IR 05000267/1990013

Insp Rept 50-267/90-13 on 900709-13.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Program Including Emergency Detection & Classification,Knowledge & Performance of Duties

ML20058M873
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Saint Vrain
Issue date:	08/03/1990
From:	Powers D, Spitzberg D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20058M872	List: IR 05000267/1990013 ML20058M868
References
50-267-90-13, NUDOCS 9008130101
Download: ML20058M873 (6)

Text

- _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - .

Pid11 - . , .

,

.

' '

APPENDIX-

=c U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-267/90-13 Operating License: DPR-34

'

' Docket: 50-267

.

Licensee: Public Service Company ::f. Colorado (PSC)-

P.O. Box 840 Denver, Colorado 80201-0840 Facility Name: Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station (FSV)

~

,

Inspection At: Weld County, Platteville, Colorado Inspection Conducted: July 9-13, 1990

,- Inspector: . 'M Dr. O. B. Spitzb9fgf7Erq(rgency Preparedness 7-5/-@

Date Analyst, Security and' Emergency Preparedness

.

Section Approved- CLAAdt k3MO Dr. D. A. Powers, Chief, Security and Date Emergency Preparedness Section Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted July 9-13, 1990 (Report 50-267/90-13)

Areas Inspected: Unarnounced inspection of the emergency preparedness program including emergency dete-tion and classification, knowledge and performance of duties, and dose calculation and assessmen Results: Within the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identified. Two previous violations (267/8811-01; 267/9006-01) were effectively corrected and closed during the inspection. Both violations pertained to training inadequacies related to abilities of control room personnel to carry out the emergency . plan and implementing procedures. The

. performance of these personnel during walkthrough interviews improved since the-previous inspection, and it was determined that their capabilities in detectina, classifying, assessing emergencies, and performing other emergency plan-activ.ities were goo I 9008130101 900809 i PDR ADOCK 05000267-Q PDC

__

-

.

I [ t i

\"

( : '$ b

+.

fp

~

Vjn -2-

DETAILS

..

' Persons-Contacted

• C. H. Fuller, Manager, Nuclear Production and Stawlon Manager

-

• E. Deniston, Superintendent of Operation *D.'W -Evans, Manager, Operations / Maintenance

• F. J. Borst, Manager, Training and Support

• R. M1111 son, Senior Emergency Planning Specialist

• Block, Manager, System Engir aring

• J. M. Grambling,. Supervisor, N. lear Licensing, Operations

• N. E. Snyder, Fuel Deck Manager

• M. J. Ferris, Manager, Quality Assurance (QA) Operations

• M. J. Raymond, -Supervisor, Training

'

• K. J. Evans, Manager, 0perations Maintenance

• H. L. Brey, Manager,' Nuclear Licensing and Resource The inspector also held discussions with other station and corporate personnel in the areas of security, health physics, operations, training, and emergency respons * Denotes those present at the exit briefin Followup on Previously Identified Violations (92702)

(Closed) Violation (267/9006-01; 267/8529-01):_ Failure.to Provide Adequate Training to Emergency Responders. These violations were identified during walkthrough interviews of control room personnel assigned as emergency responders. The training inadequacies were in areas including emergency detection, classification, notification,- dose assessment, and knowledge of radiological emergency' response plan img,lementing procedures (RERPs). During this inspection, the inspector reviewed documentation of special retraining in emergency preparedness given to all control room emergency responders as committed to in the-license'e's response letter dated May 25, 1990. The inspector also serified the changes made in Radiological Emergency Response Plan Procedure RERP-DOSE "Offsite Dose Calculation Methodology" in order to prevent certain errors made during the interviews documented by NRC Inspection Report 50-267/90-06. Finally, during the current inspection, interviews of each of the control room shif ts were performed. Each team demonstrated adequate knowledge of the emergency plan and RERPs and was able to make accurate dose assessments from the control room. Specific questions and scenarios were presented to the teams which were related to problem areas noted in prior inspections. The teams _' responses were good and indicated no coritinuing training inadequacie (Closed) Unresolved Item (267/9006-01): NRC review of licensee plans to fill the vacant emergency planning coordinator's position. Thb inspector verified that effective loril 2, 1990, the senior technical service engineering technician who had been acting as the emergency planning m

2 m,,o;

,

'

',

'

, 3

'

coordinator was appointed to-the new position of senior emergency planning:

specialist. A review of this position's job description showed that the 6 . functions and responsibilities of this position 'are essentially equivalent

- to'.the former emergency planning coordinator's position which was delete . -Emergency Detection and Classification (82201).

.

The inspecto- reviewed licensee procedures, inspected instrumentation and operator aids in the control room, and discussed emergency detection 'and

-

classification with emergency responders to determine whether the licensee's emergency classification and action-level scheme met the -

- requirements of -10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and 10. CFR 50, Appendix E, Section I ,

a Procedure EP CLASS contains the licensee's emergency action levels (EAls)

and~ initiating events. The inspector reviewed this procedure and determined that it had not been changed since the last inspection and that '

it had been reviewed internally annually.- The EALs and initiating event i are generally consistent with the initiating conditions in Appendix 1 of i NUREG-0654. . Controlled copies of the emergency plan and implementing !

procedures and any changes to these documents have been sent to the ,

Colorado Division of Disaster Emergency Services, j Control room instrumentation and operator aids were noted to be present ,

which could .be used to rapidly detect and correlate initiating events with !

EALs outlined-in EP CLAS One^ instrument, however, was noted to read out ,

in units which could not'readily be used in generating manual dose 1 calculations. This issue is discussed in detail in paragraph l-0 The inspector reviewed the emergency response organization duty roster and '

s shift coverages and determined that an individual had been assigned to the site at all times who had the authority and responsibility to initiate emergency actions. The inspector discussed entry into the emergency classification procedures with responsible control room directors an ;

shift supervisors. Events detected-in the control room by means of- '

instrument or equipment alarms would be acted on by the operators entering ;

into an abnormal operating procedure. It was noted that the introduction l of the abnormal operating procedure manual directs the operator to EP' -!

CLASS for appropriate classification of abnormal conditions. - References to EP CLASS were not made, however, in the individual abnormal operating procederes, nor did the operator's actions specified for alarms in these procedures direct the operators to determine if the events met initiating a conditions for an emergency as outlined in EP CLAS No violations or deviations were noted in this program are , K_nowledge and Performance of Duties The inspector conducted a series of walkthrough interviews of teams of critical emergency response personnel to determine whether the basic level

_

{ \ ~

'

,

'

.

o

'

. , . , , ,

+ '

l M -

%. . . m. . , .-4- .

$lq ^

of training,, understanding of emergency prepa' redness,-'and their abilities ,

.to implement emergency actions were adequate to satisfy the requirements

".. of the emergency pla ,

The inspector interviewed five control room. teams. The' teams. consisted-o control room. shift personnel including a shift supervisor / emergency

-

director'and at least two reactor operators. The interviews were held in the control room.. Each interview lasted about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and consisted of_  ;

,

two' parts. One part presented questions of a technical nature pertaining *

to fundra.snt t knowledge of the emergency plan and implementing procedures:

that decisionmr.kers need to know in order to perform their-duties efficient' Some of the-questions were in areas where operators were fosnd to be W ak during'the last interviews _ performed. -(Reference NRC Inspection ~ Report 50-267/90-06). The other part of the' interview

. consisted of' presenting an accident scenario developed by the inspector, which was designed to prompt the-interviewees to detect, classify,-notify,

. perform dose assessments, and make protective action recommendations (PARS).

The-scenario was developed using the technical assistance of a licensee-  !

operations training instructo The scenario involved a seismic event  !

which toppled the refueling machine as it was loaded with spent fuel'and reflector blocks during a derueling operation. The machine broke open, )

spilling out fragments of broken spent fuel. An. operator-was injured-and - '

pinned under debris 'near the toppled refueling machine. The seismic event l also caused atloss of the data logger capabilities. Control room

. indications' for operators to act on included a.. seismic alarm, area l I

radiation monitor alarms from Level- 11 (refueling floor), and operato I messages to:the control roo Later,' a. release of radioactive material took place out of the ventilation stack as indicated by high-level alarms and activity release rates on the iodine and noble gas vont monitors. The source term used was similar to~ values used in a scenario developed by the L licensee and drilled during 1989. Necessary monitor values, ventilation L flowrates, and meteorological conditions were given to the interviewees as  !'

l requested to'use as input parameters for. dose assessment purposes.

"

Overall the teams responded well to the interview questions and ,

demonstrated a sound understanding of the emergency pla In responding

!. to the scenario, the teams arrived at the proper classification and made-li prompt and accurate notifications to offsite authoritie Information h flow was good and the teams were able'to capably act on the contaminated

>

and injured operator scenario by promptly entering the medical emergency >

procedure. The teams were found to be proficient in using the manual dose

!.' assessment procedure and made proper protective action recommendations l ' based upon the information availabl '

'No violations or deviations were identified .n this program are l

!

u I:

W

'

.

_ _ _ . . _ . .

at u

,7 , ,

~

,, ..

'

g "

4,, . Dose Calculation and Assessment (82207)

The-inspector reviewed dose assessment procedures, computer based dose assessment systems used during emergencies, and interviewed emergency dose s - assessors to determine that adequate methods were available for assessing the c'onsequences of radiological release The Dose Assessment Procedure RERP DOSE had been changed since the previous inspection conducted February 26 through March 2,1990, .in order:

to: improve the . ease at which users wo.uld be able to complete the procedure. The inspector reviewed these changes,and found that errors made during the previous inspection's walkthroughs would be less likely to occur'as a result of the changes. During the walkthroughs performed -

ouring this-inspection as docum9nted in paragraph 4, a manual-dose assessment task was incorporated into the scenario to retest the dose assessor's capabilities in this area. All teams were proficient at

'

. manually calculating accurate offsite doses. The procedure remains slow to complete, however, and may require the user to spend time generating results which are not needed in order to classify a release and make early

. protective action recommendation The review-of Procedure RERP DOSE identified a unit inconsistency with control room instrumentation that could result in confusion or errors in performing manual dose assessment The inconsistency relates to the procedural need for delta temperature from 60 meters to 10 meters in degrees Fahrenheit. The control room instrument, however, which indicates delta temperature, reads'out only in degrees Celsius. The absence of a conversion factor in the procedure caused unnecessary delays during the walkthroughs. During the exit meeting,'the' licensee acknowledged this problem and committed to change the procedure to include the necessary unit conversio The inspector reviewed protective action. recommendation procedures and determined that the protective action recommendations determined through the dose assessment procedures were consistent with those specified in RERP PAR and NUREG-065 The licensee's dose assessment model-is the.same for both the data logger and the manual calculation procedure and is based upon the Gaussian-Pasquil atmospheric dispersion models in general use.in the industry. The model was found to have the capability to incorporate field measurements into the assessments. The inspector called representatives with the state of Colorado Division of Disaster Services and was infonned that the dose assessment model used by the state is of the same type as the licensee's and has yielded results which are in agreement with the licensee's during exercises. Differences between the state and licensee dose assessment models are primarily in the number of atmospheric stability classes and options for release height parameter No violations or deviations were identified in this program are l l

f

. . . . . . - - - - . . .

_ _

_____ .

_ . _ . . . . _ _ . . . .

2l'i'l_,

.

.

' '

, 6-

. 6 .' Exit Interview

'

.The inspector met with licensee representativesLdenoted inLparagraph 1 on:

July 13, 1990, and summarized the scope'and findings of the inspection as presented in this report. Th9 licensee did not identify as proprietary

-

any.of the' material provided to, or reviewed by,'the inspector during the inspectio e t

4