation monitors.
Contamination levels and exposure rates were observed to be posted at entrances to radiologically controlled areas and in other appropriate areas and were verified to be up to date by the inspector. The inspector noted that health physics technicians were present to provide assistance when workers were required to enter radiologically controlled areas. The workers observed by the inspector followed the instructions on radiation work
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permits concerning prote::tive clothing and dosimetry and using proper
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procedures for contamination control, including proper removal of protective clothing and whole-body-frisking upon exiting a radiologically -
controlled area.
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The inspector randomly verified _ that the number of armed security officers '
required by the security.-plan were' present. A lead security officer was
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verified that search equipment, including an x-ray machine, explosive
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detector, and netal detector, were operational or a 100 percent hands-on search was conducted.
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- The protected area barrier was surveyed by the inspector to ensure that it, was not compromised by erosion or other objects. The inspector observed ~
that vital area barriers were well maintained and not compromised. The a
inspector also observed that persons granted access to the site were badged and visitors were properly escorted.
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. No violations or deviations were' identified in the review of this program area.
6.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
t During the inspection period, the licensee completed repairs to the FHM.
These repairs involved replacing one damaged guide rail and straightening
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another inside the FHM. The rollers on the FHM telescoping mast run up.and '
down on these rails maintaining the orientation of the mast and the attached fuel grapple, Subsequent to 'complating these repairs, the licensee was moving the FHM
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and damaged it further. The damage was slight and was repaired the following week. More-significantly, though no one received any radiation exposure, a potential for significant. personnel radiation exposure was created when the FHM was lifted with the shutters open. A narrative
description of the event is sumarized below.
On July 11 the licensee was ready to functionally test the repaired fuel handling machine. The grapple was to first be moved to its full up position. To move the grapple, the logic in the FHM had to have a " shutter open" signal from both the FHM shutter integral to the machine and the reactor isolation valve (RIV) upon which the FHM rested..RIVs are used to attach the FHM to equipment storage wells and fuel storage wells in addition to reactor refueling regions.
In this case, the FHM was sitting on an RIV above an equipment storage well. The shutter on the RIV and FHM opens, allowing the fuel grapple on the telescope mast to pass through.
When work is complete and the mast is retracted, both shutters close.
Thus, the FHM is a closed container, and the storage well or reactor region is also closed by the RIV.
To move the FHM grapple, an electrical umbilical cord was attached between the FHM and RIV. The shutters on the RIV and FHM were opened with the
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signal from the RIV delivered to the FHM via the umbilical cord. The FHM
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grapple was fuliy retracted. The FHM was resting on top of an equipment ~
storage well connected via an RIV with both the RIV and FHM shutters open.
The FHM is sealed via inflatable seals to the RIV as is the RIV to the equipment storage well.
In this configuration, the FHM forms a' seismic Category "I sealed extension of the equipment storage well. This is a
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normal analyzed configuration. Upon retracting the FHM grapple, the fuel deck workers ceased work for the day and Irft the equipment as described.
The following day, July 12, the fuel deck workers commenced work. Their instructions were to move the FHM to set up for work in Region 15 of the reactor. _The workers unbolted the FHM from the RIV and deflated the seal between the RIV and the FHM, The FHM was then lifted a few inches above the RIV. At this point, a worker noticed that the shutters o' the RIV and FHM were still open cnd the umbilical cord between the FHM an RIV was still in place. Crane movement was stopped. Health physics technicians on the fuel deck surveyed the space between the RIV and FHM with a
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0-5 millirem / hour dose rate survey instrument. The meter pegged high.
The health physics personnel ordered the FHM lowered back on the RIV. The
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FHM was immediately lowered back onto the RIV and both the RIV and FHM shutters were closed. The umbilical between the RIV and FHM was damaged and had to be repaired. Subsequent checking of self-reading dosimeters showed no measurable personnel exposures from this event.
The movements of the FHM by the fuei deck workers were all within the
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normal job knowledge expected of these workers.
The controlled work instruction governing the work stated tasks to be completed without the step-by-step detail of fuel handling procedures. The workers have done this type of work for years, thus, the work was considered to be routine.
No violation of procedures occurred and the procedures were considered to be adequate. The apparent cause of the mishap was the break at the end of the day with the shutters of the FHM and RIV open and the umbilical cord attached. No one remembered to check the shutters or cord the following morning before beginning to move the FHM.
The inspector discussed this incident with licensee management and expressed concern over a lack of attention to details which resulted in a potential high radiation exposure from this incident. The licensee
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shared the inspector's concern and is attempting to tighten controls on the fuel deck, including conside'ing fuel deck worker suggestions to i
make the individual workers more responsible for activities. The licensee l
advised the inspector that this particular incident had occurred previously, but not in several years.
The potential for high radiation exposure came from the contents of the equipment wells. The particular well contained irradiated metal-clad reflection blocks from the reactor core. One licensee estimate of dose rate inside the well was approximately 4000 rem per hour. The inspector expressed concern to licensee management that this incident continued to highlight the need for greater attention to detail by plant workers. This concern was expressed previously in NRC Inspection Report 50-267/90-07 covering the previous inspection period.
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No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program area.
7.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspector routinely reviewed surveillance logs in the control room
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to verify that Q applicable surveillances were being maintained current.
l The inspector also oowled portions of surycillances on the ' alternate
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cooling nethod diesel-generator's waste gas and 11ould waste sampling and ~
Appendix R shutow:a c M ing train walkdown.
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The inspector noted that the surveillance log indicated that the surveillance on the startup neutron channels and the reserve shutdown system were both in the grace period.
Discussion with the shift supervisor and compliance engineer identified that the startup neutron channels were not required with the reactor shut
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down, all rods-in, and no incore work being done. The licensee does the-1 surveillance,n the startup neutron channels with the reactor shut down
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prior to doin; incore manipulations. This is in accordance with the TS.
The reserve shutdown system surveillance is an 18-month surveillance.
This surveillance involves placing the most recently removed control rod drive assembly in the plant hot cell and activating the assembly reserve shutdown matwial. This test is a destructive test rupturing the graphite rupture cisk and visually confirming the fill movement of the horizontal graphite reserve shutdown material. As the inspection J
period ended, the licensee was preparing to do this test. The actual test will be conducted during the next inspection period.
No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program-i area.
8.
Exit Meeting (30703)
hn exit interview was conducted with licensee representatives identified in paragraph 1 on July 24, 1990.
During this interview, the inspector reviewed the scope and findings of the report. The-licensee did not-identify as proprietary any infonnation provided to, or reviewed by, the
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inspector.
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