IR 05000267/1988020
| ML20207K876 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Saint Vrain  |
| Issue date: | 09/29/1988 |
| From: | Farrell R, Michaud P, Westerman T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207K801 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-267-88-20, NUDOCS 8810170066 | |
| Download: ML20207K876 (11) | |
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a APPENDIX B U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report:
50-267/88-20 License:
DPR-34 Docket: 50-267 Licensee:
Public Service Compmy of Colorado (PSC)
Facility Name:
Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station Inspection At:
Fort St. Vrain (FSV) Nuclear Generating Station Platteville, Colorado Inspectiun Conducted: August 1-Saptember 10, 1988
.h. N 9fMh[-
l Inspectors: h R. E. Farrell, Senior Resident Reactor Inspector
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W. eda 9 h4
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T. W. Michauc, Resident Reactor Inspector Date
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T. F. Westeman, Cnief, Projects Section B Date Division of Reactor Projects Inspection Sumary Inspection Conducted August 1-Septerr.ber 10, 1988 (Report 50-267/88-20)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee action on previously identified inspection findings, operational safety verification, licensee event report review, monthly maintenance observations, monthly surveillance observations, engineered safety feature walkdown, radiological protection, and monthly security observations.
Results: Within the eight areas inspected, or,e violation (failure to follow procedures, paragraph 6) was identified.
8810170066 881006 PDR ADOCK 0 % 2 7 Q
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2-DETAILS 1.
Persons contacted D. Alps Supervisor, Security
- F. Borst, Nuclear Training Manager L. Brey, Manager Nuclear Licensing and Resources
- H. Block, System Engineering Manager M. Cappello, Central Planning and Scheduling Manager
- R. Craun, Nuclear Site Engineering Manager
- H. Deniston, Superintendent Operations
- J. Eggebroten, Technical Projects Manager
- D. Evans, Operations Manager
- H. Ferris. QA 9perations Manager C. Fuller, Ma93ger Nuclear Production
- J. Gramling, supervisor, Nuclear Licensing Operations
- J. Hak, Superintendent Maintenance
- H. Holmes. Nuclear Licensing Manager
- F. Novachek, Nuclear Support Manager
- H. O'Hagan, Outage Manager
- L. Scott, QA Services Manager l
- N. Snyder, Maintenance Manager j
- P. Tomlinson, Manager, QA
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D. Warembourg, Manager Nuclear Engineering
- R. Williams Jr., Vice President, Nuclear Operations The NRC inspectors also contacted other licensee and contractor personnel during the inspection.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on September lj,1988.
2.
Plant Status l
The plant continued in an extended equipment maintenance outage during the entire inspection period.
The primary work, bolt replacement on the secondary side of Qe helium circulators, is on schedule and nearing completion. Other tasks are still being worked throughout the plant.
The planned return to critical operation on October 7,1988, may be delayed by problems with the station batteries or hydraulic system corrponents. The new station batteries that were replaced during this outage did not meet the vendor's predicted specific gravity measurements.
The hydraulic system, a safety-related, two-train system, is partially disabled while awaiting return of parts being refurbished by a vendor.
Tha vendor has encountered difficulty bringing a hydraulic cylinder into dimensional and metallurgical specification.
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The licensee must also remove water inadvertently injected into the reactor.
This may delay criticality and will definitely increase the time between criticality and power operation.
3.
Licensee Action on Previously Identifiedinsoection Findings (92701)
(Closed) Violation 267/8708-01:
Improper calibration of reactor pressure instruments.
The reactor pressure indicators in the control room were being calibrated only over their normal operating range of 400-800 psia. However, these indicators are also used to verify compliance with Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 4.2.7 at 100 psia.
The licensee changed the pressure instruments calibration range to 100-900 psia in Survetilance Procedure SR 5.4.1.1.9c-R on April 3, 1987. The instruments were recalibrated on April 3,1987, and r.c recurrence of this nature has been observed by the NRC resident inspectors.
This item is t.losed.
(Closed) Violation 267/8717-03:
Breaker identification and failure to follow procedures.
The identification of breakers on tN 120-Vac vital electric distribution system panels was not in agreement with system drawings. The licensee perfonned a complete walkdown of the 120-Vac distribution system and as a
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l result issued a change notice (CN-2673) to correct both drawing and labeling discrepancies. This change notice was completed on October 14, 1987.
The NRC resident inspector verified the discrepancies had been
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corrected. This violation additionally cited the licensee for failure to j
secure a full nitrogen bottle as rer;utred by procedures. The NRC resident inspectors verified a memo addressing this occurrence was issued to all personnel by the station manager on July 20, 1987.
In addition, the general employee training (GET) lesson plan on "Plant and Personnel Safety," was revised to provide additional emphasis in this area.
Finally, a new weekly surveillance SR-0P-45-W, "High Pressure Bottle Restraint Vortfication Checklist," was issued on Decenter 18, 1987 The NRC resident inspectors consider these actions to have sufficient'y addressed the NRC's concerns, and no subsequent items of this nature have been observed by the NRC resident inspectors.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation 267/8721-01:
Inadequate procedura for control of radioactivity.
No procedures existed to establish responsibility or provide instructions to control contamination if an individual attempted to exit tne protected area af ter the portal monitor alarmed.
The licensee issued Procedure P-3, Issue 13 on December 3,1987, which added Section 4.7 to address these concerns.
In addition, the security officer stationed at the exit to the protected area will now take act'en to confront any individual who attempts to exit the protected a' ea af ter tripping the portal nonito _ _.
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-4 The NRC resident inspectors verified these corrective actions and no i
recurrence of this problem has been observed. This item is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
l There was no critical operation at any tim during the inspection period.
Many plant systems were out of urvice for maintenance. At all times, the
control rods were fully inserted and disabled.
The operator's primary i
I concerns were maintaining bulk core temperature below 760'F and pressure i
vessel liner temperature above 100'F.
l The NRC inspectors toured the control room on a daily basis during ronnal l
working hours and weekly during backshift hours.
The reactor operator and j
shift supervisor logs and TS compliance logs were reviewed daily.
The NRC
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inspectors obseived proper control room staffing at all times and verified
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that operators were attentive and adhered to approved procedures.
Control i
room instrumentation was observed by the NRC inspectors and the operability of equipment required during the extended shutdom was verified by the NRC inspectors on each control room tour. Operator awareness and understanding of abnormal or alann conditions was verified.
The NRC inspectors reviewed the operations order book, operat. ions
ceviation report (ODR) log, clearance log, and temporary configuration report (TCR) log to ve.rify compliance with TS requirements.
Shift
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turnovers were observed at least weekly by the NRC resident inspectors.
The information flow appeared to be good, with the shift su;mrvisors routinely soliciting coments or concerns from reactor operators, equipment operators, and auxiliary tenders.
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On September 7,19d8, at 8:32 a.m., Helium Circulator Bearing Water Purap p-2101S tripped. This was caused by a loss of 480-Vac BW 2 due to
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an incorrect fuse being pulleo as discussed in paragraph 6.
The loss of
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Pump P-2101S caused a low bearing water flow trip signal on the A and B l
Helium Circulators. The standby bearing water pump, P-2106, automatically started and bearing water flow was never actually lost. The B Helium circulator was self-turbining at approximately 700 rpm and automatically tripped when the low bearing water flow.C nal was received. The A Helium
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Circulator was operating at approximately 2200 rp on its water turbir.c-drive which was being supplied from the energency condensate system (a nomal shutdown lineup).
The A Helium Circulator did not trip and remained at approximately 2200 rpm although a trip signal was present, j
This was due to the fact that its water turbine speed control valve.
SV-2109, was manually jacked open.
Yalve SV-2109, the A Helium Circulator water turbine speed control valve, was manually jacked open under ODR 5998. This ODR was issued on August 27, 1988, because an unrelated clearance had affected the electrical controls of this valve. Thus, in order to operate the A helium l
circulator, Valve SV-2109 had to be manually operated. At that ti.re, the j
B helium circulator had problems self-turbining and sir.ce Loop 2 was l
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-5-cleared out for outage work, it was decided to manually jack open Yalve SV-2109 to restore primary coolant flow.
The plant was left in this configuration until September 7,1988.
Had bearing water actually been lost, the control room operators would have been required to manually isolate the turbine water supply to the A Helium Circulatoa.
This may not have been fast enough to prevent damage to the circulat:r had bearing water actually been lost.
Following these events and the subsequent restoration of the 480-Vac Bus 2 the A Helium Circulator was taken out of service and the B Helium Circulator was placed in operation. Although not a safety issue in itself, this event exposed a potential weakness in tha licensee's control of abnormal configurations, ODR 5998 was reviewed and approved by the Plant Operations Review Couittee (PORC) in Meeting No. 793 on September 1, 1988 The abnormal configuration, which in this case could have economic and operationally limiting consequences, was allowed to exist when it was no longer necessary.
The B Helium Circulator, which could be controlled from the control room, was not utilized when it became available on August 29, 1988.
The licensee explained that this situatinn was not noticed because the ODR was poorly written and the licensee's management simply missed the significance of remaining in the abnormal configuration. The licensee's station manager and operations manager assured the NRC resident inspectors that the DDR process wil: be reviewed and that shift supervisors will be counseled on the importance of controlling and minimizing abnormal configurations. The NRC resident inspectors will closely monitor the licensee's activities in this area.
No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program area.
5.
Licensee Action on Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
(92700)
(Closed) LER 85 011: Loop 1 shutdown due to a technician attempting to calibrate the wrong controller on the bearing water surge tank. The location of the controller was not specified and was easily confused with another level controller on the surge tank.
The NRC resident inspectors verified that Surveillance Procedure SR 5.3.4bl-A,1, sue 4, contained a note before Step 5.20.15 specifying the location of Controller LC-21245.
The NRC resident inspectors also verified that the results engineer involved was retrained on December 30, 1985.
This item is closed.
(Closed) LER 85-021:
Deficiencies in some safe shutdown equipment found by the licensee during en equipment qualification (EQ) field walkdown.
The NRC resident inspectors verified that each of these identified deficiencies was corrected by September 30, 1985.
Further corrective action consisted of inspecting all safety related electrical equipment not specifically included in the EQ progran, including verification of as-built configurations and nameplate data. The NRC res dent inspectors have rtviewed the licensee's program to accomplish this and consider it a sufficient bisis to close this LER.
This item is closed.
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-6-(Closed)LER88-010:
Wide-range nuclear channel upscaled from noise source and actuated scram channel.
This LER was reviewed in NRC Inspection Report 50-267/88-16 ano left open.
During this inspection period, the NRC resident inspectors met with licensee personnel to discuss the ambiguity in LER 88-010 regarding the scram actuation on May 10, 1988.
This was a spurious scram actuation due to electronic noise occurring when the reactor was shut down with all rods fully inserted. LER 88-010 implied that the licensee could not verify that a scram actuation had occurred.
The NRC resident ii.spectors verified that the licensee was sure a scram had occurred.
The control room operators noted the scram and entered it in the control room narrative log. The uncertainty described in LER 88-010 was due to the plant data logger not recording the event.
The NRC resident inspectors learned that the plant data logger is fed information of plant protection system (PPS) actuations only from Logic Train A.
Thus, if the two out of three PPS logic is satisfied by a B Channel and a C Channel without a concurrent A Channel trip, as was the case on May 10 the data logger does not record the event.
The licensee engineer initially assigned to review this event and generate LER 88-010 was unaware of this aspect of the data logger design.
The engineer concluded that if the data logger did not record an event, then the event had not occurred. This logic caused the engineer to conclude that the control room operators were mistaken in believing that a scram actuation had occurred.
The scram actuation occurring with the plant shut down and all rods inserted involved only relay actuations and alarms in the control room.
Licensee personnel informed the NRC resident inspectors that when LER 88-010 was generated, the licensee did not realize the implications of the wording in the LER. Prior to the NRC resident inspectors' review of the LER, the licensee had determined that a scram actuation had occurred.
Additionally, the licensee expressed confidence in the control room operators' ability to determine that a scram actuation had occurred.
The licensee attributed the engineer's discounting of control room operators'
observations to the engineer's trexperience. The engineer was cautioned to place more confidence in the control room operators' observations.
The NRC resident inspectors questions and concerns were adequately addressed by the licensee. This item is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program a rea.
6.
Venthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The NRC resident inspectors continued to monitor the maintenance activities on the emergency diesel generators (EDGs). Asseably and testing of the A EDG was completed on August 29, 1988, and the annual preventive maintenance was begun on B EDG.
The NRC resident inspectors observed various portions of this work, which was perforced in accordance with Procedure MP-7090, Issue 2, dated September 9,1987 "Erergency
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-7-Diesel Generator Preventive Maintenance." At the end of this report period, the work on the 8 EDG was continuing and no discrepancies were
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noted by the NRC resident inspectors.
Clearance No. 24662 was used to deenergize 480-volt bus relays to work Change Notice (CN) 2748 A.
This CN specifies the installation of zipper tubing on selected cables in order to meet fire protection separation criteria.
The clearance was being hung and returned on a daily basis so that the affected relays would not remain deenergized when work was not in progress. On September 7, 1988, while placing Clearance No. 24662, an incorrect fuse, F7, was pulled watch was not part of this clearance.
This caused a loss of 480-Vac Bus 2, as discussed in paragraph 4, and the consequent loss of Circulator Bearing Weter Pump P-21015.
The licensee's failure to follow Clearance No. 24662, which specified the fuses to be pulled, is an apparent violation. (267/8820-01)
The NRC resident inspe: tors observed work to replace the mechanical seal on backup Bearing Water Pump P-2105 and reviewed the associated documentation. The work was performed under Station Service Request (SSR) 88503793. The documentation appeared to be complete.
One apparent violation as described above was identified in the review of this program area.
7.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The liRC resident inspectors reviewed Surveillance SR-0P-42-W, "Fire Detection-Roving Fire Watch," to verify that adequate fire watch coverage was being maintained where required due to equipment inoperability or qualification. No discrepancies were ti ted by the NRC resident inspectors during this review.
Fire watches were observed throughout this inspection period routinely pr. trolling their designated areas.
The NRC resident inspectors verified Surveillance SR-0P-45-W, "High Pressure Bottle Restraint Yerification Checklist," was perfomed on a weekly basis. This surveillance procedure checks that all high pressure gas bottles in the plant are secured properly and was instituted as a result of an NRC identified discrepancy.
The NRC resident impectors observed portions of Surveillance SR 5.6.ledb-A, Issue 10. "Stard'sy Diesel Generator Calibrations." This surveillance is an annual calibrstion of the diesel's protective functions and exhaust terperature shuttown and declutch function.
The NRC inspectors also monitored the TS surveillance logs to assure that TS required surveillances were current.
No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
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8.
Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Walkdown (71710)
The NRC resident inspectors performed a complete walkdown of the essential and emergency electrical power distribution systems.
Applicable sections
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Included in this walkdown were the 4160-Yac alternate cooling method (ACM),
480-Vac, 120-Yac, and 125-Yde distribution systems.
Key diagrams of these systems were used by the NRC resident inspectors to perform this walkdown.
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The as-found configuration was compared to the drawings to determine their
agreement, including cable numbers, breaker ratings, local and remote t
breaker positions, and labeling.
The conditions of equipment, including
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I the interior of panels, were inspected for any items which might degrade performance or affect safety, y
The NRC resident inspectors noted a significant improvement in the i
labeling of breakers. New permanent labels have been affixed to all
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breakers in the 120-Vac and 125-Vdc distribution systems.
However, the NRC resident inspectors did find two instances where the cable numbers listed on the key diagram and the number printed on the breaker label were not in agreement.
Drawing E-1097, Issue AH, "Key Diagram,120-ac Noninterruptible," dated August 11, 1988, shows Breaker 48 on Bus 1 to feed Cable
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No. 408. The label on Breaker 4B indicates Cable No. 425. Also on i
Drawing E ~197, Breaker 12B on Bus 2 is shown to feed Cable No. 442.
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label on Breaker 128 indicated Cable No. 403.
This inconsistency was brought to the licensee's attention snd will be tracked as an open item t
(267/8820-02). No additional discrepanci n were identified in this inspection ares.
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No violations or deviations were dentified in the review of this program
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9.
Radiological Protection (71709)
The NRC inspectors verified that required area surveys of exposure rates were made and posted at entrances to radiation areas and in other l
appropriate areas.
Thc NRC resident inspectors observed health physics
professionals on duty on all shifts, including backshifts.
The NRC
inspectors observed the health physics technicians checking area radiation i
monitors, air samplers, and doing area surveys for radioactive
contamination.
The NRC inspectors observed that when workers are required to enter ueas J
where radiation exposure is possible or contamination exists, the health I
physics technicians are present and available to provide assistance.
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During this inspection period, the NRC inspectors had several I
opportunities to observe workers in contaminated or pots:ntially
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contaminated areas.
In all cases, health physics technicians were present i
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and providing assistance to workers.
The NRC inspectors observed that plant
workers paid close attention to, and heeded directions and suggestions
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from, the health physics technicians, i
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During this inspection period, the licensee experienced an incident resulting in the contamination of six individuals.
The six workers were
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j removing auxiliary equipment from the C Helium Circulator in preparation for changing internal bolts.
The workers loosened an acorn nut holding a
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j flange which constituted a penetration interspace seal around the C Helium
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Circulator. At this time, water and primary coolant gas escaped around
the stud with the loosened acorn nut.
The water and gas sprayed the
workers and scaffolding.
The licensee's health physicist en duty identified the contamination and J
supervised decontamination of the individuals.
All six individuals were
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decontaminated with soap and water.
All of the contamination was surface
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i contamination on hands, feet, and knees.
The licensee, as a precaution, t
did whole body counts and bioassays; all results were negative.
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There was no evidence of any worker being sprayed in the face. However,
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an isotopic analysis of the water showed the presence of tritium. Thus the licensee took precautions to identify any intake of water.
The total amount of water spilled from the interspace was estimated by the licensee to be anywhere from i to 6 quarts.
The water was sprayed under
i some pressure making an accurate estimate difficult.
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The licensee did a thorough job of cleaning the work area and replacing j
contaminated scaffolding.
Radiological protection measures appeared
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thorough and effective.
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l A review of the event and analysis by the licensee's engineers explained I
the presence of the water and the gas.
The penetration interspace around l
l each helium circulator is nomally pressurized above reactor coolant l
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pressure with purified helium.
This ensures that any interspace leakage
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will be purified helium into the reactor or into the reactor building,
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This interspace pressurization is a TS requirement when reactor pressure
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is above 100 psia.
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During the outage, the reactor pressure was below 100 psia removing the requirement for purified helium pressure to the penetration interspace,
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j During this outage the licensee experience a water ingress on the C Helium i
Circulator. The C Helium Circulator has a known primary seal leak between i
the reactor pressure vessel and the penetration interspace. The seal leak j
has been :reasured and analyzed and is only a fraction of a percent of TS
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limits.
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The reactor was pressurized above 85 psia following the water ingress.
j This pressure is required to place the helium purification system in
service, which was done to renove moisture from the reactor coolant. The reactor pressure was higher than the penetration interspace pressure.
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Consequently, water was pushed through the seal leak with the primary c>olant gas.
The licensee, after decontamination and evaluation of the gas and water, proceeded with the circulator work.
The licensee did not anticipate an equipment problem as the penetration would be dried while the circulator work progressed. A similar problem on other penetrations was not anticipated as this required a seal leak and a water ingress to occur.
Additionally this was the last of four identical penetrations to be opened and there was no other occurrance of this problem.
The licensee did identify a procedural weakness during a review of this event. The circulator removal instructions Procedure HP-2225, Issue 4,
"Helium Circulator Change Out," does not contain a precaution to depressurize the penetration interspace before loosening the nuts holding the seal surface.
This interspace is nonnally pressurized with pure helium.
Thus, even without a leaking primary seal, the interspace is expected to be pressurized.
The NRC resident inspectors learned from the licensee that no one had previously thought to put a precaution regarding penetration pressure into the precedure. Historically, the mechanics have vented penetration pressure without being procedurally required to do so.
Reliance on the mechanic's experience to compensate for poor or nonexistent procedures was identified previously in Region IV maintenance inspections and most recently by the NRR Operational Safety Team inspection. This particular incident underscores the need for improved maintenance procedures. The quality of the licensee's maintenance procedures is already the subject of increased NRC attention.
On September 1,1988, the flow elemer e in the circulating water tower blowdown line was broken as it was being removed for calibration. The signal provided by this flow elem,nt is normally used in the calculation of liquid waste and reactor bui' ding sump release rates, in conformance with TS ELCO 8.1.2, Radioacti.e Liquid Effluent LCO.
Section F of ELCO 8.1.2 provides for cm.cinued releases if the blowdown flow measuring devices become inaperab'.e. by requiring a flow rate estiretion at least once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> due:ng actual releases.
This flow rate estimation is performed using Ge Parshall Flume in the liquid discharge path. The Parshall Flume is a concrete box approximately 18 inches wide in the discharge slough. Water height measurements are taken upstream and downstream of the flume and a calculation of the flowrate is then made using c. conversion table. The NRC resident inspectors verified the readings were taken at least once every four hours during releases and the estinated flowrates were logged by the control room operators. The NRC resident inspectors will continue to monitor the licensee's compliance with ELCO 8.1.2 in this manner until the flow element is replaced.
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area.
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10. Monthly Security Observation (71881)
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The NRC resident inspectors verified that there was a lead security
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officer (LS0) on duty as authorized by the facility security plan, to
direct security activities on site for each shift. The LSO did not have
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duties assigned that would interfere with the direction of security
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activities.
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The NRC inspectors verified, randomly and on the backshift, that the minimum number of armed guards required by the facility's security plan were present.
Search equipment, including the X-ray machine, metal i
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detector, and explosive detector, were operational or a 100 percent
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hands-on search was being utilized.
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The protected area barrier was surveyed by the NRC inspectors. The barrier was properly maintained and was not compromised by erosion or
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j other objects that could be used to scale the barrier. The NRC inspectors
observed that the vital area barriers were well maintained and not l
compromised by obvious breaches or weaknesses.
The NRC inspectors l
l observed that persons granted access to the site were badged indicating
q whether they had unescorted or escorted access authorization.
i No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program
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11. Exit Meeting (30703)
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An exit meeting was conducted on September 13, 1988, attended by those i
identified in paragraph 1.
At this time, the NRC inspectors reviewed the
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scope and findings of the inspection.
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